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!Dhe basio pixrpose' of this study is to pi'osent %'hat 
conclusions may be draim from the practice of the United. 
I^ations in relation to the principle of non-intei'vention 
in matters essentially \vithin the domestic jurisdiction of 
states under Article 2(7) of the Oh&rter, the text of v/hich 
is as follows:
nothing contained in the present Charter shall 
authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters 
which are essentially Vid.thin the domestic jurisdict­
ion of any state or sliall reauire the Members to 
submit such matters to settlement under the present 
Charter: but this principle shall not prejudice the 
application of enforcement measures under Chaptei" VÎI.
In the light of the discussions at the San Francisco 
Conference in 1945, it v;as the evident intention of those 
who drafted Article 2(7) that organs should not interfere
iX! any v/ay in matters traditionally regarded within the 
domestic jurisdiction of states, the only exception to this 
general principle being the competence of the Security 
Council to authorise enforcement measures to maintain or 
restore international peace and security if it determined 
that a situation arising out of a matter essentially within 
the domestic jurisdiction of a state constituted a threat 
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.
This study, having placed the eubjeot in historical 
perspective, examines how far oz'gans have observed or
departed fz'om this interpretation of Article 2(7) in human 
rights and colonial g^uestions, peacekeeping operations, the 
regulation and reduction of national ari'iæients, and economic 
and social {questions, and assesses the impact of their 
deoisione on the development of the Organ!siation.
The general conclusion is reached that whilst it is 
judicious that the organs of the United lîations should refrain 
froia interfering in the affairs of states not covered by 
precise international legal obligations, it is desirable 
that Ü1I members should consent to a greater diminution of 
their domestic jurisdiction in favour of such obligations, 
in order to make international co-operation more effective 
in the security, political, economic and social fields.
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JSoTwe the nttoopt ic tiatle to annlyao the prl'noiple of 
non-intcrvo::^tioz% l%'"'zatt*3ra GDRontlsZly within the dos^eetic 
jurliadiotloA of stotoB under Article 2(7) of the Ch&rtcr of 
tho United Nation^), end to oeseeo the eigniflcezico of ito 
interpretation and - explication by United iJ&tlons organe, .It 
l6 .propOGOd to plaoo.the ouhjeet in hletorloal- poropectlve 
by examlninc varlouo .davelopmonto in international relatione, 
cf relevance to It, froa^  the Goniirewe .of Vienne, in 1815 to - 
the period of the. league of llatlons eztpcrin^ ent.
The Ocnr:T03G Svotem
The -aoln also of the Allied great powers the t effeetea 
the ovorthi'C;'; of Itùpoleon - Austria, hrltaln, Iruesla and 
Russia - wore to prevent a rcourgenoe of French aggression, 
Tûtbout depriving franco of great power status, end te ^
.oreate an eçuillbrlûm of power to ensure the stability of. 
Su3"ope. Various territorial adjuetuionto were agreed upon 
to fioniove theae .objeotlveo,. which were flnallQoa, with 
Aronoh ocncurrenoG, under tlie freaty of Vienna In Juno 1815#
The gonez'ol Interz^atlonal background w,bloh obtained 
for alnio^t forty yearc after the Itapolecnic vfare was ehaped 
by the Vienna eettlez^ont, rz'-aat power agreet^ent on tne 
holding of periodic conrrcGyee, In nooordanoe with, the 
Treaty of Ohauinont vhiich had heen concluded in farcb 1814, 
to consider the affairs of furope oe a whole and to oeel 
with iooueo that afght dlaturb the peace, go.ve rise to the 
congreüslonel forti o.f International government - the first 
experlE:ent of its kind in the hietcry of moder,: furope. (1)
:':hù Oongrcüo system, Y/hick franco joined, en tormü of 
oqüsllty at the Oongross cf Alà-la-OZxipelle Iz': 1618, thus 
oajûe.lnto bolng to protect the public law of I:u%'opo,(2) 
with the exception of .the furklch empire#(3) hut co deter- 
nlncd woi'c the Continental e.utooraoieo - Auz^trla, Ruesla  ^
and lTU3o:la - to preoerve the i3!cn'2%'ù3ûoal system in Nurcpean 
ota.ucog In accordance %'ith their holy Alliance wMoh they 
cigned in 1815, that they considered it legitimate -co use 
the Congrose syotem oe an Instrument for authorising inter- 
vczitioa In the domestic of those otatoe whoeo con-_
stltutlcnal devolopRent dicplecmad them.
i'G thie doctrine, Oaotlereogh, the frit ioh foreign 
1 ec.retcry, w;.:o eTroiigly o p c o A n x i o u e  to molntoin the 
territorial BC-ttlemento ci' the po%ce treaties, he inrgloted 
that the forLÙ of governaczit v-lLhln a state was 8 matter . 
within its domectic jurisdiction, outoldc the InternR.tiencl 
jurl:;::diotlGn of the Oongreoa aysten. * In this Alllanoo. ae 
in all ether humFin .Arrangements, nothing io noz'c likely to 
.impair oz* cTen destroy, its, real .utility, .than any attempt 
to push ite duties and obll one beyond the sphere which 
Its cri » Conception emu. undorstoed brinc.iplea .will 
%-arz'Bnt,* he declared In a otato paper, of .5 1820# . *%t
wat: an union for the Noeon:iu^ ^^ t and llbez'stlon o.f a great 
proportion of the Continent of Vurcpo from the lûlltary 
Dozninlon of F.rance, end îiaving eubcued the Conqueror it 
took the State cf fosGcaaicn ao cotabliahod ty the Peaoo 
under tbe.frotcotlon of the Alllanoe; - It never was however 
Intended: as an Union foz.' the Government of the World, or foi* 
tho ..'UperlxAtendenoo of the Inbez'nal Affairs of other Stvtee#*(4)
Such wa.;:; OaBtlerosgh's response to the fBer'o call for a 
congreos to bo Guziiinonec) for the purpose of approving con­
certed Intervmticz* in bpain to put m: end to the liberal 
oonatltution which haâ limited the po'wer-of the king 
through a revolution early in 1G20. Ho ooziolderod that 
the Gongrose aystoB ehould he used to authorise the joint 
intcrvtmtion of tim ?owere only If a nr,ntc thres-tened to 
undei%lne or destroy the territorial integrity and Independ­
ence. odT cu3C)tf%c%r.
2%iough' metternioh, the Auotrian Chn^zoellor, * wanted to 
maintain nil"oetabllGhed governmentc and-.existing Institut-' 
ione because he believed that a defeat of authority in aziy 
state could lead to e coll apse of order throughout lurcpe\(5} 
he joined Co.etloreAgh on ttiic occaolcn in opposing the fsnr'o 
eppeal for a congz'eos ainoe he waa wary of t?ie dealre
to send forces to the aid cf the 6panioh Boyalinto and to 
.eecuro the eotabliohmoYit of a kucBlan .fleet in the A:editezT- 
anean. but he agreed to a when revolutions hnd
ectabllohod do/.coi^atio conatltutlcna in Portugal, I'icdzionU 
and Naples, and at.the Congreaa of froppau in October 16PO, 
tc\\hiob DritPiln. oont .an ohDcrve.]r. but not a plenipotentiary, 
he concurred in a protocol inspired., by the Tsar, ..an.d -ljecued . . 
by Nuaoia, Austria.and iruoola, which aeolared their intention 
to izitervene by fcz'cc, if nocec.oary, to suppi'esG revolutlonary 
covemente in ntatea in v.diich the outhority of mona.rc.hs 
threatened#
Oastlerea.gl: attacked thin pclley iZt a oii'oular publicaod 
in January lEül before the Continezztal lowere ïsct again at
the vongreae of ho oooeedod the right of inter­
vention by a a:tbte or states w^h-gro their own 
oeourit^', or esuentlal interests, ere seriously encengored. 
by the Internal trans^acticns of another itate*, but . 
empbaslseu that Its eppliontion ohoulc alivuye be an except­
ion to the general rule of Yicn-intervestlon eiooe It could 
be juatiflea only by e^trezie necessity*(6) Tor the moat 
pa%"t, thea, Gagïtleroagh believed that if the Oongrees wyeteizi 
Yfas to ?3Ucoeed, it- was Imporatlve that it should combine its 
'regulative functlono to those fields Y^here the extornsl 
policies of states impinged upon the territorial.Integrity 
end independence of other Eïtotee# l(e thuo called for a 
policy of ervobt 1 on In matt ore within tho domestic ..
jurl edict ion of otates in opposition to tho Gon t:inon;:f>l 
Fovfero, It v/eo a policy which neither, aimed to facilitate 
2:'0litlcal qr oeciîil obecgoB, nor to arrest such ohangee, 
but one dosigised to ensure the. sjeintenance of tho .territorial 
status quo In the Interact of the general peaoe ond. seouzlty 
of burope,(7) It was rejectea by the other gi'eo.t powero,
mettornich was BUthorlsea at the Congreee of laibsch In 
January 1621, deoplte /Jritlsh protests, to rù-oetabllü;!. 
obsolutiot regimce In Nailes end riodmont, cmd in Kmroh of 
the eome year .Anotrion fcrooe .iFOved into Italy to oafoi'ce 
thlz;i poliqif#
fbougb Gastlereagh refused to anecciat-e Irlta.lri with 
the docls: of the Ooz3.{a?eee of lalbsch, ho ia.yaehea agree-
mezft- with ketternich at the end of 1821 to snrntion a oon.r.:reGa 
Y:lth too %im cf preventing Alexander of A.uosia. tro.m 
vening .in the .Im^klsh esqzirc to aeeist the national rovc.lt
of the ^rsGk ahrictlmB. Zo Aettornleh the application of 
the pzûnoivle of non-intervention in this Insjtanoe was 
justified bGoeusc it msant GUp%;.'Ortlng the oauDo of legit- 
inote authoilty and order Bgainot s revolutionai'j raovement; 
to Oastlerecgh ouch a policy was cozisistent with hie doctrine 
that the Gongreoo oysteza should not be used to eut ho rise 
intervention in lasttero of domeetlc jurlsdlotlon mainly 
teoauoj of M o  fofjr of *@11 the deetructive confueièn and 
ciGOUosiom which eu oh an atteiagt may lead to not only in 
Turkey but in hurope *, where it * must... #_basard.... the 
fortune onddsetlny of that (of Intemotloncl relations)
to the conaoTV&tion of which our Isteot ooleim trfmsaotlone 
with our allies have bound to uu*. (8) :ut before the 
.congress met at Verona In 1622, Gao tier eagb wao deed and had. 
been replaced by Canning.
At the- Ccn/^coc of Verona the question of Spain tooZf 
%)rooedoz3Ce over the Greek affair aince^Aetternich was able 
to convince the Tam' Alez-nndm' at the outset of the ccngrees 
prcoeedingo that the Greek 'rising against the lurlm was 
'outsldo the rontrlcted sphere cvez" wbloh the Quadruple 
AllDsnoe plojod the part of i'rovidenoe%(9) The attention, 
of the oongz^ecB t/iYo thuo fooused on the Trench request to 
obtain the support of the other great powers to restore 
order In Spain, where olvll war had broken cut between the 
Royeliste and the oonstitutlonclletu, and to re-ostablish 
the.Spm)ish kizzg as an absolute rulor, hotwithatandin/j: the 
proteatc of Gelliniirtcn, the British repreaentltive, thr-: 
Contineatal ; t powere gave ?renoe morel support,
and iz] 1825 the latter invaded û^ain, abclished Ita liberal
6oonstiûutloDw and,restcyoù the abcolutlat status cf the 
king.
0Riming defined the' British position In r:uoh the oamc 
teriim as Caeslerezzgh had cone. *Intinetoly oounectod as v;o 
are with , the syste;:: of Auropo,* he otatod, *it doen not 
follow that we are therefore called upon to M z  cursolves 
on every oocaalozz# with a izestlcBB end. îAeêdllng activity, in 
the conoor^su cf the nations whlcli om'iTunc uu#*(10) The 
only justification for a policy of intervention i%i the 
laternal nffalrs of other otatec, he oonacnded, vmo *tbat 
oar interest8 ohould .have been, in .Gome way or ..other,
.affected by' their condition, or by their proôoediz;g8*,(ll) 
end hlo antipathy to eny further Arltloh Invclvemont izi ?he 
Congress eycteo wB.a that in 1824 he declined to cenO
reuroGcntatlveo to ccngz'onceB'eummcned to deal with the 
Greek revolt against lurliey and Spain* G in our gent S.onth 
.A^erlcmz colonlce. Instead# without ccneultlng the other 
power*>, .ho ea?? to it that Srltaiyz accorded belligerent 
0 ta tu 8 to the Greek rebels, which involved a do poz" tare from 
OastleroA.gh'c. policy cf non-interventlcn in msttors within 
the dozT'.eatic juriadictlcn of ZurkezA^ reoofhiood the 
indepenqonce of apain*o revolted oolonlee in llr^ o with the 
Zuonroe doeti'inc th&t Aricrian, wquld not tolorstc the Intez^- 
ventiozi of BtatoL: in the affaire of the American
oontlzjont, 0mining thn& hastened the ooll&pcc of the 
CongreoG. eyete. oj envisaged under tbs Treaty of ChaurAont, 
though Its disintegration stemmed not only fro% his Independ­
ent notion, but also from disagreement among the four Contin­
ental powers whose meeting at Peterobnrg Iz; 1625 broke up o:z 
account of dleseimlon over the question of the Greek rovoi'::
Turkey#(12) \
This re'vlow of the Co r;s indien,too that *lf
oil the Towei'o bogon by agrooing that e new intornationol 
. syston was noeoed In Europe they brought difforozit eoneept- 
ions of Intm'Tzaticmol organlGatlon - and, evon, different 
oonoeptionB of Burcpo - to the took of roco?:6truction# It 
.woe on the rocks..of thegso dlfferencofz as to the and
limite cf an international oystem that the Couzreso 
foimdered*, (15} In.cthmz words. Its failure ofme about 
becauE^ or gro^t po%vor cloagi'comont over the meaoure cf 
Internatl-CDel juâûüdleticn which .the Ccngrees sycteB! ehould 
poaoeos, and the purpose for y/hloli it should be. used, for It 
oould not pooaibly function effcotively cc long &e the great 
.powei'B %Y03'e at %'arlenee ever the piûnclule o.f noz)-lntorvmtion 
in matters o: demeetic. jhrlo<aotle-i9# Jjzdeod, thig^  is a 
.mikstm* ivhlüh 1$ w l #  to t ' Ih .I;"*# v&en we
to $h# wo:'h cf the lea/me of .
i':atloDc and irzited Nations Byetems, W t  at this juncture let 
i;c cz'-'nlno the role which "waEi. assigned to t3ie. Concert cf 
iBurope tziat functioned salnly through ad hqc oonferencoc 
after the colli of the Congroee nyote:;:#
AUG Concert..of Euro3)0 after the Co].la'oee of the
It is üigjZiifloKnt tliat * the falluz^e of the OongresG 
oyo.tem zBarked not the end but the- beginning ef an oge of 
ocllaboratlon between the Great lowers beoauec they then fell 
back on the Oongrcoe system ao it had beon interpreted by 
Castiereaph*g(14) the essence cf which was *the notion of a 
body cf rp.'eat powez.'G alwayo ready to defend the ectsbllohcd. 
balance of power by .coE^ blning e..rainGt any Æ^ tate wclch was
dot'enslÀcd "to ' disturb. wke existing tezTitoz'lnl. order* # (15)
In Tjractice meant that aa far as poesible the great 
powers attc::y*,ea to maintain the atntue quo, and that who.-;- 
evei' any te:rritorial changes took :>laoe they had to he final­
ised In acoordanee with tzie principle of *no annexation 
without ratification*.(16) It also meant that the gi'Oàt 
powers on the whole observed the principle of non-intervention 
in mattorc ' jthin the doneetio juricdiction of ctatee, w M o h  
had been wO strongly advocated by Ua,stleroo.g3j# Certainly, 
during tho revolutions of 1850 and 1846 the Concert of 
furope was not used as an instrument to supproso or assist 
revolutionary movements in vs^rious states, and the extent to 
'Which some of the great poiYors intervoned unilaterally did 
not upset the general kuz'opean balance cf power.
It v;aG kiioaia's unwillingziees to I'eopeot the priz.iciple 
of . non-in t er vent ion in mutters wltliln the domestic jui'isdiot- 
Ion of ..fui'key, .which other great powers considered woule 
adversely affect the Luropoan balance of power, that brought 
about the Oza. \ _* %'ar In 1854# Though ;lritaizz and f3''anco had 
joined huQsia to help the insurgent Greeks by deoti'oying ASho 
furkish fleet at Navsrinc in 1627, and forced the bultmi to 
UGOopt the independence of GrGeoe,(17) they were not prepared 
to permit unilateral Russian interventicz: in the felkone. 
uoveral dlplomatio efforts v/cre made to induce the Isfiir to 
abandon his olalm that Russia ho.d the sole right to protect 
Turkey*8 Chi'lstian subjects, and brltaiz) end franco declared 
war. in IJaroh^  1854, * after Austi'ia and Russia had joined 
them in a further cenfereizce vhich iasuod a further protoccl 
to v;ern the Tsar that Rurope would be against bin if .he 
failed in hie prcmiscB to respect Tu:'key*s Integrity/ and
üdo nothing to weaken the Sultan*c authority bio
Christian subject»*«(18)
Though undo:; the Treaty of lario (1656) the oonoert of 
major Ruropoan powezzu expreosou tnolr concoza: about the 
future trect&ont of the Sult&n's Gzirlstio.n aubjects in t W  
halkanü. It rooognlsed Turkey as a oompletcl^/ oevoreign 
state Yûthln the ooMty of European and/cade the
Gultfm ret^ponslcle for their welfare, and it was lala down . 
that there oheuld he no unllaterBl or colleotlvo Intorvent- 
Icn In Turkey*G domoctio jm'lsdletlcn. In effect, therefore, 
the powers of the Concert of Curope simply oontented them- 
eelvea vûth a moral appeal be the ocneolenee of the Sultazz, 
for *tho Independenoe of lurkey wao affirmed: no lower had 
the right to interfmze between the Sultan And ale subjectst 
the privilegoa of Ncldr^via, kollaoiilD. were .guaranteed, 'zut 
olwayc under t):;c GUBeralnty of Turkey : " the generous 
Intentions" of the Sulton tcwords hia subjects "V/ithout 
dietInotlex: of religion or of race" were reoc-iTiood, ae was 
the "high value" of the propoosle he had made In a. rocenr 
Clearly, the signatories of the Treaty of 
laris intended that there should be no dictatorial Interfer- 
enoe to force furke^r to observe her prorjiise^  to carry out 
reforniB to .Improve the condition of her Ghrietian GUbjeocB#
fiiat the prlnoi.ple of non-intezzvontion ohould apply to, 
furkey'o treat%ent of her Jhriotlen eubjeoto was strongly 
challenged by OlE^dstone dm*l2ig the Bulgarian atrocity 
agitation in 1676, when he urged that the Concert of Europe, 
which had played no %;art in datez'ainlng the questions of 
German and It.alien unification, ehould autnoz'ieo collective 
m.eaaurea to cnforee humanitarian refor^nc on furkoy and the
1 0
granting of self-govemment to Chrictisn cincrlties under 
bez' diroot rule in the Balkans. Tven though ho argued that 
furke^/ should T/OSGoss eovez eighty ' over the oelf-
governing terrltorloa which he desired to see establiohed,
In order to exclude foreign powers from then, v/bat he urged - 
required diotatorisl lntcz'ference In Turklqh sffairo because 
it meant that the Sultan v;ould be requirj^^ to delegate power 
to the oppressed pooploo to enable them to operate oystems of 
eelf-goreznmbnt# Gladstone's, viev;, the Concert of Europe . 
was * an important faotor in the advance of civilisation# Ite 
functions in this respect wez'e to enforce international law, 
to preserve European peace and to relieve oppressed peoples# 
.Chile the first two carried the emphaâis In.hiB thcught 
during .the eighteen fifties, and sixties, the lout one gained 
prcdomlnanco in the late seyentleu* #(2<;) Nut in view of the 
rival azabitions among the gre&t po?;ers, the possibility of 
obtaining agreement tc operate the Oonoort of .^-ui'ope wmon 
Gladstoiie advocated %'jas remote#
Ruosia had urged the concertod intervention of the groat 
ï)Owers shortly after the outbreak of the: revolt of ;osnia anc . 
heroegovlna ï%2 1875, but thou# Austria and frusoia joined- 
Russia in threatezûng sanctions against Turkey ifeno oid not 
carry cut reforms, fiaraeii, ouD%)icicus of .lueeion désigna in 
the. hear N-aot, rejected such a policy# It is. true that nor-i 
Salisbury attempted with the repreocntatlvea o.f the other 
powers at Constantinople and.londcn, early in 1877, to incuce 
Turkey to undertake a progz'anne of reforms undoi' international 
GU^;ervl8lon, but tho powers of the Concert lacked the unity "cc 
agree on eizf or cement mecBUrea, Indeed, the Berlin ücngresa o* 
.1676, which effected a eottlemont of the Taetorn cueotion
I I
after RuoBia'a imllatoral intervention in in 1877$
'sacrificed the national eapiratlone of all '1:on pecplea 
to the avarice end rivMrics of the great powers', (21) and 
though the arrengoments which Turkey wo-o obligod to aooo%)t 
deprivod her of half her territory, the Gulten'o promieee 
to introcuoe re.foi^ mo In what remained of his Balkan empire 
at ill depended on hia readlneso to oo-opÊ^rete. Thus little 
was done at the Congreoo of Berlin by the Concert of Tk^rope 
to oatiafy Gladstone'e dciiiond to obtain juotioe foi' the 
oppreeeed national grcupo in the anl^cann, and .durln^ .:; hie 
Oeoond ministry (1880-35), 'when he faced Rlemarok in 
European polltioo, it became olcar to him that it wee no 
long^er poeelble to eetablleb a dlulooatlo oonoert of : the 
princlpM powex'c# .rhough ho alv/gyo hoped one day to oeo the 
(Pi'oat epTzerc brought together for humanit&rian ends, in these 
y oars he rarely advcoatod hlo idea of the %{:uropean Ooncei"t'#{22)
. jester in thlc ct.udy it will ize interesting to ccnaider 
boYz far one's oonoopt of the Concert of T^uz-ope as an
instrument i w  intervening In t W  domeetlc jurladlotion of 
atat%38, to ey;able oppreoaed pcoplcz) to secure baaio human 
rights, e c < with the theory ezzd pi'actioc of the league 
of No,tioi:e and United Nations Bystems. But at this 
before le-av:i.ng the nineteenth century, mention laust be made 
of 4^ crd belisbnry'o actompt to revlA^e the Concert of Yiluropo ; 
in the late 1890's, when Europe had become divided Into two 
rival cz^ mpo - the Triple Alliozioc of Gorann;,:, Austrie-Rungnry . 
and Ital^ /, and the Dual Alliance of Branoo and Russia - and 
European atatos were in danger of colliaiozi as they cnobonded 
their juriediction over tcrritorlos in Asia end Africa ag
InperlollGu powers#
Though Baliobury had beez: very crltioal of the Concert 
of Europe both bofore and after the Ucngrcos oi kGrliz] Ic 
167$, In 1607 he advocated its ro^ /^lvol becauoc he was con­
cerned about the arse race and the growing tonolon in Europe, 
In brief, he believed It should be used to maintain the 
territorial arrangements laid down In the treaties concluded 
by the groat powers, Including those that gusi'antesd the 
territorial integrity and Indopeyzdenoe of the Ottom-'an cmplro, 
notwlthotoi'ïdlng the further disrepute which it had acquired 
tin/cugh the Armezilon atrocities of 1894-5)6* That the Oonoez't 
skeulc bo used for the collective intervontion of the pows3L's 
in the domoetic jurisdiction of t>tateo, for the iiumanltoz'ian 
pur%3csas whlc7a Gladstone had advocated in the eighteen 
sovcnties, formed no part of hie concept, But It should be 
noted that haliabury wozit further than bo suggest a revival 
of the fcncert of liurope which rested on i3o formal instrument 
aznd who^e proceedings wez'o not regulated by ccnstltutlGnal 
obllgnticno, 'The cnc hops we have,* he stated in hovenbor 
1697» *l3 that the lowero nsy gradually be brought together, 
to act togothsr in a friendly spirit on all questions of 
difference Y^ hioli oey srlee, until at laet they shell Ixz 
weldod in so^e interziotionrl conoTitution which shell give 
to the vzçrld, as a result of thoir gre;..:t strength., a long 
spell of unfettered and prosperous trade and. oor^tinued
peace*,(P5)
It can ihue. be aeon that Salisbury, like Oaetlercagh, 
was *ncro intorontad in peace tzian in juotlco* Gut Gladstone
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moved by the suffering of cppreseed peoples and Inspired by 
the Ideas cf natlcnulity mid ca^ lf-gcvei'nmcn.t, etro^^e for 
juütioe# üeetlereagh, who oonotinee expressed what might 
be cnlloü an crgenic conception of the cengreGO systoia, and 
Ealiabmq,', who in 1897 ho^^ed that the T:imTopcc.n ooncez'k would 
lead to soar oort of international oonctitnticn, countenanced 
orgmiication of the acciety of atateo* fut Gladstone, 
a c v o c a t lo g  r e fo r m  and r e o r g a n i s a t io n  i n  T u r k e y ,  c o n c e n t r a te d  
on clvillsaticn of barbaric governiizienta, Oestlezzeagh, v;ho 
identifieu hinself with tho territorial ari'angemonts of the 
Vienna Ccngrees. and àoiiBbnry, v/ho defended the work of the 
i^erlinfJcnigreso, based, their vlewo on a positive lav^  of 
treaties, hut Gladfztone rested hie Ideae on a natural law 
cf rights*.(94)
Juoh \;ere the ideas that induced Oaotlereagh
dallobury to consider it necoosary'to'advocate - a policy of
non-intervention in ciat'tero within the dcneetlc juriodlotlcn
#
of states, and why Gladstone felt that the principle cf non- 
intci'ven^ion in euch zaatters should not stand in the way cf 
the Concezzt of Europe to advance the cause of liuinan righto 
and aoolM justice; and how far ttieoc concepts of internatlonExl 
crganiszvtion iicfluenood the aroliitecvo of tho league of 
Nations will be reforroo to pros ont ly. But, as further back;- 
ground to a study of such oueotiozie, mention cuot nor: be 
nade of the Hague Confer once of 1899 which ehowed the rol— 
uotanoc of sovereign states to surrender mattoro of ccmestlo 
jurisdiction to the ccnwzzcl cf an intornationel bcdy,
Ket; only did. the licqtie Confcroaco fail to produce .izn
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agreement en the. limitation of national a.r%amentc — It 
noz'ely stated that a reduction of military budgets was 
oxtramoiy üeairablo for the material and moral wclfsi'e of 
mankind - buu the jurladlotien cf the Court of Arbitz'atlon 
Yznron it 03:v up was serioucil^ r limited by 'the fact that no 
state DOUBG itself to report to the Court: that no state 
could get assistance in bringing an unwilling state.to 
aroitration: zmd that disputes involving the honour m:d 
Vital IntercGuE? of a state wez'e expressly exempted fz'^ozi the 
Court's jurlsdlctlcn'*(25) ".ach state t^ jUc .roaeinod the 
cole judge of whotbor it would submit to the Court disputes 
%YZtn other states, .which ehG\"Gd t W t  ctatec were unprepared 
to surronoer a sufficient -Cieasure of thoir sovereignty to 
give uZi9 UGurt tho necessary; ccmpovenoe to boconie an effect­
ive urolvrcl OGdy,. Indeed, not until the world ho.(l endured 
the ageny of the Great bar was the atteizipt made to establish 
tne league of Nations whose priî:ary aim was the aettle-
ment of mternaticnsl disputes which might endanger pe^ s^ ce end 
seom'ity#
.qid the frinclole r C ( n—Intervention
.If., r.'cucr» G z ^ i m ? i r w ; ? n g : 5 f [ F r ~  — — — —
. To 80^0 extent the Covenant of the league of «atlons 
had zmim features whloh were Inherent In Gladstone's concept . 
cf the Concert of fuz*ope as on izistrument for the p^romotlcgi 
of social juatlco# Thus Article 22 of the Covenant, which 
dealt with the nandatos oystem, proclaimed that vhe well 
being and dcvelopsiezit of pooples not yet able zzc govern them­
selves ohouid form a 'sacred trust cf civilisation* - 
much a Glauatozilan phrace - and the Oouneil of the league (2G)
was given sugertûoory powers over the adminiotrativo acts of 
the manJxùüz'y powers#(2?) The Oouncli wae also asked to 
concern Itself with minorities of langiuzge or religion
who were assured protccticn by the leayuo under the peoeo 
.troetiea# But *in each cae.e tlie league could, izi preotioe, 
do little more than exert a jnoral pressure, relying on the 
unwilllngzioso cf govcromeo.ts to be held up, in the Ooimoll 
or the Assembly , (28) as having failed to cun')' out tholr ' 
treaty oblig;8ticn3*#(29) Ncreover, although the Covenant 
rec0fp.iiced the need for peaceful change t'iirough the I'evision 
of treaties, all the Aooanbly could do under Article I9 of 
the Oovannnt waa 'to advise the reconsideration by.members 
of the .veagiue of treaties which became inapplicable*, and 
::ot even this'Wao attempt el 'baoauoe of the aGcezidazicy of 
brenck policies tGwardz; lezra.ony when the letter's oo- 
operation might have been achieved*,(30)
fho faeb 'waa that the Covenant of the l,ea.gue was mere 
in tune _ the concept'', of Caatlaz'eagh.and Ealiabury tlum 
that of 'dladatone, for the mninton.ance of peace througb the 
preservation oB' the status quo was more important to its 
arcliiteoto than the provision of effective moane to remove 
injustices through imperfections izi the peace troaties*
Above all, as laid do?^ *n in ATticlc 10 of the Covenant, the 
heuguo was designed to rnrotect the tez'Titcz'lal integrity nzid 
exiatin.g polltlo.ol indo%:endenoe of its mombez's In aoccrdanco 
with the ^vrinciplc of collective security, and it was kdao 
made clear in the Covenant th.as she or^cnnlsstion was not 
intended lo Interfere dictatcriall^; in natters witlzin the 
domestic jmvLsdietion of Gt.ates - the scope of which will bs
e x a m in e d  p r e s e n t l y  -  e v e n  th o u g h  c u c h  m a t t o r a ,  eg# a  s t a t e ' s  
immigration poll03:,(31) nighs give rise to international 
dloputee,
lïr order to understE.md the pi'inclplo of noi:-in ter vent ion 
In matters of dcmeatlo jori-sdiotlon unde;' the .ueaguo of 
N&ticnG ByoteX:, It ie neoesasTy to exanlize the proood: 
laid down in Its Oovenant for the paoiflo ssttlooent ef 
International disputoe and the onforoomcmt of peaee, Article / 
12 of tlie Coven.mt stated that if thore ohoi^ld erlso any 
dieputo botwGon momboro cf the li3;el\r to loed to a
rupture, they would be required to eubmit the nattcf^ic^erb- 
Itration or gi^dlolnl settlement, or to inquiry ])y the Oouncil, 
end they ngroed in no caoo to resort to war until throe 
monthn after the award by the orbitz'otore, or the judicial 
d o o io io n ,  o r  t h e  r e p o r t :  b y  t h e  O o u n o i l ,  w h ic h  h a d  t o  b e  
pi'osonteu within six months afteiq the oubmlooioz3- of the 
dispute# Zhuo the most difficult disputée had, finally, tc 
be brought before the Council, for if the disputimts had 
failed to wettle a dispute through diplomatic negotiations, 
or had not aubziitted it to arhitratlon or judicial processes 
imder Article 13 of the Covenant, they were required to 
submit the nattor to the Council under Az'ticle 15# If, then, 
the LCambers of trie Council, votinfi without the parties to the 
dieputo, succeeded in z'caohing a unanimous z-e^ Dort on the .case, 
3.30 laonber ef the leiume waa %)ornitted to qzo to wa%' with 
%3arty tTait coaTzlied with the Z'ecomr:ondationa of the report* 
hut if the Council 3:%embero failed to produce .a mianiuous 
z'eport, tbio condition no longer applied* Ztiven then, hoaever, 
a party to a diopute would :oe guilty of brasking the Covenant
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if it resorted to war beforo threo nontho had clapaod after 
the rsTicrt liad bocn published, and aanoticna under Article 
16  c o u ld  ' a p p 3 d .o d # (3 2 )
In view of the fact that 'before the Covenant v.-as 
oigned every nation had still an unllm.itec right cf private 
war, except in so far ea this had been curtailed by a oertMn ' 
nc::ber of arbitz'al devoid of international o&action*»
(33) otatos oignator^^ to the Govensnt thus aqp'ced to accept 
olgnifliaat reetrlotlons on their right to make private  ^
_:;ut it should be reallaod that no. euoh restrlotlono applied 
if the Counqil found that a state's claim that a
dispute i?.i zieh it was involved arose out of a matter within 
its doneotlo jurisdiction, such a Eatatc'a Immigration 
pclicioG* A;.kis was laid down in paragraph G of Article 15 
of the Covenant, the text of which ..was os .follows:
'If the dispute, bev7:een the parties is claimed by. cne of 
.them, end ia found by the Gonnoil, to arise out of a natter 
Ydilch by International law is solely/rltMo . the domestic 
jurisdiction of that paz'ty, the Oounoll shall E;o report, 
ai3d ohall make no rear L.andatiqhs as to its settl.^m at*,
As iir Alfred zl'/'01,1 pointed out, the inclusion of 
Article 1 5 (G ) la the Oovenant meezit. that *nc sanction what­
soever was provided for a war arloing out of ouoh a dlsputo, 
sin00 the sanotiono of Article XVI apply only tc breeches of 
XII, XIII fmd XV*#(34) And It was Zlomern's view that, 'thio 
paragraph, in fact, if pushed to ito logical limit, endangoz'e 
the whole peace-preserving structure of the Oovensht, alncc, 
as has been pointed out, the gz'CRt majority of really 
dengorouü dlspates arlcc out of cattore which indisputably
fell within the category" of Tomoctio jurisdietlon and the 
problem of. her,v to deal with is the most cruel el, and
unfortunatgly also the most Inimm-otocle, of all international 
problems % (  35)
Elmmorn also eaphnslsed that though dioputce arlolng 
out of mattora:of domostio jurisdiction could otill bo 
rolced under Article'll of the Oovenant, which stipulated 
that the .league could take sny octlon that might he deemed 
Yû.ce and effectual to safeguard the peace of nationo in the 
event of any v;ar or threat cf war, the Tiartlea to such 
dloputou were 'left quite free, under triat article, to 
accept 0%' reject any ouggcotion made by combers of the 
Council'$(36) The fact wao that no action could ho taken 
by t3ie hoaguo Council or the Aaoembly under Ai'tlcle 11 with- 
out r;he une?:lmity cf their remberc, inoluding those memboi*- 
ctatoB party to the dinpiite.tC?)
But though ei^matcrlea to the Covenant did not socept 
zroetrictlcnc cn their right to n::!lre private in the cauo 
of a dispute .-zrlcing out of a matter of domeatio jui*iodict- 
10.0# it was roGogizlBOd in Article. 15(8) of the Covenant 
t W t  the olaim by a state that a natter woo oololy within 
ito dcziestio jurisdiction, l#e# that it was oolo judge of 
the master and 00 outeide the interziational jui'iodlction of 
the league Coimcil, had to be tesl^ c-d by the criterion of 
internatlona3kla%v, and could bo refer3;ed that body i;o 
the fer^onent Court of International Justice for an adviaory 
opinion. (39) Oiie i m p o r t i n s t a n c e  of this zaroee in 1(;22 . 
when ' the Court v/cs asked to give an opinion to the be ague 
Council concerning a dispute l^etween kranoe a%ct UTitaln over
19
a qucüticn of nationality# /ranee had attempted to Impooo 
french nationality and liability military conscription 
upon certain fritieh cuhjocto in her protectoz'atee of Tunia 
and Icrceco, and refucGd ic resort to arlltratio'n on the 
ground that the quootlon wac oolely :ithin her domootlc 
juriodlcticz':# .arc when Britain appealed to the league of 
Rations, the ;/yuo Gounci). referred the matter .to the 
leiT'hneDu lourt for an advisory opinion*
The ^'craancnt Oouz't pointed out'that although queatian^z 
of natlcmality were not in principle regulated.by Inter- 
.natlonM law, thib did not.apply in this case becaUBe Britain 
could Gloim the validity, of oe%d;aln treaties whloZi placed 
obllgatlenc on franoo that denied her the right to act ao 
sole judga of tho matter* hence the Court concluded that 
the iacuo was not a oattcr solely within the domestic juris- 
dlotlon of :'Tanoc*(39) In off cot, then, the Court -naintainod 
that a matter not I'egulatod in principle by Internatlonol 
m In the absence of international trcgtlee which 
obligati02:a on the partlea to sucli treatieo, was Bclcl;/ 
within tae domootlc juz'i diction of a state* (40) %'cgnrds
such.matters,' it declared, *enob ntate is sole maotor of its 
decisions.,* to v;hioh it added; 'The question t'herher e. partic­
ular matjcr is oz' le not solely within the juriidlotlan of a 
state is an osnonticily zxhl.ative quootio?:; it dep93:ds upon 
the dovolopoont of intornaticnal relations'*(41)
During the league of Nations pei'iod the development of 
Izztcz'natlonM relacicns was ouch that It generally recog­
nised that matters aoialy within the bomeetic jurisdiction of 
8 ùtate Included its ri^t to'make private war an permitted
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under the cuaei legal articles cf uhc Cevci:Ea:t, as clz-ecdy 
explained; the nature cf its gcTcTnmert;(42) the eirc cf ite 
araamcntc cab aa'ncd. for con, exoei^ t tlzoce of the defeat oâ 
0vaàca Izv Tcz'ld Ta%' i. until they defied the Reroaillea troaty 
which bad Impooed z'cotrletlonu on thoir military etrongth;
Itr rcrcmaont of the colonics it pooGccocd, i#o* those non- 
.aelf-''ovo:a:liig terrltorioG which, wore not under the loamao 
oystom of mandates: (433) the treatment cf its ovm oubjecte» 
vfhloh CGTored tho whole field of huaazi rlghta$(44) except 
the traatnont of nlnoritioc under the TJinorltioE; treatiGe;(45) 
and, In the aerxmoo of Intornatlonal treaties, , its Immigrat­
ion pollole3g('<6) quest!cno of Dationallty, (47) economic 
pollcioa, ouch astho inpooitlon of torlffc, quotas, otc#(48) 
The Eicope of a. state* e domeotio jui'iooiotion was thus very 
wide, end tho.gurpoce cf article 15(8) of the Govenent was 
to prevent the.hoague of T'ationo Council from making reocmm-. 
endatlons for vhe settlu%nont of dioputea tkst crooo out of 
matters which, acooz'dlng to the criterion of. international 
law, Y/ero otlll within the domestic jurisdiction of stotes* 
furthermorc, already ctated, thr,n;'i: any vjar oz' throat of 
v;a%' ai'lBlny iron such disputes could be cohcldered by the. 
Council or under Article 11 of the Covenant, no
action could be decided by thoso bodies v^ithout the unanli^ity 
.of their uiombcr.B, including those member-state^ party to a 
dispute*
..But jir Alfred limiiorn's misgivings oozicerning tZie 
duisestic jurisdiction liultauion on the powers of the l-eaAa30 
of I'Asticns to maintain; intcrnaticnsl peace proved in yracsicc 
to be unfounded* luring the exiotonoo .cf the Lea.guo 'the 
dosmst;io jurisdiction o.f .Article 15(8) was tested in its
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forü% In oaoes, thourh the lü5uo oT doaG3%l2 jwrlG*
diotlon cropped tirnoo in bhe ooür^% of ^obatoo zn tho
fea^Mo '83%Tüly and the Cornell',(49) and in non# of tho 
diüt^tOG oon^lôared by.the h^ogue Oo^noll did a obate onco- 
esofblly invohe the do^^^tlo j^riadictlon provision of 
Article 15(B),(50) The point neode tc be otreoaod, there­
fore,, that tha did not fail to maintain International
peace baeau&e of Ita lack of oonpetenoo %nder the Covenant 
to deal ^ith breaoheo of the peace that arose o%t of nattera 
within the lomeetio jurisdiction of atatea; its failure 
cauoei by the reluctance of its menbero to i&plenent the 
principle of cellootive security in nsjor Inotanoee of 
aggression, auob ae those committed by Japsn. againot lanoh* 
uria in 1931 and by lùaly against "byssinla In. 1939; ^hcn 
the domeatic jurisdiction limitation under Article 15(6} 
could not be Justifiably invoked to prevent the league 
Council from aGCiClng that ag^rcGDlon had been committed. 
and from authorising sanctions under Article 16 of the 
Covenant, Had league aembero used the Organisation ae they 
^ere entitled under the ternie, of the Covenant, the Axle 
pGwere would not have been emboldened In the late, thirties 
to pursue their aggressive policies on a wider scale*
fho however, Diat the .boague did not have definite
re^ponsibllltloü and powers under tha Covenant to regulate 
to so#3'ezt3nt interstate oeoncmie and financial relations * 
the various aspects of the economic and social policies of 
orates remained within their domestic Jurisdiction in the 
aboonca of.international treaties - wac a major weakness*
It wae because of this that, as the great economic depression
of.the late twcntiou anc.early thirties aprcnu unemployment 
and poverty tlrcnghouu the world, *thc Council nni the 
Assembly ware hardly more 1 *otatc-ra of a soriea of
catastrophic oventG*p(51) ana ao far eo the League was con­
cerned; direct and. imodiato ccnocqncnce wao to tear 
down the atruoture of coononic oc-cperaticn which, w&c grad­
ually being built up, . Its indirect coneonuonce was to 
poison anc c 'ittcr relations between Germany and franco, 
Itoly and : ico, and, in general, between the co-callcd
diocatiofied powers on the one hand and the satisfied on 
the other; to encourage the worst forms of natlcnaliot and 
belllGooc ambition in Germany, Japan and Italy; to weaken 
the cohesion, and confuse the purpoGoo, of the peace-loving 
8tateo*.(9L)
Ic Girl up: , in this introduction It h&o been emph&Gleed 
that the Congreso system of the early nlnetoonth oontury 
collapsed boo3U32 of groat power diGarreemont over the 
measure of intemotional jurisdiction which the system 
ehould poGGC&G, and the purpose for which It should be UBod$ 
The olomh bot\TO(m those who bellovod that poaco and stability 
depended upon a policy of non-intervention in mattero of 
domestic jurisdiction, and thooe who wanted to une the 
CongreGG oyatom. to intervene in suoa mottora to prevent or 
OGGiot political changes, woe later rofloctod in the con­
flicting policies of the groat powers of the Concert of 
Luropa towards the Lastera quoction, with Lusoia, an ambit­
ious power aaüicuæ to intervene In furbish affairs in the 
name of justice for opprosoed pecplec, and other powers, to 
a greater or lesser entent, suspicions of husslon aesigno
end Influenced by & mizture of etratogle and selfish conoid- 
orations* The consoouonco of this woe n settlement of the 
iB&tern eueotion in 1978; at the Congress of Berlin, which 
ignored the :iaticnaliE;t aopiraticno of the Balkan z^eoploo 
and Gcntalned the aeeds of future ware*
Cf particular interest to the student of international . 
relationo io the difference between the llDdotonian concept 
of the Concert of Huropo and that cf lord Callchury* Whereas 
Dladotone's concept required the Intervention of the Concert 
in the domOQtlc jurisdiction of Turkey to effect the Implem­
entation of hnnon rl^^its mid the solf-detoiTilnatlon of 
nations* Callsbury*B concept, which wao similar to that of 
Cacticreagh, stressed that the Concert of powers should aim 
to maintain the territorial integrity and political independ­
ence of at&tc8, end observe a strict policy of non­
intervention in matters cf domestic jurisdiction, even if 
this meant blocking the path to political and social changes 
to meet the demands of justice* In line with CaDtlerc&gh*e 
concept of the Congress system,yualihbnry considered that 
in a world of variegated stateo, with differing idoologicc* 
it was impracticable for international organisation, char'cC 
with the task of maintaining peace, to bo used for the 
advance of social justice through intervening in r^tterc of 
domestic jurisdiction ana that its terns cf rcferenoe should 
be oonflneo to preserving ths iinlepcndenoe of states against 
acts of aggression*
Though tho principle of national self-determination, 
which was inherent in GlRd&t&ne*n concept of the Concert of 
fwrope as an instrument for the promotion of social justice*
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wcG a prominent feature cf toodrcw fll8cn*c fcurtoe# feint#* 
the loDguo of fotlons spotcm, which woo largely hie broin- 
child, die not provide effective crrsDgcmanto to protect tho 
largo number of new national minorities that ctill criGtcd 
after the.Treaty of Voraaillco - about 25 million people in 
all - though the treaty had granted na%ion"l oelf-dGtormin&tzea 
to 75 million people.(53) lonce the treatment of thene 
minorities, though in theory s natter outoldo the done^tic 
jurisdiction of otateo under the Minority Treaties^ wae In 
practice within the control of those states In whose terrlt- 
orlco they had boon placed, The foot was tnat the o%
hatione ayoten wan more in conuonanoo with the concept- of 
Cootloroaal and laliobury than that ef Gladstone, doaignec 
primarily uo preserve against grtemal aggression the terr­
itorial Integrity and political Independence of menher-otates 
of the Crganioation. It failed becaneo ite n^mbere laokea 
the "ill lo implorent the principle of collective aeourisy 
when it might have oueooodod without the help of loolationiGr 
America* Its policy of non-intervention in disputes arising 
out of matters of domestic jurisdiction did not militate 
rr.inst its functioning as a peacekeeping organisation.
fha nczt chapter will attempt to czplaln how far the 
architecte ai tne Charter of the United nations in 1045 were, 
influenced by the theory and practice of the Ccncerü oyotom 
of the nineteenth century and the lesgac of faliens cmperia— 
ent. ihcir main prcfler, of course, w^c that of oefinrng 
the aocBure of international jurlediotion which the new 
nhculd pcasesc, and the ertent to anicn the 
principle cf non-intervention should apply tc xattera wltnm 
the dqmoetic jurisdiction of states, ' ,
Jii'iL's ■•■|TFoS~ti- " ' ^ i t W W W ' Y î a  
û T T : . '^ n.axoa ~' " " "" ™ " " "
. _The took that ohaZlangeü the arehltaots ef the Ob&rtor 
of the United Rasions at kranolGOo la 1945 won to draw 
up the oonatltution of an international organisation whose 
authority would depend upon the measure of national sover-. 
eignty which.the nation-states,particularly the great powora* . 
were proparod to forego In order to provide It with the 
n80R8G&ry jurledlction to effectuate auoh broad purposes as 
the maintenance of international poaoe and security, the 
development of friendly relatione awong nations ha&od on 
reapeot for the principle of equal xighto mid aelf-doton-:ination 
of peogloB, mid the nohieveirient of Intezaiotional cc-opcnvitieri 
In solving problème of an eoosomio* social*, cultural* or 
huriînnita.rien eh&raoto%\ renl in .prcmoting reoi/eot for hunan 
rights and fundamontal freedoms* 1% brief, they had to form­
ulate a ooni^tltution .indicating .the pO'^ers .which the member- 
states would he required to delegate to the new united Laticns 
eyi , and.enouro that the .United katione would not be em­
powered to Intorveno in Battero which were to remain , under 
the Control or within the domeotlc jurladlctio# of the member- 
Gtates,
The principle of non-lnterventicn In matters esoontiglly 
withih thG.do&GGvlc jurlocioticn of nember-st&tGe of the 
United Uaticna, which ie stated in Article 2, pa ziph 7 cf. 
the Charter, has given rloe to such conflicting interpretat­
ions that It is proposed In thio chapter to ezaalnc the 
subject in the light of the diaoueBicns which took piece at 
the San PranolGOo Conference, es'well &s the great power
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negoti.aüicno at Ducibnrton Oaka, near Taohlzigtoiz, which
paved Jhv way for that Conference, Flrat of all, however, 
it Is.naüOGUüry to consider the pcwore which the foundor 
meab&rs of the United Uationo decided to delegate tc the 
Organisation to -laplement its bread purpoeos,
PGwera dGlomgtca t^o^tZïe United ZTgtlp^s
ror the purpoae of ^aintelnlng international poaoo ana 
security, scaber-statea accepted.two.basic obligation^; the 
obligation to meek a peaceful settlement of cituatlonü or 
disputes likely to endanger the peace, and the obligation to 
refrain in their international relations from the threat/or 
U8G of force * \n»t the territorial integrity or political 
ladg^enCc^ce of any state. Under Chapter VI of the Charter 
t?aGlfic.3ctvl&5Gnt of finputeo), it wes thus agreed th%t 
if parties tc a dispute likely to endanger international 
peace failed tc reach a peaceful nottlement of the natter, 
they should refer It to the Security Council, the organ 
primarily ro^pcnGlble for the malnteaanoc of International 
pence and.security, and that.body was empowered to ^akc 
reoommonu"ilo#G for  ^ olflo #8ttle%ent.
Such reooamendatlona under Chapter VI of the Charter 
#0re to have no binding effect on the partlen to the dispute, 
.however, : The doclsieno of the Security Uouncll ^era to be 
binding, oh the ^oabcr ùtaiec of United Satlone only If 
they related to measures for the enforcement of tho peace 
under Ohnptor VIZ of the Charter, I.e. action with respect 
to throats to the peaee^ .breaches of the peace, and acts of 
aggreaüian, ^creovèr, the security Oouncil'a ability to 
decide on enforcement neGsuros was made dependent upon the
unanimity of its five great power permanent membere* for. 
though at San Lranoieoo, after much reluctance on tho part 
of the Soviet Union, tha great powers agreed to the principle 
th&t & permanent member of the Seourity Oouncil, p&rty to a 
dl&puta to be resolved through paolfic methods, should not 
heve tac right to veto a roGo^mendatlon of the Council, they 
ineieted that in. all deolelon# requlrlna the application of 
aanotio&G agalnat a recalcitrant state, a permenent member, 
whether party to & dlcpute or not,was to poeaeac the veto# 
This neant that each of.the five gre^t powero on the Security 
Council wn# to have the.right to block the authorie&tio# of 
diplomatic* eeomonlc, or military aanctione not only againat 
Itaelf, hut elRo againet a email ctate which it cared to 
sponsor. Indeed, this insistence or che dominant role of the 
great powora lees worked In the league of Uatlons systcw, 
for under the Covenant of the league it wag posaible for the 
Council to racoææend canotions against a great power which 
committed an act of cggTc&8lon.(l) In this Bence the United 
dations .oystezî wac ccro closely patterned.: on..: the Oonoei't of 
Icrope of the nineteenth. centmy .thrM'f%M Icsgce of 'h.itlons . 
cyctem. It Ghculd be noted, however, that the fact that th# 
rl"at of Individual or collective self-defence was included 
in the Charter, undor its Article 51, w%8 a taoit admission 
by the architect# cf the Charter of +the BGOesGlty of rely­
ing upon operationc and arrangementc of the bclaace of po^er 
for dealing with potential throats of disorder that 
might he posed.by great powero or etatoB acting unüer their 
protective wln(3',(f)
Unlike the Ueoumity Ooencll, which wea given the power 
to telco i^^ erdatory deolcicne undez' Chapter VII of the Charter
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If approved by Ita five perzanont and any two of Ito other
.seven to&porary members,(3) the General Assembly of the
United liatlone, in which each otmte hne one vote end whose
resolution# on Important.gnestlono require a two—thirds
majority of the members preoent and voting, wa# not given
the authority to/##ke any of its decisions binding on
United Hatione members* Under Article 11(2) of the Charter
it was authorised to discuss any question relating to the
maintenance cf international peace &nâ soourity, and to
make ree&&%ondGtipnG with regard to any such queBticno to
the state or stateo concerned, or to the Security Council,
provided they were not being considered by the Council.
or to CGthy' ^  But" the faot .that the semo.' article' laid down 
that any question on which action was neoGeeary should' 
be referroa to the ^oourity Council has been Interpreted In 
different uey0»(4)
it muGt oiac be pointed out that those roaponcible for 
drawing up the ütatute of the International Court of Juetloe, 
whlob annezcod to the Charter, might have doelded that all 
dioputos of @ judicial'nature should come within the compul­
sory jurledlGtlcn of the Court, On the other hand, they could 
have loit the issue of accepting the jurisdiction or judicial 
authority of V6G Court a& a purely voluntary act on the port 
of its slgnasorlea when a dispute to which Ihcy might bo party 
arose# Actually the statute of the Court wos a ocmproaise#
Tne acceptance of the Court'o juriodiction was left to the 
discretion of each state In each dispute to which it might bo 
party, and it was made 'optional for any atate, signatory to 
the dtasute, to accept the compulsory jurisdiction cf the 
Court i%) advance, according to its Article 36, paragraph 2, 
vzs!:# 'zhe etates, i^ orty to the yi'ooent Utatutie, at anj?
time daclarc that they a#, compulsory* ipso faoto». .
and without opeolal agreeao&t in relation tc any other mtate 
accepting the oomo db3' *ioB* the jurisdiction of the Court 
in all legal dispute# concerning (a) the Interpretation of & 
treaty* (h) any question of International law, (o) the o%i%t- 
.enoe of any fact, which* if established* would oonetitute à 
breach of am International obligation* (d) the natm'c or 
eztsnt of the reparation to be nade for. the hre&oh of an 
intorn&tlonsl obligation#* Thie.w&e the equivalent of the 
Optional Olauee. of the statute.of the Permanent Court.
.uted under the Covenant' of the league of Thtions, and it was 
arranged that the jurisdiction of the International Court 
ehould apply to all tbone declaratlono that were made accept­
ing the o#2pul&ory jurisdiction of the original Court, Although 
some forty-flvG states nigned the Optional Gleuee.during the 
hlotory of the fer^ancnt Court* it nual he reae&barGdf.of 
eouree* that their acceptance of the olauao was &ore often 
than not eharacterieed by a z:us:bcr of ^.'oeervaticne v-hlch cur­
tailed eonalderably the moaeure of compulsory jurisdiction 
Involved* and. this was to apply u&^er the'new oystem^
. The m&ih"cnsnce of international pc^ue end Geourlty 
placed as the firoû purpose of the United katlone in Article 
1 of the Charter, As to the purpose otatod in Article 1(2) - 
'to develop friendly relations among Dntiçns ba&ed on roopect 
forth# olple of equal righto and aolf-ôet%rcinatlcn cf 
people#* - It was laid down in .Article 73 of Chapter XI that 
'Liombere of the United Xmtiono wTilch have or aaoanie respcno- 
ibllitlea for the administration of territories whoco peoples 
have not yet attained a full sieasuro of Belf-govornm(%^2t recog- 
the principle that the izitei'oot# of the Inhabitants of
30
thoBo terrltorlGG ore par&nount, and accept &$.& oacrod trpct 
the obligation to promote tc the utnoGt, within the oyotem of 
Intem&tlan&l peace- and oo our it y cntabliehod by the preeent 
Charter, the well-being of. trie inhabitants of theec torrit- 
orie&,#*, unaor psr&graph (e) of the oamo.article, *to
transmit : arly to the Becretary-GenBral for information
purpocea, subject to ouch limitation as secuzity- and conotlt- 
ntionol oonoldcrationc may require* Gtatlntical and other 
Information of a toohnloal nature relating tc economic, cccir&l 
and educational conditions In the territories for whioh tSiey 
are respectively re&ponelble other than those territorioo to 
which Chapter XZI end kill apply*, i.e. other than those non-
self-governing torrltorlee r the Intematlcnal trustee-
ship system of the United Nations* But the administering pov/ers 
were not obliged to transmit to the Secretary- General 
information of a political nature indicating the development
of self-government v/ithin their colonies* and their administrat-
!
ion of such territories remained essentially within
their domestic jurisdiction. 1% fact* 'Chapter x% ia to bo 
Gh&rply dlotlnguiohod from Chaptero'XIZ and XIII* which relate 
to the trusteeship oyster and provide in detail for inters 
national accountability and international ouperviuion, but 
o&ly for thoae territories placed under trusteeship by Gpecl&l . 
agreeacnt# Chapter XI* l^ y contrast, makes no specific provis­
ion for international supervisory aaohinery; however. It 
applies to all non-eelf-governing territories from the tin# - 
the Charter entered into force**(S)
In oz*der to Implement the purpcsco of u33.e. United Nations 
stated in Article 1(3) of the Charter — *to achieve inter­
national eo-operation In aolvlng international proble%^ of
as üoonc^lc, nodal, cultural, or hu&anltari&n character, , 
and in promoting and encouraging roopoct for human rights 
and f&r fundamental freoocmc for nil without diotlncticn as 
to race, language, or religion* - the General AGuembly
and the Loonomio and Social Council were authorised to make 
endatioDS of a non-hinding .character to mcnber-stntes 
on ouch matters,(6) izic force of ouch roeomi^eMatlene ore 
thUD eenontially of a moral netizrey member-states being free 
to accept or reject then, %nd it ahoulà aloe ho reallaed 
that the prooeoB of converting acral obligations into inter­
national legal oonmitaontn under conventions pre&srod by the _ 
General Aasembly and the.Bconoalc and Social Council, noting 
under Ita authority, depends upon.the oonoent of memher-states 
of the Unitea étions to ratify such convention8*{?)
Some InterproterG of the Charter have asserted that its 
si^pzatorios hovo accepted legal obllgatlonB with reopoot to 
the. iaplmæntntion of rlgiits.(B) But it Ic true
that the .z'çvulalon grcdicood by Katsi violations cf basic hun&n 
righto had created, a. climat0 of cpUnlon vAieh i clled the 
drafters of the Charter to require Ito signatcrioB to pledge 
themeelve# tc take joint and separate action in Go-operatlon 
with the United Nation# to pzc e respect for and observance 
of hubon rights under Article 56, they cade no attempt to 
define each i ta and the mo^gureo neoesoery for their 
Inplecontatlon. fhis was not embarked upon until after the 
birth of the United Nations when the UN Commission on Human 
Rights began Ite work in 1947* and until states have accepted 
preoloe legal obligations with respect to such zaatter through 
tho ratification of international conventions, it is difficult
to GO# hew it can be maintained that human, rights and fUBd- 
omez:tal frcedeiDS* ae well as economic end social matt ora 
not regulated by Inter-atate treaties, are not wi%hi# the 
domestic jurisdiction of etatew* Certainly, * there-io the 
strong legal argument to.be overcome that #lnoe the Charssr 
does net coma&t Nenbero to renpect dcTlBOd righta and free- 
GoaS; there le no taaio for. eaylng that a Ke^ber baa violated 
& particular right unleoo it h%8 ezpresely.a&reed to reup&ct 
it*.(9).
In fact* the United Hationo, a voluntary association of 
Goverelg^ states with differing political, oconomic and seelal 
syoteoo, and henoe differing oonee%)to of hunmm right#* .was 
Intended to function in accordance with the general principle 
of non-intervention in matters GBaentlally within the io^0stic 
jurisdiction of ntate#, the only exception to thlo general . 
principle being the competence of the Security Connell to 
authorise enforcement measures to maintain or restore inter­
national peace, if it decided that a situation arising out of 
a. matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction cf a. 
atote constituted a throat.to the peace, bronch of the peace, 
or act of aggroRsion under Article 39 of Chapter VII of the- 
Charter* This Ic lala down in Article 2(7) of the Charter, 
which is hnalysGd below*
The Brlnelple of Uon-intervontlqn
the above outline of the powers delegated to the 
organo of the Unite; It can be .seen that 'sovereigni­
ty under the Charter obviously #e^n.sovereignty subject
to the prcvieion# of the Charter* It Izpllos that the Aembe}'- 
States are free and sovereign ithln the limltst: imposed
upon thorn by the Oherter, It means that they are aGüuæoü tc 
have accepted In good faith the obligations of mcmbor&hip 
and to have delegated to the Organisation the powers that 
they have expressly delegated; hut that the residue of the 
80 called sovereign powers.of states still romaine with the 
üomber-St&toB themselves**(10) In fact, to safeguard the 
poworo which were to:ze%&ln with the member-atatee of the 
United Nations, the drafter# of the Charter laid down the 
princi.l) of ncn-lntarveniicn In matters of domestic juris- 
dictiez in Article 2(7), the text of which Is as follows; 
nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the 
United Nations to intervene in matters which are assertlali.y 
.withia the domeatic jurisdiction of any state or shalT reguiz e 
the Lemberg to eubalt such mattcrc tc settlement under the, 
present Charter; hut thie principle ehall not'prejudice.the• 
application of enforcement meaaure# under Chapter VII*
Article 2(7) Gtemced from.the domestic jurisdiction 
reservation included in the proposals for a general inter­
national organisation agrhed to by the four great powers, 
the United ftatos, Coviet Union, Great Britain and Chine, at 
Dumbarton/O&ks in 1944, It was stated 1%. paragraph 7, 
eection A, Chapter Till, the first si% paragraphs of which 
stipulated the procedure to be followed by the Security 
Council and members of the Organisation In resolving sit­
uations that might cause international friction and for the 
pacific sctzlement of disputes, Parties to a dispute, the 
continuance of which was likely to endanger International 
peace and æcourlty, wero obliged to submit the matter to th# 
Security Council if they failed to find a solution through
pacific method#, But paragraph 7 stated that 'the previa- 
lone of parorraphG 1 to 6 of Section A should not apply to 
Bltu&tlORG or Ql8pute& arising cut of matters which by inter­
national law aro solely within the domestic jurisdiction of 
the st&tc concerned**(11)
The domestic jurisdiction clause in the Dumbarton Oaho 
proposals wao thua designed to limit the authority of 
Organlaatlon In the pacific sestlenent of eitu&tlon# or dia- 
putez T sing out of a natter oclely within the domestic jur- 
iedlctïon of a state, cuoh no a otate'o immigration policy 
not governed by an International treaty. . Ao in Article 15(8). 
of the Covenant of the ht wj of Nations, it laid down that 
international law w&o to he the criterion for testing whether 
a situation or dispute arose out of & matter within the dom8%t~ 
lo jurisdiction of & state, hut It did net etate, as Article 
15(8) of the Ocvonant hod done, the organ or authority which 
was to determine; in accorocace with this criterion, whether 
the situation or dispute was outcide the international juris­
diction of the Crgrnisatlon,
fhlo omission in the Dunbarton Oaku proposal prompted, 
uome states to ouhmlt omendmantg to the text agreed to by the 
four great powers, and .prior to the Z/rcnicleco C(.%%fercc.ce 
Brasil* Oücchoolovckia* Nouador* Greece, He%loo* leru and . 
Turkey suggested.It should bo revised so that the later^atAonsl. 
Court of Justice would be the cr#an to make the dG0i%ion^(12) 
and Belgium proposed that *any state, party to a dispute 
brought before the Security Council, shall have the right to 
08k the Court of Intcrnational Justice whether a recommend­
ation or a. decision made by the Council or proposed In it
29
infringes bn its oeeentiBl liberties. If the Ocurt ocnGlders 
that Bueh rights have been disregarded or are threatened, it 
is for the Council either tc reconsider the ouestic# or to 
refer " r dispute to the Assembly for diBCUsoion**(13) But 
Norway took the view that the domeotio jurisdiction clause 
should be deleted on the grounds that *ae long as the proced­
ure Instituted by the Heeurlty Council ie one cf pacific 
ecttlement of dlcputea, the party in whooe domestic jurisdict­
ion a _auuer belongs will alweyc have the right to present 
this plea# Gcnoequently* the original draft affords no real 
additional protection at this stage, bn the other hand, the 
Geourlty Council should hot be prevented from recommending a 
procedure or method by the mere fact that a matter involved In 
the dispute or situation belongs in the domestic jurisdloticn 
of a party*.(14)
As a result of preliminary discussions on the line to be 
taken at Son Pranclsoo, the United States delegation alec , 
dc&ircU changes in the text of the domestic jurisdiction res­
ervation agreed to at Dunbarton Oaks, Congressional opinion 
in the delegation wanted it to be made clear - that in & sit­
uation or dispute to be reoolved through paolfio settlement 
under Chapter VIII, Lection A, of the proposals, a atate 
which was involved should be able tc decide the jurisdiction 
Issue* Ihi&, it wae decided, could bo met by widening the 
domestic jurisdiction reservation through omitting the inter- 
natlonol law criterion^ and substituting the word 'oosontially* 
for 'aolely* to describe matters of domestic juri8diotion*(15)
At ben Francisco, John foster Dulloo, senior advisor to 
the United btates delegation, defended the use of the word
'üssontially* en the ground that if the term 'solely* were 
retained; the whole effect of the limitation on the.authority 
of tho United Nationa, which wae the purpose of the dome&tio 
jurisdlotion reservation, would he dootrcyed, Els argument 
was that although in the modern world mattero of domeatio 
jurlodlction wore elmost alwayc bound tc have ocme internat-v 
lonal repereuoBions; or cause some internetional concern, thlG 
woo no /vérification for saying that such matters should he 
regardoe _ outside the domestic jurisdiction of abate#.
Through the use of the term 'essentially*, thee, the United 
jtateo.delegation hoped to the.domestic jurisdiction 
clause apply to & much wider field of domestic matters, for 
though ito members considered that international co-opcratlon 
throu h uJ^ General Aoscmhly and the Iconomio and Lociol 
Council was essential tc promote eoonoaio and social progreoe 
and the iaplom&ntotion of human rightc, they did not want 
thooe org&no; in Dulles's words, *to penetrate into the.econ­
omic and social life of the æembcr-statGa*,(lG)
The British delegation also believed that there should be 
changes in the text of the domestic jurisdiction reservation 
agreed to by the four great powers at the .Dumbarton Oaks 
meetings* Prior tc the San DrcnGlsco discussions in Committee- 
1 of Oon^olesion Ig. whlch dealt with the drafting of the olnuse, 
Britain propoced tc the other great powerc that the Dumbarton, 
Caks clause (paragraph 7, Lection A, Chapter Till) should be 
replaced by the following proviclonc, which night ultimately 
form a separate chapter in the Charter.(17)
(I) The Chorter should not confer the right on any 
momvcr of the United.Nations to require that a 
Tir^vte or.situation arising out of muttere which 
by International law arc solely within the aeaostlo 
jurisdiction of the Ltoto ccDoernec should bo sub­
sisted to the moane of settlement mentioned in 
Locticn A(3).(lo) uhould, however, such a actuat­
ion or dlopute-constitute'e threat to the maintes- 
ance of international peace or security, or should 
a breach of. t:ie peace occur in consequence of such ( 
a oituation.or aiopute,it should be open to-the 
Security Council, acting in accordance with caotios 
B*(19) to talc 8Uoh action as it may deem appropriate,
(k) Lhe question whether a particular dispute or situat­
ion does arise oui of a&tters which by International
law arc solely vithin the domostio jurisdiction of 
"the State concerned should be decided, if necQ&&ary» 
by the body to which it is Bought to submit the 
dispute or situation*
Ihigj Irltlnh amendment, together with a Unitod States 
amendment which crated tb&t,"the provisions of paragraph 1 
to G of Lection A should not apply to altustlona or disputes 
arlGlng out of matters which are within the domestic juris- 
diouion of the state concerned* — an amendment which omitted 
the refercDOo to 'International law* and the word 'solely* - 
was referred to a oub-oommittee of the four powers to produce 
a redraft of the domeotle jurisdiction rowerv lion# On that 
committee were Hr. Dulles (United States),blr William %alkin 
(United llnydoc), %r, Golunoky (Loviot Union), and fang 
Onia-caonfUklna), and as a result of tbelr discussions they 
proouoea a foraula on which they could all agree except for 
one point, via, whether or not the InternDtlon&l law criter­
ion should be Included, The representative# of the United 
ctateo ana the üovlet Union on the committee were opposed to 
its inclusion, these of Great fritaln and China y/anted Its 
retention, Consequently, the words #by International law* 
were placed In parcnth^GeB in the text when It wcs submitted 
to the aelcgaticno of the four powers under the leadership of
Nr. Ltettlnlus (United Utnteo), N. Lolotcv (Soviet union)*
Nr, rden (Groat Britain), and Br. Gcong (China). The rodraft 
ress as iollorg;
fct.int ooB^clned la thlo Charter shall authorise the 
Cl. nlnatic :o interfere with inatter# which (^ y inter— 
national 2t\) are esaentlally within the dcmeotlo juris- 
aictirr oCthc utate concerned or shall rocniro the 
!:eicero to submit ouch matter# to settlement ualoz thl# 
Chorxor, should, however, a situation or disput' arising , 
ou% of GwOh a matter ooou6e an International character '
. consjiwUtG a throor to the.z^inlonanoe of internat- 
io M  po?o& or security* or ohould & breach of the peace 
occur in consequence of ouch" a situation or dloputo, it 
axaii be open to the Security Oouncll, noting In accord- 
MOO wjkh Uhepter VIII, Section B, to toko such action 
ae It may deem nece8&ary#(20)\ ... ^
Nr, Dullea, who reported to the four powero on this re­
draft, stated that the subcommittee *had agreed that the 
exception for domcatlo jurisdiction should cover not only the 
peaceful settlement of disputes, but should apply to the whole 
Charter except for throats to thé peace, breaches of the peace 
and action with respect thereto', As.to the question of in- . 
eluding the wordo *by international law*, *tho United Kingdom 
and China wore inclined to Include them, but the U.S.8*^^ and 
U,S, representatives on the oubooomlttee had preferred to 
exclude them due.to the difficulty of establishing when a 
natter Is by international law under domestic jurisdiction*
But after further cloouosiene by the leaders of the four del­
egations this was rosolvod when Lroat.Britain and China con­
ceded to the Loviet Union and the United states on the question, 
and subséquent redrafting produced a shorter paragraph which 
become knom-n as the sponsoring powers* amendment, which read 
as follows:
.Nothing contained in this Charter oholl authorise the 
Organisation to intervene in matters which -ere eBsent— 
lully within the domestic jurisdiction of the state 
concerned or shall require the members to submit
Buoh aantoro to Gouklomont under this Charter; but thlj 
principle ohall not prejudice the &#Bllcatlon of 
Til, Lection B.(22)
The nain difference# between this vorolon and the 
original Dumbarton Oaks.propooal may now be surnnarioed*
(1) It did.not refer to r-nttorn solely but enoentlally 
vilhin the domeatlo jurisdiction of the state con­
cerned, The reaocn for this change hac already 
been explained*
(11) The refoi'once to. Interziatlcna].. lav; as the criterion 
for determining whether or not a matter fell Gooent- 
lolly within the domestic jurisdiction of & state, 
which !:ad been included in the ^vumbarton Oeko in-op- 
ODOl, wac not in the new version, Nor did it 
include any reference to the organ or authority 
that should determine the matter,
(ill) The now verBlon involved the tran&for&hoe of the 
domcBtic jurisdiction clause from.paragraph 7, . 
hcotlon A, Chapter Till of the Dumbarton Oaks prop­
osal#, which dealt with the olfic Battlement of 
Dispute#; to paragraph 8 of Chapter II, which 
listed the principle# of the Organloatlon, This 
modification, which wa# inspired by the United 
ùtates; otemmod from the *fear of the Unitec States 
Government that under the expanded powerB given the 
united Botiono in the economic and social fielda^ 
the-United Nations might Interfere in neitore that 
had been traditionally regarded ac within the ezclua* 
ivo jurisdiction of statea. fhiô attitude no doubt
reflected uncertainty over vhat night be the UenCiL^ G 
attitude toward the Ghart.er, in view of earlier Senate 
OppOGltlcn to thohe.agueI'6bVënaQ±:, if United Itatea
domestic jurladiGtion in ouch, matters no Immigrat­
ion* tariff# and civil right# was not protected*.(23) 
Ihio is aloo made abundantly clear in luaoell and,
. Luther's account of tho role of the United Btatoo 
.at the Dan rranelGCo Conference.(24)
The purpoGO of tranofcrring the domestic juris­
diction clause to the chapter on Principles was to 
±ako ell the activities.of the United %;ations cr,;;an3p 
; not simply the pacific settlement ofaloputcG, sub­
ject to the principle of non-intervention, and the 
only exception to thio general rule was the compet­
ence of the Security Council under Chapter VIII, 
Jection 1$ to authorise heaeurcc to maintain or 
.restore international peace and security, should 
that body determine Ube existence of any threat to. 
the peace, broach of the peace, or act cf aggrcBB- 
ion arising cut of a, matter esaenti&lly within the 
/oncotic jurisdiction/of a ot&te. hut it should be 
rcnohbcred that the ùocurity Council could only make 
such decisions through the affirmative votes of T out 
of ito 11 members, including tho concurring vote# of 
its five permanent, members.
(iv) Ghat woG Confuoln.g about the new version was the use 
of t%3c tezmi to .intervene in the first pa.rt of the 
paragraph. The words to^ ^^ intei'foré had 'been used in 
early ctage of drafting the cponporing powers* 
aTi^dment,(25) and this tera did not have the game 
technical connotation a& the lerm tc intez'vene.
As defined by Liz: K. lautorpaoht, intervention *ie 
a technical term of, cn the vhole, unequivocBl conn­
otation. It signifies dictatorial interference in
the eense of action amounting to the denial of the 
independence of the state. It Involve# a perempt­
ory demand for pocltlvo conduct or abstention ~ a 
Gonend, which, if not complied with, invclveo a 
threat of, or recourse to compulsion, though net 
neceeGarlly physical connuleion, in some rorm**(26) 
.if tbie was what wns meant by.intervention in 
the G%;on3oring pGwero* amendment. United Nations 
organa would ue prohibited, under the générai rule 
of non-intervention stated in the flrat part of the 
article,from making dictatorial demands Involving 
mhe tarea^ to or roconrae to Gome form of compulsion 
on membor-states, but still competent to discuss and 
invoouirato natters a&gentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of states, in order to make recommend- 
ntlonsof a non-binding nature on such matters, in­
cluding recommendations for the pacific settlement of 
situations or disputes that might arise out of. them* 
JUt this does not appear to.have been the intention 
of vco four powers. In transferring the domestic 
jurisdiction reservation to Chapter II on Principles, 
the principle of non-lntervontlcn was to apply tc all 
tae operations of the orgmne of the Crganisaticn 
G%cep% tnosG of the Jeourlty Council when dealing 
wzta threats to the peace or brooches of the peace 
ari&ing out of msttere essentially within the domeot- 
Ic jurisdiction of states, and hence to the non- 
Titendatory recommndavionG of vhe Security Council 
ana the General Aseeakly in the pacific settlement 
cl disputes, #5 well as to the resolutions and z^ KZ—
ommendetion# of tho General Assembly and bcononio 
end UoGlal Council on a state's policies on economic 
one Goci&l natters. Including human rights. It le 
logioal to infei;, therefoz'e, that by non-lnte': .
under the general rule of the article it# drafters 
k no. interference in any form* as come interpret- 
of the article have 8Ugga3ted*(27) It Is not 
/without aimificance that in the.four power consult- 
ntlcna tc which reference has boon made, - ' 'Benator 
V&ndenberg commented that under the new.text, & 
state has a larger option tc reaerve domestic juris­
diction*, and that another member of the United 
btatea delegation, Nr* Paavclkay, 'added that in. . 
the now fcrm and location it applied oven to Assem­
bly discussion**(2S) and this wao not challenged by 
any member of the other delegations* Lorecver, sub- 
oequcnt discussions in Committee 1 of OommiGolon I 
at fan Pranclcco, which was reopcnGlble for the final 
^ting of the article, reinforces thlc interprétât- 
ion*:
Committee i of Commission I Di&cuseions
theedq^ith fca'ing of Committee l/ï on 17 May 1945, 
the Norwegian delegate reiterated the view of hio government 
that the provision of an article on the principle of non­
intervention in natter# of doncetic jurisdiction should be 
dropped, he considered that there was no reason why the 
Security Council should be debarred from'passing recomnond- 
ntione for the. pacific settlement of situations or disputes 
that sight arise out of such mrtterc*(29) On the other hand* 
since the Australian delegate. Dr. Ivatt, feared that this
wGS G t l l l  I m p l i c i t  i n  th e  s p o n s o r in g  power#' a m e n d m e n t, h a
wanted It modified.
Dr Sv&tt eontended that the first part of the üpGnüorinc 
powers* amendment - 'Nothing contained in this Uhsrt&r shall 
authorise tho Organisation tc Intervene In matters GBaentlaily 
within the domeutle jurisdiction of any state(30) or shall 
require member# to Bubmlt auoh.matters to settlement under 
thl# Charter# — was undone by wao stated In the. eeoond 
part - *but this principle shall not prejudice the applicat­
ion of Chapter VIII, Section D*, on the ground that since 
paragraph 2 of Beotian B stated that *1% general the Security 
Council should determine the exietenoe of any th^v ~ to the 
peace, breach of the peace or act of.e.ggre36lcn ana ehould 
make recommendation# or decide upon neaGurec to be taken to 
maintain or rectoro peace and Bcourlty*, the Council would 
still be able to reccmmond term# of a settlement with respect 
tc a dispute erlcing out of % matter within the domestic jur­
isdiction of a etato.(51)
In & me%Gr&ndum on the subject,Dr. Dv&tt stated the 
Australian position in the following termes
8ucb a provision is elmoc: an invitation to use or 
. threaten force, in any dispute arising out of a matter 
of Acrostic jurisdiction, In the hope of inducing the 
Security Council to extort concessions fros the state 
that is threatened, Broadly, the exception cancels 
out the rule, whenever an aggresaor threatens to wee 
force, This freedom of action which international law 
h%& always recognised In natters of domestic jurisdict­
ion becomes subject In effect tc the full jurisdiction 
cf the Security Council#
the Au#lralian delegation opposée the inclusion in the 
Charter of xny provision whleh produces this recuit*
Our grounds are in no way peculiar to Australie itself* 
^Tory ccrnary représente# in this Conference has its 
own internal problems, its own vital spheres of domestic 
policy, ir .''hlch it cannot without forfeiting its very 
existence os a elate permit external intervention#
I acüort thau why "ovcrnmont# rould net vbem—
solves have included in the Charter thlo prlnciplGgof 
genoTFl lntorvf#L:fn, had it not been for one signific­
ant fact, The wh^rter reserves to each of them on indbv— 
i/i _ vote OL rrbi.n by the Cornell under Cbnatcr^VIlI,/
; i_on 3# Cney can therefore aaouro their leglnl&surea 
1 ' t^ouo dzosric powers of Intervention In uone&tic 
r. or; can never he put Into operation against them- 
eelvc.. That lo the position however of the remaining 
r ochcro of the frgnnl&aticn - those 45 neicbcrs who have 
\jAo? /ho very argument which iuetifios rcceutanoe 
cf this propcc^c : rngrapli by the sponsoring rcvernuentk; ; 
de.;r\ys the ' or ito acceptance tec rent, (32)
Dr t thus proposed that the clause, *out thia principle 
shall net prejudice the.application of Chapter Till, lection 
#*, ohould he amended to read, 'but this principle.shall not 
prejudice the application of enforcement measures under 
bna^rer VIII, Leotlon B*, co that the Hcourity Council would' 
be prohibited from recommending terms for the oettlGment of 
a dispute arising out of a matucr eeaGniially within the dom- 
oetic jurisdiction of a ctate, even though It had determined 
that a threat to the peace existed* Its action would then bo 
limited to enforcement measures against the aggressive slate,
The rcnoh delegate argued that acceptance.of the Austral- 
lEn would not allow ths Uocurlty Council to intervene
at the ii:\ when It should intervene, "It can, According to 
this provlclcng# he maintained, 'intervene only when a situ - 
ion is toe far advanced tc make such intervention really eff­
ective In preventing aggreaolcn, and It is for this reason 
that we.cannot support the a m e n d m e n t T h e  Chlneeo deleg­
ate also felt that it woe wrong tc limit the authority of th^ 
Security Oounoll to enforcement measures only, *A threat to 
the peace may lead to a breach cf the peace, and a bro#eh of 
the poacG may lead tc acta of aggression, heoonmendatlonu 
may, therefore, very well precede enforcement nea&uree, which, 
eft&r all, should only he taken as a la&t resort, Prevention
is better than cure*'(34) rut tc this criticism the Austral­
ian delegate, who.was very anzicuc thaw there ehould be no 
inter.C» ace of any kind In hla country'c immigration policy, - 
and reflected the aenoitivity of moot delegates towardo any 
encroachments by the Organisation In matters CBaentlally with­
in the coaeotie jurisdiction of their santcc, replied: 'Now 
why should a country*# right, r&cognlGed by everybody, in 
that reepect be prejudiced merely bocauee a country with a 
demand which, in Ita initial otage, is wrong, follows up that 
demand with force cr threat of fcrco#*(35)
Ihc Australian amendment was approved by 31 votes to 3, 
with 5 delc.jatea cb&taining and 11 making no response, fhie 
indicated,therefore, that there was very nub&tantial support 
for the view that recc%mondationG by the Security Council, 
whether under Chapter Vlll, /ecticn A, which dealt with the 
pacific aettlcment of dicputec, or under Chapter VIII, Section 
B, which dealt with action with rccpect to threats to tho 
peace, hroBchao cf the peace, and eota of aggression, even 
though they were net intended to be binding on the elates to 
whoa vhey might he addreeeod, (36) should not bo permitted by 
thé United Nations in.situations or dloputoa arising out of 
matters cGuontlally ?;!thin tiie dcmastio juziodiction of stat&o* 
Moreover, olnco the general rule of non-intervention wo# inten­
ded to apply to all crgano cf the United Umticno in the spons­
oring, powers* amendment, it would apply to the ncn-nandstory 
reoommondatlcrc of the General /oecnhly in the pacific sett­
lement of disputée»
The approval of tho Australian amendment by Ccamlttce 
l/l meant that the text of the oponooring powers* amendment
:a&6 revised tc read as follows;
in thlû Charter Ghall authorise the 
Crj^^irrcicn te intervene in matters #hloh are easent- 
inlly " "Ithln tlie do^eotlc jnrloüiotlcn of any étato or 
nhaiï ro^ülre the nonbcrs te wwbnit ouch ^atterw to 
antticnokt unüci thin Charter; W t  thla prlnoi 1 o aboli 
net irojrJioü <bo application of enforcement m  ^rea 
unler Chapter viix, Leotion 3.
Zhis amendment, and other a&ondmentg %hioh called for 
the Inelnslon of the International law criterion, the naming 
of the orjan or authority th&t ehould dctnr^lr^ whether or 
not a r^c ennentially ^ithin the dorc^tic
of a Gtatg, as well as an amendment to substitute * solely* 
for *r llyt.to describe a^ttars of domestic jurl&diot*'
loh* woro Cl ted in Committee I/l at its seventeenth and 
final r= ^ on 1' "vnc, lS-5#.
is the spokesman for the sponsoring powers' aoendmont,
John Foster Dullos gave an erplnnatlon oi its basic oonce_L 
of non-intervention. *1 want first to make.it clear. If % 
may, we arc. dealing nôwfwith a prmciplo, not with aomc
technical rnie of law dealing with international disputes,' 
he stated* *rh^ language of Shlo principle is In some respecta 
sinllar to th..'» longuape which \ foimd in the Covenant of 
the &eapne of H&tiono, article 15* and in the or 
Dumbarton  ^ iropooslo. But in both the league cr %%tloQG 
Covenant and In the original Dumbarton 0%ks IropoaalB, th# 
langUH'-r was that of a r%thor technical 1 viatic formulm 
designed to deal with a specific subject natter,namely the. 
settlement of disputes by the Council, Tho present Four- 
lower amendment puts the matter in a totally different aspect, 
and presents a new and basic principle governing the entire 
Organisation: that the Organisation, in none of its branches,
In none of Its organs, shall intervene In.what is essentially
the.domestic life of the rczbcr.ctatoc.' This had been 
neoeeocry, he czplsinoa, because they wore building: ct Uen 
francisco an organisation Which was quite different in 
character from the J( _ e cf Katicns, and indeed, from that 
which, had been planned at Dumbarton Caks. The difference, 
he added; w&c primarily the fact that the Organisation they 
were building was one which was Going tc have functions which 
they.believed would enable it to eradicate the causes of war, 
and not simply to deal with international disputes after they 
had arisen* But having explained this point, Dullee waa 
snzlous to cake It clear that though this would involve inter- 
gcvernvchtal economic and aocial cc-opcratlon through the 
United katicno, this did not mean that the organs of the 
United Uationo would be permitted *to penetrate into the 
economic and oroiol life of the mcnber-ot-tee'. It was for 
this reacon, ho asserted, thot the principle of non-intervent­
ion in matterc essentially within the domestic jurisdiction 
of states had been laid down in the cponccrinr powers* amend­
ment as a.broad directive,(57)
This statement implied, as has already.been inferred 
from the four power consultations which had preceded the dis— , 
eussions in uoomlttee I/l, that the term *to.intervene* was 
not to be interpreted in its traditional legal senee as def­
ined by hnuterpecht, but rather as meaning 'interference In 
any form*, is already explained, it had been made clear that 
recormendotiona for the pacific settlement cf disputes arising 
out of ratters essentially within the domootio jurisdiction of 
otatee would be outolde the competence of the unitei hâtions, 
even.though they wore of a non-binding character. In the 
light cf or, Dulles's speech, too, it may he inferred that
although the aponocrinr powers looked forward to Inter­
governmental Gc-oporetion in solving pvoblero of an economic 
and. social nature through the work of the iusemlly and the 
Sconouiu kocial Ccrnsil, \'w; rare opposed to any form 
of interference by those organs In the economic and cccl&l 
policioo of states» It is roaconablc to conclude, therefore, 
that rhilot they intended that the Acaoobly nnd Economic and 
Ooclal Council ohculd function within their terre of refer­
ence by di.oühoeiz:g economic and eocial natters, eaid addraec- . 
Ing reoonmcndationo on anchisGuec generally to nenbcr- 
otTtc^ -fer Ihelr .guid^aoo, in order to facilitate internat­
ional cGoawxic and social co-opcratlon, they did not intend 
that those organa should hold dlscuGciono, Institute Invest- 
IgatlonS; and paaa rocovaendatlonc cn the oeoncmic and social 
policies of a particular atato, rhieh world ofbarrase it . 
through noao form of censure or urge It to take action to 
effect a pacific eottlomani of an international dispute 
arising out of a matter which it regarded ao a domestic 
eueatloD, The only exception to the general rule of non­
intervention or non-lnterforonçe was the Security Council's 
oompGT^^je to authcrioe enforcement measures against & state* 
if the vounoil decided that.a situation arlclng out of on 
economic or sonial matter within that state's jurisdiction,, 
or any other matter of dcmoGulc jurisdiction, constituted & 
threat to or breach of International peace and security.
hr. kullos mot with no criticise because the sponaorlng 
powers' ovùndment had included the dcaootio jurisdiction res­
ervation ao a principle in the United DatienB Charter, Bu# 
there vac criticism cf the amendment bocnuea it die not Gtatc
(i) how a rattor ecsontlrlly within the conostio jurisdiction 
of a state wma to ho defined^ and (11) who was to be rcnpons- 
ible for the definition. As to the question of including a 
reference tc International low ao the criterion for determin­
ing whether or not o natter woo one within doroBtlc cr Inter­
national jurisdiction; which oovoral delegatee hod called for, 
hr, Dulles disnloocd this In ocmewhat dloparBglng temc. he 
cecced tc fear.that Its inclusion'would.Iced to the. crronecuo 
belief that every subject.dealt with by the United dations 
would no longer bo a natter of domootlc jurisdiction on the 
ground# that the Ohartcr would bo a treaty which ra-o inter—  ^
national with the conoequont danger that the I'hclc pur­
pose of the principle of non-intervention would be done away 
with, horoovcr; .ln .defence of the omloaion In the sponsoring 
powers* text of anyrofersnca to what authority should deter­
mine. the Isoue of jurisdiction, Dullee maintained that it 
would not bo on effective lialtatlcn .cn the united Hâtions, in 
such mattèro If It were left to the Organisation to decide*
As to thopacaoi## being decided by the International Court 
of Justice, he contended It wa# *not practicable to
provide, certainly In _;^rrd to nations who do not accept 
the 0  ^ ory clause, unmu the jurisdioticn of the Court 
should bo compulsory on them*.(58)
Tha truth waa that after lumfartcn foba the United 
atotoe end the Uovlet Union had had second thought# about 
the desirability of inserting the international law criterion 
in the dorestle jurisdiction reservation, hr, Dulles, like 
other American officials, hai run into *the problea of tradit­
ional congressional fear thot an International craanlsaticn
dictate* to the United Dtstoa on any queat- 
ion that it considered chculd not be within the purview of 
the o'suc/a for this rouDoa American officials oought at 
San Fr c»*:_coo to make the doceotio jurisdiction reservation 
æubjeot to She interpretation of the state eonoermed, rather 
then to the oo%v&&tion%l standard of international law (and 
hence to Interpretation by the Court)*,,,,.* The Soviet 
Union else #i$had the right to Ite own int^r.retation of - 
domestic jurisdiction, Thie waa In line wita wartime Soviet 
in&lGtenoe that ita oontrovergleo with neighbcuzl&G countries 
wore subject only to blroet settlement with them*.(58)
Am Büüültted by the Greek dele in the
final meeting of Committee l/l, whieh urged taut *it oh&vid 
be left to the Imters&ticnal Court of dueulcG et the rooncut 
of o party to decide whether-or not such oltuation or dleputo 
erioGs out of a matter that under International law falls 
the hemcotlc juriodlotion of. the state concerned', 
was carried by IT votes to 14* but It failed to get the re­
quired two-thirds majGrity*(40) Before the veto was taken 
kr, hullo# intervened to asoert that Its approval woul& be 
t&ntaaouat to the aecsptance.by etates of the.compulsory jur­
isdiction of the Court, 'There are # thousand questions to 
every para^ 'a^ aph of our Charter,* he maintained, 'where, the 
question cas be raided if a Cloputo arisoe - who will eottle 
It? And whoa you take all of those snd roll thea. together,
Dr# Chairuan, you have the' .problem vbich the Judicl&ry Soamitt- 
ae hao been wrestling with throughout the life of thib Con­
ference* And they have coho to the conclusion shat et the 
pro a 0311 "state of world development it i& not possible to o&y
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that mil of tboGG questions will bo referred to the %orl& 
Oourt for Gcttlomont# It has left that for each st%Se to 
actermino for It&alf, Au I pointed out before, there are & 
number of Bt&tes who have accepted the compulaory jurisdict­
ion oleuoe. In the oaee of thoee states, the icrld Court 
will decide, The Council,the Assembly, the Pcono&io and 
Coolal Council can get advisory opinions fro&.the World 
Court whenever they feel that they are in doubt. Conceiv­
ably that leave# that area in this matter &s it exists in 
aloost every other matter, where differences con conceivably 
arlae without any.agreed method of settlement by the World 
Court, but % am very much; afraid thot it le net possible in 
this particular case, any more than In other canes, to Intro­
duce in effect the principle of oon^uleory jurisdiction of 
the- f-orld Oourt whlcii ano:cher .^ rancic of this fonferoDCO 
after very thorough consideration has found it neceseary to 
reject,*(41)
Ih' t-glan delegate put forward oeveral amendment# to 
.^Gdlfy the .sponsoring powers^ text, his main purpose was to 
effect cLamgoc in the general rule of Doa-lntcrvontion in 
the flrvb p:rt.of the article*. ZaatCKd of 'Rothlng contained 
.in this Charter shall authorlüG the Organization to intervene 
in.mat bar# #hioh are essentially within the GcoOGtic juris­
diction of any osate or shall require the membcrn to submit 
euoh mattere to settloaent under this Charter*, ho wanted it 
to read so follovm; 'Nothing contained In thlo Charter ohail 
authorise' - the pr^enihpticn to intervene in. matt or o whic!i In 
the .1uü.'%ant of the Crgranioaticn _a^  ^ aooordlng toplntcrnat- . 
lonal law exoluslvely (or oololy) within the domeatio juris-
di Coi oil of 3ta.te or obeli ircqniro the monboro to oubælt 
ouch matters to Bettlement under this Charter*. The under- 
lined words indicate that hl& proposals involved three amend- 
meats to the aponeori## powera'o text, but all throe wore 
defeated* Thua the te&t of the sponsoring powers' amendment, 
apart from the cbmaga .which, had been mode to the e^ceotlcn 
stated In thé oeoond part of the article through the ^oeept- 
anee of the Australian amendment,rcualnea UDoh&Dgeâ. It 
w&# approved In Committee I/i by 53 votes to 4, (42) and sub­
sequently accepted by the Ocnfcr&noG as Article 2(7).of the 
Charter*
It 1# important to realise that there w&o nothing la the 
adopted text to Indicate which organ or authority %^s to det­
ermine vhéUher or not a matter ';:%s eoso.ntlali27 within the 
domestic juriodiotlon of a ztato* anc thia* together %ltb the 
fac% that the criterion of ipternotloDal law was also emitted, 
oonRpirod to neke It a subject of ocntrovcroial interpretation. 
Besides, although It is reasonably clear, In the light of the 
d&n fr;^ci^oc liKCUGolanB, that she term *noa-lntcrventlca* 
wa& so mean *no Interference in any form*, It waa
perhaps Inevitable that controversy over this would arise 
bcoauoe the full iaplioetlowo of %he term were not Btatod in 
precise toros.
Goodrich and. Hsmbro heva^^aintsined that 'while diseuse- 
Ion dOGo not amoimt to intervention, the creation of a ocm&- 
Isolon of Inqnis^y, the making of a .roccmmenâatlon of a proced­
ural cr evbutontlvG nature or the taking of a binding decision 
constitute# intervention uadgr the tenais of t W  paragraph' # (45)
On the other as already mentioned; sir A. Lauterpacht
h&G a&oGrt&a that the passing of reooKmendatlcns on matter# 
of Gomeotlc jurisdiction does hot amount to intervention, 
dlnee he oontende _ that intervention is used in a strictly 
tr&dltionol legal sense in Article 2(7}, no inforo that the 
principle of non-intervention 'doea not exclude on the part 
oftno organ# of the United Datlona procedures of Investir- 
at ion, ' study, report and recoaisen dations*,.' eeeina tk&t they 
do not amount to intervention in ocoepted legal ccnaot—
.atiqn*#(44) According to ^autorpscbt, therefore, United 
Hation& organ# are cc _rtent to addresa recommendations not 
only to otateo generally, but aloo to individual esatee, on 
matters of ûOÆOOtlc jurisdiction, oihce such recommendations 
do not Involve a threat to or recourse to oompuleion in some 
fora, if they are not complied with,
if*::, Bajan î:^ n doécribed tlie Good%*leh and havzbro Inter­
pretation as a. 'static* one, which, If followed, would not . . 
enable the United uaticnn to advance the broad purposes of 
the 0  ^ ;r# ^It does/not B&em to attach any importance to
the neoaa of the c iiing conditlono of international society 
and la content to make a literal end restrictive Interpretat­
ion of the provision# of the Charter,* he asserte. *Zt has 
eeoentlally a negative and atatio approach,* . In contrast, 
&ej&n point0 out, *the .Leutcrpaoht theoaÿ of interpretation 
olRlms to be based on g<%:oral principles of IntGrnatlon&l .law, 
ito dcminant purpooe is to effectuate the broad purposes and 
functions of the united Hâtions according to the changing 
needo and conditions of intersatlcnal society# It alao eoeks 
to nlnlmiae the effeoto cf indifforont or faulty drafting of 
tno provisions of the Oharter to the e::tent of giving iimanlng
end purpose to ostensibly conflicting terms of.come of the 
Charter provisions* Ito approach is eaoentially positive 
and dynamic# It is therefore appropriate to call It the 
dynamic theory of interpretation of the term**(45)
The interpretation of Article 2(7) in this study differs 
from the so-called *dynenic* end 'ctotlc* interpretations#
In the light of the ilBcuooloBB at Ban Frsnclece, It appears 
that It the intention of thooe who drafted Article 2(7) 
that whilst Un3+<^ uions orjana should function within 
their term& of reference by dleousBlng matters within the 
domeotlo guriediotlon of atatec %ith a view to rddrec&ing 
reeom\^nU%-icnE aiorally to sember-ctatOB* in order to 
further Intor-govemmental co-operation in the political, 
economic, eoeial and cultural fields, they did not intend 
that thoso organ# obould autborioo procedures of inveetlgat- 
ion into the doeectlo policies of any etatc, or make recomm­
endations on euch matter# to a particular state, which would 
oauae omharra^rvent to it through expreGGing^aome form of 
censure or calling for some form of aotlon«(46) In fact, it 
wae not Intended that a state's domestic policies should be 
dlcouBsed'im Gnlted Nations organs, even though it would be 
obviously difficult for s United nations organ to.decide, 
without :1 evasion, whether or not some æatter# were essent­
ially kin the.domestic jurisdiction of otatea# - Neverthe­
less, r dleouGGlOBa at dan Francisco point to.that conclus­
ion* and reflect the desire of the majority of powers to make 
the domestic jurisdiction reservation subject to the interpret­
ation of the sovereign state# Certainly they.were opposed to 
the inclusion of any reference in Article 2(7) && to how and 
by whom #Qttoro essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
o f  s t a t e s  s h o u ld  b e  d e f in e d .
In brief, It was the evident intention- cf thoso who
drafted Article 2(7) of the Uhnrter that the United DatiGns
should observe & otriot policy of non-l5torfero%oo in matters
bra%&tion&lly regarded aa within the domestic iurisdiotic# of
(47)
stacee* aucn as s etave's form of govemmont^the treatment of 
ite own eubjeota* which covers the entire field of human 
righte: in the .absenoe of intern&tlonsl treaties, its ocono^lo 
polioleo and questions of imæigfatio& and nationality; the 
sise of its national arznamante %xid armed foroe#; Intei'nal 
oonfllote .wltMn ito territory; and its administration of 
non-self-govorzily/ territcries, if cmy, not placed under tbo 
trusteeship eyrtr. of the united Dotions* The only exception 
to thie general principle of non-interferenoo.in nsttoro of 
doneotlo jurlGdietion which they intended was the competence 
given to the deourity Council to authorloe enforcement meas­
ures to maintain or restore international peace and security, 
if it'determined that a situation or dispute arising out of 
a matter e&oentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a 
state constituted a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, 
cr act of aggreoolon,
As already oxplcin»3d, the yeourlty .Ooimoii'e competence*'., 
under tki& exception to the general.principle of non- 
Intorferenoeg.wan specifically restricted to the authorioat^ 
Ion of enforaencnt.meaonrea to maintain or roctcre internat­
ional peace and security in order to emphasise that It did 
not possess the authority to gako recomoenGatione or decide 
upon the terms of a aottloment of.a dispute arising out of a 
matter eoeentially within the domestic jurisdiction of s
su
otate# It W&8 feared that unless thl# wag made clear a state 
would be tempted to uae or threaten the uee of foroo against 
another Gt&te In any situation or dispute that arose out of 
& matter el domestic jurisdiction, in the hope of inducing 
the Security Council to extort concessions from the state 
that was threatened or attacked.
It ehould. be understood* therefore, that the competence 
of the UR Beeurity Council under the exception to Article 
2(7) differs from Gladatone*& concept of the Concert of 
Burope as an instrument for the enforcement of reforms on 
a state that grossly violated the b&&lo human rights.of.its . 
subjects* for whereae Gladstone believed that the Concert of 
Burope should have possessed the competence to Intorveno with 
force to aecure justice for oppressed peoples, those who 
drafted Article 2(7) of the Charter considered that the 
Beourity Council should poeseae the competence to authorise 
enforocuont measures to maintain cr ra&tcro international 
peace and security if the situation arising out of a matter 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state ocn- 
ctltuted a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act 
of aggression.
It should be appreciated that though the ter# 'threat 
to the peace* was not defined in the Charter, the Boourity 
Council was given the ccwpetonco to decide whether & 'threat 
to the peace* existed under Article 59 of the Charter, It 
was thus given the loophole to decide that a situation of 
international tension arising out of a matter essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of a state, such as might 
arise froa a ctete*o violation of human rights cr dlscrioin-
atory.immigration practices, constituted a threat to inter­
national poaoe and security, even though the Buate judged 
guilty of sueh praotlooo had not used or threatened to uoe 
force AgaiuBt another state, or employed other measures to 
underline Ito territorial integrity or political independ­
ence, 1% contravention of Article 2(4} of the Charter.(48)
In %'tj connection it should be noted that Committee 
1 ^(2) at vac Sen Francisco Oonferonce, which dealt with legal 
problems, anticipated that diffioultiea ever the interpretat­
ion of the Charter would ba bound to ari&e in United Nations 
practice* vonBcquently, it declared that *ln the course of 
the operations from day to day of the various organs of the 
Organica^xcHp it i& inevitable that each organ will interpret 
such parte of the Charter as are applicable to Ito particular 
functions* This process is Inherent- in the functioning of any 
body which operates under an Inetrumcnt defining its functions 
and powers. It will bo manifested in the functioning of such 
a body a# the General Assembly, the Beourlty Council, or the 
International Court of Justice* Accordingly, it is not nec­
essary kC inoiude in the Charter a provision either authoris­
ing 0%' approving the.normal operation of this principle*.(49) 
This vzew, which was adopted by the Conference, time gave the 
organs of mae United Dations the loophole to assert their co^ w. 
petencG to Goozdo wnetner or not a question \vae -precluded frosi 
their eoimlderatlon under Article 2(7) of the Oharter, tmd to 
aaopt resolutions on matters claimed by states as matters 
eoaenuioily within their domestic jurisdiction, contrary to 
tne intentions of those who drafted the non-intervention 
principle*
5G
2ho purpose of subsequent chapters In this study is to 
present what conclusions may be drawn from the practice of 
United, nations organs in relation to the principle of non­
intervention In m&ttora essentially within the domestic jur- 
ledioticn of states, We sarll need to consider, therefore, 
how far they have obeerved or departed from the general prin- 
ci%)le of aon-lnterferenee which was the evident Intention of 
those who drafted Article 2(7) of the Charter, their inter­
pretation and application of the exception to that general 
principle, and the impact of their decisions on the develop­
ment of the United Hhtione,
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III. ï. ...ïc rm-ïSxUiM phisoiijj;; ïi
Tho rovülclcn o&üuGd by the flagrant violation of 
human rights by the Nazi regime, before and during tbo 
Beoond World w&r, resulted in a widespread feeling that the 
eseentlRl rights of the individual, such as freedom from 
arbitrary arrest, the right to a f&lr trial* freodom from 
torture* and freedom of speech, should be internationally 
protected* It was not surprising, therefore, at thehl&n 
Francisco Conference in 1945, that aeveral delegations put 
forr/ard proposals for the inclusion of provisions concern­
ing specific human rights in the Oharter of the United Nat­
ions, 80 th&t stetec signatory to it would assume definite 
legal obligations to treat peroona under their rale with, 
respect for such righto#(1)' But these proposals were not
accepted. Ocmslttee 1/1, which drafted the Preamble, fur-
\
pooos and Principles of Chapter I of the Charter, received 
the proposals with sympathy, but decided that the Goaference, 
if only for lack of tine, could not proceed to draft an 
intcracblsnol bill of human.rights for inclusion in th# 
Charter* Is was felt that the United N&tion#, once forced, 
.oould better proceed to consider the suggestion and to deal 
effectively with it through a special commission or by some 
other method, and the Committee recommended that the General 
Assembly of the projected CTganla%tion should consider the 
matter and give it effectif) %t '%aa agreed at üan Francisco,., 
however, that the Charter should contain various articles 
affirming that the United Wation# should seek to pz'omote ead 
encourage respect for human right# and fundamental freedom^ 
without defining them, and this purpose was included In
Article 1(5) of the Charter* This was reiterated in Article 
55(c) In Chapter 1% {International Boonomlo and Social Co­
operation), vis. 71th g view to the creation of conditions 
of etahility and well-being which,ore ncceGpary for peaceful 
and friendly relations among notlona based, on the reaueot 
for the principle of ecual and oclf-de terminât Ion, of
pooplee* the United 'ictlcna shall promote. 
universal respect for* and observance;of* human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without diotinction ao to race.
e«^ in Article 56 it was laid 
down that. All koai3ers pledgee themEjolvo# to joint mid
separate sobion ip co-oper&tlcn with.the. Organization for 
t M _ g £ M a m a a j l...e£.jfeg_^ set.forth la Article 55.
There were some miogivingG at Gan Francisco that the 
pledge required of BlgnatorlcB to the Charter, under Article 
56, to take not only joint hut separate action to promote 
reapGCt for human rights, was in the nature of a direct obllg- 
atlcn \hlch would remove a state's treatment of ito own 
BubjecvG from the sphere of domestic jurisdiction* If the 
pledge involved this, it was feared, the united Nations 
would be competent to intervene in questions concerning 
human righto which most states regarded as essentially with^ 
in their domestic jurisdiction, and in order to remove all 
possible doubts about this, Committee II/5,,which dealt with 
the question of economic and social co-operation under 
Chapter IX of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposalo (Chapter IX and X 
of the Charter), including the promotion of human rights, 
agreed to insert in its records the following statement; 
gl±c:Ae#p>rs_cfGoTmittee 3 of üorjaisoion II are in full
agreement that nothing oontainod In Chapter IX (Chapter IX 
and X of the Charter) can bo ^ onGtrued as giving authority 
to the gz'/lsation to intervene in the domestic affairs of , 
member jt'tos.(33 nroover, thlo v/ao also mado doer Izi the 
dlGCVzalcJo tlat led/to the drafting of Article 2, paragraph  ^
?, . of the Charter by ,Ocmnlttec I/l at San Pi'tmoisco, ae . 
explained in the previous chapter* The principle of non­
intervention In matters essentially within the doseetlo 
jurisdiction of states was Intended to prevent the United 
Nstiozis frCO .Interfering 111 any form in the economic and 
social pollcieo of statee, and in humon-righte questions 
relating to their own subjects,
Doroover, it Ic difficult to seo hew the Security Coun­
cil could jUDuiflably determine that a state's violation of 
human rights of its own nationals constituted a threat to 
international peace and Gcourlty, ' and/authorise enforcement 
seaeureo In aeoordanee with.she exception to the.general 
prlnci.lo of non-intervention in matters ^ coGontislly within 
the domestic jurisdiction of states under Article 2(?) of the 
If the state considered guilty of such pr&otloen 
had not or tlireatened to use force against another state,
or Gought to undermine its territorial integrity or polltlc&l 
independence In eoae other way*
fho fact io that the UN wao not conceived as an instru­
ment for the on forcement of human rights, and member chip of 
the Organisation did not involve the nocoptanoo by states cf 
prccloe legal obligations In respect of the hu%&n rights of 
their subjeote. It ie true that <1' nombera have pledged them­
selves to take joint and separate action in co-operation.with
the Organisation to achieve the purpose set forth in Article 
55 of the Charter, vis, the promotion of wnlveroBl respect 
for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental free­
doms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language* 
or religion, but what this neano, in effect, io that they 
have promised to adopt a co-operative attitude towards the 
non-binding recommendations of the UN Aosembly and bconoæio 
end Sooi&l Council whose terms of reference in respect of 
human rights were defined In the following articles of the 
Charter,
Article 15(lh)s The General Aesembl^y shall Initiate
- studies and make recommandations for 
the purpOGé of,.*,promoting internat­
ional co-operation in the economic, 
social; cultural, educational, and 
health fields, and assisting in the 
reel! 1:0vlon of human rights and fund­
amental freedoms for all without dist­
inction as tc race, sex, language, or 
religion.
Article 62 The Economic and Nodal Council#,#*.,*
2, It may make recommendatiaa# for tac 
purpGBG of promoting respect for, 
and observance of, hunon rights and 
'.fundamental freedoms for all,
:3# It may prepare draft convonticna^for 
GUbmiOBlon to the Gonerol A8&embly,y 
with respect to mattero falling with, 
in its competence*.
A^rtlcle 68: The ACoonomlo and Social Council ohall
^ set up commiseiono In economic
social fields for the promotion of 
human rights, and ouch other cc":d o s ­
ions as may be required for the per­
formance of ite functions,
The drafters of the Charter thuo intended that s special 
-connlsoion should be appointed by the Bccnonlo and Social 
Council to ui&ou&s and report on the best way to promote res­
pect for, and cboorvaneo of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms, and that when the Council had approved the.reo- 
ommenaatlono of the Gommlsolan, thoy should bo considered 
and voted upon by the .(ascnbly.
The Oommioolon on Human Elghto, which began its w&rk In 
January.1947* envisaged an international bill of human rights 
in throe ^rts; a declaration proololmlng general principles*, 
tao force .of which would bo eGaentlmlly of a æoral nature; a 
covenant; or covenants* embodying thece principles which 
would become legally binding on states that ratified them; 
and measures to implement the covenant or covenants through 
Internationa)! aachlner^ :-. (4) , The firet part of this programme 
w#G completed when the Assembly, by a vote of 48 to 0* with 
8 ab8t08tio#&* approved the universal Declaration of Human 
KightG on lu feoembor 1948,(5) Its articles consisted of 
Individual civil and political rights*,such as freedom of 
speech* freedom from arbitrary arreet* end the right of the 
Individual to take part in the government of his country* 
directly or through freely choeen representatives* end ouch 
economic and coda! Ue &o a person's right to work and 
education* Froclalmea cy the Assembly as *a common etsnaard 
of achievement for all peoples and all nations** It was In­
tended &B a gez%ercl appeal to the conscience c-f S'ulera* Iiut* 
&G the U&cgiasion on Hunan hlghts had emphasised in ito 
report* it w&2 not a treaty which imposed legal obligatlono 
on atstoo* and this wag reiterated by the President of the 
General Asaecbly* who said that. *the Declaration only marked 
a first step* since it was net a convention by which otatea 
would be bcun. to carry out and give effect to the fundament­
al human rights, nor would It provide for enforcement» yet 
it wae a atop forward in a groat evolutionary process*,(5)
(Sa
Only tho representatives of e few states - Bel&lum, 
Franco, Debanon, D&namn and Chile - maintained that the 
Universal Declaration had a legal force, and even then net 
without some reservations,(7) As Coctonoda hoe pointed out, 
*tho prevailing opinion is that the great majority who part­
icipated in its drafting did not intend to create e binding 
document;- that la, to impose on ot&tes the international 
legal obligation to respect and guarantee the rights expreesed 
in the iGOlaratlon, oo'that the.states that violated then 
would incur an international responsibility**(8) Indeed, 
the very fact that after adopting the Universal Declaration, 
the Assembly requested the Noonomio and Dooi&l Council t o . 
ask tho Commission on Human Rights to prepare draft.covenants 
on civil polltioal righto, and eoonomlo, social, aad cul­
tural righte, which would become Icgrlly binding on atates 
that ratified them, substantiates the view that the force of 
the UnlvGraal Declaration was easentially of a moral, not a . 
legal nature, bo, too, does the fact that the aener"! Ass­
embly and the UN specialised agencies adopted and opened for 
signature ana ratification a number of International convent- 
lone relating to human.rights mentioned In the Declaration, 
such as the Gonventlon on the Political Rights of Aomen in 
1952, Consequently, even after the adoption of the Declarat­
ion, unless states voluntarily bound themselves to respect 
and observe human rights through ratifying treaties, or con­
ventions, cr the international covenants on hu^an rights 
approved by the Asoesbly in 1066,(9) they were still legally 
justified in claiming that questions involving the treatment 
of their eubjeots, which .covered the entire field, of hU2:an 
rights* were essentially within their domestic lurladlaticm.
te wld.cli tho pTlnciple of non-intorvcntlon ui^dor Az'tiele 7"(7) 
ohoulâ apply*
Thle is likely to bo the'position within the foreseeable 
future, for UN me tzo who have ratified parti oui nr 00%- 
vantions have done oo für with Important reservation#* and 
the large najcrlty of otates have shown reluctance to ratify 
the OGcpruZ^cnelve lnte%%atlonal oovonants on human rights 
approved by the Aosembly*(10) DeeideG, 'ratification apart, 
the l^pl^aatatlon meaDurea In most of the conventions (other 
than thooe of the 1,1,0,) are of limited BignifiG&noe, Nome 
.provide npno;. othere, only govern^ent&l reporting, done 
.provider a. moi^datory rigLt of an individual to. make a ocr- 
plaint*,(11) And, as explained below, in the covenants on 
human righto approved by the AoGohbly no provision is made 
for an international organ to override the authority of the 
supreme organs of each etato.
In the Znter^iatlonal' Covencmt .on Bconomio, Nocial aiid 
.Cultural Rights .It Is I'eoognieed that the implementat.ion of 
Guoh righto muGt be a long term objective for most states*
-and the only neasuro of Imploaentatich v?liloh ..It -.provides is 
the requlrczaont that states rdilch ratify it must submit pro­
gress reports to the bconoiz^ io end I'oolcO, Oouncil# And .though 
provision Is made In the International Oovcn^mt on Civil and 
Political Rights for the states that ratify it to elect a 
human Rights ComoltteG, that body is not given the power to 
authorise oanctionG ogainat a state which violates any of the 
rights stipulated In the Covenant. All t3ie Comc-ij.tt'Oe is 
permitted to do ic to consider periodic reports submitted by 
the otateo-parties and addreoa comments to those etatee a^d
the Dcencxlc one occïal Council, and tc help to effect a 
settlement cl one state's ocmplalnt againct another ctatc 
cn a rights issue, if hcth ctatce agree in advance to
such a procedure. If a aottlezent lo net reached, the Ccmm- 
ittee would confine its report to a brief statement of the 
facts, and attach to the report the written su&mlsaiono and 
record of the oral.oubmlosicno made.by the ototes ooncerne&+ 
This* toe, would be the procedure adopted If the Committee 
set up a conciliation oomaiaclon to help the disputants to 
find an amicable solution of the matter, except that the 
commlcslqn'B report would include its views on the posoibil- 
;Itiea of a r&aaonable settlement, . .
Ho provision is thus made in the Covenant on Civil and 
rolrtioal hzgnvo for the reference of a human rights dispute 
between ototoa to an International court, a# provided for 
imder vlie Juropeon Convention on Hunan Righto# l;3orcover, - 
only If states ratify th» *tlanal Protocol to the Internat­
ional UcTc ' 't on Oivll and Political Rights 'vould the L ion 
mign%o UommikVoo be competent to consider ooopleinta from 
private Izidivliualn olaiming to be viotims of a vlolxticn of 
husian rignaa included in the Oovenant, and in audi oases all 
vhSv %no i-c. ...iliac could do would be to foiv;ard ito vlcvvs to 
tne sueuc concerned and the individual ccLpl,lnant*
Czocny, under the International Covenants each state 
tna%; raDzfics thorn has tho final word in hunzan rights quest— 
icno, and no interrmtlon,%l cz\:an ivculd be able tc override 
tne authority of the supreme organs in each state, fvcn so, 
u%:o riivcziantrcnai p%*ocedureo under the Govonanto provide the 
bn with Gcne scope to expose violations of human right# by
these suctos thav ratify thom, and it io posciblo that states 
will do ocuotId.ng to modif3' their donoatio nolicioo la the. 
field of huoon rights if tr.03^ arc likely- to Inour the moral. 
ccnacmiatioz: of world opinion for tranogroooing ooTOZianto 
wlfLch tho3". liavo- volimt&rily led,
But though 13N orgeno have reoognlBod th&t states are not 
bound by I c r l  obllgatione In respect of human rights unless 
they have voluntarily ratified Intemâtlbnel conventions or 
coven onto on such matters, v c have nevertheleso Interfered 
in hu:zna questions with regard to which statGc have
not accepted euoh bbligatlcno* Indeed, there have been - sev­
eral InctNmùcû in which a%,a.cj.aeou^ of\\lolating.human 
rights ha^ ro claiued that 111 organa hj^ ivo interpretod end 
applied, the piinciple of ncn-intoivention In nattcre essont- 
ially withis: the domestic jurisdicticm of etates, as laid 
doY/n in Article 2(7) of the 01;ai'ter, omtrary to t. J wliloh 
was lnto:fcod by .those that drafted the ai'ticlo at ; j - a- 
cisco, m:d inoonoiotont with the lAT approach to tho Implc::- 
entatiozï of ham. a righto througli the adoption of internaUlozial 
convent;ene or oov\. ivhich states are fcee to reject or
ratify# these cacec are analysed below*
G&sea cf Alleged Violations of human Righto
Ac explained in Chapter I* under the longue of hâtions 
System, if a state claimed that a dispute in which it was 
involved arose out of a matter within ito dcmootio jurisdlot- 
ion, the hoa'^o Council was ompowoi'Gd to decide whether the 
claim w&o juotified or.not in accordance with the criterion' 
of international law, ozid this it did in the fov; inotanoos 
ivith which it v;as eonoezned by aeeld.ng the advisory opinions
of the Pornnneat Court of Zntornationcl Juotice* But thoxe 
Y'ho drafted the non-lntervontion prinoiilo in.nattc:?:: essent­
ially vflthlntho. dqnestic jurl edict ion of ctetec* stipulated . 
in Article f(?) of the Charter of the CD,did not specify the 
organ or .onthorit^; lYhick.wao to dote::p::lne vdiothor or not- a 
matter \cr eccrrtiriiy within the donestle,jurisdiction of a, 
etate* or the o:ih:e:icn ty vNiloh ouch a ' ttor to be dot- . 
erxinod# To/a groat .G:d;ent those ..OTicolciis stcni.'od from % e  
dccire of %)oth the United States 'and the Cqvlet union to uolaz. ' 
the doi.iaotio juiiodlctlon srese^ rva.ticzi oubjoet to the Interprot- 
'atlcn .of the rv'-re conco-rned* But' oinco it \?as rooo(;nisod at 
Sànir'cc:oiGCo t::ot In tho ooureo.of the day to day operations 
cf the Tlnitod Dationo* e-rcli organ would .interpret such parte 
of the Charter as were applicable toite fenctioNLo* the door 
uao left open to. the political organe of the Oiy;;:aiicatlon, 
like tize General hAoeeabl^; and the Cooiu^lty Oounoll, to aoco.i*t 
their cc .'.potonco to decide whether or not a question. wac pro- 
eluded, fran tholr eonôldoratioji under .Artlole 2, pmcagraph 7, 
of the Ghartor m  e t:i9.t it mis a matter osoentlallz/
iTlthla -tlio doaoovic juriodiotlon of a otate»(12) In .fact, 
the General Aooembly borm to couert ito conpetencc in thio 
connection, without t xng a formal voté on the iBoue, at Its 
firot CGcolon in 194G* when It decided to deal v;lth the 
question, flie Treatment. qf loojxle of Indiazi Crj.rin jjs 
Union of Dcnth Africa. (15)
that
Tli0 Indian c o m p l a i n t . t h e  South .African governmont 
liad..onacted dloorloi:. uory neaouree rootrlotlng the riglitn of 
Ito eubjoctc of Indian origin in regard .to trade and rooidcnoo 
lender the Asiatic Zi^ aad ure and Iiidlan Bopreaentatloz: dot of
igAG* and thowe wor# a TlcJ4i.ti.04i of the Cn.%)r)_
town .l;^ ?eomcnto of and 195?* awd of the prlnclp3.o.0 of 
who Charter cc;\cornirg humon rlghta cnJ funiomontcJ. f%*oodçri;3# 
The IziCim goTorznicnt .also tJ:at .i]l:40o ..'xyuDc 7fzio.3.
ho.d rofuood to settle the quootlon fy ;.iaioablo mocino'^  a sit­
uation heJ '''-rlocn ' hi oh wo.o to Icpslr friendZg rolo.t-
lono bet-''cor the two cteteo, ano It had thuo resolved to - 
orbnlt tho matter for oonslderation by the G-enoz'ol. Aooezfoly - 
in aoGordc^rce w%th Ai'-tlcles 10. and. 14#
,l,dor .Artiolo 10 tb.0 General Aseembly may die ones any 
matter wltlilii the soopo cf .the Ohartor and make reoczzcondat- 
lone  ^ ;fer.ard to.lt, proiCCel the hecui'lty Ooimeil la net 
.dealli ..th. it under a, t loi a 12, end imdor Art! d o  14* aub- 
jc.ot t.o the anme proviso, tho Genez'r.'l Aoaezf.Jl^ r liiey roocxmiend. 
mcoGurec for the poacoful adjUBtmont of any situation %-vhich -. 
it deocs lihol^^ to Impaiz" the gon.a;c3l vreifcro or friendl^^ . 
relations ecacng nation.a, But the cci.ctenoe of the Conoral 
Aooonbly under , these artlcloo was doniod ly tho boutl: / .rican 
delegate v;hen the Indian oonid.aiDt -was brouglit up in the Gen­
eral CorzfWLic of the .tosccibl^ #^ lie c :d t3.%at slzzoc tlx)
quoetlon out .of a n-tter oBsontially within the domestio
jnriadlctlon of South Ifriea, the principle of non-intorvG%::tion 
under Article 2, paragraph 7, by which ho noant 'no Intcrfor- 
enee in o^ziy forn\ prooludod the doncrnl Aooombly from consid­
ering it# Tbio was not aoceptod.b^'- the General Oonmittoe, 
howovo]?, mid later the General Aooe^bly In plenary session 
decided that ite lot (Political) a.nd 6th (legal) connlttoeo 
chould diBcuoo the matter jointly,
Tho delegate of India reiterated the reasons for hie
I'-rairot Gou'R;. Africa vJion it \W'0 diooucscd 
by: t::e Zat and Ctli ccnmittecc* but t::.c N'cuth Africmi deloA^ato 
luDlctod tbgt tl:o matter wco c-nc Y;it3d.Ti t!ic demostic 
103.;' of CouthL Africa coz:tenui%"g that the Capetci'A: .Agi'ecnDntB 
did not give floe to Intezi^otlcnnl legal ohllg:itionr. olnco . . 
they had nevGT heen olgnW rcrmylotoreâ as treaties "by tlio 
league of ÎTaticcio fend, that M o  govpz'rmcat M â  not violated . 
human zTlghts' a$ a signatory , to the Cliaz'tcr mi tho that
sin CO hu:.wa: rights w;ero ) v ere definod In the CMa^tor, no . 
monber state could be &;ald to Izave undertaken legal; cbllgat- 
ions in regard to ouch mattero, Co thus roàoDortçd hla gov— 
omszGiit'^ g claim t'""./ h a low oral Aooonbly was not oc.*%ct:^t 
to de,aL velth a matter, within the domestic jurisdiction of 
üouth Africa* IWvozthQlesc, he put for;;ard a propocol* w M c h  
W0.5 Guppoi'tod by the uziitcd Kingdom and Sweden, that the. 
International Court of Juotioe ohoi^ld be asked for an advloory 
opinion as to whothor or not the matter ?;as eccentially one of 
domestic jurisdiction*
fliO fact that this proposal was rejected b}:" tlie General 
Aooembly in ylongry session by s vote of 31 to 21,. with 2 
abotentlonO;(14) indicated that there was a large ceotlon of 
opinion la t cnoral Asoonbl\f which conoidered that the 
Interxstle ,rt of Juctioo was tho most Gultable org^æ
for offering gnidanco ùiKïor, .Articlo'ASG.. of the Ghartei* to a 
political fcrum, like the Aseembly, on a matter which required 
legal intorpretetlon* It.will be recalled that when the 
lea .quo cf mations v^ ao in exlot enoo* the remanent Court of 
InternationM Juotlce liad molntalned that a matter net reg- 
ulatod li: principle by International lew* in the abcence of 
International treetiee which placed dbligationo on the parties
to ni30h solely within the doneotlo
diotlm of . a ;v"T3i ancl with thlo :l-n nlnl cever'^l " 
liatlons folt . that it wsu (lesinible In the iicpizte .
het'veen " %' and 3outh .^ bfrlea that the International Oonrt 
of Jnstloo a^iùüld advl,ao the Gonoral AseonhJr; whqthcr tb-3 
Oapotoi% Agrooinente Ï:ïaâ the .force of international troütino 
vmloh placed le^al oiligatiea'e on fpntli Afrloa an<l 'tht*!3 ' - 
rsnovod t:ic pnootlon from tho donestlo ju;rlnaictim of that 
otato, ycr;luoo$ clnoe rcnc ctato.o oi.:.ooofl Indla% oontontw. . 
ion that tlm matt01* waa not v;lthln the sphere of donootlo 
jm'ir'Alotlm m  the that tho ontZ: A.frloan gores^ment
had irlclotol the %frinolpl.e8 of the Charter rolatzr JO l a m n  - 
right8) tZioy Gonoldered it neoassary that the opinion of the 
International Oowt ohonld he songht on the legal InplleatlonG,
if any^ of artloloB of the Charter*. 3ut$ ao .
already :;ez:tlonod^  .the .majority of ntatoa fjzially took the 
vlei? tla^ v t''3 a#ice of the Oonrt was nzmooeosaTw, and the 
GenerrZ '"jc-tlr, approved a rosGlntlonj^ by a vote .of 3:^  to 15^
TJivh 7 .'stcAtlcna^ which rnprccocd the opinion that the
uruatrj.., of of InClan origin In South Africa should
be In unn3o:r!tr v^lth the international olzligation^. under 
.the Ca^atcw: ooa the.relevant. provl<^i{%:3 of the
Oharterf 'md .at^ koâ the two partlo^% to the dispute to report 
to the nc:r!; co::cien of the ûonor^O. Aonomhly*(lI/) It thus 
impliolt in tha resolution that tho GonoreJ. ..f<!s:;G.ably did not 
rc^trd tho  ^ leiplc of non.#lntarve3:3tlon uni or Article 
psrafpnigh GO. a .denial of its anthorlt^r to diocueo the onu*# 
otanoo of the oaao tmd to roeo:%aono. a lino of approaoli foz"
Itc; pacific octulonontj, notnnlthGtandins the elain by tho dol";^  
egate of ijontli /irrioa that thie a contravention of the
article and omtrary to the intentlona of those who had
araftea it at Bar iclsoo* . -
Reports oubslttcci by India and South Africa at the 
OGOond ooGslon of the General Aoseïihly in Z.947, when lokiotoa 
bocac:e a party In the 0SBe$(16) indloateci thot no x^rogreos 
hod boon zado to settle the cuesticn^ and In .ouboeguent OGSO'» - . 
Ions of the Aosenbl^^ the delegation of South Africa adherea 
to the olaiia t:r"u the United ZJations ra%' no right to Interfere 
in a matt or. out side international jnrieiiotion# wae . - ..
countered by the Indian delegatees aooertlon in tl^ Political 
Ooimlttcc of the .Asccdhly in Key) 3» that any argument 
baood on the doméatic jurisdiction reeorvatlon imder Article A 
-Sÿ. paragraph 7# o'* the Ghorter was invalidated by .the right . : 
of . the Asoenhly. to dlscuoe and make rocommendationa on any 
matter witMn the ecope of "the OMrter under Aziiicle 10^ 
provldod it v;ae ziot seised by the Security Cornell * (17 )...aio3 A 
"V:.e8 taiiteoiount to claiming that, the A..ooemblyTau compot02:3t to 
disGuas n%%:e reeo^ïaendatione on the matter * ^ cther or not 
it iTOc within the domestic jurisdiction of a lino,
with tlie l::torpretatlon of Article c', paragraph 7» for­
ward by -zanterpachty vis* that since the term _ tc /ontion . 
wao a tochnioal term implying a peremptory, dammed sccoispan^c^ . j 
hy enforoczcnt) or the threat of erforcozcz^t^ la: the event of '..' 
non«*co.3pll^'nco^ it followed that the Aoco^ nA-ly was competent, 
under tin article net only to die cues and investigate a ait— 
nation 03:* dlsiaite firlcing cut of a m;ittor OBCc^^tlnlly witMn.. . . 
the dommtie jnrioilctlcn of a statc^ hut also tc aadrmo 
recoYnmci.y3D.tiono to a state dnrcetl^r oonocm'ned to facilitate 
a pcacofnl oottloment of the mattcV) ci^ ics noBB of those pro- 
oeduroc aznc-nntod te intervontlgn .b: the accentod legal meaning
c f  the term* th is  r.ryunent; Ziowove::\ the
InCl'-n deloreto ctlll attecptee to tko Asncchly'c
rlglit to deal v;ith tlie quootio]i oz:. the that it wre
not a mettco: rlthlzi the âcnôatic jurrlodlétlni cf Sc^ uth. Africa.,} 
fo r  ho .alco m iiltita ined th a t the co n tra c tu a l o h li,g itic n n  a.os- 
urmd. by Gouth Af%*lca %:nler the Copotown ^canontc, oj:id a
is
state*E T)lo%o under Artlole 9() of the  ^ !;er to t:iko joint 
czil Bopar'Zte n o tio n  in-'coopioratlon w ith  the H nitod R ations 
f c r  _ ,n ''o„io :a  o f reopèot fo r^  mid obo rr-nno ' f*  hir^o::..
'%"nur,n.,cmtal :b:'oQ%rK.^ f statml in Aadzldo.^S^ ro-*#. 
iLOTol iho :'" Xor froni Idie op/ere of lone ntla tlon*
'.he Indian dclag.:tc*o Intorprct&tlou of Artlolo 56 of
the Glainjz* pronptcc tZio lontZi Afrlcim cslc^ To to wazvi the 
P o lit ic a l CG nnltt00 t lia t i f  i t  aeeeptoi euoh a %ylen\. the dooz* 
w;ould bo oponol to bnitou Ratlmo Interference not only in  
questions re la tin g  to  hnm'i:^ ! r i^ ts .^  bu t nloo jn  o th e r m atters 
re fe r ra l tq .:W  A a^lo le  55 v lilo h  Involvad the  eomoiziic and 
oooial 2)ollelee of otaton, lot surni*lthigly$ thorefoi'o^ the 
d o la j itoe on a-eiroral :u "ten^ in e lu lin g  tho^ U n it e l ;il::igdon 
one .'ir:%^ca^ onproonLi view tZiat tlie  quj:. .-i-.n ./Z:'"\;ld bo 
.re fe iru i tn  tlm  Into?,viatlonal Ooirrt o f J im tloe  fo r  on a l^ e o ry - 
opinion^ I I  u n ila v iu n  botwoon a'le lioprta.nen f n i lo l  to  o ffo o t 
a so lu tio n * fuv the  Znlina  delogetc wao o lo a rly  rmzioua t o . 
oeouro aoecptmioe o f a re so lu tio n  wMoh \;ould asse rt the  
ro y p o n o lb lllty  o f the Aooonbly in  quootione in v o lv in g  lmna% 
ziyh^o and roDomaenci the appointment of a ooimloolon to 
In q u ire  in to  oh c jc  o f ra c ia l d isc rim in a tio n  aga inst 
%)eoi>lé. o f fad: in and ZaZiic'mn o i'ig in  in  South A frio a * Ih io  
wao 3iot aoGGpted by t ' l r  B o lit lo a l Oomalttee^ but i t  approved.
a draft- resolution oponoored by hezioo and franoe which . 
reùonmeziûed tiiut the dioputaniu choiilu be invited to Goek 
a settle : cf the dispute throngn clecueeion at a round 
table ce^iferénce* and tcIcG into aeocnnt the pi;i\'Oees and 
principles of the vhurtor and the Universal lyccl-ai'atlon ' 
vtYhioh had been adopted 3'jy the Aeueally ii': laoenborg 1948#
I'hio w&o adeptod by the Aeeeably by a veto of 47 to 1, with 
10 abotentlcnUg on 14 hoy lg4g,(lS) but the negctiations for 
holding roui.,'üablo conference, fell through, and "men 
India, in 1950; reqncntod that further coneiêeraticc ehould 
be given to the a':Ltor by the ioeerbly, that body z'oferred 
it to Ito Ad Toe I'Olitichl Gozulttoo*.
fhe dobate izi the AI Hcc iolltioal Oommittec in lyo^ c^hboi' 
1950; dealt almost entiroly with the eztcnt to ohioh the gen­
eral z'ulo of non-intorvontIon under Article f, paragraph 7$ 
farrod the Aeaembly from taking at ope to bring -about a peace— 
iul settlement of the al3puto#(19) Hitherto the A.aeembly. 
had ooDoiderodltBelf oompcuent to decide ite ocm comyetenoe 
In tlic.matter rithout a formal' vote, but on this oocaolon the 
chairman ruled that the liecuscion \YOuld pi'ocoed on both the 
quoetlcn c-f competence and the eubotancc of the item, and. that 
a vote.world be t ho: on the qucelion. of cempetoncc prior to 
vet lay on any y cvC'-le auhnitted*
fziG delegates of thoeo eta tee that argued that tlie 
Assembly was  ^.._j/ctent to deol with the quosbion - ScuD.dor, 
India, Iraq, iicbnncn, He%loo, lokistnn, the Philippines, the 
United Gtates, Umguoy and Yugoslavia - attempted to do so 
not by advcnolng the lauterpacht interpretation of Article 2, 
paragraph 7, vl:;# thot the general rule of non-intervention
JiD matters essontlolly wltliZD the dciacotlc jurioOlotlon of 
atatea did not precludG ..xoaourum oliort of coorclcn, but by 
puttlzig fcrvard ro'ucons why tZic qucotlcn wio ciitoido the 
a%;bere of dcmoutlo jurladictiGn, ;:o vliat tl;-' I'ule
of non-intorventlcn.waa not r.ccllcablo, hbo polnto ivhloh 
they advanood nay bo smc:arloac. co follcwo:
(1) A matter A?hlch threatened to Impair relations between . .
otateo or 3eopa.%'dl8e international, peace and oeourlty,.. 
aueh as tho South Afz^io&n government*s diacrimlnatcrjw 
measures _:st minority raolâl groups, oeasod to be 
essentlEïlly witMn the domestic jurlodlotlcn of a state# 
(11) .South Africa had vl.ol8tod certain intematicnal oblig­
ations uiiàoi' the Capotovm Agreemontc,
(ill) The obli;'tlono ascumed by .South Africa .under the human- 
righto articles of the Charter of the United Retiens 
were sufficient to establlch the competence of the 
'r tod -%atiGne to ccnBider the quositlon imd to no i^o 
roe: _ ^udatlonc In accordance with Articles 10 and 14 
of the 01'.art or#
(Iv) Though the Univoroal Déclaration of Human Righto ht;ia 
' r.c legal binding force, It itnpcsed the moral obligation,
on hembers of the United Rations not to odopt legislat­
ive meacuree which viclatcd human righto*
for .theoc rcaoons it w3o eooertod th.at the AG8e.:R)ly was 
coapote'dt to alsousc and moke rccomaendaticna. on the natter to 
effect ito pacific oettlenent* Rut the delegate of South 
Africa, supported by the delegates of Greece and .Australia, 
argued.that Article P, paragraph 7, of the Charter prohibited 
the 'Asse%5bly from dealing with the question under Articles 10
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and 14 bccauoe It was a matter within the domosliio juzlüdlotl.0%1 
Cl tlie Jouth AfiioLLi government* TZioy canuoncnd that it was.
I. aoneGüie aattor foi' tho Icllowing 3?eaacna:-
(i) Rie pocple cf and Pnhlotan orlgl- referred to
in the caoo were aoubh Africain citiaeno whoso , otatuo 
ond rights 'were t W o  within the juris diet Ion of the 
UeuGh African governuent.
(11) The OapGtovm /i^rrccmenta.of IfPT .and 193S, which defined 
the ctatuo of the minority racial croupe conoomed, did 
not have the.force of International treaties, snd there­
fore did. not involve Internatlenal legal obligations 
which .ronoved tho question from the ephere of r gotic 
juriodietion*
(ill) That a mcaber ctato cf the United natlcns iwac not obliged 
to carry out the huinen righto. proviolcDG of the Ohorwer, 
ineludina the pledge under Article 56, had 'been isado 
clear by the architects :cf tbs Chcruer, for it had been 
agreed at fan franciecc that * nothing contained in 
Ohnpter I%********oan bo con&itrued as. giving authority 
Ic the United Zlationo to.intervene in the doaeotic 
niTciro cf aenler dtatca** (uR Conforenon cf Internation#! 
bA_.rh_:K.a_j!iie^ as— r^^2.I6j5.*._iql.#lv «bf.'i-,'":. *, )
Ihio Bunrary of the arguments for and against the ooi:!- 
petcneo of the Aaccmbl^' to dicoucG and make recommendationzi 
on the question emphasised the i^oed for the clai'ifioatioz: of 
oevoral oontrovorslal issueo by the judicial organ of the 
United fatioDS, the International Court of Juatioe* Ooz'tainly, 
this applied to the question whether the Capeto'wn Agreemento 
involved the legal obligations of international treaties, mid
( f
to the quootion whothor the human righto artlclec of the. 
Cha%"tcr had a legal force which,invalidated berth African 
government * c claim that the treatment cf percons cf Indian 
and faklnt;!:: origin was n matter cf doncctic jn:','lsdiotlon, 
hut nc attempt vao made to ocol. the rruidanoo cf the Inter­
national Court of Jurtlce, end on 16 hovorbcr 1950, the 
.Ad Hoe Political Ccarnittec declared itself oc .pctcnt to con- 
sidor end vote on propocale relating to the question by a 
vote of 35 to 3, %aith 17 abetentlono* llzio the flrat 
occasion that a formal vote on the cinectlcn of eonpetenCG 
hod been t(=h:an*. ' .
In the light of the don franolooo dlsoushiono that 3_od 
to the inclusion of Article ?(7) in the Charter, the Beuth 
African delegate could justifiably oialn that it had not 
been the intention of those who had drafted the artlclo to 
empower the Aeeetbly to interfere in e natter involving a 
state* G treatment cf its ovai nationals* fdut the vote on 
the losuo of cczipetcnoc in the Hoc rclltical Oonnittee 
of the Asss-bly had ohcon that the majority of ototCG were 
doternlned to Interpret the .principle of non-intcrvonticn in 
accordance with their political or nor-1 predllectlcno, not 
from a legal standpoint, and . the fact that they wei*c unwill-, 
lag to sock the adviscry logcl opinion of the International 
Ccurt Geeacd 10 ind1cate their fear that they mlght receive 
advice vhlcli wcule. net su.p%:ert interprétation of
Article 9(7}* the fact vac that the tack aoairçncd to the 
United "Tatlona Oommiesicn on Humam Righto, te forirulato cov­
enants which would tranofoiT. the moral orlipatlcns of nomber 
ctatcc cf the United Hat lens under the. Univoren.l Rcolaratlon 
cf Humr.n dl.ghtc into Icgallj' llndlng chli.ratlcne, had onl^ r
just befTun, mid no particular international oonventlcn on
7S
the elimination of oil ferme of laoial dioori:;iinaticn had yet 
been draftod#
Iho fact that the Univerwil leclaraticn of Rumen Righto 
wae a moral appeal to rulers to roopeot sad observe human 
rights, which had. not created ony legnl. obligations,, was 
emghaslsGd by the Oouth Afrlce.n dc_ Jo In a statement vmloh 
he made to the 21 Political Gommlttee after It had voted . 
on the question of compotoDce* Olecrly, the moral principles 
of the Universal Dcolar&ti.OD; which called, for the eliminat­
ion of all forms of discrimination against human beings, were 
not going to deflect his government from proceeding with its 
policy of apartheid* or raoju 1 eogregatlcn, .which had been 
intrcdaood in Jouth Afz'loa, in 1950$ the Grcup .Arccc
Act; for the pmrpose of dividing the population Inuo threo 
racial groups, aahlte, nallve ctnd colouza^d; and there were 
sevoi'al condomnatory refci'e.oceo to Thio in tho n:oetings of 
M  Uoc rolitioal Committee, . In fact, the .crafw résolut- . 
ion appro%^cd by the Comiittoe cn the complaints by. India and 
Pakistan against Uoath Africa, which was adopted bj' the Ace- 
enbly In %:lo.nary oeseion on f Deoemhei* 105C; included .a rof- 
orcncc to the p.:oliey of apartheid . ae Anoocsoarily. based on 
âoctiinoc of r-.:-alnl âlacrijinntlcn*, before recc-arendlng that 
the. throe otatùo oheul:l hole a round-table conference *on the 
baoic of thcli" ogToed agenda, ijid bearing in mind the pzrovis- 
ions of.the Charter of Lho United Untlono and of the Univer­
sal Iccl&c'ition of 3a;con. highto% It also rocczm.ended that 
if tho q.ovoirmionte coneernoG f-llcd tc reach a.groorant in the 
.roimd-tablo u.cnferonce within c rLaaGna.ble tiao, a commiBOion 
Ghculd be ngj/ointod to acolot the partioo in ecrrying out 
apprc^.riato negctit,tlonL*(fC)
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can thus be seen from the iiamcilliig: ci tlio
case from IfaG to 1950 that, It had consiaeroc: itself compet­
ent, without f the advice of the Intci'ncitlcmal Court of
Juhtico, to adopt variouü f;rooadurea in a ca-oc o.C alleged 
violation of liuman rights, notwithstanding the claim of the 
5;COUoea atate that uuoh proooduree oonti'avoned the pi'inclple 
of non-l:/boza:ention i'o aattero essentially Yfithln the dom- 
ockle juriaClotion of otatoo under Article.f, paragraph 7, 
of the Clirrtor* flioae procedurea included iflaelng the quest­
ion on it G ag'onda, discuocing it, and making rcoo^wiendatlons 
for its mniflo aettlement which had not been intended by . 
thoGO who di'ofted. Article f, paragraph 7, at the San ^ranoloco 
OoDfereDCc, But the iBoeably had atterupted to justify its 
competence by Iv:plying in Its reeolutione that the human 
righto (laoution being dealt with wuB ziot. a matter^.es&Gntiolly 
within the doaoatic jnrlcdlotlcn of South Africa on the 
grouzido A;het (1) the disputente had ontcrnd into contractual 
obligations by acoepting agreemento which.hem the legal force 
of mi intezmational.treat3^; (11) the linnnn righto proTioicns 
of the Charter' and the Universal Declaration cf Hunan hlghts 
ImpGSCd Çibligatlone on a member state o.f the United î^atlonc 
to observe certain Btondardo of conduct in tZio treatment of 
its naticnals without diotinotion cm to race, ,ne%, longuage, 
or rGllglc::: and (ill) tl.m eltnation canned by the houth 
African govornzozifn diDO%'l:ulnator,y acamuren againat minority 
groups under itn rule impairod Intor-otate relations* hince, 
therefore^ the Aononbl^^ did not consider that the question 
was Genontiolly within the domes tic juriaiictloz) of South 
Africa, it oonoluded that it wan not contravening the general 
rule cf non-intorvention by adopting the prooodures referreu
GO
to above*.
It Is import cm t to reallso; however, that so far ell 
that the Aosombly had considered Itself compétent to do in 
the case was tc 03:ert moral prosouro on -the state acensed of 
violating human righte to ocopcrate la achieving a pacific 
settlement of the matter through ooecrving the ^irlnolples 
relating to human righto in the Charter, and the nnlvereal . 
Declaration of Hunan Rights, Though the AsBembl^^ had IndlO"* 
atqd in ito reoolutlono that the situation caused by the 
polic)^ of the Couth African government towards perscno of 
Indian and I'ekiotan origin threatened to impair rolaticna 
between the otateo Involved in the dispute, it h&d not re— 
qncatod t;).o : eourity Council to deal with the matter as a 
throat to Intomatlcnal peace and oconrit^- under Chapter 7 
of the Ch.artcr, so that enforcement ineETc%.;rea night bo oonGid— 
ez/od undei" the exception tc .the general rule cf non- 
intervention under Azrticle f, pr.rngranh 7*
After 1950 the Couth .African government continued to 
deny the ociapetonce of t%:e Assenbly to deal v/lth the question^ 
end Ignored the Aeaembly * a cell to suspend its Implemezitation 
of the Group Areas Act whilst the atte:ipt ?;as being made to 
arrange c round-table conference to exploz'c ways and means cf 
settle ,ho dispute* In fact, negot'iaticns to convene the 
conferenoe ocoii broke down, ^nd later a HA Good Offioec 
Coimnleslon which v;aa cq)pointed l/y the Aseerbly at Ito oevonth 
session in 1959, to arrange and aaclet negotiationo between 
India, Drdcistan and douth Africa, (91) wac not r'cccgnlscd bqf 
the Goutb African government* govcrnnent continued to
pay no lieod to the moral appcnlc .of tho Assoabl^^ to modify
iU3 policq/ tcwaz'da Itm nubjcotn cf Indian and lakiatan 
origin, o./!.d ii:ointod that Article 9(7) of the Gi-az-lor lec- 
hibitod rU. .Torno.cl" InterA'eronoo Ir; iratioro of oo'rouilc jur— 
iudiction, oxocpt the omthcm'Ho'iticr of cnforcorcDt oraaourec 
by tbo Aiccurlty Council to deal with. br.rc,rt;: to International 
pooco and aocnrlty m^icing out of ouoli nnttoz'o*
The general quaatlon of srace conflict alleged to have 
arloen from tizc .A^ outh Africsm .government*o pcllcioo of. 
n par the id considered as a ',ate Item the .
Assembly in 195^# but before tZii.o matter in examined, it In 
l^ropoaeu to deal with two other cases .which highligiited the 
controversy' over the Intoz'pretaticn and application of the 
domestic juriodiotion I'eacz'vation imder Article 9(7) cf the 
Ghartcr in 1R4B and 1949, one in Y.hich tn.c. .,:evict Hnion was 
accused of ""/iolatlng; the righto of <,oviet vivos.of foreign 
olti^onc who wlsleci to leave Rusoia to join their hnsb^zhds 
abi'oad, the c Involving the alleged denial of haoio 
human rights to ccrtcln elcrico in A^uljarln, hungary azid. 
Rumania*
Zhe question involving the .olli deniol of basic 
rights to Aoviat vrives of foreign oitisens, vmloh the deleg­
ate of .Chile rcqaeeted tc be placed oz:- the agenda of the A.ss- 
emtly^^E tliird z'egular socsion in 1948, was entitled* The
Human Rl^ .dita* traditional iAlplomatic fra otic os ^ and other 
Irincicles of the .Oharter.(S2j A.ooordlng to the Chilean 
oo%iplalnt, the measureo taken ky the to prevent
doviet wives. Including the daughter-in.4Law of the forner 
Chilean Ambassador In Moscow, from leaving Russia to join
thoir liunkanin anrnid, cnnstitutcn viciation;.; of t/io hunon 
j?igbtn ar:f.'lolon of the C.licrtar, co woll o.o traditional dip— 
lorotlo praetloos, ond o.t Ito plonaïqj 'aeetiro on 94 OO'vuODber 
1Q48, tho Iseor.bly: rcfoz'rod the qnootlcn to ito 6th (Z^ egol 
Conr.ittoo) to oonoldezy a Chilean draft roaolutior requiring 
the Asnembly to recomrnend tho withdrawmil of .the moasures oom- ' 
plained of^ mid also an Auotralion draft rooolution which 
called for an advisory oipinlon from the International Court 
of Justice on tv;o iesuec, the text of which read as follows;
( ^ ) to what extent do the nrivily'^ qc and_ linnmiltioo yrranted 
to the 3:0''d of a foreirrc. mibBion In aopordmioo with dialomatio 
prnoticec traultlonally eoi yl-^ shed by Intomational law 
ext .end to hlq family and to hio establlebmont? and (11) in 
partipular, ie the action of a otate in prevontina one _pf ito 
no.tion<ils who ip the w/ife of a of f)' forel.vn dinlomotio
miselon, or of a ncmhor of hie family, or of Ills establishnent* 
from leavin «" ito territory with her huoband, or in ox'der to 
join her ?iUBhend* ,^^a bresoh of international law?
...lerinc the debote in the Gi^ rbZi Oomnlttee it wae cl.almed 
by the Ohllean delegate that the.measures taken.by the 
were violetiono not only of the human righto art loi es cf the 
Charter - the freenble. Articles 1(3), 55 %nd 55 were all 
cited - but "-fLoc of certain articles of the draft Uniirers'fL ., 
heolnratj.on of Hunan Highte wTiioh bad ieen a%>proved, at that 
5tage, by the Third Commit tee of the AsG0D:bl;/,(23) mid of a 
resolution of the economic and Rooial Council*(94) But all 
theae olaints were refuted by the delegate of the fovieZ: Union 
on the groimdo that the grantin.r of exit vises and marriago 
le.nielatlon were natters of ccnoatio jurisdictio?i, and the 
reference to human rights was irrelevant. As to the alloga'kicn
that diplomatic prcctlcoo hod been contrnvoocd In the ccoe 
of the üoiirh.toT^iTi-low of too foo.T'cr Clilloon Anhaosodor Ih 
;losooT'\ ho mointoinod that dlplonotlo immunity did not extend 
to oil 7:tembors of n diplomatie family, and ho ?;arned the 
Cor mit too that it could net lerl with the nuortlon wltliout. 
violating the p:rincij)le of non-intenrenticn in nsittcro ess­
entially' withlz: the domeotio jurlBolotlon of states under 
Article .9(7) of the Charter*
Ihoi'o vm-8 ruch to justify' the doE^ii'abllity of r of erring 
the case to the International Ooui't of Juoklce for an advisoi'y 
opinion, as rocoimnended by: the Ai^ oetralian delegate^ in view 
of the dlvorgenoe of vlev^ B Izi the Ooimnittee on the legal 
a.8peot. 101:* inotonoe, It was the moviet view timt unciei;
Article 15 of tha Canbridge he^gulGtions cn diplomatic Priv­
ilege 0 adopted ay the Institute of International maw on 13 
August 1695$ tac was entitled to ôoclde the subjeot
of the o:{lt of its oitluene from the country, cnc that the 
matter waa vherofore within its homootic jurisdiction. On 
the other hand, the Chilean delegate calnta.ined that by 
vli'tue of Article 19 of the provl;;lono laid down by the 
Institute of International lew at Oxford in Auguet, 1895g 
Members of a diplomat*o fomily, by the nere fact of living, 
in hie house, enjoy^ed diplemetio immunity, and thum did not 
come under the penal or civil r'i:rindiotlon of the etato to 
which the diplomat vmo accredited. Indeed, it wee ceoauoe 
of such difforenceo of opinion that the Australian delegate 
was anxlouo to obtain the ' ffuidanoc of the International Court 
of Justice* and in 8UpT)ort of this approach he quoted résolut- 
ion 171 which had been adopted by the Assembly in 1947$ accord­
ing to which it was *of paramount import once - that the Court
chculd bo iTuilized tr the .yrcctort pccolblo cztont in. the 
prCitroGoiTc cevclopma-t af Internal::'cn.al ].rw, bet?; in regard . 
te legal inei'on ketwoeii Otetee; end 1?: regard te ccretituticn!il 
intorpreteticci*. But the Committee rejected the /'uotralien 
irrft reeoluticn b^r 13 votoc to 9, with ].C abetez3Clone^  a 
furtlxor Inetenee of the reluetei^ ce of the majority' to seek 
..the aivloo of the Oeui't oe the or- 'r most qu^ illfled to assist 
the pelivioal ergons of the Hnitel Rati one In determining 
whether , or not c matter was eesertially v;itkin the domootlo 
juzriodictlon of a otate e.oooi'oin^  ^to the .criterion of inter— 
no.tionel law. In feet, it woo the Chilean draft résolution; 
to some extent modified by' an amfsndment; put forward by Prance, 
and îTuroay, t.hot wac finally epprcved by tlio firth Cccnlttce 
cf the Arooubly#.
.hue iro.uoh delegate had omyhaolood, in off cot, that if. 
.the .Aooec.Tjly ocfU.d not aooume oonpetenoe in. .the question 
because it w-uo )?ot oovei''ed b;7 International ayreoaont under 
which the D.b.h.R* had aooe.pted loya.l ohll.qatlcnc, its oompot— 
e.o.oe in the .TAattcr would have to be claimed on the ground that 
the oltustlon ".as likely to cauao an imnairmont of friendly' 
relstlona hetwoen the etmtea directly Involved, eo It
could act imder Article.14 of the Okarter to effect a pcnoc- 
ful adjz^ etTnent of .the mattnr* and It io elgnificont tAmt the 
draft roeojution reooru'cnded b'" tha Oommlttoe, which waa
endormodk'.by .'^:b.e Acae::bl;/ in plenary; eeaolon b-y a iroto of 39 
to G, with ll:abatontlonc;(f5) took thio into account. Having 
invoked .t'lo human rights artioleo of the Charter, artloleo 13 
and 16 of the Hniveroal Z^ 'cclaratlcn cf Hunan Rirbte, and the 
Hconoalc and '^ c-elal Council reeclution 154(711) D, tc which
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reference bas already "been iitade, the Aesœ^bly declared that 
*tbe Koasures which prevent or coerce the %ivc8 of cltlzeno 
of other natlonnlltieo from leaving their country of origin 
with their husband8 or in oz'do): to join them abroad, are not 
In oonfon^lty with the Charter; and that when thoee meaquroo 
i^cfer to the y/ivee of ^^ ersione belonging to foreign diplomatic 
miRBionB, or of mê^ibero of their families or retinue, they 
ere contrary to courtesy, to dlplomstio practioes end to the 
principle of reolproolty, and are likely to inpair friendly 
relations (mong nations* # It thu% reco^ nziicndeb the. Governmont 
of the U'.R.D.H* to "withdroAŸ the mouonrea which it had taken 
to prevent Govlet v/ivcc from leevlnr" s^uesia to join their 
buabande abrO'Sd*
The question of the observance of huMsn rights in 
.Bulgarie: m d  Hungary requested to be placed on. the agenda 
of the.AiSseaolj by" the delegate , of AuBtralia. oz] IB March 1949» 
The item was entitled Cboervance of fundenentel freedoms and 
hu-::an ri^zhts in lul^ ^^ az/ia end RunrA%'%''. IneludinfZ the gueetlgn 
l Q # _ a Æ  Myil W___mlation to _ r e o ^
trlalc pk ,ph^ 3:ùh leadero. end this groposai and a.nother gut 
for^^ard by the Bolivian delegate that the Assembly should 
study the legal proceed Inga against Cardinal Minds senty,
Roman Catholic Hrimate of in relation to Articles
1(3) eact 55(c) of the Charter, were -presented as a ' joint 
item At tho t'hlro oeosion of the Aaaer-bi^ f in the following 
ter^ za;
havln/3.1 Yd to the provisions cf the Ghartei' and of the 
Peace 1;3?eatle:g* ^.the question of the ol^oeryancc in Huljrarifz 
and bunf5:az;y of hu)2an rlKrhto and fundamentol froedome^ includ­
ing" quootiong; cf religious end civil llbcrtios. with egcoij^
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r e f r e c e n t  t r i a l s  le a d e rn *
th e  o p p o s it io n  o f  c e r ta in  d é lé g a tio n s  to  I t c  
conBlderotiOH bj: the  Assembly f o r  the  reaeon thmt i t  c o u e t i t -  
uted in te r fo re n o e  in  th e  dcmeetio ju r ls d lo t lo n  o f the two 
a ta te s , who were n o t then membore o f  the  U n ited  h a tio n e , th e  
Assembly refezTed th e  m a tte i' to  i t s  Ad Hoc P o l i t i c a l  G o im iiltt- 
ee, w h ich  dlnoucsed i t  from I'B to  .92 A p r i l  1949#(96)
The taajority? o f  deleg%te8 In  the  vommlttee took the  
v iew  th s t  o inoe m in o r ity  Gommunist .groups had oeioed power 
In  f u l  rrZ a  end i snd ouppreosed p o l i t i o a l ,  c i v i l  and
religious liberties in contravention of the geaoe treaties 
undei' which th e  two e ta te s  had undoz'taken In te rn a tio n ^ z l o b l ig ­
a t io n s  in  rasp ee t o f  s;uoh r ig h to ,  the  p r in c ip le  o f  non­
in te rv e n t io n  in  m a tte rs  cG G o n tioH ly  w ith in  th e  doinestlo juz"- 
io d io t lo n  o f  a ta te a , under A r t ic le  9 (7 ) d id  n o t app ly  to  th e  
case. I t  v;as a loo .aeoe rted  th a t  .A rtio le o  55 56 o f . th e
C h a rte r hzcu x t queotionB In v o lv in g  human r i" h : ;s  w ith in ,  the  
ocmpotenos of she But these c la im s were re je c te d  .
by th e  de lega tes .o f the  , Dhe Ukz'a inian the  .
'Byeloruosittn Oseoho$lovakiG, Poland and Yngcnlavia ao
Or violation of the principle of ncn-lnterfercnoe in the internai 
affaire of ota tea#
The draft resolution whioli ?;aG e.gpz'ovod by the Ad Hog . . 
Polltlo?il OcMT;;lttee, and later endorsed by. the Aasombly In
plenary session by a vote of 54 to 6, with 9 abateatlone $(67)
/ ■
%.'cad as fo llo ^ 'S ;
Tho General .Aeecmbly,
.ConnlCoring t w t  one cf the  purposes of th e  h n ite d  B a t—- 
&ons in to achieve internr!tlonal co-operation in gronot—
lag; and encouraging reoaeot f o r  hnh':an r ig l i t e  ond fundog;- 
e n ta l .freedomo fo r  a l l ,  w ith o u t d lo t ln c tlo z ^  to  ra ce , 
sex, %!:nguage o r ro ll^ 'io n #
0*3
OonGiderlnc thot the Governsents of Bulgaria and- 
Mungm'y have boon accused, before the General Aasembly, 
of acts contrary to the gurpooec of the Hnited Rations 
and to their obligations under the Peace Treaties to 
eneure to all pernozio within their roopeotlvo jurisdict­
ion tlie enjo^naent of human rlghte and fundamental free- 
dome,
1* :3:preoees its deep concern at the- grave aocLZMlono 
zgxlnst the Governaonts of Bulgaria and 
/r, zJi::g the suppreoolon of humsn rights and IwcRiiental 
rcc.cüo in thoce countries; ' . -
9# - hct(( ;;ith oatiofaction that steps have been taken 
by GOV,».1 Htateo algnetorlee to the reaoe Treaties with 
_nl _ «uid :.wngaiy rsgcrllng theee accusations, and 
o::^raLet\ "uhe l.C; o th.it'^mcuoures will be diligently 
' ^ r^Lltwa,' ZD accorasnce with tae Treaties, in order to 
en.jurc ros:,oct for auman rights and funda::GAtal. f reedoms# 
3» 0 0U u%\geetly crrwc tho'attez3tion of the Goveirnment
of I L l r e n d  hunger;; to their obligations læàer the ' 
PeaO'j ^Z'cjzivs, ' Including the obligation to co-operate 
in the ^jOvüloment cf all'those questions;
4# ^.acides vo retain the question on the «-' onda of the 
fourth sregular ecsslcn of the General ASu':* ^_y of the 
United Ratione#
This rcsclation thus illustrâtes the point that the 
Asee;,galy considered itself compétent to deal with a ?oattor 
Glalaed by etateo to bo within their domestic jurisdiction for 
two rcaoonü; that the contractual obllgatlono assumed by Z'Ul— 
garis and Hungary undeiytho peace treaties had removed the 
questic:: of ensuring hmaon to their oitiamis from their
domestic jurisdiction, and that the ocnduct of the two govern— 
mento wae contrary to the purposo of the United Rations in 
gZ'onotz rcc^'OCt for ' bnmah rlg^ta though Bulgoria end Hungary 
were not monuez^a of the United Ratlcno.
hater, in Octobmr 1949, after Rumania had been accused 
cf hwan-i'lghwB violations cinllar to those thnt ?:ad been made 
againat Bulgaria and Hungary, end all three otates had. z-ejocted 
the charges' of tz*esty violation made against then by states 
s^ignatory to the'peace troatles, and had r Li^ ed to appoint 
repreoerl' wlyes to treaty eo3:!::is8iona:for trie BOttlement of.
the êlGputes, whloh. It was contended, was prescribed in the 
peace treaties, the question conalderW by the Asoecbly's 
Ad ;::pg Bolltloal Oommlttco#(28) Rince Bulgaria, jjungary and 
Rumania denied the legal obligation to cooperate in the 
inatlcn-of the chsrgee brought sgainat them in this way, the 
delegates of the United states, 0.%mda and Bolivia put for- 
%';ard a propoaol that the follo:?lng quoetioDG should bo sub- 
to the .International Court of Juatico for an aù^visory 
opinion*
(1) ,c the diplomatio exchangea between Bulgaria,
and Rumania on the one hand and cei't&ln 
.ad Asaoclated lov;ero signatories to the 
'ties Of fence on the ' other, conoernin \ tha I
c.eiv' uion of "rtlcle 9 In .the Troatic: wlui |
:ri'* nil' Htmg'Ary "ad article 3 In the c.ai,/ |
wzL< ..u dig-'olo'üe dloi^utos subject tf. f.c j
prcvlelonL for the of dieputea coa;,..!ined j
fn article 36 of the -fr.eaiiy of recoe with Bulgaria, |
article 40 . of the Treaty of woaeo with Bhingnry, and I
az^tlclé 33 of the fi'^ eaty of feaoe with .Rurjonia?
In^the event of an afflmatlve rcpl^ '' to 
\li) Arc the Gcvornrients of Bulgaria, fuigary anC ob^ !
ligated' to carry out the provlsi- r < of the ériiolo, 
refeiTcd to in question (i). In alt ,n,_ tha gravis- !
iaar for the appolzitment of their rrprowcntutlvos I
tc . Tj^ c'7ty CçtmlasionsŸ " !
llll) ,f (%:': _rrt;/ fails to appoint a repz'oaoDtative to a
'tg ^ (/C3nijsi03i under the froGtiea of fo.sce with j
. auh,_uy mid -u. :i _are thz)t "liy l-.r ;
chm.irntcd tc np\.olnt a c^t'tive to Sue li'o'-tv |
vomii;iuaz,ùz^ ,^  Is the Goo''^ a''^ r''-Gcnerol of tha j
- :;;lGna autiiorisoR. to -..can.' thé vhirê aecbor o. '
yle imm.'leeion upon %;h :\ % rot of the other zi't, i
to a ixiapute according uo %.ho provioionB of the I
^ro^'P^Gtive fro.étics?
.  ^ In the event of on affirmative reply to quostion(Hl):
- (iv) woüld & Treaty woi&uiioelon composed of a ropz'cment— 
r&tlvc cf one pfJirty and a third member appointed by 
the Beoretory-ieneral c-i" the United iatioz%s ccn^itit- 
uto a OozDieelon, withlzi the lAonnlng of the relev­
ant prcets" arviolea, corupetent to make a definitive .
n:!C binding decision in. a et tl osent of a dit^pute? |
The U#8*U*R# delegation opî;oaad this spproaoh to trie 
Internsticmal Court on the ^around that the tort of :;he ti'oatiaa
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with Bulgaria, Hungary and Hutaanla olafirly stipulated that 
in all queotion'G relating to the interpretation and epplio- 
atlon of the Boace Treaties, a^greemont had to bo reaohed 
between the representatives of the United'Klngdmn, the 
United Btatoa and the Bovlet Union, and that If no Ggreamant . 
OGUld be reoohed, no action could be taken under tae peace 
treaties# In the preeezit case, the Soviet delegation aoaerted, 
there wae no Duoh agreement elnce the 2^ovlet Union did not 
roeogniOG the oxiatence of a dispute or violation of the 
Ireatleo# It thus oonoldored that eettlng up of ccmilosicns 
envieaged In the freatieB was )3ot eal.led for, and that there 
was no reason to apply for an advisory opinion by the Inter­
national Oonrt of duotlDO# But the.majority of delegatea
rejected this ^rgumezit, and the draft recolntlon which was 
to
passed the Assembly In plenary oos:;:ion included the recuoet 
to the Ocui4; to the four questions preferred, to above#. .
Cn 92 October 194y$ vnlo vms endorsed by the Assembly by .a . /. 
vote of 4? to 5$ with 7 abstontion&,(29) a procedure %;'hich 
it. had not appz'oved cf in dealing vi.th .%adie*s complei#t 
against Gouth Africa of violating the Oapetc^m Agz'oementa, 
and Chile*^ Taint against Rusoia ccncerning the Soviet
wives.0:3 eltiscns#
In its reply to the Assembly, the International Oo.urt 
of Justice made the following corrzGnt:(30)
Iho Court is not oallod upon to deal vzltb the obargos 
brought before the General Assembly since the Mziestionn 
put to the Court relate neither to the alleged violât- 
Icno of the provisions of the I'reatlee concerning hum%i: 
rl^zto [%nd fund^imental freedoms nor to the interpretmt- 
ion of the articles relating to those mattero, T.he 
object of the Request is much laore limited# It is dir­
ected oolcly to obtaining from the Court certain olarif— 
icationo cf a legnl nature rcg^irding the applicability 
of the procedure for the settlcmmit of disputes by the
Goifmiisslona provided for in the express teroB of Article
go
36 of the Treaty v/lth Bulg&iria, Article 40 of the 
-( ' with Hungary and Article 58 of the Treaty with
u fao Interpretation of the tcrms of a treaty
j-or uiiio purpoGG could not be conoldercc a question 
C800ntl<aliy within the domestic jurlBdiotlon of à 
ctatc* It is a question of Intoroationel low which, 
by itc very nature, lies within the competence of thé 
üciart#
IheoG consider aticne filec cuff loo to dispose of the 
objection baeed on the principle of dome*3tlc jurisdict­
ion w 6  directed epeoifleally agc lnet the competence of 
the Court, nan'oly, that the Bcurt. an oz'gan of the 
United ZTatlons; la bound to cbacrve the provioione of 
the Ohartei", Including Artlele 1, .paragrap!i ?..
The Intai'natlonal Court also stated that *for the 
purposes,of the present Opinion, it sufflcee to note that the 
General ABaembly justified the adoption of ite Resolution by 
stating that '^the United Yaticne, pursuant to Article 55 of 
the Charter, shall promote universal rsopoot for and obcorv— 
ance of human rights and fundamental freedoag for all without 
diotini'tion as to race, sex, Isnguege or religion -^',(31) and 
this statesient, acooz'ding to Rosalyn Higgins, ci(ailfied that 
*tne Court clearly upheld the vie»/ that,no objection could lo 
raised to tho parsing of rooolutlonc; by the Assembly, on 
grounds of Art# 2(7), when human rlghte were Involved; for 
Article 55 provided a leg/fL basle of obligation*#(39) hut it 
is difficult to see this, for the AsoGmiily^e resolution was 
no more than a roquoot, as the Court 'Itself streeeW, * solely 
to obtaining fro?:; the Court C(),:rt,ain olarifioatlone of a legsO. 
nature regarding the applicability of the procedure for the 
settlement of disputes by the OommicGionc provided for in the 
express terme of Article 36 of the Treaty with Bulgaria, 
Article 40 of the Treaty with Hungary, and Article 38 cf rhe 
Iroaty with Ho:-iania% Surely, what the Court Implied was 
that the Assembly * e.request for an opinion on the question 
was justified uodei' Ai'tlcle 55 of the Charter, not that
Article 55 Izposod & le » obligation otatoa with regard 
to respect for and obsert^snce of rights*
m  to .questions (l) .ond (11.) ccnto.inea in the ,
ABso:ahly*o Z'csolutlon, the Court declaz'ed that a dispute did 
Gxiot, and. that Bulgaria, Hungary end Humanlo were obligated to 
nominate thoii' representstlvos to the tz'eaty comzsiosiona, m d  
it set a. of thirty dâyo for the three strates tc
ooi:iply with the .opinion* Dlnco, hoiA^ sver, they failed tc nom­
inate reproigentatives within the tlme-limlt, the Court advised, 
in reply to question (111),.that the Becretary-General of the 
United UatlonG .wao not authorieed to appoint the third member 
of each ooms^icmion* In view of thls, the Court etated that the 
reply to question (Iv)^ whleb ao):W. whether a oomz^lGBicn of 
two members, one appointed by the Béozretory-Conernl and t?io 
ot.her bp a psrt^ '^ to .the dispute, would bo competent to zr.ako 
a definitive and binding doeision, net nact
. In Ifoveaber, 1950, the Aesegibly oondotiiod 'the wilful 
refusal of the ' Covernamto of 3ulgeri€i, Hun ' ry end Boaiania 
to fulfil their obligations under, the proviolons'of the 
TroatloG of leaoe to appoint regreoentatlveo to the Treaty 
Ocmmleelono, which obligation' .has been oonflrmed by the Inter­
national Court of.Justice* $ and expreosed Ito opinion that 
their violation of huznen z^ightc anJ fundo^aental freedcma 
Gbowed that they were * oallouely Indifferent to the sentlwenta 
of the world community'. It concluded Its moral oenenre of 
the three atates by inviting members of the United Rations, 
and in particular those which were parties to the Treaties of 
feaoe with Bulgarie, .!.hm.gary and aomanla, tc submit tc the 
5eoretary—General all evidence which they hold or which might
become available In future in relrtlcn to the question.(54)
In this oaoe and the other two case a which have eo far 
been examined, it may be Gkatcd that résolutions wore uaeood 
by the Assembly, notwlthstending the olalno of those ovsteo- 
aoDused of human-righto violations that Article 2(7) of the 
Oharter prohibited any form of interz^erezice in matters oso- 
entlmlly within tholr doneetlc 'jurisdiction, The msijority of 
statcG that voted for these reoolutlcna eoagkt to justify the 
Of __ ütenoo of the Assembly by claiming that the lesueo conoid- 
ered were not matters of domeotio jurisdiction mainly on the 
groundo that (1) the veriouo human-righta artioloa of tlie 
Ubarter or the Univoroal Declaration Imposed ohligatione on 
the aoouBccl etatos to promote reepoot for and. tho o'bservanoe 
of hunien rights and fundamental freodomo, without dlotlnotlon 
00 to race, B03c, language or religion, mid (11) the Btateo 
acouaed of violating human rights had broken oontractuel oblig­
ati on 8 in reopeot of certain nraotloea which they had agreed 
to obeerve under international treaties or oustooary inter­
national law* Dut In tYVo of the three caoeo - the Indian 
complaint against bouta Africa .and the Ohllean compli^int 
agalnat the U.S.B.B, - It was also impliod in the Assembly*a 
reoolutlone that the likely iiapalrmont of friendly, relatione 
between etates through the violation of human rights had 
removed the quostiono from the sphere of domeetlo jurisdict­
ion, and thuG made it noaaille for the Assembly tc acBort Its 
competence under Article 14 of the Charter to recommend 
meaBuroo for thelz" peaceful adjustznoat. In none of th% thi'oe 
oaees, therefore, did the Aeso^bly attempt to juetlfy its 
oompetmice in accordance with the view advanced by
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namely, that the general rule of ncn-Intei'vention In mattero 
essentially wltMn the domootlo jurisdiction of etatoo aid 
not preclude measures ohort of coercion. Moroovor, only In 
ono of the three cosee - the Observanoo of Hum on lllgbtG and 
DundamentGl Preedoi%B Izi Dulgsrla, Hungary and Rurzanla - did 
the '^ oot^ ably request advioor^^ opinion froo t;ie lnUei%3.tlo^ ;al 
vouru 01' JUGuico, (^ OLthough thi& procedure clearly ùcolz''— 
able in the Interest of isipartiallty in the other caseo.
A further point that needs to be atreaaed is the fact 
that the z'eoolutions approved by thsi Aaoembly in the three 
caaeo were z^ornl ezhoz'tatione to the stateo aocusaa of viol- 
ationo of Iiumon rights* they contained no requoat to the 
security Vounoll to consider the question of onforcec-ont 
noaauroe In the event cf non-oompllcnoo of the reoo'iiieudutiona 
put forward, and no attempt %a.o tiiade within the Ae:>G5bly to 
Initiate 20 ve;^  that would load that body to roconcAend c.n for co- 
Dent action against any of the. otatea for violating hmcian 
right 0$ a recoirzendation Ydiieli other aiembcr at a too cf the 
imlted Rationo would be f3?c0 to accept o%* reject*
At a lotcr stage In its history the ALSoeDbly tc 
reco.i5Zîcnd economic sanctlonB. against üouth Afz^ics beccuoe of 
the refusal of that atcto to respond to moral appealc to 
abc^men itc pclloy of apartheid. But this did not oo%e about 
until .Bo%''G%=al Dorel exhorto.tlcno addreoood to the Mouth Jfric^zm 
goveramcnt had failed to bring about o change In that gov- 
ernment*e policy#
It WÜG In Jeptember 1939 that eeverel Afro-AolB.n 
%'equeoteô that the Queetion of Race Conflict in 'South Africa
l'OBUltln-rfrcm rollcies of Apartheid cf the Goveriimmt of 
the Union of Mouth Africa (35) be placed on the sgendo, of the 
seventh Goselon of the Aooembly* In a ?noi%orrmdum submitted 
by these DtGtes,(36) It wee alleged that pcllcies cf racial 
cegregatlon in. Mouth Africa were causing an inflammatory sit­
uation which ooîïGtltuted a threat to Intei'national peace end 
a flagr. violation of the prlnolplea of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms laid down in tlie Charter, and oever^l 
inetanceg were cltod of racial dlacricinatlcn agalnet.the non- 
white populstlcn through the co,:^ Tregation of races u%Wer the 
Group Areas Act* It was thus urged that the Aoaembly chould 
uirgently concider the matter, and on 17 October 1939 the 
AGEembly, a vote of 45 to 6, with 8 abetenticnB, nocc%H,ed 
its General Committee*o recozzmiendatlon that the question chc-uld 
be placed on its agenda and then referred it to its M. 
rolitiCGl Ocn:elttea*(37}
In both the Genersl Oomi^ilttce and plenary session of 
the Assembly the South African delegate had protested strongly 
against the matter being. Included as an Item on the agenda,
He erguod *. the domestic jurlsdiotlon z'eservation under 
Article 9(7) .of the Charter prohibited united îvationc inter­
ference in any form, In accordance with the Intentions of 
those who drafted the Article at Men Franoloco; fmd 
the matter v;aw brought up at a mcetln.g of the Kcc Political 
'Oommlttoe In Zlevenber, 1959, he in sis tod that with the single 
exce%)tio5 of the application o.f onfoieocncnt 'meaeuroa by the 
Security Oouncll -under Chapter VII of the Charter, l,e. action 
with respect to throats to the peace, broaches of the peaco, 
and acts of aggz'esslon, Article 2(7) did not pei^zit a.ny kind
of intez'foronco in the domestic -I'ae pointy:
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be acvancod In support of his argument were as follows;-
(1) The terzi 'to Intervene* In Article 2, paragraph 7$ 
was not to he Interpreted in the narrow restrictive 
sense of dictatorial interference, hut included suoh 
Interforenoo ac the discussion cf, and passing of 
r'^ .,c'l';:ülcns by 'che Assemhlj" on nattoz's oeoezitiall;^
.IwLln the dcu^otlo'jurlâdlùtion of a state*
(11) I'he pledge of international oooperatlon In Article $6 
to promote respect for and observance of human z'ighte 
and the economic end social objectives of Article 55, 
did not authorise any Interference by the United 
Uatlcns*
(ill) The allegation that the policy of apartheid in South 
Africa constituted a tlzreat to intomstional peace 
could hot bo justified booause It did not threaten 
the territorial Integrity or politics! Independence 
. of e.ny other, state#
These points were generally supported by the delegates 
of Australia, folgium, Zealand and the United
kingdom, end in the light of the discussione at the Man fran- 
oiaco Oonferenco In 1945 it le difficult to mee how they could 
be refuted# hut by a vote of 45 to 6, with 8 cbotentions, the 
Ad Hoc lolltioGl Oommlttee rejected a South African motion 
which raqulz'od the Committee toalmit that undez' A.rticle 2(7)
It had no competence to consider the oueetlcn, and then pro­
ceeded to vote on two resolutlcne#
The firGt resolution wiiieh it adopted by a vote of 35 
to 2, with 22 ebstentlcno, included Z'eferenoea tc the policy 
of izaolal segrogation ( apart hoi u ) no 'neccBsarily hosed on 
dootrincR of racial disorIninatlon'; the eat&bllshment of a 
ComalOGion, conaisting of three members,"to study the racial 
situation in the Union of Mouth Afrloa in the light of the 
Purposes and Principles of the Charter, with due regard to 
the provision of Article. 2, paragi'aph 7, as well as the pro- 
violC'118 of Article I, paragrapim 2 and 5, Article 13,
graph Ib; Article 55c* and Article $6 of the Charter, and the 
reaolutloao of the United ^atlona on racial percecutlon and 
dlGorimlnatién, end to report its conclusions to the General 
Assembly at lt% eighth Gc%ülcn':ond an invitation to the 
Government of the Union of aouuh Africa to extend its full co* 
operation to the Oomalseion, It thuo implicit in the ree* 
olution, ion was approved by the Aoeembly by & vote of 35 
to I* #ith 23 abstentions,(38) that the Gc j^sio# should 
study the extent to which the human righte articles of the 
Charter ana the principle of non-intervention under Article 
2(7) might determine or affect the competence of the united 
^atione. ln the. matter* ^
The other resolution approved by the Hoc Political 
Committee by a vote of 2C to 7, with 32 abetentlone, which 
had been originally submitted by Denmark, Iceland* Norway 
and iweden, end later adopted by the Assembly in plenary 
aesolon by 24 to I, with 34 abstentions,(39) declared that. , 
*in & multi-racial society harmony and roapect for human 
righto and freodoac and the peaceful development of a unified 
community are best assured #hcn pattcrna of legislation and 
practice ere directed tcwardo cnourlng equality before the 
l&w of all per&ons rcgcrdleBe of race, creed or colour, and 
when eoononio, social, cultural and political participation 
of all racial groups la on a basic of equality*; affirmed that 
'governmental policies of Member ut&tcs which arc not directed 
towards thoGC goalo but which arc designed to perpetuate or 
increase discrimination, are inconsistent with the pledges of 
the hembers under Article 56 of the Charter*: and.solemnly 
called upon all hamber Otatcs* to bring thoir polielcB into 
conformity with thoir obligation under the Charter to promote
the observance of human righto and fundamental freedoms**
Though couched In general tcrao, the resolution dourly stated 
that Article $6 of the Charter inpoced a definite obligation 
on member states of the United Nations to refrain from pursu­
ing a policy of racial discrimination, but the very large 
number </ states that abstained from voting Indicated that this 
was still a very controversial question.
The report of the OommioGlon appointed by the Acsedbly 
under its-other resolution (616A) was submitted to the.Assembly 
et it# eighth session* Based on & study of the legislative 
end admiBlotratlvo provisions in force in the Union of Uouth 
Africa, et'tCi^nts by witnesses, end Information supplied by 
Gome member states of the United Nations, it alleged that 
because of the policy of apartheid* 80 per cent of the popul­
ation were being denied basic human rights and fundamental 
freedoms* hut when the report wae 'considered by the Ad iloc 
Political' Committee of the Aesembly In November, 1953, the 
$outh African delegate, whooe government had not recognised 
the Commission, maintained thus It presented a distorted 
picture of the situation in his country, and still insisted 
that the Assembly did not poo&ee& the competence to consider 
the matter for reasons which he had etaucd earlier# This 
contention was rejected by the majority of delegates, however, 
and the Committoe, by a vote of 37 to 10, with 9 abstentions, 
noted with concern that the Commission, in its study of the 
racial policies of the Government of the Union of South Africa, 
had concluded that these policies and their consequences wore 
contrary to the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, and requested the Commission to continue its study of
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thü development of the racial aitu&tlon In the Union of üouth 
Africa, and to ougacot meacurec which would help to alleviate 
tae #l%uak%qn and promote a peaceful octtlomcnt, lüe Committ­
ee also invlvoo the South African governacnt to extend Its 
full cooperation to the Oommiooica* and its resolution %aa 
endorsed by the Assembly by a vote of.38 to 11, with 11 abst­
entions, on 8 December 1953.(40)
Turthcr reporta Bübmltted to the Assembly by ito three- 
m&n uommloolon in 1954 and 1955 etrecscâ that the policy of 
A m # h ç i ô  had not been revised,(41) but the douth African 
delegate in the Assembly continued to assort that there ehoulo 
be no interference by the United Rations in.matters within the 
domestic jurzsdlotioh of his state. It was not surprising* 
therefore, that the African and Asian states* who regarded 
auartaoid as a new form of colonialism against which they 
were conducting a persistent struggle in the United Rations, 
and waose numbers in tha United U&tions increased oqnelder- 
ably in the late 1S50G ana early I9CO&, began to ohow signs 
of wantin»y m&re positive actios, agrinst the. South African 
regime than expressions of concern by the Assembly* and the 
aharpeville incident of Korch 1958, when seventy four demon­
strators against racial discrimination and.segregation were 
killed by bouth African police, intensified this trend. %ithin 
a few dayo of the incident, twenty nine Afro-Asian states req­
uested the Security Council to consider the situation In South 
Africa which, in their view, 'had grave potentialities for 
International friction, which endangered the maintenance of 
international peace and eecurity'. Put though the Security 
Council rejected the Uouth African government'^ claim that 
Article 2(7) of the Charter prohibited the matter being placed
on ita ag&nâB, and reoognioed that if continued the situation 
in South Afrioa sight endanger international peace and secur­
ity, the resolution .which.It adopted amounted to little more 
than a morsi appeal to the South African government to abandon 
its polloiee of apartheid and racial Uisorimination»(Af) It 
was approved by a vote of 9 to. 0* with frenoe and the United 
Kingdcm abstaining, the latter making it clesr before the 
vote anything more than a discueolcn of the issue would
amount to a contravention of the principle of non-lntervenbio# 
in s matter oaeentially within the dome&tio juriocicticn of 
the Onion of Bouth Africa,
This Security Council resolution wno an obvious dloepp- 
olnt&ent to thoue Afro-Aslan states who were anxious to obtain 
the approval of sanctionary meaoureG against the àouth African 
rogimo, D%t in April igGl the Aoaembly, by a vote of 96 to 1 
(Portugal)* with 0 obstmitiono, approved a resolution which 
reiterated the point ^ade in Ito previous resolutions that 
'racial polioies designed to perpetuate or Inoreaee discrim­
ination are inconsistent with the Charter of the united Nations 
and with the pledgee of Membere under Article.56 of the 
Charter*; noted 'with grave concern that thooo policies have 
led to International friction end their continuance 
International peace and security*; and requested all ctêtsg 
*tc conoid 01* taking ou oh separate and collective action aa 
Id open to them* in conformity with the Charter of the United 
Rations, to bring about the abandonment of theoe policies*#(43) 
Avon the United Kingdom and France, who had hitherto been 
oppooed to anything beyond a discussion of the apartheid 
question in uhe Security Council and the Aeaeobly, on the 
ground that thie would contravene the principle of non­
IvO
intervention in matters of domestic jurisdiction under 
Article 2(7); voted for the resolution. In fact, the United 
Kingdom delegate, stated in the debate which preceded the vote 
that hio.government now regarded apartheid as being so except­
ional as to be Bui generis.whioh apparently implied that the 
practice of held wac & worae form of Bin than the denial 
of individual civil and political righta by those states with 
totalitarian eysteme of government which supported the reeol-. 
Uuion,
Glcarly. the resolution indicated that there was now 
overwhelming support for the view that Article 2(7)- could 
not nullify the Isseably'B competence to request its members 
to consider taking some form of action against üouth Africa. 
But it did not specify the kind of action that should be 
taken since there were differences of opinion even among the 
Afro-Aaian ot&toG so to what should be recommended# In 19&2, . 
however* during the Govontoenth session of the AsGembly, when 
the:question.of apartheid and the treatment of persons of 
Indian and fakiatan origin in the Union of Uouth Africa were 
considered jointly, the Afro-Asian states, with the support 
of the Soviet bloc, succeeded in securing the adoption of & 
resolution(44) which requested member-statcs to take action, 
separately or collectively, to bring about the abandonment of 
the polloieo of apartheid and raolri discrimination by *(a) 
breaking off diplomatic relatione with the Government of t:ie 
Republic of Uouth Africa or refraining from establishing such 
relations; (b) cloning their ports to all vessels flying the 
oouth African flag; (o) enacting legislation prohibiting their 
ship# frc% entering üouth African porta; (d) boycotting oil 
fouth African gooda and refraining from exporting goods,
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including til arms and .unities, tc South Africa* (e) ref­
using landing and p&B&agc facilltioc to all aircraft belong­
ing to the Government of South Africa and companies registered 
under thc.lawa of South Africa*,
Those moacureB were recommended after the resolution 
h&d deprecated the continued end total disregard by the South 
African government of its oblT i^one under the Charter end 
re-affirmed that the continuation of its policies of a#rthgld 
seriouely endangered international peace and security* The 
resolution also-requested the Security Council to take approp­
riate soasuroB, including senctionG, to eecure South Africa's 
compliance with the resolutions of the Aseombly and itcelf on 
the subject, and, if noooGsary, to consider action under 
Article 6 of the Charter - the Article which states that a 
UR member which has persistently violated the principles of , 
the Charter mc-;y be expelled from the Orgrailsation by the 
Assembly on the Security Council's recommendation. In addit­
ion, the Assembly decided to ectablich a opeei&l committee to 
keep the racial policies of the South African government under 
review when the Aosombly wae.not 1% session, and to.report 
either to the Assembly or to the Security Council, or to both, 
as might be  ^ opriote from time to time* .
This resolution, which appears to have boon based on 
Article 11(2) of the Charter, under which the Assembly may 
make reoom&ond&ticna on a queation relating to the mainten­
ance of international peace and security, provided It is not 
seised by the Gecurity Council, and in line with the 'Uniting 
for Peace* procedure adopted by the Assembly in 195C*(45) wo# 
approved by a vote of G? to 16, with 23 abstentions*. It was
1 0 2
opposed by Australia, Belgium^ Canada, Prance, Greece, Ireland, 
Japan, buxoauonrc, PetherlandG, New Zealand, Portugal, Gouth 
Africa, Spain, Turkey* United Kingdom and United Statoa, end 
Glnoe four of these states (the united kingdom, United States, 
PranoG and Japan) were South Africa's leading trade partnora, 
there woo little possibility that the economic oanctiona rec­
ommended by the AGGombly would be effective.
During the debate on the resolution the United States 
delegate warned that if the coercive mcaouree svere ineffective-';- 
ly applied, the authority of the United Rations would be ser­
iously weakened, and several members of the Assembly, among 
then the United Kingdom, United States and Prance, expressed 
doubts as to the wisdom of requesting the Security Council 
to consider action, if neceasary^for the expulsion of uouth 
Africa from the United Nations. The United States delegate 
thought that expuloion would simply remove the South African 
government from the one place where the full weight of world 
opinion could bo brought to bear on it,
But the Western powers laid themselves open to the crit­
icism that though they no longer regarded the general princip­
le of non-intervention In matters essentially within the 
sphere of domestic jurisdiction as an Impediment to the UR's 
application of moral pressure on the Gouth African government, 
and had gone as far as to support the Assembly's resolution 
1958(%?1 which had noted with grave concern that the contin­
uance of the policies of apartheid endangered internation&l 
peace and security, and requested states to oonslder taking 
ouch separate and collective action as was open to thorn to 
bring about an abandonment of those policies, they were un-
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willing te ar \ the logical consequences of those deoiælonG 
by the AGsomhl;/'o rGGOwrjendotion for diplomatic and
economic sanctions against South Africa* Moreover* though 
they Bupportod a Security Council resolution which described 
the situation in South Africa as 'seriously dioturhing inter­
national pence and ceourity*, and solemnly called upon UR 
monhcrs 'to eerse forthwith the eale.and oh;,  ^ t of equip­
ment and material for the manufacture and maintenance of 
arms and ammunition in douth Africa*,(46) they opposed moves 
for the Council to authorloc a general economic boycott on 
the ground that the p^ractice of ^rarth^ld did not e^iount to 
a threat under Artic].o 39 of Chapter VII of. the Charter# (47) 
They thus exposed themselvea to.the charge of being inconsis­
tent in their npp2:'oach to the apartheid question, and it 
would appear that their opposition to the authorisation of 
coercive measures by the security Council against 8outh 
Africa was due to their concern that such action would milit­
ate against their economic and defence interests in an area 
In which the Soviet Union was seeking to extend its influence 
and naval power.
But the fact that is is neoeosary to point out the in­
consistency of the footer# powers in this connection should 
not be rcg-rded as justification for the claim, advanced by 
the loviet Union and Afro-^sian states, that oincc the pract­
ice of lllliül&d created racial tension in on area where sev­
eral states.were highly sensitive to the racial discrimination 
bolng practiced sgalnot the black population in the Uziion of 
couth Africa, it conatituted a threat tc international peace; 
for It is difficult to see how it could be claimed that the 
racial policies of thé douth African government within its
own territory'could threaten the territorial Integrity or 
political Independence cf ether states,
Beaidee, it should not bo overlooked that among those 
states which vehemently supported the dowcnd for coercive 
me&üurea egelnst houth Africa and consideration by the hecur-, 
ity Council;.if neoecsary, for that state'a expulsion from 
the United : aliens - a measure *cbviou8ly conceived, ae a form 
of action going beyond the enforcement measuree for the tak- . 
ing of which the Ueourity Council lo made rG%pon8lble*(4G) 
there were several whose dictatorial forma of government and 
tyrannical practices made them ill-qualified to call for ouch 
measure^» Certainly In. view, of the fact that the.hovlot 
Union'o violent suppression of the political rights of the 
Hungarian people in 1956 had demonstrated the .scant respect 
of its government for fundame ^^1 freedoms, its attitude to­
wards the practice of tyreany. in fouth Africa was.very hypo­
critical*
The hlotor): of the apartheid question at the United 
Rations thuG demonstrated the inoonaictenoy and hypocrisy of 
states towards the use of the Assembly and heourlty Council aa 
instrumente for authorising various forms of Interference In 
a human righto issue which legally belonged to the sphere; of 
domestic .jurisdiction, and there can he listle doubt that 
since the United Rations vjao weakened as a recuit of inter­
state 'antagonism over.the affair, it highlighted the need for 
the Organisation to confine its ro&ulatlvo functions to those 
nattera over which it could legitimately claim to have ecme 
jurisdiction, such as South Africa's disregard of its internat^ 
lonal obli.gations as the mandatory %)Ower iz: South gpst/Africa
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(Namibia)*
The cucetlcn of foufh vest Africa (Namibia) will be 
examined at alater atare in thic etudj* but row let us oon- 
elder an tscefbly rcrcluUïcr approved by 72 votes tc 35, with 
32 abstentions, on 11 ^ovowbor 1975, which, bavin: taken note 
of 5 resolution of the Crgnoleaticn cf :fricer Vhlty which con-_ 
aldorcd ^hot 'the racist regime in occupied faleetlne &ra %&e 
raciot regime in blnbobwe and c( Africa.have a common im— . 
perlalict origin* fcrringa whole and having the seme racist 
otrrcture and boi ^ ^^anloolly.linked In,their policy, aimed 
at rcprcRsion of the dignity and integrity of the human beim;*, 
determined that 'mlonicm is & form of racT/i '».racial dis­
crimination*.(4a) .
Cjmroii.y the Aenanbl-'n ;.'Go]r:iration on llonienras. _a 
?cnr .cf Racrlraa viïloh wac opcneorof by twg^ i^ty Arab states, 
and supported by the Commtriou bant burcpcan.countries, ex­
cept lomamia, eb'ul'Btantial nim:bor cf Afric.an %:d Aaian states, 
inoluding UM./am enG. a few latin American countries, was 
intended to c^aoredit icroel. aa a racist Grnrc which was 
guilty of violating human rights in much .the Bomo way as the 
.white minority regimes in Rhodesia and mouth Africa* hut it 
woo strongly condemned by the United ftatea anu members oi taa 
lurcpean fconocic Oc*mizunity, end the substantial numcer of 
states that either voted ayninat the resolution cr abc^ainaa 
from voting reflected the deep division among the membora of 
the Assembly over the question.
The United atotes dolepate contended that 'rcclem* w%o 
according to fcbster'a Third sow international dictionary, *o- 
belief in the inherent superiority of a particular race and ita 
right to doolnation over ethers', and had 'olwaya oee%
.altogether slion to the political and raliciouo movement known 
as Zionism*, aonuoquently, ho argued, RioniGm was not and 
could not be.a form of racism.
ôince tha resolution referred to *the racist regime in 
occupied rolos^ino*, the United kingdom delegate rightly 
.v/az'ned the .ADoombly that it would 'undermine the right of 
leraol to exist*# The point needs to he stressed, therefore, 
that the adoption of the resolution was. In effect, another 
Instance of 'iiho Lli AsBcmhly ueing used to Intez'fere in a 
human, righto loouo that legally belongoa to the spziere of dom­
estic jurisdiction of a state which was a mômoer of the 
United Rations, and ran counter to what had been intended 
by thooe who drafted the rion-lntervention principle' under 
Article 2(7) of the Charter, It also needs to be emphasised 
that the bitter confrontations between .those Who took opp­
osite sides on the question militated against the usefulness 
of the United Raticna as a forum in which it was essential 
that the attempt should be nadc to promote a settlement of 
the .Arab-Israoll question which recognieed. and guaranteed 
the existGzioe of the state of lai'aol and the estGbllBhmen!; 
of a state the Palestinian Arabs#
of _^ the j^ ryen^  ^ kTdaioiple, igf .the ^
"Tc()nC'riy''nir*.ooiajr Council and ita Uommiaoicn. on :iunu^ n. .piphYS.
In 1947 the Economic and Uocial Council endorsed a dec­
laration by itc subsidiary organ, the Commission on Human 
Hlghte, that it had no authority to toko action in regard to 
ccTCT'lainto oczscerning human ri:hts,(50) and when the qucat- 
icn of inveetiyatiny such matters aa the violation of trade
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union rlrhtn rnô forced labour wno rriocô in BUbnnyuGnt oesa— 
icno of vis Council, it uno recognised that tic consent of. 
the governments concernai would bo required before such In­
quiries could to corricd out.(51) In 1959 the Council end­
orsed its 19<7 rule that the ComalBSlon on human Righto was., 
not conpeUent to tale any action with rerord to human righto 
eczflaintc.(52)'
411 these deoioiono wore in line/with the principle of 
non-intervention under Article 2(7) of the Charter, but thlG 
approach was modified in 1A67 when the Economic end Social 
Council confirmed the decision of its ComalSGlon on Human 
lightc to giro annual consideration to the quoction of human- 
rights violations,(53) and the Oommigsicn ectabliohod an ad 
hoc working group of experte to investigate, chargee of torture 
and ill-treatacnt of prioonerc, dctcineeo or. persona in _.olioe 
cuctcdy in Jouth Africa.(5/)
24th
. _ : At.its^oceolon, held frcn % February to .12 March 19G8, 
the Oommiooion on luran lights examined a report by the ad lioc 
working group of experts which otatad that, in ell their main 
features, the alleritiono mace in the varlouo dccuncntc trano— 
mlttod by the Uf Aosenbly's Special Committee on the lolioloG 
cf Apartheid by the lovernnent of the Republic of South Africa 
wore Guppcrtod by evidence given by witnesses questioned by 
the group, and rcconncndoi that the South African government 
should rofcrm the appalling prison Conditions described In the 
report, and that otudios be undertaken to ascertain whether 
the elements of the crime of genocide existed in the oyotec 
prevailing in douth Africa.(59)
on
The Commission human lights endorsed tlic ccnclucions and
rcccmmüxcatlcna of the hcc vcrkinr group, arc called upon 
gcvcrmmcci cf ^outh .Afiicu to ccrfcr.: tc the International 
^tanéarà .Inimum Rulec for the Treatment of Irieonors* and to 
exBuro that tne cuporvlclng authorities kept a olooo watch on 
the behaviour oi the police end prison officiels* But the 
Ccamissien ili not approve at its 24tb aeroicn the reconrond- 
ation .01 its hüb-üocdauicn on irevontion of Dioorlnin&tlon 
ang rrctectron c- Minorities for the eatabllBhment of working 
groupe of oxperto to Inveotigato complaint# concerning violat­
ions of hnman rights by the military junta in üreeco and the 
Duvalier government in Haiti. In fact, during the OcamlGGlon'q 
debate,(56) differing views were ezprcaued on whether tho 
Comnlssicn should confine itself to diGCUGsinc violations of 
numan rignuo resulting from pcliciec of.racial discrimination
ToUühem Africa, or coneldor violations in all 
parts 01 tnc wcriü, This was not surprising in view of the 
lact rnai alléguions of violations of hunan rights wore meco 
&y v&riou3 mcmoor states against the governments of Greece, 
Israel, tne united htatee^ the Toviot Union and the Ukrainian 
LNK, wut tncngn one.Uommiceicn took no action on allegations 
01 irl—urcctmont cf Joolsh minoTitioB In certain countrloo of 
one ^xecio aaot, it expressed its distress to l o a m  from news—, 
papers of Israeli acts of destroying homos of the Arab popul­
ation- in arc'-s occupied by the Israeli authorities subsequent 
to the hostilities cf Juno if67, and called upon the govern­
ment of luraol to desist forthwith-from indulging 1% auch 
practiccc ana to reupect human rights and fundamental freedoms#
Jubscquont ooealono of the Ccmaiscion on Hu?ian Rights 
and other organs of the United hations(57) al%a deaonotrated 
that thnre ans.little consistency In the xttitcdc of the maj-
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crlty of members of these hcdleo. for thoy wore concerned 
almoat ozolunlvaly with charges cgcinsh bcuth Africa,.Israel, 
and (after 1370) the regime that rcglccêl the Allcnds Govern­
ment in Ohilo.(55) fhclr inconsistency thus further illust­
rated the peint that had boon.made earlier hy one writer, vlG. 
'Governments might ho ready to assort the Organisation's 
authority a-einot other governments even in despite of the 
precedents thereby created» They were leoo enthuoiastio when 
its aotiono were directed towards their own state*,(59)
Conclusions . ...
It woo the evident intention of those who drafted 
Article 2(7) of the t ^rter that the United Rations should 
not interfere in questions involving a'atate's treatment of 
its own subjects, which covers the entire field of human 
righto, But in several oaces of alleged violations of hunan 
rights. United Rations organs have not observed this general 
principle of non-interferencc and brushed aside claims made 
by otatos that they have not accepted international legal 
obligations in respect of human lights which they have been 
acoùoed of violauing. for inetanoe, UR oz^ganc have addressed 
censures to particular states on such nottorn, and the Assembly 
has oven asserted its competence to recommend the application 
of ccorclvo noaoures against fouth Africa because of that 
state's prmcuice of apartheid.
besides, notwithstanding conflicting interpretations cf 
the principle of non-intervention under Article 2(7) of the 
Charter in particular cases of alleged violations of human 
rights, the International Court of Juetioo has net been asked, 
to give a judicial o%)inion on the interpretation of the prin-
ciple for rkc general guloanco cl UR comUcr atovca, and lt% 
advice &ov ^oaght when tUiu woo certainly ^oclraUlo, flic 
h&& not. boon conducive to promoting a ocnoc ci iaparticliuy 
in contentions quGctlo&&.
But though DUUctantial majcritiec have indicated thoir 
reluctance to permit legal considerations to modify their pol­
itical predilections on controversial issues in human righto 
quGablonop the UN Assembly and the Economic and boclal Council 
have novertholeoB pursued at the.&a&e time wh&t nay.be described 
ao.the legal approach to the i&plGncntaticn of.human righto 
through the adoption of international conventions and coven­
ants which stazes may ratify or reject in accordance with 
the principle of consent. Clearly, oince it is implicit in 
this approach that otatoo ere not bound by.International legal 
obligations in reapoob of human rights unlooa.they.have vol­
untarily ratified the international conventions or covenants* 
this is tantamount to admitting that the human rights of their 
subjects are matters essentially within their domestic juris­
diction, to which the principle of non-intervention or non­
interference ic applicable, until ouch tlnOyaa they ratify 
Guoh oonventiono or covenants,,
It can shun bo seen that UR organs have acted ambival­
ently in human righuc oueasions, and tc oeaee being inconsis­
tent it is o^ucntial tha% they should acknowledge that the 
only legitimate approach to the implementation of human rights 
la through the legal approach, whlcn involves the voluntary 
acceptance by states of logoi obligations under the internat­
ional conventions or covenants which have boon approved by 
the Assembly or such specialised agencies ao the International
mnbour Organisation, and their oborrvanco of the procedures 
laid down in much, rultilotnral rgronmonto,
^hat Un orgono should-follow this approach, and,abandon 
tneir practice of interfering in hunen rights questions which 
states-can legally claim as matters of domestic jurisdiction, 
la clearly nocccsary hecauae tholr unwarranted interference 
in oases of allogea violationo of human righto, with, eoant 
respect for legal consldri ions, has created much antagonism 
between member states of the United Rations, and militated 
agalnat its development aa an 3^icy for dealing with matters 
that az'O: légitimâtoly wlt]3ln its oonpetenoe imdor the Ghai'ter,
Ae to the exception to the general principle of non­
intervention laid down in frtiolc 2(7) of the Charter, under 
which the Security.Council is competent tc authorise enforce­
ment roaoures to maintain or rectors international peace and 
security if It determines that a t .to the peace, preach 
of the peace, or act of agaresoion arise# out of.a matter 
within the domestic jurisdiction of % state, it la difficult 
to see how this is applicable to a state's.violation of the 
human riahtc of its subjects which does not ondr/gor tha terr­
itorial Integrity or political independence of another state, 
as in tho oaso of South Africa's practice of apartheid* 
resides, 1% noodo to be emphasised that those member states 
of the united Rations which practise eome form of tyranny 
within their territories are ill-qualified to advocate the 
application of coercive measures by the united Rations against 
B State whose form of tyranny they happen to dicllhe.
"inally, it.must be pointed cut that such colonial 
ioeuee as 'Ireria and Tunisia which wore considered 8^ the
United Ration# before the peoples of thoee countries gained 
independence, au well as the Hhoaeeian nilalr, in which quest­
ions involving human rights were significant factors, have 
not been mentioned In this chapter because in dealing with 
theae matters the United Ratlona was primarily concerned with 
the collective 'right of aelf-actsrmlnatlon* - a type of 
right 'clearly different in kind from the Individual form 
of human rights which are normally.understood under the term** 
and the attainment oi which is not bound to lead to the real­
isation of individual rights.(60) These issues will be con­
sidered in the next chapter which deals with the principle of 
non-intervention and de-colonisation.
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At "an '^ranniocr in 19^5 It wan JcciRoô te include 
three ohnetcrT on dependent ^crritcrioo in tho C-ortcr of 
the United Tntlono; Chapter TT.f'rticlo 73—4), which won 
C'ncntiollT n general dnolnrniion of colonial policy by mem­
ber ntuton cl tho United rntlono with rcnpcnolbililiec for 
the cdrlnletrntlon of territories whose peoples hod net yot 
attainoi a full re of Golf-nouurnment: Chapter XII
(hrtloloo 79-65)2 '_oh described the baôlc objectives of the 
International trusteeship oystem for the adminietrotlon and" 
snpervinlon cf such tarritorloo an right ho placed under that 
arrangeront by gubseqaent cyreowcnto with the governments thot 
would adainioter then» and Chapter Mill (Articles 86-Ç1), 
which donlt with the ooapoaitlon, functlonu and powcre.of tho 
United Uatiogc Tractoechlp Council that wen to Boporvlse the 
adainlctrotlcn of the trust territories.
It wa# agreed that a.haolc aim of the tructoeobip cynten 
would be *to promote tho political, economic? social and edu­
cational advancement.of the truet territorico, and their pro- 
groE%alve. development towardo Belf-governaent or I'adepondcnoo 
aa may he appropriate to the particular circumstance# of each 
territory and ita peoples and the freely exprcGCod wishes of 
the pooplce concerned; and as may be provided by the terms of 
each trustGonhlp arrconcnt* (Article 76b); and that the system 
would apply to (i) terrltcrloa then hold under RanUatos cntab- 
linked by the heague of Rations ritcr tho first Torld far; (ii) 
territories' dotaohod fron enemy states on a result of the 
Uocond -arid tar: and (ill) torrltorioo voluntarily pieced 
under the ayotcn by stator roapcnoiblo for thoir administration
l i a
(Article 77), Moreover, . It laid daWK in Chapter kill (Art^ 
lolo 8?) that;
y, :\k"_ 'g,L:'ly ito aulhoritj", thc\25%;&t-
^cuki^ -yUAciZ, ij crr/'in cut their iunotiono, 5oy: 
la) reçoit: nus:, i" . by the administering auch^
rvlty; ^b) '.oaept pctlmions .&nd examine them in ocnoultot*
.. icu^'-yh th^ .imiaieüering authority; (o) provide for 
piriuMo ^iaitg uo mk# respective trust territories &t 
. ogwC\i x^LC with fho auninlBterln authority; and
(1; t'Co yheai and onh.r actions in coniarri^y wit6 the 
twr,; c M: - ûr:.tot.,h_^ agrocmmite»
:t wm thur mr'c chomr that the adnintrterlnh ^cwero under 
tho t3Tur ' wet ^  j c.'tt"», ' ("]/ 00 horahhy obligiw, to : eoct^ arrazi("o- 
nchtc :"\r R / 1.^ 1 ' oC R^tlcnc 8upo3*vio5cn of. their administrât*» 
icn .cf i-rur Trrzf'jfrioZ; &.nl to a.biio.by t^ x? tozzr^ ù of tho tru^iteo- 
ohlp e-rrr. ww.i ro;i(/eR tL rae OGlf-goveizmorit or lad-
epenoonco of thoc^ ir.heu. imccr their. ,t%vf.zicA ip# ilnce, there- 
fore, the aânlnMz'üezTrng po\;oro wei'o madr ley 11;. aocoimtable to 
the miitel Ihtticmie hci' üho oâninlstratlGi: of truot terz'itorleo, 
they coulû not el^ i^n that, the policloo which thoy purauW in ouch. 
territories wore nattero within their domestic guriadlcwion, and 
that , the principle ofmnon^lntervention. under Article 2(7) . 
hiblted tbo Iruetco&blp Council or tho Aseehbly,from putting 
forward reooinm/rticne on ouch nnttore*(l)
ITN'lv/- the aCainiotoring pc7;ero of .trnot .terrltorloo* those ., 
states admlnlotering non-aolf-gevemlnc territories net placed 
under the trrstcosclp eysteT were net zado craHarly aGoou^ "'Tj f' 
to the Unit00 Rations, ThoE.col^rntion ko.rardiiTU Kon—Jelf— 
Governing ferr.it or lee. in Article 73 of tho Charter did not 
require the colonial powers to cocopt kho international oupcr- 
vioicn machinery of the mrueteoahip nyotem; thoir legal cblig- 
aticn WUÜ limited under olau&o (e) of the Article to the 
tranmziaclon to the Hooretary-Cfcneral for infoznotion purposes, 
Gubject to ouch limitation as eeGin?lty nnâ ccazotltutionel 
conaluoratioDG night reeuirc* . etatiati other^ .^infor
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of g technical rature r to cDgnomlc, sooial. and '
oducaticnai^Li , Ationg in tbcir colonicl torrltorios. They 
were net loyally obligated to transmit to tUc feoretary- 
General information of a political nature indicating the dev­
elopment of aolf-governmcnt within their ccloni&a, and In 
view of thlo, their promlso under Article 75(b) — *to develop 
oolf-aovornaont; to take due account cf the political aspir­
ations of tho pooploG, and tc acGist thorn in the prcgreosivo 
development of thoir free political inetltutlcns, according 
to the particular circumstances of oaca territory and It# 
pGoplcc and their varying stages of advancement* - wee ec&eat- 
tally a moral, not a legal obligation. It is reasonable to 
soGumC; therefore, that the architects of Article 75 Invendad 
that tho tiding and eanner in which the colonial peoples sere 
to advance to Golf-goverLocnt were tc bo.regarded as matters 
GSBontlally vitbin the uca&stic jurisdiction of the eolohivl 
powers, Cartoinly, thin was tho view of tho United Kingdom 
delegation at the fan Francisco Conference, for in Its report 
cumnarlslng the work of the Conference on. Colonial folicy and 
Trusteeship; it was. stated: * Ac have evolved three chapters 
dealing with (a) general declaration of policy; (b) s. ay&bo% 
of international trusteeship for the limited categories of 
territories defined at Yalta; (o) the functions of a trustee- 
ship Council* (a) doos not infringe cur sovereign rights, 
which arc protected by the overriding proviolons elsewhere in 
the Charter relating to domestic jurisdiction*,(2) Cloerly, 
the UK delegation aseuaed that the principle of non­
intervention under Article 2(7) wac applicable to the oolioioo 
of adalnictering powers in thoir colonies, and tbia wao 
Gtrocsod in the British government'^ fhite Taper published
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ükcrtly after the Gan Franol&co Ccaforenco, *The general 
declaration in Chapter XI 1# tha first comprehensive state-, 
oent of O&lonini policy to be Included In on International 
inotruse&t,* It-stated,- *lts Inoluoicn is duo to tho init­
iative.of the unlted -Klngdom. a#d ûnotralia, who took the 
lead in the drafting of this Chapter* The Chapter preocribee 
the principles of Ucloniol Administration and lay# spoolel 
emphasis on the political,.econoolo, social end educational 
advancement of the inhabitants of the territories (whose 
intere&%8 are reoognloeG to be pmr^Rount), and on good noigh- 
bourllnesB in international relationo. It dees not empower 
the united Rations urganl&atioh to Intervene In the applic­
ation of thoce principles by the lowera ooncornod, Irovis-. 
Icn Is howovei" made for the royular supply vo the Jeeretary- 
fonervl, for information purposes, .of- otatlotiool- and other 
meterioi relating to economic, eool&l and educational conait— 
looB in Colonial territories**(3)
At one stage in tho diecuG#io%& of the five lower 
Consultative Group (The b*f*G*R,, U*l*, France and
Uhina) which, with Oox-mlttpe il/4 of the fan FrancisGc Oon- . 
fereno9*.w%8 responsible .for the drafting of the Declaration, 
the hoviet Union*# delegate tried to secure prevision in the 
text 1er the trancwission of Information by the oGmiolctcrlng 
pGwera of political matter#, in addition to information on 
economic, cocial and edweatlrnnl conditions in colonial terr­
itories, Rut the delegates of- Britain end franco wore OPD- 
ooed to this, uDo latter protecting that *the Charter 
provision# on colonial queation& ought to bo minimal*,(a) 
and whoD the Consultative Group considered the final draft 
of the feClar&tlon on lüth. Juno 1S&5, he made a otatement
to. meko It clear that none of Inu provicionu submitted for 
tae approval oi that oomsiitua Implied total cr partial ren­
unciation oy tbo French aovcrnmeot cl khe right to tako 
aoTuntago of the article on domestic jurisdictiono.(5)
it caa Lhu#.bo yeon that tho major colonic! sclera, : 
Brltolh Gad France* wore a&xloco to have it roooq#iaod that 
the prinelpioe laid.down in tho general declaration, under 
Article 73 of the Charter, wore not merat to override the 
principle cl non-intervention in colonial questiono. Though, 
tney accepted she principle that thoy should ensure the pol­
itical adva&uomcnt of the colonial peoplce, they successful^ 
opposed the Joviet attempt to %qk0 tho administering ^owore 
troaomit to the kccretary-General of the suited habions 
Information on political matters relating bo their colonial 
torritGrlca#(6) Moreover, though they accepted the principle 
tnat government* should bo developed In for#:# approp­
riate to the particular oireumotaneea cf colonial terrltcrioB* 
they rejected 'indepondence* a# a co-cqu&l alternative goal 
for Guch territories, &s indicated by the.following account 
of the dc,au^: #& the uubjeot in.Committee li/4, of the. San 
IranolGOo foafcrcace#
pit the Cîixth meeting of Oomiittee II/4. on 17 May 1945, 
the Ohlneoe delegate proposed that instead of the clause *to 
develop self—government In forms appropriate to tho varying 
oircumatanceo of each territory*, tho following text ohculd 
be u&edt * to promote dovolopao&t towards independence or 
self-governscnt oo ü;ay be appropriate to bhe partlouler cir­
cumstances-of each territory** In favour of the proposal,
It warn argued that *tho ohango did uot læply that nil dependent
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territories would heoeoo&rlly ottoin indépendant e-tnbus; bet 
independence wae an ol# of many dependent peoples end its 
attainment abould not be excluded by the termo of the Charter*, 
Agelnot tlilG motion, bov^evor, It was argued tlmt "the word 
"eelf-govemmoDtdid not exclude, the poBBlblllty of ' "indep­
endence" and rep%'G5onted a broad iaoasure of agreement wlilch 
it would be Izmxpedlent to Inipair by the aubotitutlcn of a 
%or@ controversial wording, .Furtherî))ore,. - the word. "l?*dependT 
enoe" memt different thing# to different peoples, and it# 
uao night lead to oonfu$;lon, fho use of the word "independ- 
ence" would _ cause - political uncertainty, which would tend - to 
provont capital development fmd to diaBuade governments from 
spending-zoney on strategic worke, Tho ultimate romüt would 
bo the creation of nu5arou8.#&all statee at a ùlmê.whan the 
intordopGndenoe of nil people# wnc bocomlng increasingly des-: 
ireble'.(7) After Informal oonaultatlcnG among the delegations 
concerned,.however, the Chinese delegate agreed to withdraw 
hie proposal' for. tho incortion In the general declaration on 
dependent territories of % reference to independence, os an 
alternative goal with oelf-government, If independence were 
included among the objectives to be eought in the political 
development of the territories placed under the international 
trusteeship system,(8) and this was the formula finally 
accepted by Gemsltiee I1/& and the Conference as a whole.
bone delegations asoertod that tne acceptance of this 
formula could give the general impression that "the Confer­
ence intended that territories under trusteeship, but not 
other.dependent territories, zalght.eventually attain Indep­
endence", and that ''3o.lf-detercinntirm*\ a core ecnoreto word 
than 'hmlf-govornment'\ had been approved by Committee I/l of
tho OowforcnoG for Inclusion among general principles in 
another part of the Charter.(9) Certainly, the fact t&at 
the Charter acknowledged tho principle of oelf-dotermln&t 1on 
of peopleo In Articles 1(2) 59 of the Charter, but dll
not mention or ra-sfflrm it in the declaration on colonial 
policy la ^'a_ver XI, oowod the Goods for much c&ncrovorsy 
over colonial aueatlon# within the United Nation#* henoo, 
before oxaælnlng the record of the United Rations In connect­
ion with the proeoGB.of oecolonlantlon that took place after 
Jorld. Mar if* it is important that we should oonoidor whether 
the architect# of the Charter intended that the principle of 
celf—determination ehouia override the principle of non- 
Imterve&tlon under Arlicla 2(7 ) which the Colonial powera 
clained was applicahla to their colonial polioieB notwith­
standing their acceptan&o of the Declaration Regarding hen- 
Jelf-Governing Territories in Chapter XI*
fho Tri&rlpic of,Self-D&torDin&tlon -' . .
During the Reoond Forld tar, Z.H* Cnrr asoortad that 
"the principle of ealf-determination, Gtrletly êeflDeâ, 
required th&t a group of people of reuGonoblG olBC desirone, 
of constituting a state should be allowed to con&titwte a 
ctate*.(10) Rut It ühould be realised,, os one writer ha# , 
emphaslooi, "at various times and various' plaeeo it has boon  ^
need to define Iho right of Gelf-governoont, the right of 
colonial people# to independence, the right of minority 
groupe to dotcr&lno thoir own fete, the right of Independent 
states to expropriate foreign'industrleo, and a host of var­
iations on theae theme#*.(11)
Though the principle wna included in Article# 1(2) and
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55 of tho üharbor of the United Ration#* no attempt was made 
to doflne it in that doowment, To ooeh light on what those 
who were responsible for its inclusion in the Charter* It is 
thus neooGsQry to examine the discussions on the matter at 
the J&n Francisco Conference.
Mo reference wa# made to the principle of self- 
determination in the great power proposals for a general 
In&ematlGnnl organisation ^hlcb were agreed to at Dumbarton 
O&hG In 1544* But at the outset of the Us# Francisco Confer­
ence in 1945, the foreign ministers of the United Dtatcs* 
Ü.8.0+R.* the United Kingdom and China decided to amend 
paragraph 2 of Chapter I (Purposes) of the proposals, via.
*to develop friendly relatione among naticna and to take 
other appropriate meaaurcc to etrongthcn universal peace* 
to read oo follows: "to develop friendly relations amo&g 
nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights 
and self-determination of peoples* end to take other approp­
riate ^ensures to strengthen unlveraal peace*. Iho amend­
ment had been proponed by tho hovlot Union who had omorgod 
at San Francisco ea the champion of colonial peoples* but 
was soon.to show that It had no intention.of honouring its 
pledge at Yalta to porælt free elections of governments res- 
pOBWlva to the will of the Eastern European countries occupied 
by the Bovlot iorooo, Thouqh *thc United Dtatco delegation 
felt that the Uoviot proposal could bo used ao a cover for 
soviet cxpanBicaiGwf; It agreed that it would be difficult 
to oppose the principle**(12) and the other groat powers* 
Britain und China* followed suit.
Uu&aell and Rubber have made lb quite clear thab in
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bhe view of tho soviet Union the principle of equal righto 
and self^^otamination required that the dependent peoples 
of both qolDnial and tru&t territories ohould be enabled to 
obtain national Independence ae coon ae poeaible^(13) but 
diGOueelone in Cczimlttee I/l, to which the sponsoring posera* 
was referred; revealed two conflicting opiniona on 
the principle#- In the uiiar^ Report of the :3i%th Meeting 
of the Committee, thebe were coserlboi.&e followc:
uciCw the principle of oelf-deierilnation. It
1 z e::ph:iolccd on the one side that thie principle 
correoponded closely to the will end-desires of peoples 
evory^acrc should be clearly enunciated in the 
, Ghapvor; on the other side. It wae steLod &hat the priB" 
clplo conformed to the purposes of the Charter only 1&«" 
Gofar SB It Implied the right of oolf-CLVomment of. 
peoples &nd not tho right of 8eGe8aion,(14)
fhoro was no attempt to define the principle of aelf- 
detorrinotinn in sho flrct opinion referred to, but it wBo 
Implied in the other opinion that In tho content of Charter 
purposes the principle meant no more than the right of 
peoples in existing states, presumably national group#, to 
obtain self^governmont within the sovereignty of those 
states; recognition of the ' principle did not mean that these 
pooplèo were entitled to independent statehood# fblo, of 
course, woB a sub&tsntially different Interpretation of 
principle fron that which bad been put forward by the aovlet 
Union, that it.required tnat nations struggling for
freedom should bo granted independent statehood. It may bo 
assumed* therefore, that the difference of opinion between 
the anti-eolaal&llGt-delegations and tholr opponents over 
the queatloB of including * independence* as an objective 
the .political development of colonial peoples in the Declar­
ation Iïon-Lielf-::[îeven'iing Z'crritorios, to which
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reference in the account of ùhe proceedings of
Committee 11/4 et boa Francisco, largely accounted for taoir 
differing viewpolnto on the principle of oelf-dcter^lnniion 
in Committee I/l,.
One get# the laproBslon that had there bean Insistoneo 
on the iDClualoD.of a definition of the principle in the 
üherter, there would have.been nc agreement to accept the 
opcnaoriz:g.%x)wers/.omendg^ent:,.,afjd It wme not surprising that. 
CcvcittGç I/l'o ecceptmoe of the amendiaent without change 
was presented to o&mmleslo# I with an interpretation that 
was couched in the following vague terms;
The after considering paragraph 2 as emended
by th^ epanaoring gov&rnmento found 11 eatl&factory %nd 
Jaeiéci tc recommend It to you,
Jcwmlttee understands that the principle of equal 
rights of peoples and that of eel.^uctermlnation are 
two ea5plo5cntury perLs of one etaadord of.conduct; 
that the roepoct of that principle is # baalo for the 
devo]r_%ont c " friendly relations ond is one of the 
Lc s^rcnalheo universal pocoe: that an eon- 
"ic, enf of the principle in question in a free 
an c rlau cm, roacion of the will of the people, which 
avol .i janee of the'alleged expression of the popular. 
uiJl, n. eh \c t\rro used for their own endg, by Germany 
i ,ly in later years,(15)
fhl8;2tat#&ent, a& feuiaaln livlin hoc argued, did not 
ans^ar a%eh qho^tiona a%% *That Is by eelf-detormlbablon?.
Docs the Ohai'ter iiiipose any obligatieas with regard to its 
o^cerclce? To when; does the priYiclplo.appl^T?. Under what 
olrcumctanec^ can it be invokod?(lG) Though at üan Iranaicco 
several oonzento wore made on the noed for the clarification 
of ouch aottera in the Co-ordinotlon Committee which reviewed 
tGYkG with the object of improving phrccoology end removing 
inconüictenoics, and it woo agroea that the Ohalrmaa and 
Rapporteur of Committee l/l should be asked for n clearer
Interpretation than had been provided,(17) the.ConCeronco 
finally approved the inclusion of the principle of equal 
rights and aelf—determination of peoples In Articles 1(2) an# 
55 of the Charter without this being done* As dir franola 
Vallat "hag pointo'd out, *no guidance io given in the Charter 
.whether the principle constitutes a legal right or is polit­
ical in character, Bor is there any ro&l guidance as to ito 
Intended oontont**(l8)
It is difficult to oeo, therefore, how it con be 
claimed that the inoluelon of the principle of self-deter&in- 
ation in the Charter gave rise to legal righte end oblig&t— 
lone, as 8o%o writers have asserted,(19) ac that the Colonial 
powers that signed the Charter could no .longer claim that 
their policies relating to.tho political development of their 
colonial territories wero natters esaeotially within their 
dcmeatio jurisdiction, to which the principle of non- 
intervention under Article 2(7) woo applicable. This was 
tacitly admitted by the onti-colcni&llet forcoo in the 
United :latioDS when Afghaniatan, hr'ma, Bgypt, India, 
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakiaton, the Philippines, 
Uaudl—Arabia, hyria end the Yemen proposed in 1951 that the 
ABGombly should draw up.an article on the right to oelf- 
determination for inclusion in the draft International coven­
ants on human rights which wore then being prepared by the 
United Bâtions Commission on Human Rights,(20) The adoption 
of the proposal by the Assembly in 1952(21) was thus a recog­
nition of the fact that the principle of self-determination 
In the Charter required to be written into'law. Indeed, it 
W08 not until 1955 t'hat the Third Oom&ittee of the Assembly 
approved the text of an article in which *tho right of aelf-
determination* was defined as *the right of all peoples to 
freely determine their political status end to freely pursue 
their eoonozio, social and cultural development, including 
the right of peoplea freely to dispose of their natural 
wealth and rooGurGeo*.(22) It chould aleo bo noted .that the' 
intcmatio3i:il oovemmits on human righto adopted by the Ass­
embly in 1966,(25} both of which Include an article on *the 
right of oelf-detaralnation*, cannot impose precise internat- 
ionol legal obligations on their otate-signatorie# until they 
are ratified by thorn.(24)
Initiatlvo taken by the Dnti-coloDlall&t forces In 
the tBseobly during the 19508 to convert the principle of 
Bolf-deter&lnatlon into a legal right for colonial pocplen 
and a# international logal obligation for colonial powers, 
through the inclusion of such 3 right in the projected inter- 
national covenants on human rights, was but one means by 
which they hoped .to extend international jurisdiction over 
matters claimed by colonial powore to be essentially within 
their domestic jurisdiction to which the principle of non­
intervention applied, Even before the drafting of the inter­
national covenants began* those states that were anxious to 
enlargo the competence of the United Bationa In colonial 
questions had embarked upon the attempt to make states admin** 
istoring non-celf-governlng territories mere accountable to 
the Organisation under Article 75 of the Charter, than had 
been intended by the draftsmen of Article 2(7) of the 
Charter at fan franolooo. In fact, between 1946 and i960 
one can perceive. % gradual extension of the Assoably'e com­
petence with regard to the transmisalcn and examlnaticn of 
Information under Article 75, and Its assertion of the right
125
to decide whether or not a territory was non-self-goveraing*
The Role Aesumed by the A&sembly under Article 73(1945-60)
As already stated, the m&jn coloniel powers considered 
that the general principle of non-lnterferenoe under Article 
2(7) applied to tholr administration of thoee non-self- 
governing territories not placed under the United Bationa 
tru&teeghip system. They insisted that their acceptance of 
Article 75(h) - *to develop self-gcvemment, to take due 
account of the political sapir&tions of the peoplee, and to 
aoGlet them in the progressive development of their free pol­
itical Instltutlono, according to the particular olrcumetcnceu 
of each territory and its peopleo and their varyl#^ etagoe of 
advancement* — involved no more than the recognition of gen­
eral prinoiplGQ which they wore free to Interpret according 
to their own judgment. Certainly, their only specific commit­
ment relating to colonial territories wao laid down in clanae 
(e) of Article 75* vi%. the transmission to the Secretary- 
General for information purposes, subject to ouch limitations 
as security and constitutional considerations might require, 
statistical and other information of a toohnioal nature rel­
ating to economic, social and educational ooGditlone in such 
territories,
Thie interpretation of Article 75 woe not acceptable 
to those states who wanted to nete the colonial powers more 
accountable to the United Rations for their colonial adminis­
tration, from 1946 onwards, therefore, various initiatives 
were taken by the& to extend the competence of the Assembly 
with regard to the non-self-goveming territories not placed 
under trusteeship, and the support forthcoming from that body
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waa ouffioiont to enable them to achieve oomo oaoco^s, though 
not sufficient to watiofy the extreme antl-oolcBiallwu states, 
such as the Jovlet Union* most of the Afro-Aoien state#, and 
aomo latin b&crlcan countries,
The first oo&trovernlGl iasue aroae during the ooccnd 
part of the first session of the Aeoegbly In 1946, when con­
sideration wa# given to the Gecretary-Genorel*8 statement 
Gumaarlslng the Information tranealttoa under Article 7 5 (c) 
which had been included in hie annual report in responee to 
the 48nembly*8 rQQue5t*(25) In hie report, which enumerated 
the seventy four non-oelf-governing territories admlnletered 
by eight comber statee of the United Nation# (Australia, 
Belgium, hcamark, France, the Betherl&ndo, Few Zealand, the. 
United kingdom, and the United Ftateo), the üeorctary- 
General uugyojted the need for an ad hoc committee to assist 
the Aoao^bly in examining and making.reconaendatien#.on the 
information provided,(26) but this suggestion was viewed with 
some misgiving# by several adminietorlng powers.
the question %as considered by a aub-eovclttee.of 
üho .Aaoeably'ù fourth Committee (fruatcaehlp, including Fen-. 
Belf-Oovernlng lorritorieo) in December 1946 , ( 27 ) four.of the 
administering power# (Denmark, the Botherlands, the United 
kingdom and the United Gtatoo) proposed that the Information 
transmitted in the ocuroe of 1917 should be owmmarioed, anal­
ysed and closElfied by the :;;eoret:).ry-Oeneral and included in 
his report to the second Boaeicn of the '^ eeev.bly, when tb%t 
body might bo able to decldo whothe::' o,ny other procndurc for 
dealing wit}: the l^iformation wa# desirable# Zhio v/ao apprcvcd 
by the oub-oofinrittee, but later rejected by the Fourth Cormi-
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ittee, vbich adopted a Oubtui propcoal that called for the 
csuaulialrzjenl of an ad hoc committee to examine the Infoz'm- 
otion tranoaittod und&r Article 73(e).
The Froaob delf ""e SGserted that the c^tabllGiimont of 
' â â M S  G02;"ittee was contrary to Article 75(e), but It 
vm# approved by m @  Fourth Oommittee and endorsed by the Ass- 
ernoly on Daceisber 1S^ 46. Under the rooolutlon, the hoo 
comoittoe, was to conalot of rcpreoentatlveo of the
adX;-in%Gi:ar.in pcwera and an equal number of representatives 
of otawGu elected oy uhe losersbly, was invited * to ezao:ine 
the oeci'otary—lonorol*o oumaary and anialyoio of the Inforz&at— 
Ion trmio:::lttod under Article 75(o) of the Charter with a 
view %:o azolng the Gozjeral Asaewbly in its consideration of 
this iniormntion, and with a view to making recommendations 
to tno ecneraz Assembly regarding .the prooedureo to bo foll­
owed in uhe future and the meano of ensuring that Ite advice, 
expert Knowledge ana experience of the opooialiGod agonoieo 
are used to the best advantage*.(28)
A year later the ABaombiy went a stage further when It 
invites &wG. '"'ourtn Committee to replace the hop comBlttoe 
by a Bpoeial committee whose terms of .reference .#ould be to 
report to vnc Aooombly not only with such procedural rcoozn*%— 
ondationa a# it might dec& lit, but also with such ahbütent— 
ivG recommendations, ao it wight ccnoidor deelrabla, relating 
to the vconcGic* social and edncomlonol conditions generally 
colonial territories,(29) Ino Fpeoial Committee was thus 
not riven vhe function .of 5aking recommendations to the As#* 
cmbiy on individual colonial territories* and Ahourh sono 
^nti—colonialist elements in the Assembly were particularly
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anxious te extend the oonmittce*# funetione to cover political 
matters, this was not acceptable to the majority in the 
Assembly, A proposal recommending that states administering 
non-selC-governlng territories should transmit information on 
local government in those berritorlOG was rejected* and the 
Assembly resolved instead that the voluntary tr&nsmlBSion of 
information on political natters and its aummarl%&ticn by the 
uecretary-General were in conformity with the spirit of 
Article 75 and should be duly noted and enoouraged*(50) The 
fact was that since 194& four out of the eight states admin­
istering colonial territories - Australia* Denmark* the 
Netherlands and the United Gtateo - had voluntarily included 
Information on goverm^ont institutions in their reports* and 
France had transmitted information concerning changes in tho 
constitutional status of its dependent territories. Only 
the United kingdom and Dclgium hod restricted the Information 
supplied to economic* social and educational conditions in 
their colonies, This, of course* w&s in strict accord with 
Article 73(G)* since the clause did not specify that Inform­
ation on political matters chould be transmitted* But thé 
Soviet bloc states considered th&t the provision of such 
infonTsatlon was not only OE^oential* but also a legal obligat­
ion under Article 73# In 1940* at a meeting of the special 
committee which had been set up by the Assembly* they argued 
that in the light of all the clauses of Article 73 the states 
admlniGterinc colonial territories could not claim that the 
transmission of information wee restricted to the economic, 
social and educational conditions mentioned in clause (e) of 
the article, Dut the delegates of Belgium* France* the 
Bethorlando and the United kingdom insisted that they were 
not legally obliged to submit information on political matters
,2c
unGer article 7 the only olaueo which made reference to 
their opGciflo obligation#,(51)
"The majority of acobor states of the United Notion# 
approached the question cnutiowaly when the delegate of the 
Soviet Union put forward a forçai prcpo#al 1% the Fourth 
Committee of the Assembly, in October 1948, thst it should 
be æadO:obli' ^ory/fbr the administering powers to submit 
information on *the development,of organs of self-covsmment 
in tne non—self-governing territories and the participation 
of the local population in the work of these organs* and that 
united bawio&a representatives should be sent annually to the 
ncn-aeif-goveming territories in order to Bake surveys on 
the epot* In fact, they rejected the Soviet notion,(52) and 
Inter, In fecenhor 1949, the Assembly merely espresBOd the 
nope thaG such of the mombora as had not done so night volunt. 
arlly include details on the government of non—self-governing 
territories in the information transmitted by them under 
Article Y5(o) of the Charter.(35)
but though at this juncture the Assembly did not accept 
tho uovlet view that the oubmisGlon of information on instit­
ution# of government should be made compulsory, it aosorted 
its competence to be Informed of constitutional changes in s 
noB-#êlf-gcverainy territory to dooidc whether an administer­
ing power was justified In discontinuing the trancnlselon of 
Information on économie, social and educational matters#
There had been Boveral Inatanceæ of administering powers 
simply reporting that information under Article 75(e) would 
Kc longer be trenamltted 1% reopect of certain territories 
because they had beoomo fully oclf-gcverning or accorded
equality within the constitution of the metropolitan state, 
and thin had prompted the delegate of India to propona in
the Fourth Committee of the Aasomhly, in October 1948* that
the AGoemhly ahould roqueot the moabcro concerned to commun­
icate Guch information an might be relevant* *inoluding the 
constitution, legislative act, or executive order providing 
for the government of the territory and the conotitubional 
relationship of the territory to the Government of the metro­
politan country*.(34)
During, the debate on the Indian proposal In the , Fourth
Committee the delegates of the United Kingdom* Belgium end
'Australia aolntnlned that the action went beyond the terms of 
reference of Article 75 and, if implemented, would constitute 
interference In the dosestic jurisdiction of those otates 
administering non-solf-governlng territories through making 
them mere accountable to tho United ifations than had boon 
intended by the framers of %be Charter. The delegate of Tew 
Zealand also felt that it was not within the competence of 
the Fourth Committee to disouGS whether a particular territ­
ory had ceased to be non-solf-goveralng and thia* he feared* 
might wall occur if the Indlmi draft resolution ?,ore approved, 
On the other hand, the delegates of Denmark and the United 
Gbatco were prepared to support the motion on the understand­
ing that the information required did not in fr in go tho right 
of adalnlotorlng powerw to determine the conGtltutlcnal pos­
ition and status of dependent territories within their sov­
ereignty,
fbo majority of delegates In the Fourth Committee supp­
orted whc Indian proposal that It was oooentlal that the
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United katloxG should be informed of Gxy change in the con­
stitutional position and statno of any non-self-govorning 
territory eo a recuit of which the responsible rcvernuont 
concerned thought it unnccoooary to transmit information of 
that territory under Article 73(o)* and it wa# approved by 
the Asaenbl? in plenary Geo8lon.(33) During the debate pre­
ceding ito adoption, however, the french delegate oxproesea 
the view of most of the admlniotering powers when he aooerted 
thet though he wao not Cj^osed to^awbstance of the resolution, 
ho feared that it represented an attempt to sot a definition 
of non-S0lf-yovernlng territories and that it would lead to 
a discuoaion of constitutional and political quoetiona In 
ouch territories in the United Batlone, In contravention of 
the principle of non-intervention in motbero within the dom­
estic jurisdiction of the administering powers.
bovo3 within the Special Committo, liob dealt with the 
tr n^slaoicn of Information under Article 75(e) and the Fourth 
Cc/.ibtec of the Aesembly soon oonfirned the fears of the 
administering powero. The first move was made in 1949 when 
the foviet delegate drew the attention of the Special Comm­
ittee to communications which had been submitted by three 
administering powers explaining -why they had ceased trane- 
fitting information under Article 75(o) concerning various 
non-aelf-goveminy territories, vl%, the United Kingdom 
territories of and Pitcairn Island; the French territ­
ories of Indo-Ohina,French Rstablishacnts in Oceania and 
India, Guadeloupe and Dependencies, french Guiana, Reunion 
and 9t, Pierre ot Riquolon; and the Panama Canal Done under 
United ftates administration, ?or instance, the United 
Kingdom stated that ^alta, although not yet in full control
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of ito external affairn, had achieved full reaponniblllty 
for local self-government on 5 Beptcmbor 1947, and that oinoe 
economic* ooolal and educational conditions In halts wore now 
the Golo concern of the government of Salta, it considered 
the tranemloGlon of information on theae matter# under 
Article 75lc) *inapnroprlate and Indeed lmpOGclble*,(56)
The dologsle of the Soviet Union proposed that it should 
be reoognioed that an administering state could not cease 
transmitting information on a particular territory until all 
the dercils concerning changes in its otatuo had been consid­
ered by the Upecial Committee and that body had put forward 
recommendation# to the AGSoably regarding the gp
ouch data* Rut though the bpcclol Committee approved a 
french motion shat it w&o not competent to consider the 
voviet proposal, the Fourth Committee of the Anoembly later 
adopted an Egyptian proposal, slightly amended by Thailand, 
which conoiderod that it wno within the responsibility of the 
Assembly to expre&s ito opinion on the prlnoipleo which had 
guidod or which night in future guide the member states con­
cerned in enumerating the territories for which the obligat­
ion existed to transmit Information under Article 75(e) of 
Chapter %I of the Charter, and invited any epocial committee 
which the Aeseably might appoint to-deal with information 
transmitted under that article, to examine the factors which 
should be taken into account in deciding whether any territ­
ory was or wac not a territory whose people bad.not yet 
attained a full-measure of Belf-governnent*(57)
In accordance with the terms of reference of this res­
olution, which was endorsed by the Assembly in December 1949 
by a vote of 50 to 12, with 10 abstentions,(58) the special
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Co%Zülttoe{59) submitted a report to the Aoseably in 1951,
Nuk it was generally agreed that further otauy of the matter 
was needed, and it v;ao not until 1955, after eeverol discuss- 
Iona, that the Acoombly 'approved a list of factors which it 
recosaonded should bo woed by Itself mid she administering 
powora 'oB a guide In determining whether any Territory, due 
to changea in its oonatltutlonal statua, io or la no longer 
within the aphore of Chapter XI of the Charter, in order t ,
in view of the documentation provided under resolution 222(iii)' 
of 5 Bovembor 1948, & decision nay'be taken by the General 
Assembly on the continuation or cessation of the transmission 
cf information required by Chapter %I of the Charter*.(40)
It la important to note that it was stated in bhe resol­
ution, which was adopted by a vote of $2 to 19, with 6 abstent­
ions - thlc was not a two thirds majority but it was decided 
that a aimple majority would suffice - that the manner in 
which territories referred to in Chapter XI of the Charter 
oould become fully self-governing was primarily through the 
attainment of independence, although it recognised that 
self-govcrnmont could also be achieved by association with 
another state or group of stakes if this was done freely and 
on the baois of absolute equality, Moreover, since it was 
also asserted that each concrete ease should bo decided *in 
the light of the particular circumstances of that case and 
lakinc into account the right of ooir-determinatlon of 
peoples*, it may bo deduced that the right of oolf-detornlnation 
was considered not necessarily Gynenomous with the attainment 
of complete independence; in other words, a dependent people 
could opt for a cdf-governing status within the framework of 
another state*o covoreignty in consonance with the right of
Those status administering non-aolf-govornlng ùorritor- 
le# were otrongly opposed to the Aocorably being given the 
ooBpetoaoe to determine-whether a territory had achieve* self- 
government, and protested against such an important question 
being decided by & simple majority In the Aeaembly* But the 
Aseembly asserted its competence In thio connection by resol­
ving that the transmission of information under Article 73(e) 
by the United Dtates no longer applied to Puerto Rico at its 
eighth eeoeion in 1955,(41) -end re-asoerted Its authority 
with regard to Greenland in 1954 when that territory 
integrated with Denmark,(42) and also with regard to Nether­
lands Antilles and hurinsm In 1955,(43) after the Methorl&ndo 
govornmenl had provided infcrmftion concerning constitutional 
developments loading to the promulgation of a Charter for the 
kingdom of the BethcrlandG, Surinam and hctherlondo Antilles 
1% 1954.
^ator, in 1959, the Assembly reoolved that Alaeka and 
bad achieved eelf-govornmcnt .through their free irtc*- 
ration on on equal baslo into the United Dtatee, the metrop­
olitan country, oo that the latter was no longer required to 
transmit information under Article 73(e) in respect of those 
territories,(44) This again emphasiood that the majority of 
member otatoe of the United Nations wore determined to act on 
the assumption that the question of deciding whether Article 
73(c) applied to a partloulor territory was not a matter 
within the domestic jurisdiction of the colonial po^oro to 
which the principle of non-intervention under Article 2(7) 
was applicable»
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It can thus be seen.tb&t although specific provision 
bad not heon laid down in Chapter XI of the Charter for the 
kind of international BuporviaioA and control of non-self- 
governing kerritoriea that ^as bo apply to trust territories 
under Chapter XII, the Assembly had aosorted its competence 
during the first decade or sb of the United Nations experim­
ent to pl&y a enperviaory role eimilar in some respects to 
that which it had been authorised to perfora, in collaborat­
ion with the Trusteeship Council, with regard to trust terr­
itories. By the end of the 1950# it was generally accepted 
that it had the right not only to discuss and make recomm­
endations of a general nature on economic , social and educ­
ational conditions In non-self-governing territories under 
Article 75, but also to decide whether or not a particular 
territory had ceaoed to bo ncn-solf-governinr in order to 
determine whether an administering power was justified in 
discontinuing the transmission of information on such matters, 
end by the end of 1S6C only Portugal, which had become a 
member of the United Rations in 1955, was refusing to transmit 
informaticD on her African colonies, as required by the 
Assembly,(45).
It has to be recognised, therefore, that although the 
Assembly had not claimed by the end of the 1950& that it 
should be provided with information on the political devel­
opment of the peoples of non-eelf-governing territories —
& resolution which it adopted in 1959 referred to *the 
inextricable relationship between developments in political 
and functional fields*, but did net claim that the transmiss­
ion of information on political matters was obligatory^/#) -
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it bad BG&umod a role which the architecte of the Charter 
had not Intended it to perform, Moreover, Its intervention 
was not confined to the critical examination of economic,
Gocial and educational conditions iniDn-nelf-governing terr­
itories and to determining when a territory had ceased to be 
non-self-governing in accordance with certain criteria. Frc, 
the early yearo of the United Katicnc, tho Aasombly, like the 
Uecnrlty Council, had alao aeocrted its competence to inter-' 
fore in varicuG ways in colonial confllcta, notwithstanding 
the claims of thooe colonial powers directly involved that
such interference wao a contravention of Article.'^^7) of the
■ ' ' ' ■ ■ '
Charter, ,./
Though the United Rations did not play a very signific­
ant part in these colonial conflicts prior to 19&0, with the 
exception cf the Indonesian affair, the first case in which 
Article.2(7) was invoked by a colonial power to oppoce inter­
férence by the United Nations, the fact that the Organisation 
aSGcrted it# competence to diconss and make recommendations on 
such questions laid the basis for its subsequent practice in 
the igSGs and 1970s.
United Intervention in Cdoniol Conflicts (I9&6-6O)
Ike %Y: d on OS 1 an af f f %ir was brought to the attention of 
the Ueourlty Connell by the Ukrainian A.U.k. on 21 January 
1946$ a few months after British troops had arrived in 
Indonesia, with the consent of the Allied Powerc, for the 
purpose of accepting the surrender of Japanese troops, and on 
11 October of that year, at a meeting of the Jeourity Gounoil^/7) 
the Ukrainien delegate contended that the British authorities
^#0 lozoe uo the Indonesian notionalist
movement, and that such rotlcn w%% o violation of the prin­
ciple of oelf-dotermlnation under -rtlolo 1(R) of the Charter.
bvrasueu vhar there wae a situation in Indonesia which, 
under Article. 34 of the Charter, threatened the maintenance 
Oi ini vlonal peace ana cecnrlty, and appealed to the 
^ecdriuj ^ennorl for &n *on the cpotK investigation with & 
view to oiieotmg a peaceful settlement of the question,
The United Kingdom delegate esnertod th&b British 
forces »ccu ooligea tc aefend themoelvec against attack 
by the local Inhabitants, and that their task had been to 
restore the territory taken by the Japanese to the juriedict- 
Ion of the Netherlands, the sovereign authority in the region, 
he aloe aaintainoa that it would be a contravention of the 
principle of non-intervention under Article 2(7} of the 
onorter %cr tno United Nationo to Bend an investigating 
commcsicn to Indonesia on the ground that the situation in 
that territory was a matter essentially within the domestic 
jurzsaiction of thcretnerlande, This was reiterated by the 
bethcrlanes delegate who also argued that there was no con­
travention of Article 1(2) - the principle of self- 
determination — becauce Indonesia was a non-eclf—governing 
territory under Unap^er xl of the Charter, he insisted that 
%ho Security Council did not posocoo the competence to deal 
with the question.
at vaio stage in the Indcnoaian affair the Gecurity 
council toox no action* The Ukrainian S.G.R. proposal for 
tue establishment of & United Rations CommiGeion to investig­
ate the üituasion was rejected, uo, too, wa# & motion put
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forward by 'oYPt, which ougrostcd that the Security Council 
should express the hope that negotiations which hod started
national leaders
between the Motherlands government and the Indonoslanx^oulG 
* rapidly bo concluded by a happy eolution Inspired by the 
al&8 ana principles of the Charter end principally by the 
right of self-determination of peoploo*, and be informed in 
& very short time of the résulta of thooe negotiations. The 
President of the Council then declared the matter closed,
The negotiations which took place between the NetborlandB 
self-proclaimed
government and theqRepublio of Indonesia led to the conclus­
ion of the linggadjati Agreement in March 1947, Thio prbvldod 
for the ^  facto recognition of the indonoolan Republic in 
Java, Madura and Sumatra,, the establishment of a sovereign, 
democratic federal United 0 bates of Indonesia, consisting of 
the Republic and at least two other states, to bo formed in 
Borneo and the eastern inlands, ?nd the linking of the United 
htates of Indonesia to the hotherl#nds in a kotherlondG — 
Indonesian Union. Rut the parties to the Agroement were still 
divided ovor a number of issues, such as the status and powers 
which the Republic of Indonesia was to possess until the 
Agreement was implemented, and in July 1947, the Dutch 
launched what was described ao a *police action* to deal with 
the disorders throughout Indonesia.
It was this development wlilch prompted the '.uotralinn 
delegate to bring the Indonesian question before the Reourlty 
Council on 50 July (45), and to proposa that the Council should 
declare that the hostilities constituted, a breach' of the 
peace under Jrtldle 59 of the Charter and take immediate 
action to restore international peace. Jut ho did not urge
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tnal tno vouncii should authorise onroroomcnt measures under 
^ruruic# 4^ ana 42; In&tcaa, he recommended that it should 
call upon the govoi'nmcato of the hcthci^lE:;'ià1^hc Republic of. 
InGODCciSp under Article 40,(49} to comply, without prejudice 
to tholr righto, clai&e or position; with the following 
measures^ (&) the oe&Bation of ho&tllltlcB, and (b) the oett— 
lement oi thorr aisputee by arbitration in accordance with 
article 17 oi.tnehinggadjati Agreement.
rhe ^etn&rl&nüB delegate strongly contested the 
Australian . nt, which was generally,süppcrteê by the 
caiegoteo of tae loviet Union, Colombia, India and Cyria, 
that tne conflict wan bekween two sovereign states. He 
mainLaincd uaat uno ^police action* being taken againot the 
Indonesian nationriLiats was a mattci' eeucnbially within the 
Uu^ecLmc jurisdiction of the fcthorlonds, which was,*aovoreign 
in the region concerned* because the Republic of Indonesia
uut one oi ccnoLituent olenonts*. He thus arguod that
^ecurivy vouncil did not pocuesc the competence to inter­
vene On uue ground it was prohibited from doing so under
Article u(7) of the Charter,
m e  weigian celegmte considered that the competence of 
the uocurity Council to intervene in the affair required 
verification, uut us tuc debate proceeded it become clear that 
BCrne delegatee,: particularly those of the united Htatcs and 
aalna, were anxioua to avoid, protracted legal argumente over 
the question cf competence# In fact,.the decision taken by 
unu ^county vouncii reflected the view advanced by the 
unlüùd uGatcB delegate that the Australian proposal should 
be amended to oait references to Article.5g and 40 of the
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vhnrter,. imd no v.-rs made to justify" United Uationo
intervention Uy citing an article of the Charter. The resol­
ution adopted Blnply stated that the Coonrity Council noted 
*witb. concern the hostilities in progreao between the armed, 
fcree# of the Motherlands and the Republic of Indonesia* and 
called upon the portloo *(a) to cease hootilities forthwith, 
end (b) to eettlo their dispute# by arbitration or by other 
peaceful means and keep the Security Council informed about 
the progrès# of the settlement*.(5G)
The fact that no effort ran made to eeek the advioory 
opinion of the International Court of Jnotlce on the compet­
ence of the Security Council in the matter, notwithstanding 
the claim advanced by the Ucthorlando that It was a question 
of domestic jurisdiction to which the principle of non- 
intervention was applicable, catablluhoi the precedent that 
tho uocurity Council, the main political organ of the United 
Rations, was competent to decide that a colonial conflict was 
a matter of international concern on which it could some
action, although under traditional international law colonies 
fell within the domestic jurisdiction of the administering 
power, and under the Charter the colonial powers were only 
required to submit information under Article 73(0). Of course, 
since no guidonuG was given in the Charter on how a matter 
OGBontlally within the donestio jurisdiction of a state was 
tc bo determined, the Council was given the loophole to 
decide what was politically expedient without necessarily 
taking Into account the criterion of international lav or 
seeking the judicial opinion of the International Court of 
Justice,
It will be recalled that at Ira :ranclccc, John Icator. 
lullca, who played such an important part in Lha drafting of 
Article 1(?) of the Chartor, apoho in disparaging torma about 
international law in crdor to justify itn cmiaclon ac a crit­
erion for dOuurnlning whether or not a matter wao coaontially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of & Bt&te* Ho foared that 
its inclusion would lead to the erroncoue belief that every 
subject dealt with by the united hâtions would no longer be 
a matter of- domestic jurisdiction on the grounds that, the 
Charter would bo a treaty which made international low, with 
the consequent danger that the whole purpose of the principle 
of non-intervention would be done away with* reover, In 
defence of the omlGolon of any reference to what authority 
akould determine the losuê of jurisdiction, Dwileo considered 
that it would not be an effective limitation on the United 
Mationu in guch nattera if it were left to the Organisation 
to decide* Ao to the question being decided by the Internat­
ional Court of Justice, It was hie view that this wae Impract­
icable becauGC it would involve the acceptance of tho conpul- 
Gory jurisdiction of the Court by those abates that had not 
accepted the ocmpuloory clause under its Statute.(51) It 
was somewhat Ironical, therefore, that In the Indonesian 
affair the United State# delegate sought to avoid legal 
factors in the debate on the course of action the Security 
Council ahould t%ko,. not to limit the authority of the 
United Nations an Dulles thought was necessary, but to fac­
ilitate the assertion of its competence, since the adoption 
of the Uouncll'c resolution implied that the question was 
not a matter of domestic jurisdiction. Indeed, the United 
htates voted in favour, of Inviting a representative of th^
Indonesian Republic, after the acceptance of the cgaoc-fire 
called for hy the Oocurity Council by both ollcn, to partic­
ipate in a üiscnoüion of the qneoticn, it was approved by 
the Council on 11 Auguet 1947 by a vote.of G to a (Belgium, 
Prance and the United Uingdom), notwithstanding the protest, 
of the UctherlandG delegate, who claimed that the Republic of 
Indonesia was not a sovereign ctatc.CD?)
On 05 Auguet the aecnrlty Council decided to eutabllph 
a CC'- Ission of consuls in Batavia to supervise the Implea-' 
entation of the ceaoe-fir2^(53) .after it had rejected a 
Belgian propocel that the question of the Council*o compet­
ence should be referred to the International Court of Justice, 
It alee appointed a Committee of Good Offices to aoolst the 
parLiou Lo the dispute to reach a pacific settlement,(54) 
but though Ihiu was acceptable to both uidea, and oubsequont 
negotiations, with the help of the Committee, led to agreo- 
nent on a truhe and the acceptance of various principles which 
provided the basic for future nogotiabiono concerning the 
transfez' of ooveroignty from the Uet3iorlando to m'l independ­
ent United btates of Indonesia (the Renville Agreement of 
January 1940), the Gommitteo of Good Offiocn reported 1# 
Dooohber of that yoar thau *the setting-up of an interim' 
federal pcvemnGnt by decree of the Government of the Uethor- 
lande which is apparently to occur before 1 January 1949, will 
contribute further to fhe opinion of the Republic that the 
Netherlands Government has been proceeding unilotcrally to 
establish ultimately a United btatos of Indonesia on its own 
terms^without the Republic*. The Ooomltteo concluded, 
therefore, that It had no confidence that oven the truce
oould be maintained _&s the possibility of political agree­
ment beoamo more remote,(5$) ana when the Butch resumed 
military Gperatlo&e in Indonesia on ig December 1948, it 
reported that tko hetherlande bad violated Its obligations 
under the R&nvillo Agreement. -
Aben the matter wo# considered by the Geourity Council 
on 22—24 U c #er,{5S) the Motherlands delegate etill Insisted 
that the question was outside the competonco of the Council 
because the Charter only dealt with relations between novor— 
eign atstoG, that It was a matter essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of the Netberlande to which.the principle 
of non-interventloB applicable* and that it aid not 
endanger International peace and security* Certainly* ulnae 
the negotiations under the Renville AaroG&ent were intended 
to pave the way to the transfer of sovereignty fros the Neth— 
orlande to an independent United utatee of Indonesia, there 
wsB WUO& to support the view advanced by the delegate# of 
France a lum that the Republic of Indonesia did not
qualify ms a state in the meaning of the Caarkor on a basia 
of international Though both states admitted that the
action tah&n by the Netherlands was brutal and «hooking, they 
argued that this could not alter the legal considerations 
that should bo taken into aooount, and emphneised that tnough 
the fetbcrlënde goveronont had expressed ita readiness to eco 
tbo question of the Geovrity Councll*c competence aubmitted 
to the IntcroatiGn&l Court of Justice* thlo had not bee# done*
but little or no attention vme ^iven to legal factors 
by the majority of delegates in the debate* and It wan consid­
ered politic at that juncture'to approve a re&olutloa which
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called for the ccos&tioB of hoetllitie# &n& the release of 
prisoners* and asked the Gomslttee of Good Officaa to.super­
vise the Implementation of these meeourG&.(57) Hlnoa the 
Retberlehdo goveraaent did not respond B&tlBfaotorily to the 
Gounoil*G resolution, steps were soon taken for more oxkena- 
ive intervention in the Igdoneslan.affair# 0# 26 January 
1949 the Gounoll rocommendeatbe i#Bcdl%te resumption of 
negotiations with & vie# to % \ o:tahllak%ent of a federal, 
independent and sovereign Unised Bsatea of Indonesia, with 
the transfer of Govereignty not later than 1 July 1950, and 
reoolvod that the o ^wtee of Good rcfloeo should henceforth 
bo known o# the United Aakionc Jommicoion for Indonesia and 
empowered to assist the parties in implementing thi# resolut­
ion,(56)
That the Motherlands government eventually transferred 
complete sovereignty over Indonesia to the Republic of the 
United atateo of Indonesia — thie wee dene in November 1949 - 
de^onotr&ted the effectiveness of ünltod àatlone iotervontlon 
in the affair. Dut undoubtedly this was largely due to the 
faet thst the United,Mt&ton, which, played & leading rolo in 
determining policy in the Heewrity Council, exerted %uoh 
pressure on the Netherlands government, Before the question 
WRG reaolved the.United Utateo had auGpondod Marohall aid to 
the Netherlands In Indonesia and threotcnod further sanctions, 
if It did not move In the direction which the aocurlty Council 
hod pointed,(50) Certainly* after the reoumption of military, 
operations by the Dutch in %eeo her 1949, it would appear that 
the policy pursued.by the Dotted-Utato# In the Security Council 
the outcome of political and conGiâeration& which
did not.conflict. On the one hand, the United MtatcG govern-
monk had to take Into account the traditionRl antipathy in 
the country to'ooloniellon* which cxproaso# In the 
CongreoB when *on o^ondment to the Moonamlc.Go-operatlGn Act 
was ÔGüàted which would make it obligatory on the administ­
ration to süBpon# assistance wherever ouch aaslstance was 
deemed incocpatlblo with the obligations of the Us under 
Article 1(2) of the Charter — the article expressly concerned 
with tae principle of equal rights and oelf-determination 
of peoples*; (60) on the other hand, there was the realisat­
ion on the port of the US government that *the communists 
were winning the war of propaganda.by wedding tbemBGlvea to. 
the canoe of 5nti-coloni#lism and nationalism, and were 
putting %he U# In a# invidious pooitlcn. The temporising 
attitude to such issues must be revemed; and where mere 
fit singly vnnn in Indonesia, where Gukarno* the Republican 
^resident, had recently suppressed a ccmsuniet rebellion and 
Gxocusod %he loaders? If the new Indonesia became an ally 
01 the ues%, the defensive perimeter of the US in the South 
r&ciilc woula be advanced and secured**(61) There waa thus 
no apparent conflict bokwoen the moral r^ nd political consid­
erations which the United Gtates govcrn&ent felt it had to 
take into account, since both factors required that & settle— 
^enl of tnc Indonesian question would roault In an independent 
united ütaten of Indonesia, and the United utatoe was able 
tc pursue a policy in the ueourity Council which had enough 
cc%#cn ground with the views of other ceabero of that body 
tc enable it to function in the way that it did.
In contract to the extoncive and significant intervent­
ion by the United Nations In the Indonesian affair, Its
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intervention in the between ^ranoa an# ner ^rcteot*
orates of ^oroeea end Zunioia was verj limited and
did little to influence the oonrac of tuoee ütrv^^loa, 
ewrprlai^glj, this evokcê bbo Impatlonee of the extreme anti* 
eolonialiot &tctoD* ^^rtiaularly teo Afr#*A&l5B &o%bern of 
the.United h&tlonG* ^ho appeared to regard hthe principle of 
oelf-deteralnatlonh ender.Article 1(%) oC the Charter a& 
8jnony%&%# #ith the Ic^al ri^ht of colonial paoplee to Indep* 
endent atatebocd# la faot, though the A^rc&bly decided in 
to.include/*the right of B#lf*dotGraln8tio&* In the 
dm/t lntcr^\aioG%l covenants on hu^^e rights* it conld not 
heeo^^ ^ le^'l ri^ht nntll those covennnto had been ratified 
by their el^aatorleo, hesldeo, It etlll the majority 
vio^ In the United hatlonsp that the of foeif-
govoronont* within the frnno^ork of another ct^ue*^ uevarel^n* 
ty waü not o% vATlanGo aith the right of %olf~dGter%l&atlon 
of people#*
%he l^ aetlqn of Morocco first b:nr^^r& before the . 
Aoae^bly In October 1951, Wbon 8l% Arab states complained 
obout * tho violation of principles of the Charter and of the 
hool&ration of human highto by ^rano# in hcrocoo*, but thl& 
reqü#üt to have the item placed on the.Asao%bl%*s agenda did 
not wooure the support of tho rogyirol majority. In 195<, 
hCTover, ^hon thirteen Afrc^Aaiaa otateo alleged that civil 
liberties and êomocratlc rlghte had boon Kuppreoood undor 
Prench rwl# In %oroooo, and that the esploalvo situation 1# 
that country constituted a thront to International peace and 
security, the Assembly decided, without discussion, to 
include the question on Its agenda, end to refer it tc ite 
rirct vo%mittue*(6A)..
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Aeforc tbo wa# oonGluared by the first ücmnlttee,
wbc ?re&eh foreign Minister had contended in the opening 
general  ^ te of the AoBoably that eince Trance had acquired 
southeri rioeeo ae a protectorate under the Treaty of Tes, 
.v/bdLoh mao' concluded oith the üvltao In 1912, the externe! 
relations of Aoroooo cowld only be conducted through the 
French govemaent, and reforms in Morocco depended upon 
French Initiative and rranco*Corocca& collaboration# under 
the üh^i » he had argued, the United Nations had not been 
given the competence to revise treatleo, and the question of 
cfocGO was e matter eoaontially within the domestic jurio* 
diction of France to which the principle of non-intervention 
under Article 2(7) wao applicable, Ho had alno maintained 
that not only the Assembly, but also the Security Council, 
could not claim competence in the matter; olnee the question 
of Aorooco within French jurisdiction, the only action 
that could be taken by the üounçil was the authorisation of 
enforcement measures in accordance with the exception to the 
general rule of noD-lntcrvontion under Article 2(7), if it 
decided th ù the situation in koroooo was a threat tc inter* 
national peace and security, but It could not be reasonably 
claimed that this wao so, For these reasons the French 
.Foreign Minister had informed the AG&e&hly that the French 
delegation Gould not take part in a disouwalon of the question 
in its Flrct Goazlttce*
fho Firat Ooeaittee considered the Acroocan question 
in December 1952# when the delegatee of Ethiopia, Agypt,
India, Indonoeia, Iraq, Lebanon, fablGtan, Laudi-Ar&bia, 
byria and the Yemen asserted that France had been able to 
impose colonial rule o0 the people of Morocco for the past
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forty years through forcing the Treaty of Tea upon the 
Jult&n in I9I2* The fact was, they nainteinei, that Morocco 
could claim to have.been a eovereiga otato before and after, 
vhe establlnhment of the protectorate, elnoe the Act of 
Algeoiran of 1906 had recognised the independence of the 
üultcn and the Integrity of hlo territory, but the French 
government had treated it as a French colony under the con­
trol of French Immigrants. They also asoerted that Forooco*o 
claim to sovereignty had been upheld by the Permanent Court 
of International Justice in 1922, and that in I952 the Inter­
national Court of Justice had reon ilood.the Internationa « 
character of the relations between France and Morocco, oo 
that France could not claim, according to the criterion of 
international law, that the situation in Morocco wan a matter 
within French jurisdiction and outside the competence of the 
United F&tions. 2hc Afro-Asian otatoo thus contended that 
It w&G the duty cf the United Fations to use its good offices 
in inviting both parties to negotiate.
Ae already mentioned, the Freaoh de^eg^tion did not 
participate in the debnte, but^the delorntos of Australia,.
the Metborlande, the Union of South Africa and the 
united Fzngdom arguo# that France was protected fro^ United 
Fations intervention in the matter by the principle of non- 
intervention under /rtlclo 2(7). To justify the argument 
that tno question was one of French jurisdiction, tho United 
Kingdom celogate maintained that the International Court of 
Justice had recognleed that the protectorate treaty of iglJ 
was valid, and that under that treaty, Morocco, while retain­
ing certain attributes of aoverelgnty, had agreed that the 
control of Its external relations ahould belong to France,
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Ho thus argued that the situation involving France and Morocco 
did not have on international character which removed It 
from French jurisdiction# and that hecauBe It was neither an 
International dlopute nor a threat to international posoe,
.the AceeL'ihly did not posseoG the competence to disouec mid 
make recommendations on the natter under Article 10 or 14*
Zho United Kingdom delegate oleo aeocrtcJ that oinoe 
Morocco-was recognised as a %on-%olf-governina territory 
under Article 73 of the Ohcrter, Fr&ncc*a only obligation 
W83.to Lranzrit lnicro^%lon on economic, eoolGl and" éducat­
ion hi condition# in Morocco under olacæe (e) of that article, 
and that the un tlonc could not therefore Intervene in
Franeo-Morocc^n political relations, Fat the delegatee of 
the abates in the Soviet hlcc countered thl& by arguing that 
olnoc France had undertake# to ensure the political advance­
ment of the people of Morocco under clouco (a) of the article, 
the aituatlon in Morocco waa not n matter within the domestic 
jurlS' on of Franco but within the competence of the 
Aoaeæbly* In addition* these delegatee elalmod that the 
AGsembly was competent to t^ke meaaurea for the aoluticn of 
the MorocG&n question in accordance with the principle of 
equal rlghta and oolf-dGtar%inatlon under Article 1(2) of the 
Charter* In their view, therefore* both Articles 73 &hd 1(2) 
of the Shorter could override ito Article 2(7)*
In view of these conflicting interpretations of the 
Charter, and the fact that Ihe decision# of the International 
Court of Ju&tlCG had been quoted by the delegatee of state# 
that took different aide# in the dispute, there ^uoH to. 
justify % aovo tc ask the Court to provide soBo clarification
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on the question of competence, but this was not done.
Instead, the First Committee adopted a.rooolublon which, , 
having stated its zindfulnesB of *the neoooBity of develop­
ing friendly relations among nations based on respect for 
the principle of equal righto ana nelf-determination of 
peoples', and expressed *the confidence that, in pursuance 
of its proclaimed policies, the Government of France will 
endeavour to further the fundamental libertiea of the people 
of Morocco, in conformity with the furpooes and rrinciples of 
the Charter*, as well as *the hope that the parties will 
continue negotiation# on an urgent baeie towards developing 
the free political institutions of the people of Morocco, 
with due regard to legitimate rights and interests under the 
eetabllOhed norms and practices of the law of nations*, 
appealed to the parties involved to sottlo their diaputeo in 
accordance with the spirit cf the Charter.
This mild resolution, which wac endorsed by the Aaeombly 
by a vote of 45 to 3, with 11 abstentions,(63) had no appar­
ent effect on French policy, and although'during the next 
six months the situation in Morocco became mere explosive, 
the requisite two-thirds majority was not forthcoming In the 
Assembly for the adoption of e resolution that would have 
appealed for the reduction of tension in Morocco and urged 
that *thc right of the Moroccan people to free, democratic 
political Institutions be ensured*.(64) In fact, between 
1954 and 1955, when the anti-rrench riota in Morocco became 
% source of much ombarraG&mont to the French government, the 
Aeocmbly-oimply expressed its confidence that a satisfactory 
solution to the problem would be found.(65)- This was realised
in I95G wh&n Morocco achieved independent statehood and
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wernbcrohlp of the United Dations*
fnoura the peocoedlaga In the United Natlone had ahm# 
that the majority of states oon^idored that the Assembly was 
competent to dloouGg and make roGom^eadation# on the conflict 
1# ^oroooo, hctwlthBtondlng the claim by France and other 
colonial powers that 1% was a matter of French jurisdiction 
to which the principle of non-lntorvention wao 'w^lloable, 
they had not been in favour of exereloing the G&#o emonnt of 
pressure which bed enabled the United Nation# to play & Gig- 
nifieant role In the Indonesian effeir. One can only infer 
that too many Gtates were influenced by diplomatic consider— 
ntlono which militated againct such a role in the Moroccan 
queatioa.
the &&no comment io applicable to the part played by- 
the United nation# in the ^uoetio» of funlala which waa 
brought tc the attention of the Jeourity Council, in April 
1952, by several Afro-Aelan atasec who alleged that the sit­
uation in Tunisia was aerieu&ly ondangering the maintenance 
of international peace and 8eGurity*(66) They also asserted 
that the French government*# violation of the Treaty of Fardo 
of 1881, under which it had been provided that the French 
military occupation of Tunisia would cease when the French 
and Tunisian authorities agreed that the local Giminiotration 
was able to maintain order, had deprived the people of 
Tunisia of their * right to solf-gGVcrnmont and self- 
determination*,
Then the Security Council discuesed the question of 
including the issue on its agenda on 12 April, the Trorcb 
delegate ocntenaed that the complainants agalnnt Franco had
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presented a false picture of the.situation in funiGla, end 
tnat the boy had consented, to abide by a programme of negot- 
iationo and a plan of reforms to satisfy the national aspir­
ations of the Tunisian people, and had given instructions for 
the formation of a new government* ho was opposed to inter­
ference In any form by the United Nations,
& proposal to include the question on the Council*B 
agenda failed to obtain the requisite affirmative votes of 
oeven me&bcrs, The United. Kingdom delegate voted with France 
against the proposal, and Greece,the Nethorlnndo, Turkey and 
the Jnr&ed Mtatea abctalnad, But the question was placed on 
tne agenda of the Aasefbly at its seventh seacion later in 
195 ,^ in response to the request by thirteen Afro—Aoian otatoe 
wa.c main vaiaed tho.t oince the Geourlty Council had refused - 
to place the Tunisian question on its agenda* the ABsembly 
was competent to consider the matter under Article 11(2) of 
tne uhartcr as.one relating to the maintenance of internat­
ional ~ ce and security#
In the Mirot Oom&ittoc of the Assembly the delegates of 
Australia, belglum, the Motherlands, the Union of ùoùth Africa 
and the united kingdom questioned the competence of the 
Assorbly to interfere in the affair on the following grounds:
(1) Mineo Tunisia was recognised as a non-aelf—
governing territory under Article 73 of the charter, 
this was tantamount to recognising that the Treaty 
of uardo had. removed Pranco-tunlslan relations from 
the international plane* The Tunisian question was 
tbu% within the domectio jurisdiction of Prance, to 
which the principle of non-izitervczition under .Az'tlcle
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2(7) was applicable, and all that France wae obliged 
to do under the Charter was to submit information kO 
the United Nations on economic, social and educat­
ional conditions in Tunisia*
(11) The exception to the general principle of non­
intervention under Article 2(7), vis, the authoris­
ation of enforcement neasurco by the aeourity 
Council, if that body decided that a situation 
arising out of s matter within a state's domestic 
jurisdiction constituted a threat to international 
peace and security, wao not applicable to the 
Tunisian question, fhio was so because it could 
not be reasonably claimed that the situation threat- 
\oned international peace and security. In any case, 
the Assembly did not have the competence to auLhor- 
ise enforcement mcaouros if a threat to international 
peace arose out of a matter of domestic jurisdiction,
(ill) Zt was impolitic for the Assembly to deal with the
question because discusolon in that body would serve 
to intensify unrest and further disorder in Tunisia,
In the light of the discussions which hod led to the 
drafting of Articles 2(7) and 73 at San Francisco, as already 
explained, there were sound reasons for questioning the com­
petence of the A&oombly to intervene in the Tunisian affair, 
as in the Moroccan question. But a large number of delegat­
ions in the Assembly considered that it was competent to do 
so, though not for the same reasons.
Though it was not disputed that Tunisia, like Morocco,
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was recognised ae a non-self—governing territory administered 
by France* it was argued that (i) Article 75 reoogniBGü that 
ncn-aclf-govornlng terrltorioa were no longer subject tc the 
domestic law of the metropolitan country and established an 
international ayntem: (ii) the .roaty of Fordo had recognised 
the Tunisian state ad a separate entity and made only a partial 
delegation of powerc to Prance, oo that Irancf- oft ? relat­
ione were governed by an international treaty which removed 
any IsGUoo ariaing from Itc ideation from the domeotio 
jurisdiction of France* (ill) the Assembly had jurisdiction 
under Article 10 of the Charter which authorised it to mako 
recommcndntion# on any matter within the scope of the Charter 
if the Security Council was not dealing with it: (iv) Article 
11(2) empowered the Assembly to make recommandations on any 
question relating to the maintenance of international peace 
end Gcourity, if it was not seined by the Ceourlty Council; 
and (v) Article 14 of the Charter authorised the Assembly to 
rcoor._ond measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situat­
ion subject to the same proviso.
It was also argued by some delegates that 'the rirht of 
peoples to self-determination* under Article 1(2) cf the 
Charter prevailed over the obligations that might obtain 
under any other international treaty* such as the Treaty of 
Nardo (1831); since Article 1G5 of the Charter gtsted that 
'In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the 
Meohero ef the United Mations under the present Charter and 
tbclr obligations under any other International agrce&onk* 
their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail*-.
But this argument aseuned that the principle of oelf- 
determination under Article 1(F) of the Charter was cquival-
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eat to a logsl right, which hardly tenable; for though 
*tne right of Golf-deternlnntlon' had been included 1% the 
orait International covenants on human righto in 1952, it 
had not yet boon defined and converted into a legal right 
Aho rkôiâio&tioD of those covenants by states,
*he arguments in favour of the AsGembly'e competence 
thus ran counter to tne intentions of those who had drafted 
thd vnerüer ana the Aeaembiy'a own approach to the formulat­
ion 01 an international bill of human righto. Certainly there 
was nood for Gome clarification from she International Court 
01 jussice on natters of interpretation, but this was not 
asKed for, ihere was enough support in the Assembly for that 
body to aoaert its competence by adopting a reaolution which, 
intar elia, expressed its 'confidence that, in pursuance of 
its proo^azmea policies, the Government of France would 
en&eavGur uo further the effective development of the free 
institutiono of the Tunisian people in conformity with the 
rurpoaes and Principles of the Charter', and 'the hope that 
w^e wvuld continue negotiations on a# urgent baaic,
ivivu a Vj.mv to urznging about oolf-government for Tunisiens 
%n %&e light of the relevant provisions of the Charter*.(6?)
but this Gomswhat innocuous resolution did little to 
eabiBiy several antl-oolouialiat states in the United Nations, 
ana at elgnth aeeslon of the Assembly in 1953, when there 
was much unrost in Tunisia, the reprosentativee of AfGhanlGtan, 
uurma, ^gypt, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, the 
iniiippineo^ Baud! Arabia, üyria and Yemen submitted a draft 
lesolUüion an tne ^irat Gom^lttee which, having expreoGod the 
conviction that 'full effect should be given to the sovereignty
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of the people cf Tunisia by the exercise* aa early a$ possible, 
of their legitimate rights to self-ioterminaticn and self- 
government In conformity with the Charter*, recommenced:
(a) That all neooKSsry etope be taken to anoure the 
realisation by the people of Tunisia of their right 
to full sovereignty and independence; and eopccially
(b) That the existing state of martial law and all other 
exceptional moaoures In operation in Tunisia be 
%cr;lnatcd, that political priuonera be releaaod end 
tbck all civil libertieo be oot&bli&hcd;
(c) That negotiations be undertaken without delay with 
rcproBontatlvGS of a Tunisian government eatabllGhed 
through free elections held on the baais of universal 
ouiTrago and enjoying the noceseary guaranteeo of 
^YccJom, with a view to enabling the Tunisian people 
to exercl&e all the powere arising from their legit- 
iaote rlghta to full sovereignty;'
(d) That the Secretary-General be requeoted to transmit 
this resolution together with the record of the pro- 
ccedingn to the French Government and toieport to 
the General Assembly at its ninth session.
Thi(3 Afro-Tsian drnft resolution, whioh wae supported 
by the Tovlet Union, was couched in far too strong terme to 
gain the support of the majority of delegateo9^^hvon when it 
wao amended $o that the preamble referring to *the right of 
the Tunisian people to full sovereignty and Independence* was
omitted, paragraph (a) eubotltuted by a new text which roc-
;
omeended that 'negotiations between France and Tunisia be 
undertaken to ensure the realisation by the people cf Tunisia 
of their right to self-determination*, and paragraph (b) 
deleted, the resolution was not adopted since it failed to 
get the requisite twc-thirda majority.{6%)
Thua, although the 'cocnbly hod aGoerted Ito competence 
to dlBOUBG and make recommendations on the Tunisian affair, 
it had exerted little pressure on Trance between 1951 oad 1955, 
A reoolutlon which It approved In 1954 merely expressed its
AGonfidonco that Franco—Tunisian negotiations would bring a 
uatiüfaolory aolubicn,(YO) and undoubtedly it wao the nnroet 
in Tunisia which impelled Franco to transfer full sovereignty 
to the lunluianG in 195G.
Olosrly* the response of the United katicnu to the 
. Tunlelaa-siir, &# to the Moroccan affair* stood out in 
atroB^ contxf^v to Ito vary significant intervention in the 
Indonesia# question. This wag explicable by the fact that
variable political factors, rather then fixed legal nome
;
or gcDoraliy accepted i&orcl princlploo determined the policy 
of ctatos in Ihe Aseesbly and the Kecnrity Council. For 
example, though the United states had been prepared to advoc­
ate strong presGura against the Netherlonao In 1949, it did 
#ot urge a similar approach in the Norocoan and Tunisian nit- 
uouicno agaiaat France, probably because France was on import­
ant WAfO ally and military baseo In french North Africa wore 
eonoidorod a vital intoreot to NATO strategy,
The United Nutiona response to the ^ueotion of -Algeria, 
which W&Ü first brought to the attention of the Security 
Council ?:)y baudl-Arabia in January 1955 and later to the 
Aseombly by fourteen Afro-Acisn states, also contrasted 
strongly with how it had reacted to the Indonesian affair in 
1949.
Mhcn the General Committee of the Aooecbly considered 
whether une question should be included in the agenda at the 
tenth regular aoccica of the Assembly In ^optember 1955* the 
french delegate opposed i&G.inclusion on the ground that 
Algerian affairs were eaoenti^lly within the domestic juris­
diction of France because Algeria had been an integral part
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of Metropolitan France olnoe 1854* But the delegates cf 
hgypt; Iraq, l&kletan, lhall&nO, India and the U33R quoted 
Articles 1(2), 10, 11(2) and 14 of the Charter, as they had 
done in the Tunisian affair, to justify the competence of 
the Iseeally to deal with the question* Ihe present colonial 
status of Algeria, they asserted, was the recuit of Algeria's 
annexation by franco, and the wishes of the Algerian people, 
denied of several righte enjoyed by French clti^ena, had 
never been coa8ultod*(71)
Iho delegates of those atatoa that supported Prance - 
the dnlted hingdcn, the united States and hew Kctiland — argued 
that Algeria w&s a constituont pert of the kepubllo of France 
and that the Assembly was prohibited under Article 2(7) of 
the Charter from intervening in French internal affaire, and 
this vie%^  was upheld by the majority* 3y a vote cf S to 5 
the General Committee decided not to recommend the inclusion 
cf the question in the AsGombly's agenda*
Though the Assembly in plenary session rejected this 
recommendation on 50 Hoptenbcr 1955, it was so evenly divided 
over the issue - 28 to 27. with 5 abstentions - that:even 
the delegates of thooo states that had supported United 
Nations intervention in the Algerian affair agreed later not 
to pursue the matter further at that scsoicn of the Assezbly*
A #ove to include the matter on the Uoourity Council's agenda 
in July I95G also failed.
Although there was sufficient support in the Assembly 
in February 1957 for that body to assert its competence to 
deal with the Algerian question, the Assembly merely expressed
the hope that in a spirit of ce-cpcratlan, a peaceful, domo- 
cratio and just solution would bo found, in conformity with 
the prinolploo of the Charter.(72) An attempt by the strongly 
anti—colonialist statoo in Lhc first Committee requesting 
France tc recognise Algeria's 'right to aclf-dotermination*, 
tc hcgctl&tc & peaceful settlement with the nationalist leaders 
in Algeria, ana tc accept,the good offices of the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations, failed to win the eupport of 
the majority»
Notwithstanding the efforts of several Arab and Aoian 
ot&tea in the Aeeonbly to secure the-adoption of recoæoendat- 
Iona that might exert greater pressure on France to negotiate 
a solution of the Algerian problem in oonoonanoe with the 
principle of eelf-dotermlnation, all the AGaonbly did at its 
twelfth scnalon in 1957 was to expreco ita concern over the 
aituation, take note of the good offices made by.the. King of./ 
Morocco and the Ireaident of Tunisia, and express the wieh 
that, in a spirit of co-operation, negotlatlono would be 
entered Into oLher appropriate means used to solve the 
problem*(73) .T'uoc refused tc participate in e diGOUBOicn 
of the question when it wae again included as an item on the 
Aaoembly's a. at its thirteenth regular eo&sion in 1$58 
when the dologatea of the UBGH and oevcral African and Asian 
Gtctou urged the immediate oeeaation of hostilities in Algeria 
and negotiations between French and Algerian rcpreoentativco* 
Dut though the firat Committee of the Assembly adopted a draft 
resolution oponoored by seventeen Afro-Asian states, which 
recommended that.the Assembly should recognise 'the right of 
the Algerian people to independence' and urge the parties 
involved to negotiate with a view to reaching a solution, with
a æention that the zrovlGional Government of the Algerian 
Repuhllo was willing to do so. It w%e defeated in ollghtly 
o&endod forza by the Assembly in plenary oocsion because it . 
did not obtain the requisite'two-thlrdo majority.(74)
hike the Algerian nffolr, the Cynmo gueetlon illustrated 
the easontially insignificant role of the United Nations in 
colonial conflicts prior to 19&0, The question oamo before 
the Asnenbly in 1954 when the Greek government introduced a 
complaint entitled 'Application, under the Gucplcee of the 
United Mations, of the principle' of equal righto and Bclf- 
determination of people# in the case of the population of 
the island of Gypruo*#(75)
The United Kingdom delegate claimed that the matter was 
GBBontielly within the domestic jurisdiction of the UK since 
the island wno a British pooseoalon, and at its regular seao— 
lone In 1954 ;3nd 1955 the Assembly did not include the item 
in Its agenda* There con be little doubt that' the fact that 
the Greek government wao interested in removing Cyprus fr&% 
the sovez*eignty of the United Kingdozu in ordei" to bring about 
its union with Oroooe ællitstod againot its argument for the 
granting of OGlf-determlnation to the Cypriot people, partic­
ularly in view of the existence of the Turkish minority on 
the island* A draft resolution which urged negotiations 
between the United Kingdom and Greece tc effect the self- 
determination of the Cypriot people failed to obtain a two- 
thirdo majority at the 1957 secoicn of the Assembly - the 
voting was 31 to 25, with 24 abetentions(7G) - and in 1958, 
after much terrorist activity in the island rmd armed conflict 
between Greek and Turkish Cyprioto and the. United Kingdom had
put.forward various conatlbutlonol proposal# for s settlement 
ci tao question* she Assembly simply, exproasoo Its confidence 
that ti!8 parties oo&oornod would continue tbeir efforts tc 
reach a pcooofml, democratic and jwot solution.(77)
To GÜ& up: prior to igGO tbo United Nationo did not 
play a orgnifioant part In eolonlol oonfllote, with the ex­
ception 01 tne IndcncGian affoir* Moreover, it played no 
part in influencing the outcome of the colonial conflicts i& 
Indo—Cnina (^945—54), Mal&ya (1948—57), the Philippine# (1945— 
6), and fonya (1952-56)* Nevertheloaa, it has been shown 
tnat %ne urganieation assorted Itn competence to discuss and 
make recommendations on the colonial conflicts 1% Morocco, 
^unieaa, and Algeria, even though Its role in those questions 
woo not ciynlficant, and various roaocnn wore put forward by 
the prctagoniatG of intervention to oppooo the claim of Franco 
and her Gunportoro that such patters wore essentially within 
French jurisdiction and thus protected by the principle of 
non-intorvontlcn under Article 2(?) of the Charter*
bone arguments wore advanced that the United Nations 
was oompcsent vo intervene in colonial conflicts on internat— 
lonsl log^l gro&ndb because of tho existence of certain treaties, 
uuL tuosc wno put forward or opposed those claims were reluct­
ant %o ooek vhe advisory opinion# of the International Court 
of Justice on such matters, homo statoo maintoinod that the 
hcolaravion Regarding Non-Celf-Govomlng Torrltorlos under 
Article ?2 of vho Charter nado the principle of non-intervention 
unaer artlel# 2(7) inapplicable, whilat others oontended that 
the non-intervention principle did not apply because the viol­
ations of numan rights which were taking place removed the
questions froK the sphere of domestic jurisdiction* It wa#
also assorted that the Assembly was competent to deal with 
the questions under Article 11(2) of the Charter because the 
colonial conflicts were source# oi' international friction 
which wore likely to endanger international pence and security, 
and that It bad jurisdiction under Article 10 to nako recomm- 
ohdationG on any matter within the Bocpc of the Charter# hut
theaa argumente wezzc of a dubloao nature in the light of the
Intentions of those who drafted the Charter. So* too, was 
the argument that tho principle of Bolf-determlnatlon under 
Article 1(2) of the Charter could override the principle of 
non-intervention under Article 2(7).
Above all* it bae been seen that the political organs 
of the United bationo conaidored themselvoe competent to 
determine whether or not the principle of non-intervention 
wca applicable in colonial qneationo, and to decide what 
action chould be preaeribod* variable political factor# thus 
outweighed legal factor# in the determination of resolutions 
by the security Council and the Aaacaibly,. though It Y^ as 
beccming a,ore apparmit that the Afi'o—Aoian stetea, supportée 
by the lovlet Hoc, vmre anxious to gain general acceptance
of their claim that the political organa of the UN were
legally justified in dloouGsinr: making dociaions on colon­
ial oonflioto oololy on the grcuzid that the principle, of oolf- 
determination under Article 1(2) of the Charter could override 
the principle of non-intervention in auch matt era. It would 
oppeor that- theae otatco felt that thlo oloin had boon enhanced 
by the fact that in 1955 the Asoexbly had decided to include 
an article on the 'right of oelf-detormination' in the draft 
international covenantc on human right#, and that in 1955,
,(3:;
tho following text had boon accepted in the AoGGsuly'a Third 
üonüiûteCp notwithstanding the opposition of several leotern 
hnropGua otatou, for inclusion in both draft covenants:
All people# have the right of Bolf-dotoralnatlon* By 
viruwc cl this right they freely dotcraine their polit­
ical 8%, tuj end freely pureuo their economic, social 
c^l.Ljal dovalopnent* 
ihc :u3y, for their * a endo, freely dispose of
tanlr naunrcl wealth and %  ^i rcec 'without prejudice 
to fzn;' ol;llgationG arising out of international economic 
ccoivY kion, uaGcd^upon the principle of mutual benefit* 
anj international law* In no case may a péoplo be dep- 
rivjJ 01 its own meane of ouWiotenoe*(78)
- V entry of twelve former African and Acian colonics 
Into memborohip of the United Nations between 1955 and 1959(79), 
and & further fourteen African stateo and Cyprus in September 
1960(80), aloe served to strengthen the attack against colon­
ialism in the Assembly, and to give much greater support to 
the doctrine that the principle of oolf—determination was a 
legal right against which the principle of non-intervention 
in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of 
states was no defence* Ihio was made manifest when the 
Assembly: appz'ovod the Ueclai'ation on the Granting of Independ­
ence to Colonial Countries and leoples in December 1960,(01)
. IndGmndmG0_i6._(kaml& .
This Declaration, which wao adopted by a vote of 09 to 0, 
with 9 abvtontions - Australia, Belgium, Dominican Republic, 
Franco, Portugal, Gpnln, Union of 6outh Africa, the United 
Kingdom and the United Atatea - seemed to indicate that the 
overwhelming majority of member state# of the United Nationo 
wore clearly in no %iood to pay attention to the contention of 
the United Kingdom dologate that colonialism waa a nooeseary
transitional phono on the rood to govornmont or Inlep-
ondonoo; or to tho Uhitod Abates vlow which, whilot rooogni#- 
ing the tomporary nature of colonialism, oonsideroo it noccoo. 
ary to plan .soundly for what would, rcploce it.(e2)
m o  hGcleration weloosod "the emergen os in recant yei 
of 8. zargc number of dependent territories Into freedom and 
inaepenUunco*, end recognised.'the increasingly powerful 
trends towardo freedom in ouoh territories.which have not yet 
attaineu znuependenoo** It ooleonlyproGlalaed 'the nooGaolty
., , end
01 Bringing to a opeody and jnconditlonal^oolonialiom in all 
its ferae and aanifentationn', and to that .end it declared 
that;
'nial of
* she subjection of peoples to alien nubjn^otlon; 
(oain^tion and exploitation oanotitutoc a uenic 
fnaJaacntai human righto, ie.contrary to the Cb&rtor 
of thp^Unitad Nation# and i an impediment to the 
promotion of world, nonce co—operation,
, nil peopleo have the right to aelf-deteraination; by 
virtue of that right they freely determine thoir' 
political ntatuo and freely pursue their economic* 
social and cultural development*
5* jna_cruocy ^ol^ticjl, economic, ooclal or eduoat— 
zc-im propairdaeac never carve as a pretext
for delaying IndeiCnoojos, *
4* tAx armed action » ,]CGSive %earu^c^ of all kinds 
directed ageinot fcpriu at peoples chzll ceaso in 
orcer to enable the^ uo exorcise peacefully and 
freely their right to complete independcnco, and the 
integrity of their national territory shall be 
recpeetcd,
2, Immediate stops shall ho taken, In Trust end hen— 
cplf—Governing Territories or all other territories 
waica have not yet atuoined independence, to trcinefor 
all powers to the peoples of those tcrzltoriGo, with— 
out any conditions or roGorvations, in accordance
freely expressed will and Je&iro, without 
any alotinctlon as to rooo, crcod-or colour, in 
oiaer %o enable them to enjoy complete indépendance 
and freedom.
1 r
6* Buy -btempi aimed at the partial or total disrupt­
ion of the national unity and the territorial integ­
rity of a country is incompatible with the purposes 
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations*
7. All States ohall observe faithfully and strictly
the provision# of the Charter of the United Hationa, 
the Univoraal Declaration of Human Bights and the 
present Declaration on the basis of equality, non­
interference in the internal affairs of all Utates,
and respect for the eovereign righte of all pecploo
and their territorial integrity.
It wau implicit in the Declaration, as pointu 5, 4 and 5 
above Inûicato, that pqmplete independenoo v/as the" only statue 
connietcnt with the right of Gelf-detorminatioD which is given 
the definition that had been included in the draft international 
covenant# on human righto not yet approved in their entirety
by the Aoacmbly, via. the right of peoples to freely determine
their political status and freely puroue their economic,
Gocial and cultural development, This roprcBoated a departure 
from the concept that had been rooogniced by the Assembly 
under itc Eccolution 742(V111), 1953, vi%, that the attain­
ment of various Systems of celf—govcmaent, as distinct from 
independence, wao not incompatible with the right of eelf- 
determination* Under the Declaration the right of &elf- 
determination was thu# synonymous with complete independence* 
and according to Resolution 742(7111) the factors indicative 
of the attainment cf independence were ao- follow#:
A, International status
(1) Intorzfatlcnal recponeibility, Full international
respohefETlity' o^Tl^ 'rerrj^ Eory for the acts inherent 
in the exercise of its external sovereignty and for 
the corresponding acte in the adminiatration of its 
internal affairs*
(ii) eligibility for memborahip of the United Natione.
(ill) Kencral international relatione* lower to enter
Inf ^""direct "rciationo of ovor^kind v/ith other gov— 
crnaentG and with international inctitutiona and to
- negotiate, sign and ratify International instruments*
(iv)N%tional aGfenoe. Sovereign rig3it to provide for it# 
H^vTmîoI^'lîofenoo#.
D* Internal polf-Yovornmant
(i) _ ravcrnacnt * Complete freedom of the people
Cl the errDtory^o choose the form of government 
'kiek binp Croire,
(11} jbriiirrinl Government « Freedom from control or 
ï'itc"'fB^%criî^the~^vernment of another State in 
rarjcct cf the internal government (legislature* 
executive, judiciary, and administration of the 
/cjwitcry).
(Ill) cGClel mid oultu-^'cl iuriGdietion, Complete
'«UvOic. etsltural
Jxr,
Clearly, nothing loss than independent statehood was 
considered compatible with the principle of Gclf-determla&tlon 
under frtlelo 1(2) of the Charter, The Declaration was thus 
in line with the soviet vicw-pcint which had been emphasised 
by Molotov at the Sun Francisco Conference# Indeed* it waa 
Khrushchev, in an address to the Assembly on 2% Feptomber 1950, 
who proposed that the Declaration should be included In the 
agenda of that body at Ito fifteenth regular aoseion* Dut iü 
aeseeGing the role of the Oovlet Union in thlc connection, it 
should not be overlooked that though Ito government was vocif­
erous In its demand for the end of Postern imperialism In 
üsla and Africa, it had prevented the application of the prin­
ciple of self-determination in Dcstern Furope after the defeat 
of Daxi Germany; and intervened to suppress the revolution 
against its Communiât puppet regime in Hungary in 1956#
The AGsoablv's Apgroaoh after tho Adoption of the^1960
After the adoption of the i960 Declaration, the Assembly 
acted on the aGcumption'that the principle of self-determination
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was a l&gal right which oonetltuted üwfflciont grounds to 
justify United Nations.intervention in colonial conflicts 
without contravening the principle of non-intervention in 
matters of domestic jurisdiction under Article 2(7) of the. 
Charter* Thuo* when the Aeecrily roounod consideration of 
the Ai an question at its 16th regular seesion In 1961,
one called upon Prance and the iroviBioxsl Government of the 
;i L-ian UcpuUlic to resume nogotl&tiono, it did oo solely 
on the Al.gezlr.i people'8 'right to aelf-doteraination ;.%nd 
independence*.(83)
The conflict in Algeria was approaching ito end when 
this resolution wao approi^ 'cd by the Assembly — Algeria gained 
it8 Independence 8l% monthe later - and the Afro-Aeinn Gtotoa, 
with Uovlet support, made it clear, that they wanted the 
United Uabiono to take a more dynamic role in speeding up 
the proceoc of decoloninaticn than It had hitherto played,
This was nonifent during the debate on 'The situation 
i^ith regard to the implor.ientatlon of the Declazzatiozi on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Gountrioo and foGples*, 
an item placed cn the agenda, at the request of the Uovlet 
Union, at the Assemblyis sixteenth 8eB8lon*(84)
having i>ointod out that 40 countries %Ylth 600 u&lllion ln< 
habitante had obtained Independence cince 1946, the United 
htates .hnJ.ogote maintained that the United Nations had two 
taske to perform In the continuation of that procoao; to ^ahe 
specific rcoomxendatloBo to those administering powers that 
wore reluctant to accept thoir Charter reaponslbllltle#, and 
In other caooa to present guiding principles cf action for 
the consideration of the ncmbcr-states concerned* Tho United
1&8
uaoionS; Le added, should not interfere in the relatione 
Between tno udüzniuvcring power and the indigenous loaders 
of a ncpendont territory where there was evidence of joint, 
consultation and partnership,
hut the overwhelming majority of delegates.wanted a 
more aircct approach.to the elimination of oolonlellem than 
thia, ana the Assembly adopted.a resolution which the Baited 
ctakeu ue^egate felt he could not oppose, though the United 
Alngdo^, trance, Uouth Africa and Gpain abstained fro# voting, 
and lortuf 1 did not participate in the vote. This noted 
with regret that, with few exceptions, the provisions con— 
talneu in tao Declaration had not been t _ed out, called 
upon the state# concerned to lake action without further delay 
with a vzor to Lhe faithful application of the Declaration, 
and e&u&urlGhed & special committee of seventeen members to 
review tae situation regarding its implementaticn and make 
recommendations to the Asaombly*(B5)
On basis of the work of this special committee 
(enlarged to 24 members at the end of I9ôf),(86) which took 
over tne functions of the Committee on Information from Non— 
aeli—doverni&g Territories and became the only body under the 
Assembly concerner v;lth matters relating to dependent territ­
ories, with tne exception of the Trusteeship. Council, the 
nssomoly aadrosseu many resolutions to the colonial powers 
lor the implementation of the 196G Declaration* but the 
responses of the administering powers to its requests, appeals 
or recommendotioD8 were mixed* They were opposed to the iiaaed— 
late decolonisation of certain territories, and were reluctant 
to grant tae Bpeoial Oonmiittoe, which had a cleai' majority of
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xnti-coloniali&t members, permission to send visiting misoions 
lo dopGndonoies whoso ctakuu was being investigated. In scmo 
instances, however, they agreed that Lhe United Nation# ahould 
provide supervision of elections or rend repro&ontativec to 
participate in constitutional con&uliationc concerning non— 
GGlf-gcvorning territorloo, and only Portugal South Africa 
refused to keep the Special Gommittee of 24 informed of deyel- 
opments within their non-oelf-goveming torritorico,
It is difficult to assess the influence of the AGsembly 
and itc Special Committee on the process of docolc%i&&tlon 
which continued to gather momentum daring the 1960a* 01th 
the exception of Portugal and Couth Africa, the ooloniol 
powers wore not averse to granting independence or some 
meosure of oclf-gcvcrnment to their nen-solf~goveming terr­
itories in accordance vlth their own plane, but the pressure 
exerted by the ABscmbly end its bpooiol Committee probably 
influenced them to give the question of.decolonisation more 
urgent attention then they would otherwise have riven it*
Yithln a decade after the adoption of the I960 Declarat­
ion, twenty-six territories, with a total of 53 million inhab­
itants, had emerged from colonial otatue to independent state­
hood or a form of oelf-govornmcnt which the Assembly considered 
compatible with Golf-doterminaticn, such as the free assoc­
iation of the Cook Inlands with Zealand in 1965 - & 
development which indicated that the AG&embly had departed Lo 
some extent from its rigid dogma that only complete independ­
ence could be considered compatible with the exercise of & 
people's right of eclf-dctornlnstion. In 1970, of the P8 
million people who had not obtained self-rule, the majority -
about 18 aillloD - inhabited territories In southern Afriea*{87) 
An to trust torritorlGo, the responsibility of tho Trustee­
ship Council, all had achieved independence or boeomo freely 
integrated with other atatas, with the exception of Hew 
Guinea and the Pacific Islands»
Thua in 1970, of the territories within she terao cf 
reference of the Upeolal Committee of 24* those under Fortn- 
gt;ece &dminlstrasion (Angola* Mozambique* I'ortugueee Guinea 
and come lolande off the west ooast cf Africa), the former 
League of Nations mandate of üouth Jent. Africa (Namibia) 
under the control of Douth Africa* and Bhodeeia under the 
Bmith regime* wore Its aain problems* but though the record 
of the Unite#.Hution# in these questions illustrated the 
LrganlGatlon*8 emeertion of competence to act on the àa%unpt- 
ion that the erlnolplo of sclf-dcDeralnatlon was a legal right 
ogainnt which the principle of non-intervention under Article 
2(7) was no defenoe, it alno chewed the Org&nioation'j 
limited cap&bllitios of enforcing Ito declolona*
The United Nations and the Portuguese Colonies
ülBce the fcrtuguese government had refused to submit 
information cm its non-self-governing territories under 
Article 73(e) ..of the Charter lo responue to the Assembly's 
renolutlca 1542(ZV), on the ground that they wore overseas 
provinces of metropolitan Portugal, it was not ourprlslng 
that it ignored the Declaration on the Granting of lndOj;end- 
enOG to Colonial Ooumtries and feoplee. But this dlarocbrd 
for the objectives of the Declaration coon evoked in .the 
Assembly oevero censure of fortugucoo policy and a demand for 
change.
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In April ISGI the a reooiütion %hioh,
invoked the Declaration one Ite atatameat that the sübjeotlo# 
of #BoploB to alien subjugation constituted a denial of fund* 
ai%eotol hw&an righto, and appointed a QUb-ocm%l5tee of inquiry 
on Angola,(88) But a Bontb or.oo later, vdillat the sub* 
committee waa eon (looting ito inquiry* the &oourity Council 
paaced à reGolntlon which deeply deplored 'the severely re* 
pressiveiaeaonres in Angola*, recalled the Declar&ri&n on the 
Granting of ladependenoe to Colonial Countries.and reculas, 
and called upon the iGrtugue&e aùthorltiea *to deelot forthwith 
fro# reproaeive geanurê# and further to extend every facility 
to the oubwcos&lttea to enable it.t# l^^lement its o^ndete 
without dolay** But the Council did not describe the situate 
ion in Angola ou a threat to international peace ao thnt canot* 
lone could be ooncidored under Chapter Ÿ3I of the Charter* It 
referre# to it as one * likely to ondan^^r the oalntenanoo of 
International peace and 8eourity*,(69) aad thuo one suitable 
:for pacific settlement under Chapter VI of the Charter.
In ^^comber 1962, however, the 'c&embly, *convinoeU that . 
the.colonial #ar b&ing carried on by the Government of 
in Angola, the violation by that lovornment of the oocurlty 
Council resolution of 9 June I9&I* it# refusal to l^ple^ent 
the provision# of the Declaration on the granting of inCopeod* 
enoe to colonial countries and pooslea contained in General
AGscably resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 Deocmbor I960*.........
constitute a acurco of international conflict aa ^oll 2^  % 
threat to world ucaoe and security*, requested tho Docurlty 
council * to taae appropriate meacuree, including sanctions, 
to oeourc i-ortugal^e compliance with the present resolution 
and with previous resolutions of the General Assembly and of
T”»' i (■
the Geourity Council* *(90)
Although 1# July 1965"there was a reguiolto majority 
for the beourlty Council to determine that the oituetio# not 
only in Angola* hut also in the other lortuguGGe terrltorioa 
of Aoünæhiùue and Portuguese Guinea, was eoriou&ly disturbing 
peace and security in Southern Africa, it had only enough 
support to request that all states should refrain from offer* 
ing the rcrtugueBG govammomt any aGclotance which would 
enable It to .continue ite repression of the, people .of tho&e .. 
territories end to take measurea to prevent the sale end 
Gupply of arma to ?ortugal*(9l) Zhere was Inoufficlont 
support In that body for the authorisation of enforcement' 
^^asureo against Portugal under Chapter VII of the Charter 
b&couse three of the permanent members of the Council, franco, 
the United Abates and the United Kingdom, allies of Portugal 
in HÀTOÿ' opposed to such a move*
Dissatisfied with the response of the heourity Council 
to the question, many Afro-Aslan àtatea atto^ptod to win 
support for oonotlonw ag&inst Portugal under on Aeacobly 
re&olution, and in 19&5 they were suceowoful in eeouring 
approval of & motion in the Fourth Ooomittse, which was 
l&ter Gndcrooa by the Assembly by a vote of C5 to PS, with 
15 abotentiono, mcmbcr-statcs of the United Aationo
to impose a diplomatic and trade boycott on fortugnl, fhis 
resolution rc*e.ffinnod *the right of the peoples of the 
African Icrrltorioo under Portuguese administration to free* 
dom and independence* and recognised *tho logltinaoy of their 
otruggl# to achieve the.rights laid down In the Charter of 
the United. Datlona, the Chlvoroel Declaration of Mum%n highte,
«i» j ^
Ofïd thù Deelnratlon on the Granting of Zndapondcmoe to 
Colonial Uountrlea and i&oploc'* It aloo noted, with dooa 
conoem *%hat tbc activities of tho foreign rinanclcl 
Int3rest8 In tbo80 iGrrlkorlee are n& impediment to the 
Afrleou poople In the. realisation of choir oeplratlone to 
freodoæ and Independence', and referred to evidence submitted 
by pctitlonors which 'confirmed that the Govora^o&t of lortu* 
gal han continued to no# the aid and wevpono that It roooivco 
from it& military allio# agnlnet %ho populations of.Angola, 
-ogambiqnGe %o*oalled fortugnoeo ^ui^ea and other territories 
under Ito adolnlotratiGn'i'and requostod *all states, in 
ÿarti.onl<ïT the mlllttiry .w.l:les of fortugel within the frame­
work of the %erth Atlantic freoty Organisation, to take all 
the neoooaary measures to prevaot the sale or supply of ar%8 
and military oquipnant to the Oovernnont of Portugal* *(92j
But though the iGüeabiy, guided by It# Apealal dcmaittoo 
of 24, contimoei to poo^ resolutions of this nature, Icrtoeol 
rtllledhereF to its claim that too administration of ita 
African territories was a matter within itc domestic juris- 
dlotloa, amd th ræ poworc, who denied chargea that HAZO
supplied erme to for t i for use in Ito African territories 
and that taa ^ctlvitloo of foreign economic and financial 
lirrtoroot3 were ioj/'edlng the Implefriontntion o.f the 
of Indepondeaoc to Colonial Countries and iGopleo, cither 
voted agalnot or abatainod froa voting cn roaolutlono'shloh 
reocmmended enforcement mcaouroB againat Portugal,(95) ihuo 
the applioatlon of the diplomatic »nd trade boycott roce.mwended 
by the Assoably a.geinot Portugal rae Ip.rgoly Inoffocblvo, and 
though the bnlted Z&tiona had asserted the clai# that the 
pooplos of Angola* g oaamhlgue and Portuguese Guinea had
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the right to end Inaapendonco, it looked
the enforeeaent capabilities to compel Portugal to relinquish 
control over those territorlee. In fact, It was tbo military 
coup a ' <38t the Gaetmso regime in Portugal in April 1974* 
not cnroroemODt measuz^es by the United Dations* which ativel 
the w&y for nationalist liberation ncvemento to replace 
rortugue*3e rule in Oulnea hisoeu* Mozambique end Angola In
1975, : . - ,
Gouth Dest Africa, the territory designated ao Uamlbia 
by the Assembly in 1968* was the only one of the seven 
African territories formerly held under the league of Natlono 
mandate system* which was not placed-under trueteeohlp* 
South Africa* the mandatory powor under the leaguo mandates 
system, rejected the.UN Aeoembly'a reco^&endationG In I946, 
1947 and 1948 that the territory ohould be brought under the 
trusteeship 8yste%*(94)
In I949 the AGsembly requested the International Court 
of Justice to give &# advisory opinion on the status of the 
territory* and tblo was given in July 1950. Ihough the 
Court did not ooneider that South Africa had.a IsgalAobllgat^/ 
Ion to place the territory under the trusteeship syotem* it 
ruled that the aandato was otlll in force and that Douth 
Africa was obliged to submit reports end transmit petitions 
from the Inhabitant# of the territory to the United #atloac.
In fact* the Court concluded that the General Aeooobly of the 
United Dotlone was legally qualified to exercise auporvlBory 
function# jucvjously exercised by the heague of Dations with 
regard to the admlniotratlon of the territory, and that tne
1Union of South Africa was under an obligation to submit to 
supervision and control of the Assembly and to rondor annual 
reports to it,(95) Subeeqwent opinions of the Court In 1955 
and 1956 reinforced the Assemblyfo claim to exorcise super­
vision over the administration of the'tozTltory,(96)
During the 1950s the Assembly tried to negotiate an 
agreement with the Gouth African government on some form cf 
United nations supervision over the territory's administration 
in line with the Opinions of the International Court, but 
these negotiations proved abortive# It still'aeaerted its 
competence in the matter, however, by examining reports eub- 
mitted to its Committee on South West Africa, which were 
based on whatever information could be gleaned on the subject.
In I96&, two members of the Organisation for African 
Unity, Diboria and Ethiopia, who had been members of the 
heaguc of Hhtion#, attempted a new approach to the question 
by instituting proceedings against üouth Africa before the 
International Court^of Justice, 2hey asked the Court to 
declare that South Africa had violated the terms of the 
league of Nations mandate by refusing to transmit to the 
United dations reports on the territory and petitions frc^ i 
its inhabitants, But before the Court's judgment on the 
question appeared in I966, the Assembly bad taken steps to 
assert its competence In the matter.
In December 1S61, a year after the adoption of the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and leopleo, the Assembly proclaimed *the inalienable 
right of the people of Bouth Acat Africa to independence and 
national sovereignty*, and called for preparations for
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elections to a législative Assembly, base# on universal 
ouffr&ge, to bo hold ao soon ao possible under United Nation# 
supervision, and the co-ordination of ooonomio and social 
aBBlotance by the GpeoiallBed agoneloo of tbo Unlto# Dation# 
to help the people of the territory, fhe implementation of 
the resolution was to be attained through consultatlonn 
between the Aooombly'o Special Committee for Bouth Coot Africa 
and the couth African governmentp(97) but there was a negat­
ive response on the part of the latter,
fhe quo&tion of the legal competence of the United 
Gationo in the affair weo complicated by the International 
Court's judg^ont in July 1966, which ruled that Ethiopia and 
^iberin. had no legal standing to petition the Court that 
uouth Africa had violated its obligations under the League 
mandate, eince 'under the mandatée system, and within the 
general fra^ework of the he&gue oyolom, the varioue mandator­
ies were responsible for their conduct of the wndates aolely 
to tne ^,oagU0 — in particular its Council — and were not add­
itionally and separately reaponeiblo to each end every indiv­
idual Dtate member of the league**(98) But though the Court's 
judgment, which was decided by the casting vote of the presid­
ent, did not deter the Aneembly, by & vote of 114 to 2 
(rortugal and couth Africa) with 3 abotcntiona (franco, the 
United Aingdo# and Malawi) from revolving that the mandate 
oxercleed by Mouth Africa was terminated and that henceforth 
Couth Moot Africa wqulj be placed under the direct responsib­
ility cf the united Dations,(99) and later eotabllahlng un 
eleven member council to proceed to the territory to moke 
arrangements for it& Independence to be attained by June I96B, 
(ICO) it# decisions had no practical effect; the Couth African
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government refused the eleven member council pormioeios to 
enter Couth Moot Africa*
Though In December.1S6? the ABGomhly appealed to all 
etateh to.apply economic.sanction# and other measures to 
effect Bouth Africa's withdrawal from South Deot Africa, and 
requested the Security Council to take steps to enable the 
cloven aomher council to carry out its functions,(101) noth­
ing effective was done; for the üeotcrn powers were unwilling 
to join in the application of enforcement meaoures in response 
to the A88ombly*G recommendation,or vote for the autborlBat- 
Ion of mandatory economic canotions by the Security Council 
under Chapter VII of the Charter, In their view the situation 
could be remedied only by peaceful negotiations, as they 
czphaelGed when the Security Council dealt with the question 
in igG9*(102)
In July 1970, however, the United Stateo, unlike franco 
and the United Kingdom, voted for a Security Council reaolut- 
ion which, inter alia, aok&J all states to refrain from any 
relations vith South Africa that would Imply recognition over 
Namibia* ensure that oocpanies owned or controlled by dtoto# 
eeaee sll commercial or Industrial dealings in Uamlbia; with­
hold loans and credits or other financial support that would 
be used by tholr nationals or companies from investing in 
Namibia; end withhold protection of such investment ogainot 
claims of a future lawful government of %&mibia,(103) Indeed, 
the United btatos delegate said that his government bad recently 
announced ^easuros that sought to discourage investment by its 
citizons in Bnalbla,
This resolution waa carried by 15 votes to 0, with 2
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abstentions - Eranoo and the United kingdom. Franco wa& 
doubtful that the United Nations had greater powers than the 
league of Hâtions which, in Ito view, did not coea to have 
been empowered to deprive a country of ito xi^ andate; and the 
United Kingdom had several roservatlona concerning the polit­
ical and jurldlo&l b&al& of the oouroe of action askod for by 
the BGourlty Council. Unlike the United Kingdom, however,
France joined the United htetes in voting for a security 
Council resolution on sg July 1970# which e&kei the Internat­
ional Court of Juetloe to give a# advisory opinion on what 
wore the legal coasequGocee for state# of the continued preo- 
encG of oouth Africa in ^amihi#, shortly after Security 
Council resolution 276(1970) hoc declared 'that the continued 
presence of the south African authorltlqo In Bamlbia wao Ill­
egal and that consequently all aeto taken by Couth Africa on 
behalf of or concerning Ua&lbla after the termination of the 
mandate In 1966 were lllogal and invalid*.(104)
The beourity Council*# request for an advlcory opinion 
by the International Court was carried by 12 votes to 0, with 
5 abotenticna (the United Kingdom, the Bovlet Union and Poland). 
The Doviet.Union and Poland abstained bcc&uGc.they oon&idared 
that the Court*# opinion was unnecessary, whllot the United 
Kingdom ahotalnod on the grounds that reference of the question 
to the Court wee baaed on certain legal asGampticns which uhoula 
the^Gelves be examined by the Court* But in view of the 
Court's 1966 advisory opinion that Ethiopia and liberia, could 
not be considered to have established any legal right as 
former members of the league of Uaticno. in the oubjoot matter 
of their claims, so that it could not pa#n judgment on the 
Berlta of the case, it certainly appeared neoeeuary that ite
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opinion should bo oou&ht on the legal Implications for the 
United Hâtions of the continued presence of the Gouth African 
cutboritleo In Hamibie#
It wan stated by the Court in its advisory opinion,(105) 
#hlch was delivered on 21 June 1971# that the members of the 
league of Hationo.had not declared, or accepted even by Implic­
ation, that the kond&tes would be cancelled or lapse with the 
dissolution of the league. The last resolution of the league 
Aeeedbly and Article GO# paragraph 1, of the United Hâtions 
Charter maintained the obligations of Mandatoriee* The Court 
had consistently recognised that the Mandate survived the 
demise of the Beague, and Couth Africa had also admitted 
much for a number of yeara# Thua the supervisory element, 
which vmo an essential part of the Mandate, w&s bound to 
survive, the Ocurb declared,
The Court was of tho opinion, by 15 votes to 2, 'that 
the continued presence of üouth Africa in Mamibla being ill­
egal, Bouth Africa is under-obligation to withdraw its admin- 
iotration f i w  Hamibla i%Giimdiately and thus pi;tt an end to Its 
occupation of the Territory'; and by 11 votes to 4, 'that 
Stoteo Memboro of the United Hâtions are under obligation to 
recognise the illegality and invalidity of its acts on behalf 
of or concerning H&mlbia, and to refrain from any acts and in 
particular any dealings with the Government oC Couth Africa 
implying recognition of the legality of, or loading support 
or aesiGtnnco to, such presence and administration*. It wao 
also the majority view of the Court*# judges that the Jeourity 
Council resolutions.on Uaalbla were.legally binding on UE
In October 1971 the ^eourity Council agreed with the 
Court's opinion that the continued presence of Mouth Africa 
in Hamlbia wac Illegal and that it was under obligation to 
withdraw its administration loDodiately from the territory,\
It W&8 carried by 13 votoe to 0, with 2 abstentions - Prance 
and the United Kingdom,(106) the latter abetalning becawoe 
they could not accept the premises cn which moot of the prov­
isions of the Oourt'o opinion were based, and particularly the 
point advanced that the Geourity Council's resolutions on 
Kamibia were mandatory. Blr Colin Orowe,. the British delegate, 
asoertcd that the Mocurity Council could take decision# gener­
ally binding on member states only whan the Council had aado 
a determination under Article 39 th&t a threat to the peace, 
broach of the peace, or act of aggresolon exioted, and that 
no ouch determination oxiotcd In relation to Mouth Peat 
Africa or Hamibla, Indeed, though the United dtateo voted 
for the Meourity Gounoil'o resolution on the Court*a opinion, 
it stressed that this should not be construed'as reflecting 
any change in its position with regard to earlier resolutions 
approved by the United Hatio&a on which It had abstained#
Clearly, the International Court's advisory opinion that 
the preoenoe of the Mouth African authorities in üamlbiG was 
illegal did not fundamentally alter the view of the Keeler# 
powers that a oettiornent of the question of Namibia ehowld bo 
sought through negotiationo with the Mouth African gcvcrs^icnt, 
'and that it could not bo sensibly remedied by the application 
of coercive aeaeures under the auspices of the Ceourlty Council,
Even when, several years later, in 1974, the Mcourity 
Council unanimously adoptee a resolution which demanded that
omould # solemn declaration to the Oouaoll
unbu lu woulu Comply with paat United Dations resolutions 
and with the advleory opinion given by the International 
voLrt In l%fl*(10f) tne western powers opposed sny reference 
lu the resolution %o the application of sanction# against
a.^ rica m  cane the Council w&c not satisfied with the 
reBponnc or tno Mouth African government. In fact, though, 
they agreed that the resolution should Include a declaration 
tuat in wav event or non—compliance the Council would consider 
*tho appropriate measurea to be token under the United %&Glo&e 
d&arter*, &&oy nade it quite clear that they h&d no Intention 
of supporting sanctlona wader Chapter Til of the Charter.
lu lu û&irzowzg to escape the conclusion, therefore,
that though there was.a sound osoe for tho authori&&tion of 
sanction# by the Meourity Council agninat Couth Africa bocauco 
of i&a invra^szgene# over Namibia, the Western powera were 
airaid that tho application of oanetlonG would act only be 
damaging to their economies, but also lead to & situation In 
southern Azrzca which would have given the Coviet Union 
ater opportunitlea to extend its sphere of influence*
Auove all, however, it needs to be stressed that the 
Inefie0uxven08& of the United HatioBG In dealing with the 
Lamle^an ailalr uemonesratod the limited enforcement oaphbil— 
itieo of the \yaaaisation in a matter which. In contract to 
the question of ogmctMld In Mouth Africa, could hardly be 
charaotgrl80& as a matter eseaatlally within the.domestic 
^urlGürc&&on oi tne Mouth African government.
Only In the case of Mouthern Rhodesia did the United.
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Dations succeed in authorising mandatory sanotion^ry measures 
against a regime which it condemned for pursuing a polioy 
incompatible with 'the.right of oGlf-dotorRination^,but even 
in that Instance the aanotlonary pressure which the Organisat­
ion was able to exert wao insufficient to bring about the 
collapse of the Smith regime* The background to thin le des­
cribed below*
The Quen&iqn qf^  Southern Rhodesle
la Juno 1962, on the recommendation of its Special 
Uonmittee which was concerned with the implémentation of the 
196Q Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and leoplos, the fBoodbly affirmed that Southern 
Khodesla was a non-self—governing territory under Article 
75 of the Charter. It also declared th&t the United Ki,. "0%  
the administering power, wao accountable under the Oharser of 
the United Dationo and the I9G0 Declaration for ensuring that 
the people of southern Rhodesia would bo able to exercise 
'the right of eclf-determination* in order to attain indep­
endence, and requested the United Kingdom to call a conrerGnoc 
to formulate & now constitution for the territory, under 
which the political righto of the people, on the basis of 
'one man, one veto*, would bo guaranteed.(108)
In Southern Rhodesia, whore the ruling minority of 
white people were operating a policy of racial discrimination 
againov a vory large majority of black people, the exercise 
of the rj ; , of Bclf-deter&ination* no the Assembly'# resolut­
ion implied, meant the right of the'die-cnfr&nohleed black 
population to ohocoe freely a new government roeponeive to 
their wishes, end the^ the tr .:n^ fer of full power# to thl&
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government by the United Kingdom, the administering power* 
in s new independent state,
The United Kingdom government maintained that since 
Bonthera Rhodesia had been a self—governing colony alnoe' 1925, 
hot # non-self-governlng territory as designated by the 
AoBombly in 1962, the United Hâtions was not competent to 
deal with the political and constitutional developments in 
the territory. It thus regarded'the queotlon of formulating 
a new constitution a matter to be resolved through negotiat­
ions betweoa the Mouther# Rhodesian and United Kingdom govern­
ments, notwithstanding the resolutions of the Aeoe&bly which 
censured ito policy, and on 7 November IgGU condemned *the 
policies' of racial- discrimination and aogrcgàlion practised 
in Uouthom Rh&deaia, which constitute a crime against human- 
ity*,(l09) As a result of the Umith regime*# unilateral 
declaration of Independenco on 11 November 1965, however, 
the United Kingdom changed its policy and-requested the 
Ueeurity Oounoil to authorise notion against the,illegal 
government in Rhodesia,
The Mocurity Council immediately condemned the Mrnitb 
regime's unilateral declaration of independence by a vote of 
10 to 0, with 1 abstention (France),(110) and on 20 Hove^bor 
1965 called on members of the United Rations to dcsict from 
providing Mouther# Rhodesia with erme end military equipment, 
and to do their utmost to break all economic relations with it, 
including on embargo on oil and petroleum products* It also 
called upon the United Kingdom *to quell tblo rebellion of 
the racist minority*,(111)
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It 1565, too* that the AsoGcbly, by a vote
of 74 to 6# with 27 ab&tentlono* wont a% far as to affirm 
that the continuation of colonial rule, a# well ao a;;szth0ld 
and other forma of rooi&l discrimination, was not only *a 
threat to international peace and oconrity,*but also *a 
crime against humanity'* It alao recognised *the legitimacy 
of the straggle of colonisl peoples to e%erol#G their right 
to aclf—determination and independence'* and invited all 
statCB to provide material and moral aoGietancG to the national 
liberation movements in colonial territorie8,(112) Hot 
Gurprlsingly, therefore, the reluctance of the United King­
dom to usé force against the M^ith regime was severely critis- 
cieed by the Assembly's Special Oosmittoe of 24, on which the 
largo majority of mothers wore cxtreocly hootile to colonial­
ism, and It wao on the recommendation of that committee that 
the Assembly, at it# regular session in I966, called on the 
Uhited Kingdom to do so. It also condemned the governments 
of Portugal and Mouth Africa, oc well ao foreign financial 
and other Interests, for assisting the Smith regime, and drew 
the attention of the Security Council to 'the grave situation 
prevailing in Southern Rhodesia, In order that it may decide 
to apply the necessary meacures envisaged under Chapter VII 
of the Charter of the United Hatlone**(115)
The United Kingdom, the United Statee and Prance abst­
ained froa voting on thia resolution - it was adopted by 69 
to 2 (couth AfriOG and Portugal), with 17 ahotontiono — but 
when the icourity Council ^ot in December I9C6, the United 
Kingdom and the United M-tatos supported the Council's author- 
laacicq of selective ^andetcry economic sanctions ayainat 
Louthor# hMadehl^*(114) France end tho hcvlet Union
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abstoinod for different, roaeons; fronce conoldered that the 
Southern. Rhodc&ian problem wag the responsibility of the 
United Kingdom clone, whereae the Soviet Union ehared the 
view of the majority of Afro-Asien states that the eituation 
required firmer action. But their abstention did not, of 
course, constitute a veto.
fhia decision by the security Ocuncll In 1966, by then 
enlarged to fifteen membero, wes adopted by 11 votes to 0, 
with 4 abstention# (France* the Moviot Union, Bulgaria and 
Üall), and highly significant because It w&o the flrat time 
In the history of the Council that it had authorised mandatory 
economic sanctions against a atato* Since the sanctions wore 
mandatory, failure on the part of United Rations members to 
comply aith the dcoinion would be a violation of Article 25 
of the Charter, under which members agree to accept-end-carry 
out the Council's decisions, But not all members compiled 
with the order. In Febru.ary 1967 the UeGretary-Seneral rep­
orted to the Security Council that though there had been a 
significant decline in trade between Mouthers Rhodesia and 
many of her trading partners, there had been continuing 
traffic in certain important commodities. In f&ot, he pointed 
cut that a number of otatoo had not reported on the matter, 
including some which had significant trading .relations' with 
Mcuthem Khcdcaia,(115)
At the end of 19&7 the Assembly declared its conviction 
that the sanction# adopted co far would not put an end to the 
illegal racist regime, and -that sanctions, in order to achieve 
their objective, would have to be comprehensive, mandatory,
-and backed 3:,y force,'and it condomiod the governments of Mouth
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Africa and Portugal* as well as foreign financial, and other 
intGrestS; for assisting tho government in Mouther# Khodecia. 
(116) In a subsequent resolution it drew the attention of all 
otateo to 'the grave consequences of the development in 
southern Africa of the entente betv;oen the Governmente of 
Mouth Africa and Portugal and the Illegal raolnt minority 
regime of Mouther# Rhodesia, the aotivitioG of which run 
counter to the intereote of international peace and security*, 
and called upon thern^  'particularly the main trading partner# 
of the entente, to v/ithhold any oup%)ort or asoietanoe to the 
me^bere of the ententoJ.(117)
Though the Security Council decided in I9Ô8 to widen 
economic sanctions to include all exporta to end import# fro%;
Mouthorn Aboacsia, with the exception of medical, educational 
and, in particular circumstancea, fGoaGtuff8,(H8) these 
measures were Ineffectively-applied by UN member ctatec and 
failed to bring about the collapse of the Smith regime, and 
thua encouraged what Richard A Balk hao dcocribed as 'otret- 
egles of violent implementatlGn* by those whoco claim# to 
juotioe could not be met by the action of the United : :'.tiono*0#
In Rmzoh 1976, vdien t;o%ambique closed ito border with 
Rhodesia, it wae reported that there were a thousand African 
nationalist guerillao inuide Rhodecia and twelve to fifteen 
thousand along the bordera of Koaombique and Gambia in train­
ing camps,(120) And though Dr, Rieoingor announced in hlo 
Lusaka speech cn 27 April 197& that the United States would 
provide old to Mozambique to help compensate for Its closure 
of the border with Rhodeoia and take steps to uphold completely 
economic Gonotlono against Rhodesia,(121) he did not propose
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that military sanction# should he cuthcriood by the UK 
üocurity Council, Hot surprisingly, therefore, the mooBure& 
which he proposed were not regarded by ouch African osotea ao 
Tanzania and Rambla &# lenoening the need lor the iDuoaaiflc- 
atlon of guerilla activity in Khodeola.
üummary an# Conclualonq
Iho colonial powers which participated in the formulat­
ion. of the .Uhorter of the united Rations at, Man Franoisoo in 
1945 assumed that under Article 75 of the Charter their legal 
obligation was restricted to transmitting to the secretary— 
General for information purposeo, subject to ouch limiation 
ao security and oonotitntianal conGlderationa might require, 
statistical and other Information.of a technical nature rel­
ating to economic, social and educational conditions ia .those- 
non-Dclf-governing territories not placed under Iho UH trust­
eeship system* Kith the exception of thin commitment, they 
claimed that the timing and procedures of granting self- 
government or independence to the peoples of those noa-oclf- 
governing territories under their administration belonged to 
the sphere of their domestic jurisdiction, to which the prin­
ciple of noD-lntorvoation under Article 2(7) of the Charter 
applied, They understood 'non-intervention * to mean 'non- 
interference in any form*, and they aoonmed that 'the principle 
of equal rlghte ana cclf-detor^inatlon of pcoploa', roferrad 
to in Article 1(2} of tho Charter, did not have the force cf 
a legal rlghi; for colonial peoples and an international legal 
obligation for colonial powero, OoneoquGntly, they believed 
that questions pertaining to the administration of taeir 
colonies, invoivihg^ the timing and manner in which political 
and GonotiuUtlonal devolopL^onta were to bo effected, remained
lu
cccentlally within their domootic jurindicticn, and thus out­
side the international jurisdiction of the United Rntlono.
The history of the United Ration# hne demonstrated that 
the main political organa of the Organisation have rejected 
theoe a60ui9ptionG In soyerel wayw and on a variety of grounds, 
doth the Security Council and the Assembly have generally 
disregarded the intentions of those who drafted the Charter 
and the accepted rule of traditional international law that 
colonial qwCGtiono were solely within the domeetlo jurisdict­
ion of the adninisterln unless governed by opeoific
International treaties. Instead, they have taken the view
■ i. \ .
that provided resolutions wore supported by the requisite, 
majority vote, in accordance with the voting procedures laid 
down In the Charter* they were oonpetont to determine whether 
or not the doncotic jurisdiction reservation was applicable to 
colonial quootlcms, chin hc8 meant that variable political 
factors have generally outw, d legal factors in the%detor- 
mlnatlon of reeolutlona by both the Security Council and the 
Assembly*. . .
It ha# been nhown that between 1946 and I96& tne As&ecblj 
Gsserbod Its eennètence not only to receive, examine and make 
rcooaimGadctlons on the information provided on economic*
BoolGl and educational conditions in non-aelf-govcrnlng torr-. 
Itorlea not placed under the United Mations trusteeship eyotoa 
but also to determine whekhor or not a territory was non— 
3clf-governing under Article 75 of the Charter, and that with 
few exceptions the admlnlotoring powers accepted this measure 
cf accountability to the United Actions* The Aoacmbly wao 
thuB able to ploy a cupervlsory role slailar in oome resyoctu
to tbot which it had boon authorised to perform, with the 
cl ^he ^fUsucoahlp Council, with regard to trust territ— 
wrxca, making such inroad# into the domestic domain
01 Lhc colonist powers helped to weaken their claim that ool«. 
onial questions were governed by the principle of non­
intervention under Article 2(7) of tho Charter.
faouga m o  unitoa Rations played a significant role in 
the Indonoaion affair because of the Tillingneoo of the United 
Utatçü to.apply preacuro again&t the ketherlando in ounport of 
tae uouLriuy council's policy of decolonizing Indonesia, in 
Ouhui c^lon^al conaxlcto between 1946 and i960 It cither placed 
paru, or zn xhooe in which it did intervene, such as the 
conflict# in Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria, Its role wao res- 
tricteu uo unot of oxorcioing moral pressure for just solut-
prouzomc in very subdued terms* Indeed, in ouch 
^auwanoen it woula appear that the overthrow of oolonlallem 
wa# cau^oc uy %ho determination of national liberation movamosto 
to adopt violent measures which made it difficult for the 
cozoniar powers,weakened by the dccond forld for* to maintain 
cccUfal. acyerunelcBB, the fact tnmt the political organ# 
of the united antionn asserted their competence, prior to 
l^cv, uo aiaouos and make recommendations on cucn euoetione 
ae conizictc In morocco* Tunisia, Algeria and Cypruc, 
established the practice that it wae for the United haiiens 
to decide whether the principle of ncn-intervcntion choulc 
#pply to colonzai isouca, not the colonial power directly 
involved*
Af ser tne Aaoembly'n I9&O Declaration on the Granting- 
of Independence to Colonial uountriGO and Peoples, which men-
ifosüùd the intense deuire of the Afro-Asien otntcn, moot of 
them former colonies, to mcceloratc the prcconn of deorlonlo- 
atlon, that body.acted on the assumption that it could inter­
vene in colonial queaticna aololy on n colonial people's 
'right to self-dotermination and Indapendonoe*,
Thca;h It needs to be atroBsed that the Soviet Union*# 
etrong support for the anti-oolonloliot cause in the Assembly 
was not.' ooh.Blotent with its reluctance to reep.eot the principle 
of Bclf-dotmrmlnatlon of peoples in Eastern Europe, it was 
underct.ud^AiG that colonial peoples anxious to bo rid of the 
yoke of l.^'riallam; or those subjected to oppressive condit­
ions by white minority regimes in southern Africa, should have 
looked to the United Rations to assiot thorn in their struggle 
for liberation, and resorted to 'strategics of violent implem­
entation' v.iien' the Organisation could not effectively help 
then to achieve their objective.
It is difficult to azGCss tho extent to which the work 
of the Committee of 24, upon which the Assembly*# resolutions 
were based, influenced colonial power# to yield control over 
non-aelf-governing territories - almost thirty of them - 
during tho decade that followed the adoption of the igGv 
Icclaratlon. hut it eopmc reasonable tc aoaumo that the 
pressure which was exerted on the administering powers influ­
enced most of them to deal with the problems of decolonisation 
with a .gTeatoz' Gcnoc of urgency then they..would. othoi'wlae..have 
done* Indeed, it would appear that by aesertin their compet­
ence to uiBOUGs and innko roooDQond&tiono on colonial questions 
which administering poworu claimed an matters of domestic jur­
isdiction, the political organs of United Rations, both before
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and after the I960 foGlnralion, expound tbcoo powor# to bhe 
wind of change.
Thus, though It hno to be recogniaod that the United 
Ration# lacked the enforcement capability to compel stotoa 
to implement the principle of oelf-deterolnatioD of peoples* 
ac Illustrated by its failure to enforce Mouth Africa's obed­
ience to Assembly and Meourlty Council resolutions on Namibia* 
cr ita inability to do hing effective when Russia Inter— 
veoed in Rungary in 1956 and in OzeohoGlovakla in 1Q68, this 
study appears to justify the conclusion that the Organisation 
provided a platform for anti—colonialist propaganda which 
influenced mont of the colonial powera to speed up the process 
of decolonisation.*
* The UR and the Palestinian question is reviewed in IV, 
note 122.
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1# this chapter we shell consider how the principle of 
non-intervention in matters essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of states has been &n issue in peacekeeping 
operations with UN forceo, but in order to plnco the subject 
in perspective seme mention must be made of the assumptions 
th&t influenced the great power approach to the problem of 
u'lntainlng international peace and security at the Man 
franoieoo Conference in 1945* and how this approach was mod­
ified &8 a re&ult of great power disunity*
At Can fronciGco the architects of the Charter envisage# 
the maintenance of international pence and security primarily 
in term# of greet power unanimity* Though it was agreed under 
Article 27 of the Charter that a permanent great power member 
of the Security Council, party to a dispute to be rooclvod 
through pacific nottlement under Chapter VI cf the Charter, 
should net posacso the right to veto & rosolutipn before the 
Council* it wae given the right of veto In the field of enforce, 
ment action under Chapter VII (Action with roGpoct to threat# 
to the peaoo, breachoo of the peace, and acts of aggression}. 
The implementation of this concept of security waa thus based 
on tho aeaumption that the five permanent members of the 
Meourity Council - the United otateo, Roviot Union, China, 
United kingdom end France - would neither purouo aagrescivc 
policies themcclve# nor sponsor the aggressive policies of 
lesoer abates*
It was aloo assumed at Man Francisco tUau member—statoo 
of the United Rations would make available to the uecurity
J-
Couneil the force# noansecry for mrieAulnlng Internat­
ional poooo oni oeourity. In noocrdenoo with opeoiol agro2- 
nentn unior ^rtlcla 45 of the Charter, and % Military itaff 
Oonnitteo would aooiot tbo Security Council on nil natters 
relating to military requirements under Article 47, Gut the 
hootllo relationü between the Movlet Union and the Ueatern 
powere mndo it Impossible to cneure groat power agreement on 
the iaploEiontation of Article 45,(1) %#&, &s one writer haa 
elated, 'deprived of its cornerstone the UR cnforceBont syctem 
remained a theoretical construction ao natlone entrusted their 
defence to military coalitions of like-minded alllee*,(2)
That Ihc Roourity Council was aulo to recommend enforce­
ment action mgalnoc Forth heron In ig^U wae fortuitous, since 
thl# oade ^ossihlo by Russia*# absence from the Council in 
protest at the recognition of Taiwan, not Communist China, as 
the rightful holder of the China coat at the United Rations, 
the requisite majority taking the view that because of its 
absence, hu&oia was net entitled to exercise ito veto* having 
determined on 25 June that *the armed attack upon the Republic 
of horca* oonztltutod *a breach of the peace*, and called upon 
the north forean authorities to withdraw their foreea to the, 
53th parallel,(5) which the latter Ignored, the beourity 
Council rocomnendod on 27 June 'that the acabera of the United 
Nations furnish such agoistonoe to the republic of Lorea no 
may be acocsaary to repel the armed attack and to restore 
international peace and security in the %re%*.(4) Cn 7 July 
it further reocnaondcd * that all Rombere providing military 
forces and other assistance pursuant to the afcroaaid uooarity 
Council resolutions make such force# and other assistance 
available to a unified command under the United States**(5)
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The mejvrluj lu the security council Lhu# took Ahe view, 
a# Gubuoqucntly aouertou by Ko#alyn uigglnü, thak Lhere was 
*a clearly defined de feoüc frontier' dividing Dorth and Mouth 
korc&p and *Lwo different authorities', and that *whnt was at 
ieswe was an external attack by one authority upon the territ­
ory under the control of the other*#(6) But the Soviet Union 
contended that United hetione intervention in Korea - 
military forces were provided by sixteen states unaer the 
unified command of the United Utates and other ferma of assist­
ance by twenty—one states - was a violation of the principle 
of non-intervention In & domestic matter, *Aw regarde the 
war between the North and Mouth Koreans, it le a civil war 
and therefore does not ce&c within the definition of aggress­
ion, since It is war, not botween two States, but between two 
parts of the Korean people temporarily split into two canpa 
under aeuarate authorities,* argued Mr, Malik, the Moviot 
delegate, on hia. return to the Security Council ecrly in 
August 1950, *fho conflict in Korea i& thus an Internal'- 
conflict. Consequently rules relating to aggression are just 
as inapplicable to the northern and southern states of America, 
when they wore fighting a civil war for the unification of 
their country.'(?)
In' view of the Uoviet Union's opposition to United 
Rations intervention in Korea, the return of its delegate to 
the Security Council prevented that body from adopting any 
further resolutions on the Korean oueoticn, but action ageinst 
north Korea-'under United Rations auspices proceeded as had 
been rooc^mended, and iu order to circumvent an inactive 
Security Council if it was hamstrung by the veto in the event 
of further acts of aggression on the Korean model, the
United Fatlcn# Accombly adcptcd the 'Unibing Ter icace* plan . 
wkivh ccatcincd the icllcwing provieione: (i) the calling of 
an e^er_eney eeeeion ef tac Aceemlly clthin twenty Touz" hcura 
li the LDCErlty Ucencil, bccau&c ci lack of unanimity of it# 
permanent mcmUcra, failed to exercise its primary zeeponeibil- 
Ity lor tbo maintenancG of international peace and security in 
any caoe wnore there appeared to be a threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggreeeion,. The Assembly would 
ùc&olüor the matter immediately with a view to making appro#— 
riato rec&mmonaationG to member—states for collective meanurea* 
Including in the case of a breach of the peace, or act of agg­
ression, the use of ar.cn force when neoQos&ry to maintain or 
restore international peace and security; (11) the setting-up 
of a Beaoo Observation ConmiGSlon under the auspices of the 
AsBumbly to obcorvù and report on the situation in any area 
whore there was international tension, the continuance of which 
was likely to endanger international peace and security: (ill) 
the o a r k i n g  by each member of the United Dations within its 
national wraad forceu olemontB, sc trained, organised and 
equipped tu^t they:uould promptly be made available, in accord­
ance with their constitutional procesoco, for service in 
United Rations units in the event of a broach of the peace or 
act of aggrossicn: and (Iv) the ontoblinhMent of a Collective 
Measures Committee to study and report on methods which %ight 
be UGOd to maintain and strengthen international peace and 
security, in accordance with the purpocco and principles of 
the Charter, taking account of collective aelf-dofencc" and 
regional arrangements under Article 51 and 52 of the Gharter*(k)
The prGtmgonlet# of the 'Uniting for feace* resolution
\ J.wl' "jCu-iiC.rC: i.j.1 wi-tC
security Uouncil to be transferred Lc tbo Arje^Lly o. wro~ 
oeüüi'bl vote of any ocvcn ^o^ucre, i,o, cnc not subject to a 
^ar^^ancnt webbor^n veto, anu for she Acocnoly to nrkc reoos^^ 
oüüaticus on security qecotiono under drtlclc 10 or Article 
11(1) of tie Charter, prcviùod such ^cttore Karo not currently 
ly the iccurlty Council under Article 11; one that if 
Buoh a orocedurc wore adopted. It ^oulu then be possible for 
the AeociCly to make appropriate 'rocoooenlatlons to mcaber—etateu 
for collective measuree,.including in the o&so of a breach of 
the peace* or sot of aggression, tho U80 of force if necooearj, 
fhough meauera of the United Nations are not legally hound to 
carry out the Acse^hly+s reeoamendatlons, the nponscra of the 
* uniting for Peace* resolution conoldcrod it llholy that 
states scald respond in order to maintain international posoe 
and security*
Iho ^oviet.Union aacerteu that the resolution illegal 
under the Charter on bhe ground that only the security Council 
pouuesrcfl the or- -.'-ionca to authorise cnfcTGement 'meagures, and 
that under Article 11(2} *any euch question on shloh action is 
neooseary shall be referred to the Security Council by the 
General Anceably either before or after diocusnlon** It shun 
insisted that the Council wno cor^etcnt to accept or reject e. 
roeo^aendntion by the Aescnbly for collective aeauuros, ouch 
as those onvlonged under the 'Uniting for Peace* resolution, 
and that it a m  to the Council to ahlch ar^ iod forceu should 
be wnde available under Article 4^ of the Charter,(9)
The soviet Ylono aere rejected by a large majority in 
the Aaao::hly, and it aao in line :;lth the 'Igniting for le ace*
1resolution that the AsBoably reoa&mendcd an embargo on the 
Bhipzent oi ar^o and &atorialo of strategic value to CoomuGlet 
Cnlaa and North Korea in Key 1951,(10) But enthusiasm for 
Implementing the 'Uniting for Poaoe* plan soon declined, &u 
Indicated by the #eak response to the reoocæendatlo# that 
states should take action to maintain elements in their armed 
forces, so trained, organised and equipped that they could 
promptly bo made available for service as United Nations anita. 
*Uizty mother states ^ere soiled, Seventeen states foiled to 
responds two merely acknowledged the inquiry; and twenty-one 
replies were negative to non-oommlttal. Of the regaining 
twenty replies, some were hedged, and only four (Uonmark, 
Norway, Greece end Thailand) actually set aside any forcee 
then In eriotenoc without a groat many strings attachoô*,[ll)
As Gabriella Kooner has pointed ont, althouyh the Collective 
measures Conwittoe act up unoor the 'Uniting for leaeo* scheme 
*nado extensive studico of the question and submitted a number 
of significant nropooalo on the matter to the General Assembly, 
it was soon evident.that most Komber Ctotos were unwilling to 
undertake specific commitments for the future. The failure of 
the Security Council to establish on effective system of coll* 
active security ha& caused many of them to provide for thoir 
mutual defence by moans of special arrengeoaats for collective 
Golf-defcneo and hence they roro anxiouu to determine, their' 
future Gours.e of action in the light of theco commitments and 
the circumstances of the particular situation*,(IP)
But despite the failure of the United Nntlono; apart 
froM its fortuitous Intervention in the Korean affair, to 
function as an nrcnoy for the enforcement of pouce unber the 
authority of tha bacuritp Council* or through the Implooont*
Gtion of who /oouobly'a 'fniafug for raaco* ocfomo, tno 
frgouiG0fl03 woo rot rendered torolly Incapable of slowing 
lorn who impetro of conflict or effecting a cessation of hcGt* 
llltleo in ooro troubled ureas, luring its oarly yearo UN 
oomnioclonop ootalllehal cither by the Security Council or the 
Aooedbly, were able to oxerciee a moderating influence on var* 
icuo partiea In conflict;, and military bboerver groupe, eonoio- 
ting of unarmed officers made available to the United Nations 
by mo&ber-otatoo oonoiderod impartial by the parties, began to 
operate In the falkano in 1146; in laleotlne in 1947, and on 
the faohmir ceane-firo line in 1943,
^ince theac military observer groupe, which had tho task 
of obnorvlup and reporting on tho ^aintoncnco of ecano-flrc 
arrangwaaata and; in the hulhano» of supervising the withdrawal 
of puorillr forces from, frocoo into Albania, Bulgaria and 
Yugcolavihp wore ootabliohod. with the conacnt of tho&o otateo 
in whose territories they carried out their duties,(130 bhoir 
prononce wan not a contravention of the principle of non­
intervention in naUterG essentially within the domestic juris­
diction of state# undor Article 2(7) of the Charter# This 
also applied to the stationing end operation of the United 
nations :Am.oi%eno;Kfo%'ce which '-aa establiehed. on .;.%ypti(0; . 
territory with the consent of the Government of Ugypt in 1956»
aîi^JMJMJiïKâaaaWmsssma:™^^^
fho buen oriois-of 1956 resulting from the invasion of
bgypt by Israel, Franco and/Britain, van s situation in which 
several factors combined to,motivate the majority of United 
Uatione members to decide at a special sccoion of the Aaaomlly* 
(14) as provided in Its 'Uniting for Peace* resolution of 1950*
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to establish an International peaeokeoplng force. As Kvan 
muard aa& explained; the Korean invasion it wao one of
tno fe# oasùo tno Urgonlnation hod mot In wbioh theyo coourred 
a clear and flagrant ease of external attook against the terr­
itory of a.member. Next it wco a situation calculates to 
arouse .the wide body of onti—colonialist sentiment within the 
Organisation* finally, it was a ease whore ootivo fighting wan 
not likely to bo required by the forocs set up,*(15)
$he international peacekeeping force which the Aosombly 
eetabllGhed w&e not designed for the enforcement of'Internat­
ional peace* it was a non-coorcive force, oon&iatlng of para­
military unite contributed by ten stated on a voluntary bagls, 
(16) and n orally equipped only with weaponc of self- 
defence* tc GGcuro and supervise the cosaation of hostilities 
and to take up a .position between the forces of Krypt and.
Israel in accordance with the Armistice Agreements of February 
1949*(1?)
fhoro %voz'C! varlotm Atatuc of 2'^ oroeo a^ :treemeato with î.he 
3;oot ototo, ..Aft, e.GOording prlvilegoa and imrunitieo to UN FF 
perso&ael; the Force waa given freedom of movement vital# 
Its area of operations,and such faciliticn rcr/rding acccou 
to that area aha Go%munio5tlonD ao were neecax^ry for the 
auccGuaful completion of it# task. But UN personnel were not 
permitted in any Gonoo to be party to internal conflict# or 
used to enforce any specific political solution of pending 
problème.
It should clco bo noted that the Co^aander of the Force 
woe reuponalblo for the dlGcharge of his toek to the ABBembly, 
but under ianuruotlonc from the àocretary-Foneral on the basis
of uüe executive autaorlty for the operation ve#tod in him 
by the Aeoe^bly: the eoet of the operation was Glloaated eaoBg 
member-GGatQo of the United Nations In a.oGordanoe with the 
nor^^l seaio of audgetary oontrlbetians; and that the Assoohiy 
eet&hliehed under.ito resolution IGCl(aü-l) of %  Bovo.hvr ig^G 
a# aüvz&ory oommitsoe of eevon representatives of member— 
atatea* usder the chairmanship of the KeGratary-Genoral, which 
was requirac uot only to assist the Secretary-General in the 
planning operatzon of the Force, but alec to request the 
convening of the Aeaeably and to report to that body never 
^abter# arc#c wazeh* l# ite.opinion* of such urgency &n#
importance am to require eanGlderati## by the Aaaeobly Itoel
zaa Importance of the principle of conaent a guiding
principle in tno cot^kll&hmont a#a operation of the VNhr was
voalk wiu^ ay vhe wocretary—General In his oecond and final
le^oru anb plan lor.the ^oroe*(18) which was approved by
ua% on 7 November 1956,(19) 'Functioning ha It would,
on lae uzale #& @ ùeciclo# reached under the terme of the
%e#o^ulzoH 'uniting for re8C0**(PO) the Force, If
#&t^ü&A0aea* wquid be Ir^lvod in Ito operations to the extent
"
couae^k oi tne P&rtlec ooncemed Is required under general— 
zy reoogc^^^d jnternational l&w,* he stated* .'Khii# the 
General I;: tmehled to eatahligh the Force, with the
eoD&e&b oi «kt.cue parties walch OGDtrlbute units to the fcrce.
It oould-wt request .the".Force to he otetioned or jo^cwite on 
the territory of a given country without the connect of the 
hovornment of that country.*(P I)
^l^arly* vhe eotcaiish%ent of ÜNPF wau not et variance 
witn the principle of aon-interventioD in mattoro essentially
UJL
wisbln the jurlsdloticn of ntatcc since the Aaeemhly
could only reoo&oead, not order* UN members to contribute, 
units to the Force* and the Force could, not be atatloned or 
operate on the territory of a state without its consent* In 
fact, though the fovlet Union did not accept the oonotitutional 
boslo on which the ?orcs wan established, on the ground that 
only the Security Council, under Chapter VII of the Charter, 
not the Assembly, had the co^petoneo to set up a peace­
keeping force — the faot that UFKF was a non-ooorolve force 
mode #0 dlfforGace to the Soviet argument - it abetalnou from 
voting on the establishment of tbo foroe, rather than vote 
ngainat it, because Fgypt was prepared to oonoent to the 
stotioniag of the force on its territory*(22)
fuc question whether it was a patter within the domestic 
jurisdiction of the Zg^/ptlon goveryiment to terminate the pres­
ence of ühG? &t a time of its own choo&lng was the subject .of 
delicate negobiatlonu between'hc^^crskjold and the Kgyptisn 
government, but the Aide=momqiz*e oz). the baeio for the presence 
. fmiotiening of UN^- in Ngypt. was agreed to. by the
Government of Bgypt after Uammorakjold*# .dihCUBalona with 
i^asscr in Gciro (16-18 Uovmnbor 1956),(23) was noted with 
approve! by the Anoe&bly on 24 Novonber 195&*{24) fhlB con­
tained the following declarntlcnn by tho Government of Ngypt 
end the'vhltod Batlonst
The Government of Ngypt declares that, Khen exercising 
its sovereign rights on nny matter concerning tb# pros— 
enoe and funtloniag of.U-bi, it will be guided, i% gocd 
Gv lt8 aooe'otonoo of General Assembly resolution 
IbiC of 5 Noveaber 1956.(25)
The 'h-vcd Nations takea note of this declaration of the 
b c v , i n t  of Kgypt and declares that the nctivitlee of 
Ü ' wizl be guided, in good faith, by the taak eataulzaae;
for tho Foroe In the aforesaid resolution* In particular, 
thü United ^tions, understands'* l\iu to correspond to 
of the Governmant o: \/pL, reaffirms its
llzngnces to UG% ' until its te completed,
BeiLrr&kjola outlined 1% general taras the l^illoationo 
of the in hlo Nummary Ntudy of the G%perie;oo&
derived from the eotabllohme&t and operation of the Force, 
the text of %hlob was ac follow&t(2G)
coneequeaoe of swoh a uljatoral declaration io that* 
-oio either side to act urllatcrwlly la refusing eon tin- 
ucJ presence or deciding on withdrawal,,and were the 
rt^cr Glde to find that such actio# wao contrary to a 
poot,—faith Interpretation of the purpooee of the operat— 
3on, on exchange of vlewo #ould be called for tow&rdo 
h Où Seing khe positions# Thlo does not Imply any 
isfrl^gcnwnt of the eovereiaG right of the boot Govern- 
y* nor Liay restriction of the ' right of the United 
I 'llone to decide on the tr^  ^lation of Its own c,rrat- 
loo whenever It .ight see t vO do se, But It drew
mean a rcorrwltlon oi cms fact that the operat­
ion, being 'f wsd on collaboration between tho boat Gov- 
emnont the hnitoa Ti'aticna, should bo carried oa in 
lorpa natural to such collaboration, and especially $o 
wita regara to the quceklcns of presence and ^^Inteaance*
Is 10 implicit In tble ct^temont, oo %»#* Gsgnon has 
mwznvalnod, *%hat the host government having consulted fully 
with tne boated B&tione* can then prcusrly insist on the with— 
urawai of the force whether or not the United Nations approver,
A pledge of good felth p%t& the host state under obligation to
act r#ssonx^ly% it may well set up a duty to .consult with the
United Nati&BG o% all matters, but It docs not by itself &ek 
up a duty to agree, Any üore stringent interpretation would 
entail a# exercise of United Nations authority istconalatest 
w%ta tao &ca%%mg of consent aa the -basis of the operation and 
oppropriato only to Noourity Council enforoitnont action*,(2?) 
but aoGo: to a %mr(3onal 50%orandui2 writ te# by liamj^ iarB'xjclc^  -
it was dated 5 August 1957, & year or so before the publication 
of hio auscazy Ktudy referred to above (28) - the Kgyptlsn
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gcvern%ont wad accepted a more definite obligation tb&s th@ 
'goca laarb* agreement oeemed to Imply, Hamaarakjold aogerteü 
that Nasoor had accepted a obligation to reach agree­
ment on the question whether the taoka of &%%? &&& beg# 
plctod before heoooia _o~;timately decide to terminate tbo 
preeenoe of %%# Poroe o& bgyptian territory, and oonBoqu&atly 
Egypt's.jwrlcdietlonln regard to this question.
maooo, bamaarokjold given 03)001^1 oisphaeis tc thlB In 
the aaoouns of ni# dloowsGlono #lth Nasser in Cairo on 17 
wovomoer 1956. *Tbe device 1 used,# h% states, "meant only 
tn&w iBB&Gaa 01 limiting their righto by a basic underat&nd- 
1ug 1equ93uing o n 'agreement directly conoernlna withdrawal .
Ofw.ivwu an obligation to roach agreement on the fact that 
the tacke wore completed, and, tWe, the copditlcns for. c
In fact, boL^^marekjold stated in 
bis personal memorandum that #te sacot tho test through in 
B^lte o* #asaor*0 asrong wloh to avoid thlo, ana bio etronx 
of the legal conntmct.lon, - oi:pecially of the 
^ocbioie coaCQqnenoeB ol differences of view# reg#rdiny the 
task - I felt obliged; In the ecuroo of the dloonsBion, to 
thre^tod kuree tzmee, %hat unless &% agreement of this type 
W c, I Gowld have to propoee the immediate withdrawal of
any proof would be neoossRry for how the text of 
tno agrcrjont wa# judgod by President Aeaaer, thia laot ment­
ioned. fact tolla. the Gtary*.(30) ..
bn% acoord&ng to ,b Thant,.who as Secretary—General hoi 
to coal with tho United Arab RepubllG#a demand(31) for hBFF*G 
^lühüra^^z in ^ay lyO?, haBmarDkjold*B personal memorandum* 
mhlon was never published ao a United Bationo decumant, — it
1% Two New York Tluos on 20 June I9GY by s former 
United State# représentative to the United Nations and one of 
dacmarsK^ola'm legal eonanltanto — had *no'standing beyond 
oelng a purely private mémorandum of unknown purpose or value, 
in whicn beoretary—General Hammarekjold seems to record his 
own lm#reo8l&BG and Interpretations of the dleeusoions with 
Ireazdenv u&soor, Thle paper, therefore, cannot affect in any 
way th& beslB for the preaeaoe of UBBP on the Goil of the 
Unitoü Arab htepubilo as eot out In the official dooumente* 
much 1&B8 supercede the&e documents#.(32) Certainly, thlo
valid point, as %*R, Gagnon admits,(35) but.she is 
nGvertb0ioG8 justified in critloiaing U Thant for the 'alight 
rcgwra* which ho paid to the 'good faith* agreement under the
2O hovesiber 1956, when the United Arab Repub— 
zio requested withdrawal *without oonoultatioh or oven
a Bta^eaont of rea&ono'* Ac Gagnon assorte, #tbo day before 
tne raquoat waa Bade the Neoretary—General protested the 
ouzldup of Arab troops In the buffer sone and included, with­
out ecr e^t, a copy of the I956 good faith agreement, but when 
the request arrived, he made no further protect on grounds of 
good faith (UN foouamt A/6669, paragraphs 2, 6-7)'#(54) In 
faimeos to U Thant, however. It nust be pointed out that he 
did follo%v t;:ie procedure which had been ouggeetod by Ham^arsk- 
gold, ao explained below.
It was on 18 Nay 1967, at 12 noon (Few York time) that 
U Thant received-the aosange fro# the Foreign Minister of the 
United Arab Republic stating that his government bad 'decided 
Ü0 tertninato the presxsnoo of the United uatlone ^«aergeacy 
Foroo froï3 the territory of the United Arab Republic and the
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strip#, and requested "that the nooGos&ry &tep8 bo 
taken for the withdrawal of the Force as soon as posolblG*#(35) 
hv#n before this communication was received, U.A.R. forces 
had taken over ;*s pooto in dinai, Gharm ol hheikh and 
Baa Haarani* and the Neoretory-leneral made known to the 
permanent representative of the U,A*&* at the United Nations 
hla 'deep mlaglvinga about the llkoly dioaotrous consequences 
of the wlthd] _ of urXr* and his intention *to appeal ur­
gently to President Rancor to reconsider hio deoiGion*,(35) 
later.izï the. day,, however* he v^ as in.formed that 'such^a . 
request would bo atomly rebuffed**(3T) &nd there G&n bo no 
doubt that the United Arab hepUblia'G unreasonable conduct 
was mot In the spirit or the latter of the good faith agree­
ment of 2C November 1956.
In the circumata^eee, U lhant followed the approach 
which had been suggested by Jeoretary-Uenerel HacmtarBkjold 
ton years earlier when Israel's Foreign Minister bban had 
asked whether the Aoaezbly would be give# notice before uNKP 
waa withdrawn* *An indicated procedure,* aa^^arekjold had 
stated, "would be for the Necrctary-Oonoral to inform the 
Advisory Committee on the United Uatlons U^ergenoy force, 
which would dot engine whether the matter should bo brought 
to the attention of the Assembly*.(39) Such an approach 
was oonalatent with paragraph 9 cf the General Assembly res­
olution 1C01(F''-1) of 7 November 195&, which elated thot *tho 
Advisory Committee, in the performance of Ito duty, shall be 
empowered to r^  ^ i through the usual procedures, the con­
vening of the V, <1. Aosembly and to zoport to the Aaaembly 
whenever mat tore êrloe which, in Its opinion, are of ouch 
urgency and zaporvence au to require consideration, bt the
General Aeeecbly itself*.
In aooorlenoe with thiu procedure Bocrotary-leneral 
U Thant met with the UNRF Advisory.Cou&lütoe at 1700 hours 
(New York time) on 10 May 19&7, before replying to the 
United Arab Ropublio'a The representatives of three
.countries not mosberu of the fàvlGory vommlttee hut providing 
contingenta to UHRF, wore alao present &t the meeting, and 
In hie account of that meeting, the minute# of which have 
not yob ' : , reloaGcd by the United Rations, U Ihont.^^dc : 
the following dicolo&ure:
No. proposai WHO made that the Advioory üoalttoe should 
oxcreioe thorirhl vested la it hy the General AsGoobly 
resolution 1001(bf-l) to request the convening of the 
General ^soo^hly to take up the situation arieing from 
tne United Are^ ^^^ubiic êcmmunic&tiô&* At the conclus­
ion or tne mooirn . It was understood that the Georetary. 
voncrml U3Ü no ^uomative other than to comply ^Ith the 
unitoc^wrab nepurlic*a defend* although come représentât" 
ivpslelt tnc acctctoiy-frnoral caould previously clarify 
wiyh thac aoyarnmont tho in Its request that
vp"G;&: r. ' \'j "^rclp trJrc place **nc soon 'no p o s s i b l e T h e  
yeeroo'vy- ^niral informed the Advi&ory Committee that 
ac lnt(3s:doK to reply pro%:ptly to the United Arab ha:tab- 
l%e, yKd toloport to the General Assembly and to the 
^rorrzGy Council on the action he had tnkon. It for 
tyc c\^cr.states to decide 'father the competent organs 
axorLG 02 could take up the _^*ter and to ^urcue it 
accordingly. {3g} .
iKodintejd^. oftar the f:-oetin.g of the Advisory Oom'itto.o, 
at approximately ly.OO hours (Fow York time) on 16 Kay,
U Thant informed the foreign finiotcr of tho United Arab 
depu&llo* through that state's permanent representative at 
'GO# Uhiüoa Rations, that his Govamaent*# request would be 
compile# with;(40) and since bin special reports to the 
ambly and docurity Council were presented later,(41) the 
official united Bations response to the United Arab Republic*# 
rocuect for hdff*n withdrawal wa# made before these organe
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ooüld take any move to dloeu&de the government of that state 
to change Itw mind,
Since It wae the reaponolbillty of the Advisory Committ­
ee under the chalrmonBhip of the Secretary-General ko determine 
whether the matter should have been referred to the Aooesbly 
In aooordanGe with the AGse^bly'o rooolutlon 1001(h2-l), and 
the need for ouch action woo obviouoly desirable in view of 
the serlouB eoneequenoc# that :%lght follow from ÜRBF'o vflth- 
drawal, the failure of that G< , tteo to roqwest the Aaooably 
to consider the satter justified eenonre, Even if the AGà&mhly 
did not poeoesG the competence to decide that tho withdrawal 
of ÜRBF should not take place, elnce the question of terminat­
ing the presence of the Force on United Arab Republic territ­
ory was a Batter.within the domestic jurisdiction of that 
state, It had the competence under the good faith agreement 
of 20 November 1956 to cell for further Gon&ultatlona on the 
matter* and to make & recommendation which reflected its 
moral judgment on the matter* The Aseembly would not hava 
been contravening the principle of non-intervention in natter# 
within the domeatio jurisdiction of the United Arab Republic 
bad this procedure been followed#
In defence of the part which he played In the affair,
U Thant arg-uod that be did not bcliovo that any useful purpose 
would be served by hie cooking a meeting of cither the Ascumbly 
or the Geonrity Council, nor did he ccnoider that there was a 
hOBlG for him to do so at the time#(42) But since he stated 
in hl(3 report to the Security Council on 19 May' igG? that the 
situation In the Middle East w&o "extremely menacing* $ (43) 
be had a basis under Article 99 of the Chart or on. which to
ask the security Council to ocn&ldor the question of UNKP*# 
withdrawal aa a threat to international poaoe and security*
Under Article 99 'the Georetory-Geacral mey bring to 
the attention of the üocurlty Council any natter whiob in 
Ills oglaion maj- threaten the maintonanco of ifiternatlonal 
peace and security**(44) and tho exerclGc of thlc prerogative 
would not have been at variance with the principle of non- 
InterventlGa in e, matter .esaentlglly within the domestic, 
jurisdiction of the United Arab/Eepublio* Even though'It 
wae unlikely that the Meourlty üounoll would have been able 
to decide that the Gltu&tlcn constituted a threat to inter­
national peace under Article 39 of the Charter* because "the 
Govlet Union could have been relied upon to etoad by Egypt*, 
(45) such a m&ve would have dramatised the need for fresh 
Initiatives In the search for a political oettlemont of the 
Arab-Iar&ell question* which was long overdue*
It would appear that U Thant*o defeatist attitude was 
a reflection of the general nolalsc affecting UN's peacekeep­
ing role at that ti^c* Certainly, the morale of the Organis­
ation bad been lowered by the controveray over the financing 
of.peacekeeping oporatlonG by the Ao&ombly, which stemmad 
from the insistence of the Fovlet Union and France that only 
the.UeCw^lty Council could euthcri&e United ^atlona peaoekeep< 
lag forces, Guoh ae URbP, even though an advisory'opinion of 
the International Court'of Justice had uphold the Assembly's 
ooapetenoe to recommend the oatabllebiAont of non-coorolve 
peacekeeping foreee under Article 11(2) of the Charter.(46)
Though the United Rations Operation in the Congo (onuo)
was eatbJllG&od In July I960 by the Security Council, the 
Covlct Union'G objection to the political direction of the 
Force resulted In Its refusal to share In that peacekeeping 
operation, and intensified the financial and constitutional 
controversies within the United Rations on the question of 
peacekeeping. Beeldee, and of special relevance In thie 
study, the interpretation and application of the principle of 
DOD-intorvention in the domeatlc affairs of the Republic of 
the Congo w&G a basic issue in the Congo affair, and before 
we coiilder the second United RatiODG Inergenoy Force which 
was established in the Kiddle East in October 1973, after the 
third Arab-Israell war, it is proposed to examine the United 
Nations peacekeeping operation in the Congo and other peace­
keeping operations Involving ÜU forces which were launched in 
Uho igüOoi
The United Kations^pperption In the Oonco {OaUO)^ (47)
like uNkP, ONUÜ was a peacekeeplngforcG which was est­
ablished "with, the consent of the host state, the newly formed 
Republic of the Congo# hut unlike Uk',T* OMUC was authoriood 
under a resolution of the Security Council, not the Assembly, 
in response to Sooretary-Goneral Ha%#arskjol6*9 initiative 
under Article 99 of the Charter, following a cable from 
President kasavubu on 12 July I960* which requested military 
assistance to protect the territory of the Republic of the 
Congo against Bol#an agarosoion,(48) and a second cable from 
the President and the Frime Minister, lumumba, on 13 July, 
which threatened to look for help outside the United Nations 
If them waa no UN response,(49)
Delglan forces, stationed on bases In various parts of
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the Congo un&or the Belgo-Congoleoe Treaty of Friendship, 
asa iBvOrvcnod to quell disorders and to protect European# 
ioilowing the mutiny of Congolese troops of the Force /oblique 
against «noir Belgian officers, and their attempt to restore 
order was interpreted"by the loaders of the central government 
in jueopoldvl'ile ae an encouragement for eccesolonlGt movements 
in the provlnoeo of Kasai and Katanga, In fact, on 11 July, 
the frlDo Minister of Katanga, Molae Tshombe, who had aaked 
for the intervention of Belgian troopa in KliGobethvillo, 
annoucca the aecGGalcn of Katanga, There was thus the danger 
that if tae new Congolese government did not obtain baited 
(ationa aosiatenco* that aid would bo forthcoming
from statea whoao Intervention might turn the Congo into an 
.International cauldron,
raa boourzty Council considered the question on 13 and 
I4 ^uly, anu tho aoviet bnlon'a attempt to chargctorise the 
cltuatzon as an issue of external aggression by Belgium and 
Ü0 get tac uounoil to call for the Immediate withdrawal of 
Belgian vioops was aefcated. Instead the Council adopted a 
lunieian proposal, the tozt of which in its operative part 
read as follows:
i# the Government of Belgium to \_vbdra#
their trccps from the territory of the établie of 
the Eongc*
' ÜÊS&ÉRâ authorise the Becz*eta%^ /-Genei'al. to take
the neooapary stepe, In coneziltation with the dcvorn- 
Dent of the republic of the Congo* to nrcvldc the 
Government with each military asalGta&ee '# _Lv bo 
neeeaanry, until, through the efforts of the Cc'SgoleBe 
ivoyemment^ with the technical assistance of the United 
. ,Tions* 'the notional security forces may be able* in 
th: opinion of the Government, to meet fully their 
tasks*
the SecrBtar;y-:kmerol to report to the Sec­
urity Council as appropriate.(50)
In his Firsi o^ort to the oceurlty Council (18 July 
1960)9(51) Seor G w ary—3 en oral ((rnxnrskjold characteriaed the 
breakdown of law and order In the Oongo as a situatioii which 
represented atiireat to international peaoe and eoourity, and 
otated that the aim of the UH Force wan to asolot the Congo­
lese government to restore law and order and facilitate the 
withdrawal of Belgian forces* He was able to report that 
elements of OKUO were already in place, and that the follow­
ing rules and principles applied to the eatabllshnont and 
operation of the force; (i) the stationing of the force on 
Congolese territory was based on the consent of the host 
state, the Republic of the Congo; (ii) the use of military 
personnel and equipment by the ON depended on the consent of 
the contributing states: (ill) the Force would not Include 
contingents from any of the permanent members of tho Security 
Council; but consist of forces mainly from African state# and 
some recruited from other states; (iv) the force was not tc 
interfere in intcrnol conflicts or enforce any specific pol­
itical solution of ponding problems; (v) freedom of movement 
within its area of operations was essential for the Foroe, 
end t?iio Involved the negotiation of agreements with the 
Republic of the Congo: (vi) the Force was restricted to mil­
itary action in self-defence* which prohibited UN forces from 
taking the Initiative in the use of armed force; (vil) the 
Force would be under the exclusive command of the united 
Rations, and its Commander respcnisiblo for the discharge of 
his task to the Security Council, but under Instructions fro.^ i 
the Sccrotary-General on the baolo of the executive authority 
for the operation vested in him by the Security Council: and 
the cost should be undertaken by ^ember-statca according to
the 'I üoale of budgetary contributions.
On 22 July the Beourlty Oou&oil oom&ondeâ the secretary- 
Genor&l for the prompt, action th&t ho ha# taken, invitea tno 
specialised ogonoioB of the United Kationa to render him sudh 
agaistonoe ej he might require, sad requested him to report 
further ea coproprlato. It did not moke a formal finding 
tbst the ^Z^uatlon in the Congo was a threat to Intomatir z 
pe%oe and security, hut 'considering that the ooDplete restor­
ation: of le# and order in tho.Republic of the Congo would off- 
eotively contribute to the maintenance of international peace 
and ooeurity*, oallod u^an the Government of Belgium *to 
implement opeedily the beourity Oounoil resolution of 14 July 
i960* on the withdrawal of their troopa*, authorised the 
^ecrebary—lonoral *to take all neooocary action to thio affect*, 
and roquoatod #11 otatec *tc refrain frco any action which 
kl/ht tend to i^pedo the restoration of la# and order und the 
exeroiar the Government of vhe Con^o of its authority ana
also to liln from any action which might undermine the
territorial Integrity and the political indope&dehao of the 
Republic of tao .Gongo**(52)
The two decurlty Council roôolntionn (14.and 22 July 
i960) wore ncstlo&ed in the basic agroemont between the Repub­
lic of the Congo and the United Nations,(53) which recognised 
that thn osta.bllshmont of OKUC in the Congo was based on the 
aonnent of the host Ktate, hut also wade fairly ole^r, In 
contract to the bnnlc ngzoemont.Jet^aen Egypt the United
on JhhP, that the ouoation of the termination of OhU0*3 
preoenco in the Congo a matter which the United nation# 
was co^peüont to decide*. This egreewent* which concluaeJ
on 27 I960* ##3 %& follows:
The Government of the Republic of the Conge states 
t In the exercise of its sovereign rights with 
roxpoet to.any question concerning the presence nxd 
lUActlcnlng of the United Uationa.Force in the Congo*
It will be guided* in %ced faith, by the fact tlr.w 
It has requested eaeiotênce from the United
U&tiona shd by its eoceytenoe of the resolutions of 
the Keourity Council of 14 and 22 July I96O; it liUe- 
e^rtOG that it will ensure the freedom of #ove- 
moyt of %ho Fore# In the Interior of the country end 
will record the requisite privilege# ana l^^unlties 
to all ^oroonnel ea&oolated with the activities of 
the ;orno#
/ho United Nations tPkcs note of the statement of the 
ûovpr&wont of the republic of the O&ngo end eteteo that * 
wibh rcjard to the activities of the United Nations 
Force In the Oongo* it will be guided, in good faith*
%ho assigned so the Force in the aforementioned
reuolptionG; in particular the United PetionG^ro- 
affirm#* considering it to be'ln accordance with the 
wiLUos cf the Government of the kC.ubllG eJ the üongc* 
thot is is prepared to maintain .ho United Rations 
Force In the Congo until ouch time &a it deems the 
lot tor* a test, to have been' fully aocoapllshod.
ireo&ntly It will be geo# that thé question'of ONUG's 
freedom of movement and termination, referred to in the h&ole 
Agreement; became matters of dispute between the Congolese 
govern .a#v and. the UB Oomasnd in the Congo under the general 
direction of the hecretary-Gencral* but the main diB&greemont 
that charged at an early stage of the UK operation was ever
the application of the principles of #elf-defenoe and non­
intervention In internal conflicts, which were baele to Ua&m- 
ersljold'o ^ept of bow the peacekeeping operation should 
be conducted, .as he .had eMphasiuod in his first report to -the 
Security uouneil, A& already #totod, this report oom^onded 
by the "Ocurity Council, but the dispute between haæmarakjold 
and humumbs over the application of the two xri%ciplew woe 
highlighted in Auguat I9&0, after the becr^tary-General bed 
caked the Security Council for fresh Instructions because the 
entry of UN troops Intc Katanga were likely to bo opposed by 
force*(54)
Haœarokjolû pointed ont to tho security Council on 
8 August that since the principle of solf-defence governing 
the operation of ORUO prohibited Da forces from taking the 
Initiative in the use of araed force, their entry into Katanga 
by the use of force was not persiasible, Sut he did not aek 
the Security Council to widen OUUO'e mandate by giving it the 
right to use enforcement measurce; he was obviously anxious 
that should still operate In accordance with the self-
defence principle, for all that he recommended wag that the 
Oounoll should stress the need for UN forces tc enter Katanga 
and not be used to Intervene in the internal conflicts in 
the Congo In ordor to influence their outcome,(55)
It can thus be soon that Haamarokjold considered that 
the accession of Kctanga wan a donostic .question tc which the 
gen oral principle of. non-intervention under Article 2(7) of 
the Charter wac applicable, so that CKUC should not be weed to 
influence the outcome of the conflict between Katanga and the 
central government, Moreover* since OUUO wao alac governed 
by the principle of Gelf-defence, which prohibited U# forces 
from using enforcement measures, it wao Implicit in Hammersk- 
jold*8 policy that the exception to the general principle of 
non-Interventlon under Artiole B[7), which permits enforcement 
measures.under Chapter VII of the Charter (Articles 41 and 4M) 
if the Gcourity Council should determine that a threat to 
international peace arises out of a domestic question* could 
not be invoked to enable ONUC to apply enforcement action 
against TBhcæbe'n Kat&nga to end ita aeccsaion.
The principle of non-intervention in internal oonfibcta ' 
between political factions end the principle of oelf—defence
were thus closely linked in determining Bao^arekjold's 
approach to the problem of Katonga, a%â explains why he con- 
.eidered that the oonotltutional baal# for the Goourity Oounell'u 
rooolntienG on tho Congo affair was to be found In Article 
40 of the Bharter*(56) though neither that article nor any 
other crtlclc had been mentioned In the Council'^ reaclutlonG*
It would appear that hLrcarokjold'a vie# was ba&ed on the ass­
umption that the Security Council had already recognised that 
the Congo situation was a threat to International peace and 
security under Article 39 of the Charter, but Inetead of 
making reoomocndatlone or deciding under Article 39 wh&t 'enfor­
cement neaouroo should bo taken in accordance with Article 41 
or 42 to maintain or restore international peace and security, 
had preferred to act under Article 4.0, vi%« " in order tc pre­
vent an r'gravatlon of the situation* the Security Council may, 
before making the recomacndationo or deciding upon the meaoure# 
provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to 
comply with Guch provisional measures as It deems necessary or 
desirable* Such provisional ncaGuroa shall be without prejud­
ice to the righto, claimc; or position of the parties concerned* 
The Üocurlty Council shall duly take account of failure to 
comply with ouch provisional measure^*? Certainly, .since pro­
visional measures under Article 40'are not enforcement meaouron* 
It may he claimed that the operation of CMUO In accordance 
with the principle of aclf-defenoo was not at variance with 
Article 40, and that the exception to the general principle 
of non-intervention under Article 2(7) could not bo invoked, 
ninco that Gpocifioally refera to enforcement measures.
In hie speech to the Security Council on 0 August 19&0 
it was obvious that Hammarukjold was anxious that provisional
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measures under Article 40, as distinct from enforcement mess- 
ureo under Article 42, chowld bo applied to prevent an aggra­
vation of the aitustlon in the Congo, But thie approach was 
critlclocd by the delegate of the doviet Union who contended 
that the intervention of Belgian forces in the province of 
Katanga was a caae of external aggresaion.againet the Republic 
of the Congo, &ne maintained that the M  Force had the author­
ity to apply enforcement ceaaurea against those who resisted 
its.entry.into K&t%nga*(57)
The-deourlty Council rejected the meseureo proposed by 
the Soviet Union and adopted a reoolutlon(58). which reflected 
the viv of .rjkjoia* The operative parte of this resol­
ution were os followe:
' .Qonflr.iLc the authority given to the decrotary-General 
by the reeurlty Council resolutions of 14 July and 22 
July IjAC and requests hiæ to continue to carry out 
the responsibilities placed on him thereby;
,,upon - the Government of Belgium to withdraw Immed­
iately its troops from the frovlnce of Katanga under 
speedy mccalltieo determined by the Becretary-Goneral 
to aa^ist In every possible way the Implementation 
of tho vouncll*8 re&olutlcne»
A* Agol,^%s that, the eatry of the United Rations Force 
Into the Province o% auanga Is nooeoaary foi* the full 
Implementation of this resolution;
that the united Rations Force in the Congo 
will not bo party to or in any way intervene in or bo 
used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict* 
constitutional or otherwise;
5* ilijQjG&JlÜiSS. ;EembGZ' Btateo* in aocordoncc with
Articles 25 end 49 of the Charter, tc accept ana carry 
out the decisions of the Beourity' Council and to afford 
mutual %08istanoe In oarrying out measures decided upon 
by the Ueourlty Council;
6» Requests "She Reeretary—General to Inplemont this resol— 
utloh and to mport further to the Jeourlty Gcunell aa
appropriate.
In a memorandum ## paragraph 4 above, hammsrokjold
asaerted that thlg aeant that though the United Rations had 
no right to prevent the central 'government In ^oopoidvillo 
from taking Independent.action against Katanga, the Unl&ed 
Natlono Foroe could not he employed on behalf of the central 
government to force the provincial government in Katanga to 
accept 0 particular solution of the constitutional problem 
posed by Kata%ga*o ceoe8olon,(59)  ^But thi# interpretation 
WC& dleputed by kumumba who* in a latter to H&amar8kjcld,(60) 
maintained tact the implementation of Security Council resol­
ution# required the u&e of G^no to overthrow the rebel govern­
ment cf Kata%g%, Moreover* the fact that naoMarokjold hod 
reached, agreement with fshombc on 12 August i960 for the 
immediate entry of ONUO contingents Into k&taaga and the with­
drawal of folglcn troops from the province by the end of 
August* without involving lumwmb& In the negotiations* or 
including hia forces in the Kataaga operatic#* "had dealt a 
blo^ tc Kumw#he*c pride, and lu#u%b% had decided to seek mil—
1 help directly from the Jovict Union**(61).
In rceponao to. lumumha's criticism of his handling of
■ ■ ". ■' ■ ■ .
the Katanga quoatlon* hcm&arakjold caked for a meeting of the 
hoGurity Council* but when the Council met on August 21-2T no 
resolution was adopted by that body* Though the Coviet Union, 
supported by /Gland, proposed that % group of abates contrib­
uting contingenta to the United Nation# Pcroe ohould be set 
up to eaewrc the Implementation of beowrlty Council resolut­
ions, in oeoordanoG with lumunba'e interpretation* the Meoret— 
ary-Geueral*D inulatenco that OkUC's role ohowld be governed 
by the cloooly linked principles of "oelf-defence* and "non­
intervention in internal oonflictc,. constitutional or otherwioe* 
vm.8 supported by Ceylon, China, Ecuador, France, Italy*
F ie
United Kingdcn and the United States*(62) Thus, although 
hammarskjold established at this juncture an Advisory Comm­
ittee, .representative of the eight statoe contributing units' 
to the UN Force, with which he could consult as occasion 
demanded, he was still able to conduct the peacekeeping 
operation In the Congo in accordance with the basic principles 
which he bed formulated,
having failed to secure the use of ONUO to enforce 
fatanga*s subilBsion to the central government, humumba. 
ordered hio Congolese ooldiers Into.Kasai province to prepare 
for an attack against the secessionist province, for which 
he Bought acaistance fro# the Soviet/Union# fboir maG&acre 
of tribesmen of the Dalubo secessionist movement, soon after 
their entry Into the province, moved Eammarskjold to depart 
from a literal interpretation of the principle of non- 
intervention in Internal conflicts* "Prohibition against 
.intervention In internal conflicts cannot bo considered to 
apply to aenaolGBS slaughter of civilianc or fighting aris­
ing from tribal hostilities, * ho cabled Oordlor, who had. 
replaced \unohe as bis special representative In the Oongo, 
and after consulting with bis Advisory Committee, *he in-' 
struoted Ooraior, on September 2, to recommend strongly to 
Foreign Minister hoæboko that immediate steps be taken to 
control end discipline the army in Kasai, he also authorised 
the interposing of UN troops* uolng force if necessary to 
stop the nasaacre,*(63)
Hammarokjold Y/ao also greatly alarmed-by the threat to 
international peace and security posed by Uoviet military 
assistance to luwumba* Already lumumba*# forces bad been
helped by Roviot tr&noport pl&neo, trucks and teobnlolans* 
and on 5 Roptembor shortly aftor the Soviet Union had &nn- 
ouaood Ito support for lumumba without recognising Kaoavubu.
88 Proeldent of the Bopublle of the Oongo, hosavubu dlB^lsaod 
lu%umba e post and appointed Joseph Ileo In his pl&oo.
In responoo to thio lunumha doolmr'ed that Kasavuhu %?aa no 
longer Iresidont* iL though the Oongolono parll' vut would 
not ratify the di&æioaül of either lumumba or K&savubu, the 
bitter ccnteat for power between the rival political lea&ero 
brought to Ah end the effective functioning of the parliament­
ary system of government. ; % -
In view of the con&tltutlcnal crloi# in the Bongo, 
Uammarokjold advised Oordler to use his own Glooretlon in 
handling complex situation. "In.euoh a situation,* he . 
cabled, "respoaolble people'on the spot night commit them- 
Golves to what the Uocretary-Gen&ral oould not justify doing 
himself - taking the rlok of.- being dlooi'med when it no longer 
t a Oordler took the view that the only logiu-
imate oonGtitntlonal authority in suob a ohaotio situation 
waa the President*/ Hé thus aocBdod to President KaG&vcbu's. 
requests that ONUO hhould become responsible for maintaining 
law and order throughout the Congo and th&% all airfield# 
should be oloeed to all except ORUO aircraft. On hie own 
.initiative Oordier also decided on 6 JeptoMber to oloGo down 
the.Leopoldville radio otation in order to prevent inflammat­
ory political broadoasbe, but "Cordior and his ad vie ere did 
not know that Kasavuiu, through hio PLhongo contacts and 
friendship with the Abbe Yoçlou .' across the river in hr&B%a*» 
vlllo, would be given acooso to the even more powerful trans­
mitters of Rfïdlo 3rassa%rille. Thus whot vv^as intended to be a
general ban on political broadcast# put Lumumba at a ooneld- 
orablo disadvantage, o&gccially since Lumumba wao & far more 
effective demagogue than Kssavwbu, whoge normal reaction to 
any crisis was to look himself In his house and go to bed*»*.. 
The closing of the airports algo had a greater offset on 
Lumumba than on Kasavubu, who had no Soviet or other aircraft 
at hie disposal* and woe in any cage not engaged* as Lumumba 
Yae, in shuttling troops about the country for military pur­
poses* »(55) Not surprisingly* Oordler*8 action brought forth 
a etor# of protest from Lumumba and his supporters and exposed 
him to the cbcrgo of interfering in the situation in order to 
influence the outcome of the internal conflicts.
Kajoonwar Dayol* who replaced Oorêier ao the Secretary- 
General's representative in the Congo on 8 September* admitted 
the difficulty of conducting the ONUB operation without alien- 
atlng one or other of the Internal factions* a few.days after 
be had taken over-from Oordler.(66) But his problem became 
even more lnt_ . /zble when Colonel Mobutu, the Congoleeo 
Army Chief of Staff, announced on 14 September that parlia­
ment w&atc be dissolved, and L i the Army was to take over 
control of the country* while otill accepting Kseavubu as 
President, Though Ileo did not challenge this coup d'etat, 
^umumba"did* and ho soon had to accept the protection of OMuO 
bo avoid arrest*
On the Gü&e day aw Mobutu announced bis military coup* 
the Security Council was meeting to consider the claims of 
two rival Congolese delegations*.one accredited by president 
fasavubu* the ether by Lumumba, A.loliab proposal to seat the 
Lumumba delegation was supported only by the Soviet Union and
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Ceyloa* w t  no decision i&'ao taken on the matter^ and the 
security Council turned its attention to tho Fourth Report 
of the secretary—General* whloh' appealed to all etateo to 
refroin from any action which might tend to impede the reat^- 
oration of law and order*(67) but a draft resolution which 
e%preo8cd.the view that no etate should interfere unilaterally 
1% the domostic affaire of the Congo* and that all old to the 
Congo should be channelled through the United Mations, as 
advocated by Bamoarskjold, was vetoed by the Soviet ünion»(66)
binoG the Security Council was rendered impotent by 
%he soviet veto, the United St&teo proposed the convening of 
an emergency special session of the Asseably under the 'Uniting 
for ^eaeo* procedure* ^hih was approved'by the requioito 
seven votes, and the'Assembly began consideration of the Congo 
question on IV September» fhreo dove later it adopted a rets— 
oiution* Gponoored by seventeen Afro^Aoien states, which, 
oy requeouing the oecretary-Gcneral to continue to take vig­
orous action in accordance with the üccurity Council roaolut- 
ions of 14 and 22 of July and g August 1950, virtually endor­
sed his political direction of the Congo operation, fhe 
resolution requested all states, inter alia,, not to interfere 
in internal affairs of the Gongo and to provide all forms of 
assistance through the United Mations, and appealed to all 
Congolese 'to soak a speedy eolation by peaceful means of 
all their internal conflicts for the unity and integrity of 
the Congo, with the assistance, as appropriate, of Asian and 
^Iriosn representatives appointed by the Advisory Ooaslttoe 
on the Congo* in consultation with the ücoretary-üGnoral, for 
the purpose of conciliation*,(69)
But tho Assembly's appeal met with no reopOBBo as the 
Congo became more fragmented by rival factions, fhe mobutu 
regime, which wn# recogniDod by President Zasavubu, whooe 
delegate was authorised by the Aesembly to occupy the Congo 
Goat at the Ch after much lobbying by the Ueatem powers,(70} 
had uneasy control over the provinces of leopoldvllle and 
Equateur; Antoine üiæenga, formerly lumumba'a deputy prime 
minister, exercised some authority over Kivu and Orientale 
province from hie base in Stanleyville; Albert Kelonji wan 
at the head of a ceGcssionlGt movement in South aaoai; and 
Ishombe had declared himself the head of an independent etauc 
in Katanga* fo add to the oonfueion caused by the conflicts 
between the rival fcctiona, the violent acts of indlBOiplln&d 
eoldioro of the é Rationale Congolaise (A.M.O.) against 
civilians and CMUC personnel.created a menacing situation.
In those cireumetanooo hcnmnrckjold and Dayal found it 
impossible to secure acceptance of whet they regarded as a 
neutral political posture in accordance with the principle of 
ncn-interventlon in Internal conflicts, Their attempt to 
reconcile'Zasavubu and lumumba with a view to restoring a 
central gcv&mmcnt at Leopoldville, which could function 
under parliamentary procedures, alienated Mobutu whom they 
refused tc recognise, and incurred the oritlciom of those 
Western powers that supported the haeavubu-^obutu regime,
At the same time the covict Union, in a bitter oondeaDBtlon 
of hammarskjold's policy, demanded that CPUC forces should 
disarm 'Mobutu*# bands of terrorists* and liberate Lumumba,(71) 
though the letter had decided to forego the protection of the 
G^DO before he was arrested by wobutu's soldlera on 2 heoenber 
1&60# At this juncture* too, some states with contingents in
AOKUC — Ooylon, Guinea, Indoaeala, the united Arab Republic, 
ana ïugoslavia — eapregsed their dissatisfaction with 
^ammarsKjoia's direction of the UM operation by declaring' 
their intention to withdraw their troops from OWUO.
In tn%8 situation of domestic factionalism, In which 
vhe various factions were being aided and abetted by outside 
powers, haæmarskjold was etill anxious to maintain the neutral 
political posture which he bad hitherto claimed to have 
observed in accordance with the principle of Bon-lntervention 
in internal conflicts, But he now realised that if OMUO was 
to prevent a worsening of the situation in the Congo, it wae 
necessary tnat- the Ueourity Council should provide OMUC with 
& stronger mandate that required a ^edification of the self- 
Gofe&co principle that 'non engaged in the operation may never 
taKG the rnztiaslve in the use of ormod force, but are entitled 
to respond with force to an at jack with arms, including 
attempts ao use foroo to make them withdraw from positions 
which"they occupy under orders from thé Commander*, as laid 
down in the Cecretary-G&neralts first heport to the Eeourity 
vouncll (q/4b^9 and &dd#l-6) end approved by that body on 
July i960 (b/4404)*(?2) It was not until 21 February I96I, 
however, shortly after the murder of lumumba had made the 
Congo situation more explosive, that the requisite majority 
vote emerged in the Security Council to give OMUO a wider 
mandate, as advocated by Hammarakjold,(75)
Having characterised the situation in the Ocn^e as a 
threat to international peace and security, section A(l) of the 
Security Council's resolution urged 'that the united Nations 
take immediately all appropriate measures to prevent the
224
occurrence of civil war in the Congo, Including arrangemontc 
for oesGG-firoo; the halting of military'operations* the , 
prévention of olacheo* and the use of force, If necessary',(74) 
Ihlê Involve! a.departure from the principle of celf-oefenoo 
which had hitherto governed the functioning of OMUC, olneo 
the Force was urge! to uco cnforeanent action if circumstances 
warranto! It, It wao thua glvon a wide enough mandate to uae 
force to protoot the civilian population againat attack# by 
ar&ea units if It conoldered ouch action woo necessary, an! 
to regard enforcement action permisGlble under Boction A(2) 
of the resolution which urged 'that measures be taken for the 
iamediato withdrawal and evacuation from the Congo of all 
Belgian and ether foreign military-and para-millt&ry perponnol 
and politico! advisers not"under the United'Mations Command* 
and morcocaries',
Section B of the resolution* which was mainly eddresaed 
to the Congolese leaders* did not authorise .the enforcement 
of & political settlement of the conflicto between the various 
factlono compoting for power. Having reoognieed *the imperat­
ive necoGGlty of the restoration of parliamentary Inotlbutlcn# 
In the Congo In accordance with tho fundamental law of the 
country, no that the will of the people should be reflected 
through the freely elected Parliament', the Security Council 
confined itself to two non-mandatory rccomnondationu which 
urged *t&G convening of the Parliament and the taking of nee- 
esGcry protective measures in that connexion* * and 'that 
Oongole'co_arnod units and ooroonnel should be re-organised 
and brought under discipline and control, and arrangmento be 
made on impartial and equitable baseB bo that end with a. view
to the climinatloQ of any possibility of Interference by such
units and personnel In the political life of the Congo*#
At first 1résident Kaoavubu, who had formed'a government 
with Jos Ileo as Brime Minister on 9 February 1961* reacted 
with hostility to the Beourlty Council resolution on the'ground 
that it contravened the principle of non-intervention in the 
domestic affairs of the Congo,(75) There were armed attack# 
against OMOv units in Leopoldville,(76) and Kaouvubu went ao 
far ae to appeal to lohombe to common oauao with hi% In
opposing OMUG^s mi88ion*(77) -Early in Eerch an attack,by 
troopG of the A.K.O, (Armee h&tlon&lo Congolaise) against 
Matadi, one of CAuC*# vital links in oommunicotiono, which 
caused the withdrawal of Uh foroeo, prompted H&mmar#kjcld to 
protect to kasavubu that thia involved not only a violation 
of CkUv*D right to freedom of movement under the Bacio 
Agreement between the United Uatlona and the hoot state, but 
alGo a dioregard of the Ueourlty Council resolution of S 
August i960 which had called on all member states, *in accord­
ance with Articles 25 and 49 of the Charter to accept and 
o&rry out the decisions of the Boourity Council and to afford 
mutual asGiotanoe in carrying out moacures decided upon by 
the Council*# In fact* Hcm^arskjcld contended that the rel­
ationship between the united KationG and the Government of 
the Republic of the Congo was not merely a contractual rel­
ationship In which the Republic could impcoe its conditions 
as hoot etate &nd thereby detf i tho cirou&stances under 
which the United Hâtions opcrarea# It was rather a relation­
ship governed by mandatory decisions of tho Security Council# 
Ihe consequence 01 thie wae that no government, including the 
hoot government, could by unilateral action dotoroine how
measure# taken by the security Council in this context should 
be carried out, Euch a determination could only be made by 
the Security Council itself or cn the basle of Its explicit 
delegation of authority. It was of opeeial importance that 
only the Security Council could decide on the discontinuance 
of the operation.(7G) Certainly* since the Security Council 
had made a formal finding under Its resolution of %1 February 
I9GI that tho situation in the Congo was a threat to internat­
ional peace and security, It was now within its competence to 
determine how OMÜC should operate and when it should be with­
drawn, oven though the force had entered the Congo initially 
at the request of the Republic of the Congo, Cn the other 
hand, it must be conceded 'that the Gecurity Council's rocoim-- 
ondatloHS for the convening of the Congolese Parliament and 
tho reorganisation of Congolese armed units, though not mand­
atory deololonB, did constitute interference in the domestic 
affairs of the Congo, in contravention of the principle of 
non-intervention under Article 2(7) of the Charter,
fho'ujh in !,Mroh igbl iacavubu'u 'relations/with the 
United kauions were very strained, he soon responded, however, 
to the diplomatic efforts of a three-man conciliation commiss­
ion set up by uhe Advisory Comuitteo on OHUC, as suggested by 
haamarskjold, and to the exhortations of the Assembly,(79)
On April 17 he agreed to accept tho docurity Council's resol­
ution of 21 February 1961,(80) and early in Augucb I96I a 
constitutional government, with Oyrllie Adoule as Prime 
Minister, had been re-established at Leopoldville, so that 
the whole of the Congo, except for fshembe's hatsnga, was 
again under a central government, with l&savubu as President.
kith the financial support of the Union Minlore, tho 
largest mining company in the Congo, the encouragement of 
much of tho proas and financial intercuts in Britain, France, 
the United ftatop and Belgium, ac well os the active, support \ 
of the government of the Union of South Africa and sir Roy 
WolenGky's in the neighbouring Federation of Khodoola and 
FyaBaland,(Gl) Tohombe wao determined to maintain the eeceso- 
ion of Katanga with tho help of his Belgian and other foreign 
military and para-military perconnel and political advlBero, 
and mercenaries* Thus he was emboldened to ignore the 
leopoldvillo government's Ordinance of 24 August I96I for 
the expulsion of foreign ele&ento in the hatangose forces, 
and made no positive response to the appeals of Conor Cruise 
O'Drien, Hiuzaar sk j old * e special representative in Katanga, 
to enter into talks with the central government*(82)
Mince hanmarskjold was anxious to adhere to the prin­
ciple that CkUO should not bo party to, or in any way inter­
vene in* or bo need tc influcnco tho outcome of any internal 
conflict, as laid down in the Gcourity Council's resolution 
of 9 August igdO, he was opposed to UK forces being uocd to 
assist the central government to subdue katanga# nevertheless, 
he interpreted section A(2) of the Security Council'e resol­
ution of PI February I36I tc mean that OMUG was authorised 
to expel by force, if necessary, the foreign officers and 
mercenaries froæ hatonga.(85) Consequently, he instructed 
C'Brlen to inform Tohombe that if those foreign military 
elements were not removed by his orders, UK forces would use 
force, if necessary, to apprehend and expel them.(64)
The operation which O'Britm launched on 28 Auguot reo-
ulte! In tho arroot of eighty one offloero. but ho agreed to 
tho reqneet of consular officials In hlioabcthville that tho 
Belgian consul should .attend to tho repatriation of the rem­
ainder* It was soon made manifest, however, that thio enabled 
many hundrodc of officers and mercenaries, upon whom the 
defence of Katanga ao muoh. depended, to evade arrout. Ao to 
the second operation directed by C'Drion, which began cn 15 
Goptombor 1$61, this aimed net only to effect the round up 
of tho foreign officero and mercenaries who had gone into 
hiding, but olco the arrout of iBhombe and four of hie minis­
tère, and the symbolic take-over of the Administration by a 
representative of the central government* for thie taak, 
which %&G obviously designed to end hatanga'c ccocGaicn,
O'Brien woo briefed by Bahmoun hhiary, head of the 
civilian operations in the Congo, who planned the scheme with— 
out its authorisation by aamnarckjold.(85) The operation thus 
ran counter to the principle of non-intervention in internal 
conflicto and to hammarekjold'e approach to solving the hatanga 
problem thrci ;h peaceful diplomatic %eano, and restricting 
the use of force to apprehending the foreign military elements,
bhen the operation was sot In motion on 15 Bopteaber 
UM forces met otlff rGuiotanoe in BllQabcthvllle from the 
.if^ eroonai'y—led ai.-mgeae gondei'mrnrie* The t to arrotcit
Tohomk and other ninlotere in the ICatrmpoao government prove! 
a failure, and the fighting in Flloabothvllle oocn cpre#! to 
other parte of Katanga. Rot eurpriolngly, therefore, HamneroB- 
jold, who arrived at lecpoldvllle when the fighting in 
hlioabethvlllo was In progrcBc. wac subjected to much precGuro 
by the frltich and. other weutcm government a opposed to the 
UK aotion$(66) sud it w&c whilst on a flight to Bcola in
f:. ^
northern Rhodesia on 17 September, in tho hopo of negotiat­
ing a ceeae-flro with Tshombe, that he met hi# death*
Though a provisional oeaae-flre between the 0%UC author­
ities and Tahombe wse arranged on 20 September, fighting soon 
broke out between kata&geae forcoe and troops of the central 
government whloh was opposed to the cease-fire, and OÜDG was 
again faced with the difficult tagk of preventing an extens­
ion of civil war# But the general eonsenauB of opinion in 
the United Rations wan veering towards the conviction that 
the only solution to the Congo affair wao to put àn end to 
Katonga*# secession* The United Ltates now tended to be more 
in line with the Afro-Aeian otatec on this approach because 
it feared that if the moderate Adouia government failed to 
make progress in its struggle to overthrow.the-Tshombe regime, 
it would bo to the advantage of the extreme loft wing demente 
led by Antoine Gi%onga whose Gooeaeionist movement in Stanley­
ville had re-asserted itself,(87) OonGcquently, when the 
Security Council met to deal with the Katanga question in
November I96I, the United States was prepared tc take a
' /
harder line against the fsbcnbe regime, and thia undoubtedly 
influenced Britain and Prance to take a leos pronounooo pro- 
fShombe attitude»
It i& significant that though the Security Ccunoil'G 
reacluticn of 24 Moveabor 1961(86) did net specifically auth­
orise the use of enforcement measures to end Katanga's secess­
ion, it indicated a distinct departure from the principle cl 
non-intervention in the internal' conflicts of the Congo, which 
it had more or leas observed when Uarziarokjold vfae responsible 
for the political direction of tho UU operation* Mot only
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did it declare 'that all activities ogalnet the Republic of 
the Congo are"contrary to the Loi fondamentale and üeourity 
Council decisions', but alao Bpeoificolly demanded 'ta&k 
ou oh aotlvltieo which are now taking place in Katanga shall 
cease forthwith*, and urged all member states *tc lend their 
support, according to their national procedures, to the 
Central Government of the Republic of the Congo, in conformity 
with the Charter and the decisions of the United Rations** It 
alao stated clearly that the Eecretary-leneràl was authorised 
*to take vigoroUB action, including the requioito measure of 
force, if neceoaary, for the immediate apprehension, detent­
ion pending legal action and/or deportation of all foreign 
military and para-military personnel and political advisers 
not undor the United Rations üonmmid, and mercenaries,.,*
Tohombo reacted tc the Security Council's resolution as
a declaration of war on Katanga, and in December I96I there 
wac heavy fighting between UU forces and the mercenary-led 
Katangese forces who had cut üRUC'o lino of communioationo 
between ito headquarters and strategic pointa,(69) Though 
U Thant, then Actlng-hecretary-Oeneral, deccribed the UU 
action ao .a defensive operation to regain and aosure ORUG'e 
freedom of movement,(90) the coule of the action, which in­
volved attacks by UR planes against airports ht Jodotville 
and Rolwoai, was bound to be regarded by Tohoabe, in the 
context of tho bccurity Council's resolution of R4 Uovomber 
I96I, as a major wove towards ending Katanga's secession.
In fact, üUüO'ü action was sufficient to impel Tchombe to 
seek, through the good offlcea of the United jtatcs and tüc 
United Rations, a pacific settlement with Adoula, the Prime
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Minister of tho contrel government. Under tho Declaration of 
kltona (21 Deoembei' I96I) he reoognleed Kasavuhu as President 
of the Republic of the Congo and tho authority of the central 
govcrnmeat, and also agreed that Eattmgese repreaontativee 
chould participate In the national parliament at Leopoldville 
and In a commlgeion to deal with conotltotlonal l8Gue8*(91) 
But the Katanga question woo to remain unresolved for aome 
time yet beoauêe Tcno be maintained that the Kitona agreement 
could not be implemented until it had been ratified by the 
Katanga parliament*
It in Important to rcallBe that the I# action which had 
led to the Mltona agreement had oho%n that U Thant regarded 
the Security Council reeolution of 24 November I96I as per­
mitting GMUG to intervene In the internal conflicts of the 
Congo to Influence their outcome, and that in practice there 
W&G little difference between meaaures taken by ( uG to 
ensure its freedom of movement and coercive interventionist 
measures* Of course^ since this interventionist policy by 
the United t%tions ?fas desired by the central government in 
Leopoldville to end Katanga's aecession, there was no object­
ion from that quarter that it contravened the principle of 
non-intervention In Congolese domestic affairs*
Though ORUO's intervention in Katanga, had not yet 
brought about the downfall of the Ishombe regime, its inter­
vention was a decisive factor in effecting the defeat of 
Antoine Giseng&'s secessionist movement in Orientale province 
early In I962# Its action against tlie local gendarmerie in 
stanleyvlllG, who were supporting OiBonga in his struggle 
with the central government, ?ms justified by U Thant on the
ground thrt F: forces the right to asolet the central 
govomzent tc iialnteln law and order and prevont civil war, 
but *it had Dot* In fact* been clearly authorised to toko 
action of the kind .Ich felled Gisenga; the reeolution of 
21 february 1961 did not ohvicuely Imply that the right to 
prevent civil war by force was tantamount to giving the UM 
an equivalent right in reepect of eeeeBGlon*«(92} üoeldoo, 
tliough the ^eouritg' Gmmcll'c resolution of 24 November I9GI 
had declared 'that all secoaolon&Gt activities cgGlnat the 
Eepoblie of tbs Congo «ire csatrary tc tbe MLJenagagatelc 
Slid Security Ocuncll docielone' end specifioally demanded 
'that such cctlvltioe which are now talcing pi ^ ce in Katanga 
oh/^11 ceâoe forthwith'* it had not authorised the use of 
oaforoemcnt ccasuree to end aeceseioniot activitlOB* Uever- 
tholes a* U Thnnt was not given any corrective by the Oeourlty 
Council for the enforcement action that had boon taken by ORDO,
During 19^ )2 it also became manifest that U Thnnt wso not 
to be prevLjl u by the Uecurity Oouaoll from attempting to 
put an smd to Katanga's secession by forcible means if Tshombe 
did mot recpcnd to diplomatic preosureo* In ,not ig62* 
after  ^c . ;lations between the lohombe regime and the centr^^ 
government L 5 failed to produce a formula for Katanga's re­
integration into a unified Gongo* the Beoretar2,^-aenGral put 
forward his 'Flan for Rational Reconciliation'* This provided 
for a federal eyotem of govemmcmt, tho division of reveauoG 
end foreign currency between the control and provlmelal 
governments* the foiination of a national army* and freedom 
of movement for ORUO throughout Katanga ir;hlch would ensure 
that the Katanga government v;ould not be able to control tax 
revenues from the mtmeo by exporting ores through exit points
under Its control. The plan also contained provision for an 
ovomomio uoyoott against any part)* to the mrangemomt that 
failed to abide by its terme.(95)
sjiOûh w o  oontrol government and the Katangan authorit­
ies aooepùed U' ;::hont'e plan by L opt ember 1962, but olnoo the 
Tehombe regime made no attempt to Inplemont it, the Booretary- 
General endorsed plane for OiiUO to achieve freedom of movoment 
throughout haten^ by force, If this proved neooasai'^y, (94) 
and theee were put into effect ^Aen the tenBlon that had 
develoi^ea between the UM anthoritieB and the fahombe regime 
led to fighting ogalnat OMUO poaitlons in lâie&bBthvllle In 
December 1952. The olef^ring of road blocks to ceoure freedom 
of movoment for M  troope in the city was the ^^elnde to UK 
inili taiy actj,on v/hich resulted in the occupation of other 
toanc north of %llsabethvllle;(g5) nnd on 14 January I965 
^ehombc haa.zittle alternative but to announce the end of 
&atanga*a sccersicn end hia readineeo to freedom of
movement to t Zoroeo throughout mtenga.OS) Glemrly, as 
Gàgnold has omphaGlsed, 'in the caee of katcDg^a the right 
to enforce freedom of movement ncceanarlly emt the rl#it 
to end the astnngese aecesaioh, and thus in effect to deter­
mine the Internal political structure of the Ocngo%(97)
Tsitc jo'e readlnosG to end Katanga's eeceaalon heralded 
tne pneaed withdrawal of UU forces from the Oongo, but the 
political unity v?hlch OMUO had brought about In the Oongo 
was more apparent than real. Indeed, when the last conting­
ents or Ù R W  left the country in June I964, there was further 
eruption ol violence, and tho irony of the new situation was 
that Tohombe was then the head of the Oongolese government
who had vho tasT/tz'ylng to ar.intaln the of the state
by quelling cocoGcloni&t novuLO&ta 1# various provinces, 
particularly In Grlent&le.province*
To sum ups U&ited Mationa intervention In tho Congo 
in July i960 war tho sequol to a request by the n&w Congolese 
governarrt fro military :ssi.Lanso *te _zoteot the national 
territory of She the present extorn&l aggrese-
/Ion/which is a uOrczl so international peace and security**- 
But tho Eacurlty Oouncll&iâ not c, .eoteriee the GltuatlGn oa 
ono of cxtoriial agvpr'csaion by Bohrlin foroee against'the Congo- 
leee otnto^ which nooossitnted Gnf03?ceaont moasures under 
Article 46 of she Charter. It called for the withdrawal of 
belglarforacD.and.authorised the ectaollehment of a non*
.eoerolvo peacekeeping force, under the general direction of 
tho wOjroiarr-Loncrnl* to ooBlst tho Congolese government.to 
reotorc o^ rder^  hoojjaldcrlng that the %"ootoration of law and 
order in the Congo .would t lotively . contribute to the main­
tenance of international peace and e&ourity**
Though the.establishment of the GM force wag not a 
. Gontravcntion cf the princlplo of non-intervoziticn in matters 
of dcnt^U^c jurisdiction, since it osme into being with 
the oonceah of the Republic of tho Congo, it aeon become 
clear that its operation in eocordenoc with the principles 
of self*ib\Conoo and Zion-lntorve:.fticm in intoi'zial conflicts, 
conutltutional or otl_ jo, conflicted with the
l$S
demand of the central goverDmont in Leopoldville that U% 
zoroes ahoul# be used to end Katenga'G Geoonslon* Hamm&rek— 
jolw maintained that the legal baeie of the Security Oounoil 
resolutions under Article 40 involved the application of pro­
visional mesBureo of a non-ooerclve nature, not enforcement 
iméasures as Under Article 42. île insisted, ae laid down in 
iArticle 40, that the United Nations should only authorise meas- 
toes which were not prejudicial to the rights, claims, or pos­
ition of the parties involved in the domestic conflict, and 
jwas not empowered to authorise the use of enforcement action 
ito end Katanga's secession through ;ipvbking the exception to 
ithe general principle of non-intervention under Article 2(7) 
of the Charter,viz.'hut this principle shall not prejudice 
jthe application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII
There were several reaao&s why Hnmmarskjold may be 
criticised for being so firmly attached to the view that the 
question of Katanga's secession was a domestic issue. In 
addition to the fact that the Ishombe regime depended upo# 
the intervention of foreign elements, 'there io considerable 
doubt*, aa D*W, Bowett has stressed, 'whether, in a situation 
where there oxletB a threat to international peace, there lo 
any justification for so general a rcliaace on tho *do%%ootio 
jurisdiction" limitation on the powers of the United Rations#
A threat to international poooe can never, bv definition, bo 
a purely domostio 5&tter*.(9B) Eesides, Katange's secooGlcn 
could hardly he justified by the principle of oelf-deberain&t- 
ion since 'Tohomhe'e mandate to opoak for the whole of liatanga 
was queoticnablo# he was the leader of the lunda tribe, one 
of eeveral tribes in Katanga, and one t,hat ie a minority in 
numbcro end that ocoupleo leee tlmn half the land area of the
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former Katanga Frovlnoe* Tshombe was etrcngly oppose! to the 
Ualuba tribe In the north# In the only popular election in 
Katanga, bio party gained only twenty—five ceots in a oixty 
oeat &8GG3bly, The parliamentary group that eupported him 
was a m n p  parllomont lacking adequate Daluba repreoentation.'CSS)
But it %yae Hemmarokjold's hope that the problem of 
Katanga could be colved peacefully, and that once Belgian 
forces had been withdrawn from the whole of the Gongo, i U*o 
presence would help to restore law and order and provont the 
Congo from being turned into an international cockpit through 
the intervention of outelde pWers# Rut though i^elgimi troops, 
with the exception of those in Katanga, were soon withdrawn, 
the dlsrup<tion of the central government through the clash 
between Prime Minister lumumba and President Kasovubu created 
a situation of domestic strife in which the operation of the 
UR. Force in accordance with the principle, of 'non-intervention ' 
in Intemol conflictc proved extremely difficult* Boncarsk- 
jold'ü atteint to adopt a neutral posture in relation to the 
various Uongolesc factions, implicit in this principle, was 
invariably under attack by one or other of these factions, or 
by outside powero th&t supported particular factions* iliis 
seemed to indicate as one writer has asserted, that 'the prom­
otion of lav; end order in a setting of domestic factionGlism 
is not compatible with the idea of neutrality and impartiality*
It requires that a choice be made among competing prescript­
ions for lav; and order, and competing candidates for the 
order giving function*#(100)
Dith the establishment of a unitary central government 
under Cyrille Adoula in August 1961, tho problems of OMUO
boouüie complex, but the quoctlon of Katanga* o BeoesBlbn 
&üili regained# Thé - proluac- to Its solution wao made vdion 
tho Security Council decided under Itc resolution 5002 (24 
Movemher igGl), shortly after tho death of Hamzaarskjold,
'that all aeceBsloalGt activities In the Republic of tho 
Oongo are contrary to the hoi fondamentale and Security 
Council deoleione** demanded *that such activities which are 
now taking place ±31 enga ehall ceaee forthwith*, and urged 
all member otatee *to lend their support, according to their 
national procedures, to the Central Government of the Republic 
of the Congo, in conformity vith the Charter and the decisions 
01' the United dations** This signified the UN's abandonment 
of the prlnoiplc of non-intervention in the internal conflicts 
of the Congo, and for -obvious reasons this was not considered 
a contravention of the principle of non-intervention in 
matters of domestic jurisdiction under Article 2(7) of the 
Charter by the central government in Leopoldville*
Thus, after the adoption of the liovember I96I resolut­
ion, oecretary—General Ü Thant felt free to pursue a tougher 
interventionist policy which helped to crush Gisenga's seo- 
esslonlst zaovcmmt, and to put an end to Katanga's séoession* 
Though ho maintained that the action by UH forces in Deoæaber 
1962 was intended to secure oliUO'e freedom of ^movement 
throughout Katanga, under the terms of the'basic agreement 
that governed the operation of the Force, such action approx­
imated more to enforcement measures under Artide 42 of the 
Charter than.to provisional measures to prevent an aggravat­
ion under Article 40 which Rammorskjold had attempted to
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observe*
Had enforcement sonauree under Article 42 of the Charter 
becn j^pplled ogoinot KstEmga in July I9G0, which wao what 
Lumuzma #në travubu wanted before their quarrel led to a 
disruption of tho central government, it Is reasonable to 
aosume that tho i^liticol re-unificatlon of the Congo might 
have been achieved at that tlino, and much of the conflict 
during the y care that followed might have been evoldea, Of 
course, such a policy would have required a clear decision 
the Security Council that the situation in the Congo con­
stitute! a threat to international peace and security under 
Article 59 of the Charter, end the authorisation of enforce­
ment measure# under Article 42* Certainly, if the requisite 
political oonoensUG had existed in the Geourlty Council to 
authorise ouch measures in July I96C* there would have been 
no question of the United Rations contravening the principle 
of non-l&tervontion in the domestic affairs of the Congo, 
since enforcement action initiated under Article 59 &nd 42 
of the ChmrSer 1& per;legible not only in cases of extern#! 
aggression* but also in domestic matters that constitute a 
threat to International peace and security m d e r  the oxoept- 
ion to the gorierol principle of non-lntervontion laid down %n 
Article 2(7) of Charter.
The fact Y/as that the constitutional basis under the 
Charter for IfM action, which finally put to an end Ratenga'o 
secession* was not specified in tx security council resolution, 
and our anolyois of the GI:IUC operation has indicated that 
though the Force was oi:'lginell\' established %?ith tho consent 
of the legal oontral government of the Oongo, from time to
time there were olashes between the central govemnent and 
the UK Eeorotary-General over the proper funotlone of the 
Force undoz' its original mandate* Indeed, there wore ecveral 
ocoaeiono Yi^ hon the central government In Leopoldville under 
the preo^LOjOy of Eassvubu was bitterly opposed to Hammarsk— 
jold's direction of OMUG on the ground that Its operations 
contravened the principle of non-intervention in matters 
which It cleimed were essentially witMn Ito dceaestio jurle— 
diction#. .
The Peacekeopinf^ O^/eration in
The smoothnesG of the peGoekee%jlng opm'ation by IDi 
obscrverG on! h . (United lîatiqns Security foroe) in West 
Hew Gui^ iea (Heot Irian), in 1962, etoo! out in strong contrast 
to the complexity of OHUG operation in the Oongo# This was 
mainly because the UN opcraticnc were base! on a clear man­
date mid designed to asslat in the ii plewntation of an 
agreed pacific settlement of the dispute botveen Indonesia 
and the Netherlands. Before we consider this, ho^^ever, it is 
necessary to meko brief mention of the backgi*ound to the 
di6pute*(lGiy
Under the Hague Agreement of 2 Bovember 1949 it was 
not only laid down that the Netherlands should transfer com­
plete eoveroignty over Indonesia, to tlio United Mtstes of 
Indonesia, but also agreed that the future of ^est New Guinea, 
peopled by 700,000 Papuans, should be decided by" negotiations 
between tho Netherlands and Indonesia within a year* This 
question defied solution for more than a decade, though tho 
matter was considered by the United Nations' Assembly in 1954* 
1955, 195G, 1957, and 1961. Indeed, in December I96I it
caused tho outbreak of hoatllltloG between tho Motherlands 
and IndcneaiG.#
At tblü juncture, largely through the initiative of 
Secretary—Goneral U Thant* who appointed an American d1plenaw* 
Hllcworth Runker, oa a mediator* an agreement between the 
parties to the dispute i^ as reaclied on 15 August 1962* Tnls 
otipulated t c the adininlstratlon of West Irion would be 
transferred to Indonesia in accordance with the procedure 
stated in the following articles of hi Agreement#(10k)
After the present Agreement between Indonesia one the 
Hethorlrndo has been signed snd ratified by both Yor— 
tracwin g lartlcs* Indonesia #nd the Motherlands 
jointly oponsor a draft resolution in the United ^#tioo8 
under the toms of which the Coneral Asse yez) oz the 
United Nations taken note of the present 'grecment, 
acknowledges the role conferred upon the » ccrctcr^ — 
ücuorri of the United Nations therein, and authorises 
him to carry out the tasks entrusted to him tnerein.
' Transfer of ' laistration 
Article II :, V- -
After the adootian of the resolution referred to in 
article I* thé Fctherlandn will transfer administration 
of th:; territory to a united Nations lempoz'sr^ ' uxoout— 
Ivo /uthcrity (UUTDA) established by end under the jur­
isdiction of the Uooretory-Uoneral upon tho arrival of 
the United Hâtions Adnlnistmtor appointed in accordance 
with crtiolo IV* The will in turn transfer tne
administration to Indonesia in accordance with article
All*
United Dations Administration 
Article IV
A United Rations Administrator, acceptable to.IndonoBio 
and the Uotherlsmds, will be appointeo by the ^eorewary— 
General,
Article XII  ^ .
The United UaticnB ^doinlotrator will have discretion 
to trnz.sicr cll or part of tho administration to 
Inacnoslc Lt cny tine after the flrct phase of the 
UNTMA odclnlotratlon* fho UrrRA'c authority will 
G0500 nt the moment of transfer of full administrat­
ive corlr&l to Indenooim*
The ;; ocrct ory-G oner el will provide the UMLMA with euch "... 
ooouiity foicoo as the United Motions, forlnistrator 
dcemr necoeGnr3'; cuoh forces v/ill primarily supplement 
existing r&puan (Test Irlsneso) police In the t&ok of 
uointaliiing lav; and order# Tho Papuan Volunteer Corps, 
which on tho arrival of the United Nations fdmlnlBtr&tor 
wjll cosBo being pgrt of the Netherlands armed forcGo, 
and the Indonesian armod forces in the territory Till 
be under the authority of# and at the disposal of, the 
Jecrctary-acneral foi the c^ne purpose# ihe United 
Matlcnc fdmini&tracor rill* to the extent feasible, use 
the Fepuon (Tost Iriaacsc) police as a United Actions 
security force to ralntaln l&w and order and, at his 
discretion, u&e Indonesian armed forces# iho Motherlands 
armed forces will be repatriated as rapidly as possible 
and while still in the territory will be under tho 
authority of the UNIRA#
In addition to tho UN Security forco (uREFj which was 
to bo eat&blishod under Article VII referred to above, 
milita%3 ehoorvoi's were appointed under /nnex A of Related 
Understandingo to the Indonesim-Hetherlands T^ement» (105) 
Their teak was to asslet the securing of a cease-fire in 
Test Irian jofore UN Id A took over its tenporor^ :^  adnliJ.sti'at- 
ion of the terrltcry and the UN Oocurlty Force (UR:!') was 
placed at Its disposal to aupplc&cnt the Papuan ^clioo in the 
task of maintaining lew and order,
The work of the military obsorvers was soon aoeomplished,. 
and on 21 Septonbcr I962 the UN Assembly notod with appreciat­
ion. the successful efforts of tho Meoretary-Gcneral in bring­
ing about a iidcific sottlemont of tho dispute, and cuthorisod 
to carry out the tasks entrusted to him under tho IndonoGia—
Netherlands Agreement. Its reedutlon was adopted by a vote 
of 89 to 0* with 14 abotentiong*(104) and though France 
abstained voting without cxglenntlon, the Movlot Onion, 
Ilka Britain* Uhlna and the United ^tatea, voted for the 
resolution despite the fact that it ran counter to her view 
that the eatabllahnent of a UN peacekeeping force %7&a contrary 
to Article 11(2) of the Charter and that the Secretory General* 
authority in directing péacokoeplng opcratlone should be 
curbed*
Ae to the ta&k of the UN Security Force in maintaining 
lew and order in the territory while UUTRA proceeded with its 
administrative responsibilitleç, this was carried out success­
fully by its 1,500 F&kist&ni forces who wore supported by 
Canadian end Aaerioan airforce ocmtlngonto; and by 1 May 1963, 
when adainiotrativo control wee transferred to Indonesia in 
accordance with Article XII of the Indoneoio— î ether lends 
Agreement of 15 August 1962, the UN peacekeeping forces were 
being replaced "by incoming Indonesian troops.(105)
In assessing the peacekeeping operation in Wcet Irian, 
the following points need to be stressed, Like UNB? in the 
Middle Boot and C JO In the Oongo, the UN Becurity Force la 
Test Irian woo establicbod with the consent of the states 
directly involved, so that its preaence in the territory did 
not contravene the principle of non-intervention in matters 
within the jurisdiction of those states, But the Secretary- 
General who was entrusted with its general direction did not 
have to face the sort of claim by S^ Q^ pt in the ease of UMEF 
that the withdrawal of the Force was a matter to be deter­
mined by the host state at an unspecified time, nor the kind
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of. ahallc.i-o!: by Corigolesc loaders at variouG ofcagcjo is
the opération of Kli'C that the mandate governing ite fiinot- 
icns vicrc seing Kis^lnterpreteâ anS mic-apT>Xiea. As- Roealys 
nlggino _ ' golatec» crt, ’,,*vhere the Eondate is 'inioigoucusj 
or where pelltieal clroonstancoa eaangc after the Initial 
agreement upon a œsnâBtG, the government and the OIî Secretar­
iat may develop tl'vergent views as to the proper functions 
c>f the U'. i'crcc',,. Such faetors wore mercifully  ^ t In 
«est Is’is'j» -he basis upos wJiioh the I noted was act a aero 
brief l'oncliîtica ay a ÏÏK organ, hut a detailed agreement (the 
result Gi ioy' negotietioas) hetween the Interested parties* 
Indonesia and the Ketherlands woro anxious to facilitate 
the oboervars' tsak of eocurlng a ooaae-fire. foreovor, the 
m  preaoacc ia v.est Irian vmo not primarily military at all. 
ifc was aâsiaistrativo, and tho function of 01531?  ^tbc-i main­
tenance cf lav; and order within a fairly otable quasl- 
goversmontal frfsia',vorlî,'(106) la brief, t-ao ÜS Security 
Force r oat Irian was able to fulfil its function success­
fully V in supporting the teagorary I:« administration
in tils territory, tbcro was ao noction of the United Rations 
uourping the jwr3.ot1iotlcn of tl.o heat etetee,
lilS^liiMJjations. .I'cnoekeepiTi" i'crce in Cyia’us .(b -ICIh ) 
vvjiR's v'c have beers principally concerned about in our 
analysis of D;J peacekeeping operations is tin: extent to which 
tiic bn it eg at Ions hes observed or contravened tiie prlnoiple 
of noD-intervcBtica In matters escontisslly within the domestic 
jurisdiction cf Gtatco under Article ?('?) of the Charter. It 
bae been Indicated that Eincc UI’KP in the hid die East, OllJC 
iH the- Congo, on<l ïffibP in beat Irian case into being with the
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ooDGcnt of both the host ntatom ard those otrte# that con­
tributed co^tMngentO; their eotabllsbnGnt did not contravene 
Article 2(7)» But though UhRP &nd OMS'F did not depart fro# 
tho tem8 of reference which had been accepted by the boat 
Btstos undar ^"rcïculargæandptoe proved by the competent 
Uf .crjoncg .lo rcjcrdanee with tho principle of concent, there 
ere sevrrel iT'tencea in tho cpor^tlon oi riuo in the Congo 
I the uccrctary-iGaeral's interpretation.of the mandate 
given to the Force conflicted with that of the legal govem- 
nent of the Congolese ctate, which the letter claimed wae & 
violation of tho principle of ncn-lntervention In aetters 
.essentially within its domestic jurisdiction. It should be 
noted, however, that though th.e..aoticn taken by CNUC* a.fter 
the death of hamnarokjcld, to put an end to Gl^enga's secess­
ionist zcvenent one ^utanga'c ooooGGlon in 19&2, constituted 
intervention In the domestic affairs of the üongoleae Republic, 
such action wos welcomed by tbs hoav govei  ^t because it 
wao calculated to unify the stato under its jurisdiction,
hofore we examine the Gstablishsant and operation of 
the UK foroo in Dyprus (UHPICff) in relation to the principle 
of non-intervention In matters essentially within the docestie 
jurisdiction cf ataton, let us consider briefly the develop*# 
mcntG which led to its formation In Lurch 1964,(107)
undur the /^ uz'ich-Londoz] agi'coiïicnto of 1959» v;as
declared a severci^gn republic: Britain was allowed to retain
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sovereignty over two military baoes; Greece and Turkey were 
permitted to station saall numbers of troops in the island, 
and both tnese Btates and Britain were given the right to act 
oeparatoly or eolloctivoly to guarantee tho status of the new 
BtatOj the constitution of the Republic g&ve executive power 
to 0 Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cyprict vice- 
president, each with the right to veto important measures* 
and provided for a Council of Minletera, consisting of seven 
Greek and three Curkieb Cypriots* the same ratio of represent- 
Gtion being applicable to the meaberehlp of a House of Reproo- 
ontativeog and provision was also made for separate Turkish 
and Greek Cypriot assemblies for oomTunal affairs in various 
towns*
rac &urich~London agreements were put into effect on IG 
August i960, and in tho following September Cyprus become a 
member of the United Rations* but the Creek Cypriots soon 
oeoame dissatisfied with the provision of the constitution 
wblon gave the Turld.8h Cypriot vice president the right to 
veto significant mat tors* and the system of govéï^ment designed 
under the Eurlcb*#wndon I'^ieemehts hoc irc unworkable*
In kovember 1963 President Makarlos proposed several 
amendments to the constitution which wore intended to lesson 
tho power of the Turkish Cypriot minority in order to produce 
& more unified state* But these proposals aroused such antag­
onism that the Turkish Cypriot members of the government with­
drew from office* and early in December fighting broke out in 
the Island* Tension increased when Turkey announced that it 
would intervene if the fighting continued* and to prevent a 
deterioration of the situation rresldcnt Makarlos permitted
tho iritloh* Grook forces on tüe i&lanâ. to form
% tomporary poaookoGolag forco.
dloooGolons beWoon the sregrooontatlvoo of 
the Greek cmO forkloh Oyprlct ou junitloo leô to #o change 
in the attitudes of both eldes, GB& in Janu&r^^ 1964 tho 
iriti&h government proposed the formation of a #ATO force to 
molntalyi order in the Island end the appointment of a mediator# 
fhoagh irehident Me 'UL%o8 rejected theee propoealo, he imo 
not averee to a 'ilonn on the lalondg end ao
het^een Greek and fnrklGh Cypriote developed In 
hlmasool end îEurkoÿ again th'f^iened to Intervene, Britain 
decided to place the quGGtlon before tt^ ^ourity Council on 
1!) Pebruary 1964# On the some day tïio Oyprua govemnezit olsc 
requested a mooting of the Security Council to consider tho 
threat of intervention by furkcy.
On 4 ^Orëh I964 the Gcourlty Council unanimously 
adopted a resolution recommending the establishment of a 
peacekeeping force and a mediator to help the parties towards 
a pacific settlement of their . differenoee# %ho to%t of the 
resolution Lnu &e followss—ClOB)
The oeeurlty Council,
notinjfT that the present nlti*L_tlon i lth regard to 
cyprus^o likely to threaten ^.ntcmatlcnal peace and 
security and nay further deteriorate unlenc additional 
ne&Gureo are promptly taken to maintain poooc and to 
seek out & durable solution,
Considering the poBltions taken by the pEirtleo l33 
3colaRoz3 Eo"l$e freetleB signed at ?llcoela on 16 &uguet 
I9CG;
kaving; in..mind the relevant provlclons of the Charier 
of ^ liTljnit^.'Eatf ore and Ito Article pnrog3:aph 4, 
\vhioh reada: *A11 bero ohall refroin in their inter"* 
national relatione lom the threat or use of force 
n/ ainot the territorial Integrity or political lndcpon&«" 
cnco of any State, or In an)' other manner inconsistent 
#ith the PurpoaoG of the United dations*.
1* Cells upon all Member States, in conformity with 
thelToGHgaEIom under the Charter of the United 
H&tionG, to refrain from any action or threat of 
rotten likely to worsen the situation In the sovereign 
rpbhllo of Oyprue, or to endanger international peace;
S* &3ko the Government of Cyprus, uhlch hao the roc- 
ponsihlTlty for the maintenance and restoration of 
and order, to take all additiono! measures neoeosar^ to 
stop violence ond bloodshed In Cyprus;
3# Calls upon the communities in Oyorue and their 
leaaers to act with tne.utmost restraint;
4* Beconmendc the creation* ^Ith the consent of the 
vcvol'kiment of vypms, oi a hniteù i^avlons peace-keeping 
force in Cyprus, fhe'composition and sise of the force 
shall he established by the Secretary-General, in con­
sultation with the Governments of Cyprus, .Greece, Turkey, 
and the United kingdom# The commander of the force chall 
bo appointed by .the Secretary-General end report to him* 
The %cretary-General, who shall keep the Governments 
providing the force fully.Informed, shall report period* 
ically to the Security Council on its operations;
5# Reoonnends that the function'of the force should 
be^ in"theT.ntorost of preserving International peace 
and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a 
reourronoe of fighting and, as neoesoary, to contribute 
to the maintenance and restoration of law- and order end 
a return to normal condition^;
,&coGnBonds that the stationing of the force sh^l 
be for'a""'period of throe months', all costs pertaining to 
it bclLg met, in a manner to be agreed by them, by the 
f re j'Snts providing the contingents and by the Oovem- 
of Cyprus* The ^eoretery-General may also accept 
VC untary contributions for that purpose*
Ginoe the security Council recommended the creation of a 
bid peacekeeping force with the oonsont of the government of 
Cyprus, ite establishment did not involve a contravention of 
the principle of non-intervention in - matters essentially with## 
in the dozGGtio jurisdiction of that government* But though 
the Cyprus government led by President Makarios was rsoogalsed 
by the Security Council as the hoot government to the 
force, tlie St^rooment between the United nations and ' the Cyprus 
government on the status of Ull forces, which was concluded on 
3il March 1964,(109) laid domi that whereas the security forces
of the government would ncelet U^FICYP if so roquostod* the 
commanaor oi uMolcy^ was not obliged to moot a roquoot for 
%G8l8ta#oe by tbo-governmentsecurity forooo. This gave 
tac eo%;3Rdor of D^FIOYP a sound basic on which to reject o#y 
avtempts uv tne host government to secure UIl OGsletanoe to 
enforce Ito authority ever the Turkish Gypriots,
Ï&0 UtetuQ of forces agreement also stipulated that 
J _ivi_ wao to have freedom of movement throughout Cyprus* 
and coverec euon matters as the privileges and immunities of 
du personnel* ^ut shortly after the conclusion of the agree­
ment, on Iz April 1964, the Secretary-General, in response to 
variouo Inquiriea from government ho wished for a clarific­
ation oz mandate* made available to thorn on aide—
.ÜSrJiGî3I9 ^ certain aspects of the function and operat­
ion 01 the force,(110) Its main points were as follows:
(1) dnzted ^ationc had cxcluaivo control and oo^^and 
over, the force,' w
(li) - :c force would * avoid any action designed to influ* 
ojoo "yac political situation in Cyprus except through- 
ccn:rioutinr to e restoration of quiet and through 
crofting a:: improved climate in v^hlch political sol­
utions noy be sought*.
' - : ( Z ü l ^ _^^ ai!:iilar to the noouritv Council * affirm-
196Ü that the"IfN force co
goryrilot. coaSinnnïtïrailOr^ôF^
(111) .1.410 xoToe ‘•'--ouliî wider take no function inoonnlBtwit 
li'ûh tuc dofinltlon of the function of the force set 
cut in paragraph 5 of the Security Council *s s-esolut* 
jLOn of 4 March 1964* vis. *that the function of the 
.kOi*co ' should be, in the interest of presorvina inter* 
.national, pcsce and security, to use its best efforts ' 
v( prevent a rcGurrenoe of fighting and, as nooessary, 
Ü0 contribute to -the inaintensnoe and restoration of 
and order and a return to norraoi. conditions*.
{iv)ThG use of armed force by the Uli force was permlssiblo 
only in self-defence, wW.oh included the defence of 
popuS* premises and vohiolos under armed attack, 
and tnq support of UHFIOYP personnel under armed 
tuock# m e n  UII forces were acting In self-defence.
tkc piiaciplc cC mlnlzuz forcn would always bo 
applied, and crciod force would bo used only when 
all poaooful roans of porcuosion had foiled. If 
units of î/TlOlj; arrived at the eoche of an actual 
orzcd cc_.Jilot .between the aombore of the two commun*- 
Itloa, uir' oonaaiiders on the o%iot would Inamdlately 
call on tho leaders of both comcimitiea to break off 
tho conflict and arrange for a oease firo, W  forces 
.rrld not take action likely to bring thorn into 
conflict with eithoi^ the r;reek or Turkloïi 
. cc&runitioG, \ . .'
Bignliy.cant con8tralnt6 were thus Imposed on liiriCli', 
and in tila roTK)rt on the oituation In Cyprus on 2$ April 
1964,(111) t^ nth after the force had become operational 
v?lth a strength of approximately 6000 men-which had boen con­
tributed by Auotria, Canada, uwedon, linland, Ireland, and 
the Imzwed Kingdom, (112) Secretary-General U Thant propoBod 
ihe progreooivo evacuation and removal of all fortified posit— 
Ions held by Ureek and Turkish Cypriots, with priority/ given 
to KicooiSp t W  examination of the problems arising from the 
divisions that had taken place in the Cyprus polloe betwoen 
mombere of both con:unltioB, and Ihe negotiation of neoessary 
meaauroB: for .the progressive. re-lntegrotion. of . Turkish Oy.priot 
officials in the Oypiijü administration.* He also proposed the. 
progreselvù disarming of all civilians other than the regular 
police gendanicrio, and that IR'PIOYP, if requested, would 
asaiot in facilitating end verifying the disarming and the 
Storage of arms under condltione of security#
The foot that imFICY? did not poooeoo the authority to 
arrest or;disarm Oyprioto, except - the power to arrost those 
who were ccmmittlng offences on its promises, was a groat 
restriction on its capacity to maintain law and order* Never* 
tholeos, notwithstanding its limited .0 ^rs. It had the right 
to Insiôt on its freedom of movement tliroughout Cyprus, and
t 1,
::o i.ie:über of the Beourlty Oqunoll oimllongcu the Gocrete.ry- 
.()eneroJ.*s rejection of the olaln- made by the Makarlco govern­
ment, tlie host gotc2Y,:.e'!t to the force, that the Turkish 
Cypriots r^'cnld bt r^^ardod as mn illegal group of ôi/sBidonto, 
GO that L 'jvYP aliould he used to asGlot the govormient to 
enforce Its authority on thorn#(11^)
It has been oxplolnad that In the Ooz^go affair nommarck* 
jold Inolotod that OHDO should not be used to onforoe tl^ 
authority of the host government on oeoeoalonlot Katanga,
In lino with the principle of non-intervention in internal 
oonflioto, eonstitutionsl or othorwiGo# \ After M e  death, 
however, Katanga* o eooosoion was brought to on end on ONbO, 
under U direction^ .carried out.*defensive* operations
to regain and auoure its freedom of movement throughout 
Katanga, Buch aotion, as alror^dy assorted, approximated more 
to enforoemoot moaoureo under Article 42 of the Charter than 
provisional neaourco midez* Artiole 40 to prevent an aggravat­
ion of the situation, and vfere designed to aeslot the host 
government in  Loopoldville to enforce ito au'' r^rty on the 
province of Katanga.
In contrast to the use of OTIUO in this way in the Congo 
affalz.", UMBICir hao not been directed by the ".''OCreta%\y-.
General to asaiot the host government led by ± resident Makai'ioc 
to enforce its authority on the Turkish Cypriot minority & In 
o.f.Ceot, %hat it appnm:fs to have done durinig the past dccado la 
to operate in accordance with Article 40 of CZiapter Vii of the 
Charter by taltizig provisional neasure&^ to prevent an ag',q%'avat— 
ion of the situation in Gyprue, vrithout prejudicing the r.igdite.
Security
olEiims or poslticn of the îmrtioa concoriiied# Dut the/^council 
has not fozMvelly declared that the Bltuntlcn conetitutes a
tKZ'oar tc  peoce and ao e iirlty  uizcer Ar-tlclo 59 ,
nor cited  A r t ic le  40, and I t  should be n#te&, &e Goodrich, 
aamoro anu vl'sono have commented, * there would, opnoar to  bo 
c^no^ôc^ovic ocroo^ent tBst tne p arties  concerned ore obligated  
to  comply w itn reoolutlone s p e c if ic a lly  adcpted im ler A r t ic le  
4V, th a t ctnor seiebera are obligated  to  aaM ot In  carrying, 
out Grch r rp c lu iirs e , nnC th a t the Council con adopt any . 
zeronrec i? c : rza ccccccery to  ensure conpllence w ith  ouch 
r é s o l u suDjjcot ?o tho genoral l l j^ ita t lo n e .c f  the C h arte r# ..
tg e r: ia o e n riù c r .- 'P ij ^^g.  ^ _e. tkeoe
oblicctlozr; ru p lic a b le . If thç .Council f& llo  to  c i te  . 
y-rtzvre 4 'J -  * f a l l s  to  zzhc a foiz^ol .detcrcilnatlon .ms&cr 
A r t ic le  ^9 t th re a t .to  the pence., , broach o f the peace,
or oQt o f aggression e x is t s ' . (114) '
G eitccr A r t ic le  59 nor A r t ic le  AC has boon c ited  by 
the ^ecurikg council when dealing  w ith  the Cyprus
vhe logos oeale for the ostabllshnont end operation'of 
the I' ;c:ve in v7\'ruo i- rested eu the consent .of the 
nout g^vorsncnt %n response to c. Security Oounoll recoaaond^ 
atscn, ana z% oe Btrceecd that Bincc.the agreement,
between too united natzone and the Govomænt of the Kcpuh— . 
lie of Cyprus concerning the otatua of OKflOY?. did not . '
oblige tno Cownander of the fc rce  to  soot # request fo r  
caslGtsnce by the govemza&t'o security forces, the United 
.;:au%cnü wao .(riven n. legtil oaoio to rejoot attonpto by the 
Kaxarior government to'enforce.Ito autncriCy over the 
uurjiien vyyrluw zlz^-crity, wldcli was to  be troctod & sep­
arate party»
In practice; UTAipyp, Thoce life been extended 
fro?, tine to tine slnoe Ito lnno;tlo%;(llp) has endeavoured 
to contain ^lelenea in Oyprun by ouch netbcde 20 petrclllng 
in towns rrJ rlllcyoc where tension wee high, interpoolng Ita 
units between omed hostile groups* helping to arrango agree* 
rents on llnoo of demarcation Buoh as the one dividing iiooela, 
and nerc Hating for the dismantling of fortiflcationB* In 
the ccnC.y .yearB,. reotriGtlon8 .1apoecd on ita freedom of move* . 
ment %n a aru f f r of oreaB, not only by the hoot governmmt,
W t  olQo hy armed Turkish Oypiioto, greatly impeded its peace­
keeping of crto, the serlbuo outbreaks of Inter-eomrunal 
vlolonêe t. u^ly 1964 mid Koveiher lS67xtenderod It ineffect­
ive. But for several years after tho violent eruption In 19G7 
the force functioned with much ouooeoa in accordance with the 
terms of its mandate, and helped to effect a return to reason* 
ably tolerable conditions in the island.
In July 1A*74, - however, the rritiv^ tlon in Cyprus 'changed 
dramatica_u\' "^znn a coup  ^tat by a mllltimt miosis',
group .rcaultqd in the appolntnont/of liiicos n as President
and the Jurkle'i invg-r^ lozi of tlic : I -d on Dideod.
but f01* the collapse of the Colonels* regime In Creeoo, it lo 
probable that thore would have boon war between Creeoc and 
Tu o/, and the fragile nature of the IRi poaoekooping operat­
ion in Cyprus was again cxpoecd*
On 20 July 1974 the Security Council unanimously adopted 
a resolution .which -called upon all.parties to the fighting 
to accept a oease-firo and demanded the withdrawal without 
delay from the Republic of Cyprus of foreign military nersomiol 
not outhorioed under international ngreomento. It called on 
Greece, Turkey ond the United Kingdom, the guarantors of the
IS'GO Dondozi Old lurioh Agresmonts, imdci' which an lndCj,c, Cc:5 
Cyprus had.been established* to enter into ncgctl&tlons for 
the restoration of peaoc in the area and constitutional gov­
ernment la >;prej, anl also on all parties to co-operate fully 
with UKPIGYl to o&eblo it to carry out its mand&te*(ll6)
A 03ior-firo agreed to on 22 du^y, but within honro 
A&fter ihc wgzocnont had been reached Tvr,is^ forces occupied 
hyrenia and vcre Involved in fighting.'the Greek Oypriot 
National Auarl nenr iHoosia International airport which ISI 
forces took c-vcr with much difficulty* In fact, though the ,
Poreigt I 3ter& of Britain*, fuikc^ .and Greece agreed in
-
Geneva on 50 duly that a buffer ^cac ehould he marked/out hy\ 
a mixed ^maieaion alo'n.g the l i m a  reackoi by Turkish forças 
on 22 July* that only U7 forces should bo permitted to cntor 
thia Bcno and #l#ilar nones üuzaoundlng the Turkish Uypriot - 
enclaves; and that URKICY? ohould police bhe villages of 
mixed Turkish end dreok Oyprlet population, fighting continued 
as the Tur tft ex%xmded tholr area of oocupatlon and insietod 
on aocepL :co of their pr üLs fo%* a uliglo federal govern- 
?üi in J/r "us; TWcieh Oypriot cantona posccGolng a
lar.ge rtica: ro of autono?,:^ * Clearly* .within such a context 
tim UN force of a few tliouannu men*...authorlsod to ;.,lay t W  
role of arbiter in intor-ooamunal clashes and to uao armed 
force only In oolf-dcfcnce, could do little to reotore and 
)iiaintain ycaco in Cyprus, and several of Ito menbcro were 
Icillcd and wounded through being involved in dangerous situât- 
lone,(117)
Towards the end.of August 1974* by which time the Turks 
'had estrk)lieh0d tliemselvco in the northei'n third of Oypruc in
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aoflanoo.of the ' oovrityr.Oounail* W t  finally oo?#le<" 
its call for. a ccccc-Hre arrrmgeaoit* necrctc.ry—"'rncr">l 
U%iahci% report:? to the Security Council that I ^
rm '^/ouli. Boon.have, to be redefined* ee the situation, 
obtxlnn" o, not the one in yJiloh the cHglnsl 
xejdste of the farce h&d been oetabllghGd la 1964, There 
oy 210 nccnc, full agreement among the portico oa to 
how* or wit : Objectives, mifieyp chould function, ho
cua'Lea, the nature of the hoped—for negotiated settle­
ment ^culd else be a deoleive factor in Ita future role# (116)
%atever %)olltt';ai settlement of the.Cyprus ..queetion 
10 ultinasely agreed to* it would appocr that unless a UM 
peacekeeping force, whioj: is authfiriaed to nla)' the role of . 
u;. jiUer :in mi;or—com-:unai c.leshos, is also given the author— 
zt):" ana %%l%%nry capshility to enforce the pence when nocenc— 
ory, it io mll3:oly to prove effootlve, But such a foroo,
ompmnsleed, 'would requlzro 'Wo %tolitloal 
condition^; izrs%, * t bota the super—Powers agree to let It 
Imppen. seCQ3my, that the majority of other ctatf zvc it ' 
tneir rcnntx... gccow%lif^(lig) oroover* the oonetztuHon^fl. 
haoio ::nr c^fcrcemcnt action hy such a foroewoiild M v e  to he 
Artie3.e 59 of the Charter under #iloh the Roourlt^^ Ooimoil 
la autaorzeodg Y/ztI%oi%t ccntrrivenlng the noh —intorvention 
prznczple %n matuors of domestic jurisdiction* to determine 
tao oxiu^oncc or any u#roat to the peace, breach of the peace* 
or act oi uggrqooion* and to decide what meaeuroo should bo 
ta^ ion In aoeordonoe with Article 41 or 42 to maintain or 
restore international peace*
the MldJlG Pact
hiku first T'AJ ^hioh operatoJ In the Middle Bast 
&rom l^pS to z9&7f tns soccnd uBAf* which was ootabllehëd 
by the Ooeurlty Ocuaoll after, the Arab-iarao!! war of 
October 1975,(120) was QcglgaGd to function in accordance 
'A'ltn the vriziclplo of Belf-defanoc in a buff or i^one aegarat— 
i %   ^ pcrtieo ooz'joemed, lliie the first U;BP* too* its 
oreatlcn co^cndod on the consent of the psrtioG to tho con­
flict* and appropriate agreements on the status of tho force 
had to be ccnozuaw between them and the United Nations to 
enable the force to enjc^ / froedom of movement and oc)uA3clo— 
ation and othei? c^lltleo neeessary for the gorformsnoe of 
ito tacks, .
Klnco tho Docurlty eçuncll decided that the foiAoe ohonld 
C'C DatahllzAod for m: initial period of oi% months* oïid that 
It should continue in operation thereafter 'provided the 
uecnrity Council so docidca'2(121) it appeared that the 
question of. dotonnlnlng .Its withdrawn,^ was within the jnria- 
aiction of the Ooimcll* A^ nd not an Aanuc to vJiich the principle 
of non-intervention in matters of domestic jurisdiction under 
Article of the Charter was applicable,In contrast with
the oB.oe of the first maP's withnrcra:. in I967. .In practice* 
.hG:;?over* diplomatic novoa have shown that the Security 
Council h&2 not acoerted Its competence to extend UhBF's 
mandate ^/Hthont fg^'ptian consent* (122) m d  that both fyria 
and Israel must give their approval to oxtoiiclona of the 
mandate of G.\. Or (United Katlonc Die—engagement Observation 
force) on the Oclcm Hoightn* which- tlze Coimcil ootabllalied 
with tholr consent in 1974.(125)
2ï6
Though. lorool and Krypt conoludoa a now Olnoi din- 
ongsgcrznk (grcozont in Ooptr h^r 1975 - this provided for 
the wiuhCrc^al cf Israeli forces from 12 to 26 miles in Jlaol* 
with the %%c#êâ area becoming, the buffer sone controlled (jy 
the DH BmorgoDCy Force: the ectabllekment of electronic 
varnlng poets In the key B'litle end Glddl paseos under the 
superviulcc: of IBilted Jtatee porccnnol; and thewithdra'cd 
of laracl frc.. the Abu budels ollfieldB(124)— the preoenoe 
of -x.the .'WEF' -in . A, the-Middle 00 regarded, ae a
. fragile Inot 2:^ uz ont .y : of- ooe oelreeplng which ; .is uiillkcly to 
prevent a recnrrcnoo of hoatilltios If no elgnlflc^mt progress 
Is made towcrde a comprehensive political settlement of the 
Arab-Israell question which includes lorael'a withdrawal froK: 
ooouplod tczrrltoriee, the esteblLr/iment of a lalesuinian 
otato%vhl(R: v;ili.. remove of tie gricvanoes . of the.dls- 
pla^ced f alostinlahs* and .the mooei^kance: of Israel's sovereign­
ty. by the Arab.nations, .
' If, under .Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security 
Council cetorziiine^ the existence of .a throat to the peace* 
breach of the j^ eaoe, or not of cr^n'oscion, a m  authorisoo 
enfcrcommt moamrns against e state to ndnthin or rostt^o 
Intor^iatiGnal peace and ocowity, m o b  action does not con- 
travqno the prlnolple of non-lntorvention In mattors oosont- 
l&lly within the dGnoetic jurisdiction of states unaer Article 
2(7) of the But tlie security Council cannot act in
this way if of .its five j^ jeriz^ nent members applies its 
right of veto under Y^rticle é7* and the foot that military 
action was re; ? ^nded by the Security Uounoil &galn&t North
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iDfoa in 1950 was made possible only Looauae the Soviet del­
egate was act present In the Council at that time to exercise 
the veto,
In&er the 'Baiting for fèaec* resolution of 1950 the 
Aae&mhly claimed the competence to recommend the application 
of appropriate roroureo* Incluâlng military aaactlono, if the 
Security Council, because of lack of unanimity among ite five 
permanent mombera* failed'to-cxercioe its primary recpoaeibil- 
ity for the maintenance of intcii.utlonal peace and security, 
and in ito resolution of 1 February 1951 the Aaeembly called . 
upon oil ntateo to lend assistance to the United Nations 
action in Korea* Thlo indicated that at the ti&e the majority 
of UN mazbora conaldored that an Assembly recommendation for 
military measures againat an aggressor, in consonance with 
the 'lAilting for Feaoo* rooolutisn, waa not a contravention 
of the principle of aon-intervoDtlon in matters of domeetio 
jurisdiction under Article 2(7) of the Charter* But the 
eeheme 5?eqairing etatco to eai'mark elements of thoir national 
forces for scrvioo with the United Naticmo, under the 'uniting 
for iGsee* resolution, proved a failure* .Bevoral UN.member# 
opted to provide for their mutual dofonce by nemig of regional 
" iurity arrangements, and, as. the. Hungarian affnlr of Zjjf 
demonatrated, it wa& Gonoidorod impracticable for the UN 
AoEsembly to reoomnend nilitary oancviona agalnot a auper-power*
In 1956, however, the 'Uniting for ieuoe* resolution was 
invoked to authorise the ewtabliehment of the United nationo 
üMergency Force (DITE?) to keep the peace as an interposition 
force between the forces of Egypt and. Israel. But In contract 
to the peaoekceplng fot'dea eavioaged under Cliapter VII of the
Chart nr fer the on for cornent of ^0^00/ UTMF woo a non-coercive 
force donigneâ to cperatc_in aeeordanoe ^ithtbo principle ofF . 
oolf-dofonoop and thun.oaoentinlly ae an umpire in oooes where 
the oea30-firo wao infringed, Bonides, tho eotoblinhment of 
WBP, to vizloh itnlts we3:'e contributed by TIN nenlxn/s, excluding 
tzic groat poworq, on a yolimtary baeio* deponded on the consent 
of the parti on to> the confllot and the wllllngneGB of the host 
otate, to permit BN foroeG to operate on Ito territory*
was.
and thus not at varlanoe with the mon-lntervention principle 
in mattezG of domestic juricdlctloB under Article 2(7) of 
the Charter»
The fact that , the Î.TN Secretar)—Oenorrl B Thant end the 
Advisory Committee on UNI? complied with Bgypt'e request for 
the witbdrawnl of IRTK? in lp&7 W.t bout referring .the mo tier 
to the A&aodhly - a decision acccoted without challenge læ 
the political organo of the Uhltci rtionc - wac a recognit­
ion that the question of terminating the p^ronenoo of the force 
wae within * r tic gurl#diotlon of .the rest state* Ibic
demcnatratod the.fragile nature of UN peeeehcoping by consent 
énd the foiloro of the United.Notlonc to persuade v r parties, 
concerned to accept a political settlement of their differences 
whilst the UN force vao supervising a oe&&ati&n of hostilities*
Though the establishment cf tho second UNBP.in 1973 
depended on. the consent cf %:gypt and lorael, Neourlty Ocunoil 
resolution 541(1973) implied thot the question of terminating 
the preocnce of the force in Glnei woo a rotter within the 
jurisdiction of the Council, since It loli down that extens­
ions of the force*# mandate would depend on dooiaicne by the 
Council, 3pt in practice the Connell has been reluctant to
czcrclsc ito compotonOG 1# thlB.respect, lecidoa, it has 
boon recogninea that both Cyrla and Israel must give their 
approval ao^cre tme mccuriuy Council can decide cn extensions 
cf UNDONfo Mandate for Guporvinina a ceooetlon cf hostilities 
on ünc uolon aoighto* Oon&cnuontly; the continued erosGDCo of 
DillY- and h":''\h, omcll .Gi%ed forces .armed only .for eelf^dcfeneog 
must bo iH:xrcoâ.fiG.precarl quo, and vitheotei^if leant pro- ' 
-groeG wc rd#. a compreh.emalvc oattlcccnt. of .Az'#-Tereoli.\. .
differo_oez,' the recurrence of hostilities 1% the Middle .
.18 the a#8t likely reewlt#
^naeo&p it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the 
L.icole iTiil roi3am a etonn centre until the great perfore,
paruicuiany ühe ünitec Ltatoe end the .Soviet Union, ore 
prepares to Gzcru diplomatic "and. eoonanlo prcooure on. the 
p%r%i&& concerned to accept a political.settlement, end to 
tr%cforM the ozcloting non-c6ercivc UII pooeokeeplng foroeo .
%nt (; icrC'O j wzv h offectlvt ooment oapablllt loo to enourc
the choü: o of such aeettlcn&'iit lUiid maint^Hn.intezziatlGziol
peace* le l e -in th(z interest :f the groat povror#
to adort :oc: u: ap.roaoh, for it Ic a neane by whlcti they 
o:m avoid direct confrontation with each othei\through oc-a- 
.pctlng fcr Influence. In aroun of oonfliot oetclde their . 
military CefMneo cyotcnf,
\Tho eetablichmont of a iDT force with effective m&z^ce- 
i5ont Gcpzoliltloa ?/no now nocosoar^ for the onlntonczioe of 
peace Z3:ï she Congo of tor the confllot with fshoMbo'd Katoiga 
had been resolved* 'Aut It is significant that on end to the 
conflict was not pocslblG intil after t W  Security Goimc3/:L 
.aaa autaorzcoê the Cocrct^iry—Ocnoral H  take meacuroo agalnct
foi'Ces maro to enforoomcnt
woa&urea undor Article 42 of the wxaito* the# lo provisional* 
non-onfcrooz^ent .moaoweo under A^rticle 40 which hammarokjola 
had sttemptou tc pply by requiring ONüü to function In aoeoru^ 
aneev^it3% ;thc gprinolplmof self—defence ond non-intervontion 
in internal oonfllots, constitutional oi" other?,'ice.
In the next Ghautor wo ohall conoidor the question of 
peacekceplngbyBN f or CGC AH thin tho context of an^gread 
nysteci of l i i t e r i ia t io n s l (lloarmament Izaucd on tW  In te rn a tio n a l 
control end inopeotion of national orrx j^rntB, end the extent 
to %';hioh t M s  would roqulre a diminution of the domestic 
jnrlGdiotlon of etatoo*
AIJ.
VI, y:i ; c  : ,/ic juni./jiufn'r: ..i" Xj'a^ io:: o:i ya;. c(//:.'iu:~:C=i or 
Vi, .ITT.' T x C  i'\' v .a . lu :.r.iTv.Ho K..ht^ '£xus. ..zu /a,:
k.,ÜrJjuAflU.: ANN KhOOTiOU OF Af'./r ).':;'i:h
The arohitecte of the Oh&rter of the United Nations 
onvlengod the rogulatlm and reduotlon of ar::?nnmto within 
the oont"^^ of a security oyott 'ojo effective functioning 
depended upon the uncmlmlty of the five permanent members of 
the Security Coimcll* the organ inzimarlly rocponGlble for the 
maintcnnnoe of international peace and Ooourity* . znee 0*^0^ 
permanent maaber of the Gouncll was given the right to veto 
the applloatlcn of form of Benotlone, *the oeourity echeme 
of the Obortor* then* was conceived an an arrangement for 
qollootlve action against rolatlvoly minor dloturberc of the 
peace* in caooa whore the gre&t powero were united In the 
deolre to permit or toko action*,(1)
The Implementation of this limited form of collective 
Bocurity* which required member ctateo of the United Hationo* 
under Artlclo 45 of the Charter* 'to make available to the 
Security Council* on Ito call and in accordance with a special 
agreement or ari'eomonts* armed forces* assistance* and facil­
ities? including righto of paooago* ncccL,. for the purpose 
of oalotaininy Intez^atlonal peace end security** proved 
imposoiblo because of the dlfferenccB between the Soviet 
Union ^ ]k the Woetcm powere. They disagreed on such matters 
88 the surmgth and composition of the military contributions 
to bo made by member states of the United Nations* and the 
deployment of forces that should be placed at the disposal 
of the Gcourlty Gounoil#{2) Consequently* there was no security 
framowork in which to implement Article 26 of the Charter on 
the International regulation of armoments* vis, *ln order to
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promote the ostablishméAt and malntonanoo of international 
peace and aoourlty with the leaot diveralon for arm&meatG of 
the world's human and economic reoourooo, the Security Council 
shall he responsible for formulating, with the asslotanoe of 
the Military^ Staff Committee* referred to in Article 47* piano 
to be submitted to the Members of the United Batlono for the 
eotahllGhment of a system for the regulation of aziR&monts** 
Furthermore* the Military Staff Committee, conelGting of the 
uhiefs of üteff of the permanent memhera of the Security 
Council or their representatives, never assumed its role, 
under Article 47 of the Charter, of advising and assisting 
the Security Council 'on all questions relating to the Secur­
ity Council's Military requirements for the maintenance of
international poaoe and socurity, the employment and command 
of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, 
and possible disarmament*,
railure to bring into being the limited collective sec­
urity system of the Charter, and the regulation of armaments 
within that structure, thus meant that states could still 
claim tnat the sise and nature of their armaments and armed 
forces wore matters essentially within their domestic juris­
diction, and thus protected from interference in such matters 
by the United Nations under the toi^s of Article 2(7) of the 
Charter,
During the early years of the United Hâtions, however, 
oven before the attempt to reach agreement on the limited 
collective socurity arrangement under the Charter had proved 
abortive, the Ueneral Assembly which has the competence under 
Article 11(1) of the Charter to make recommendations on the
prinoipleo of co-operation governing dioarno^aont ctnd the reg­
ulation of arQ&menta to UN member# or the Security Council, 
took the initiative to give these mattere greater priority 
thon had been accorded them under the Charter* In fact, the 
AsBombly'G first reeolutlonj in January 1946,(3) establlGhed 
an Ato#i\ orgy Commloslon* composed of one representative 
from each of those statee represented on the Security Council, 
and Canada when state w&g not e member of the Council,(4) 
to nake opecifio ^ropoealo to the Security Council 'for extend­
ing bot%veen all nstiemo the exchange of baolc ecientiflo in— 
fcru^vion for po&oeful onde; for control of atomic energy to 
the extent neoeeeary to ensure ite use only for peaceful pur­
poses; for the ollmlnatlon from national armaments of atomic 
weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass des­
truction; and for effective safeguards by way of inspection 
and other oeano to protect complying otatos against the hazards 
of vlol&tlono end evasions**
BiQoussions 1# the Atomic Rncr^y Commission,(9) which 
first met in June 19^6, Indie 'ucd the differing views of the 
Bcviet Union and the 'ostem Povmra on the measure of domestic 
jurisdiction that should be surrondciW to male possible the 
establishment of a system for the international control of 
atomic energy to ensure nuclear diG&rmament*
The plan put forward by Mr* Ecziziard Iiaruoh for the 
United States In the Atomic Energy Commission proposed that 
an Intemational authority should own cd.1 uranium and thorium 
mined, ao ?;cll as ovm end manage atomic energy plants danger­
ous to international security* Thougli national governments 
would be allowed to oorry out non-dangeroua atomic energy 
activities under, licence from the international authority.
the lobtor would have the right to inspect and ouporviOB 
those national plante at every stage of atonic energy manu­
facture* It was made clear that on effective oyaten of Inter­
national control of #11 phaoee of development end uoe of atonic 
energy nu&t bo in operation before tho United ütotee, which 
then had exclusive possession of atomic wcrpcno, released the 
sGcreta of atonic energy manufacture end eliminated itc 
stockpile of atomic weapone.
It was thuo considered onsentiel by the United StGtea 
that an international atomic development authority, governed 
by the termo of & multilateral treaty, should h&vo the righto 
of oontinuoua inspection and control, and the power to take 
provisional meacureo, ouch ah the closure of a particular 
atonic plant, in the case of violations or evasions of the 
international agreement under which it operated* It wao 
also inaieted that there muet not bo a. veto to protect ataton 
that violated their eolemn agrcomente not to develop or uoo 
atomic energy for destructive purpcocs* hence it was laid 
dovm in the United States plan that the voting procedure 
baaed on the )Oi%)lo of great power unanimity, which ob­
tained in th, ( uurlty Council, ohould not apply to the oper­
ations of the propoGod International authority; its declGionG 
would be determined by the majority of its member#*
As to the question of enforcement action against a 
violator of the agreements envisaged under the plan, Who 
eabsrkod on aggressive action, the United ^tntea position was 
&G follows: *In the event of an occurrence within the area 
of the Authority's jurisdiction constitut n i threat to the 
peace, broach of the peace or act cf aggression, ouch, occurr—
cricc GÎ'-c.u3.d iKiKüâtatcly bo certified by the iarfchority 'co the 
Security Council* the Acoombly, and the Glgn&tory wtuLes*
Tho treaty should ootBblloh this category ol.ollcncoa wil 
the oondltlonG surrounding them, For purpooo of illustration* 
they might include violations,,,.,.GUOh as; (a) Illegal poss­
ession or use of an atomic bomb; (b) Illegal possession, or
an
8e%)arati(m, of atomic material suitable fo%' use in^atomic 
bomb; (c) Goisuro of m y  plant or other property belonging 
to, or llconcod by the Authority; (d) Wilful interforenoe 
with the aotivltlea of the Authority; (e) OrGatlon or operat­
ion of dongorous projeo# in a manner contrary to, or In 
absence of, a licence granted by the Authority,' (6) mt 
though the United States justifiably maintained that in such 
aituatlons the controls eotabllohod under the multilateral 
treaty would be of no avail if enforcement action oould be 
prevented by the veto of a state signatory to It; It did not 
advocate that the atomic bombe which it.posGeasod should be 
placed at the disposal of a United Nations peacekeeping ioroe 
to deter oi* coerce an aggressor In acoordance with a recomm­
endation of the Assembl^^ if the security Uouncll waa 
strung by tjic veto of a permanent member of that body. Instead, 
the United Ntotoo proposed that in certain cases the inherent 
right of individual or collective self-defence under Article 
51 of the Ohai*ter v/ould be applicable# 'In^erprating rto pro­
visions with respect to atomic energy ratters, it is cloor 
that if atomic weapons were employed &G part of an "armed 
attack*, tho rights reserved by the nations to themselves 
under Artiblo 51 would be applicable,' It stntod, H  is 
equell^^ u. that on "armed attache" is now something entirely 
different from what It prior to the discovery of atomic
weaponc. It would therefore Boem to bo both Important #nd 
appropriate under prooent conditions that the treaty define 
"ermed attack" In a manner appropriate to atonic weapons and 
Include In the definition net simply the actual dropping of 
on atomic bomb, but also certain steps in tbemoelvee prelim­
inary to ouch #ction**(?)
But if enforooment action under Article 51 , » to be 
applied to coerce e etate found guilty by the International 
control icy of manufoGturinr r,kog:lc weipono In violation 
of the mnltil&teral treaty, i% la difficult to eee how ouch 
action oould be effective if, after the international control 
oyetea had come into operation, no state other than the viol­
ator of the treaty poG&eeGod atomic wéapona# The fact w&a 
that the qaeation of enforcement action against a potential 
aggroGoor woo not reallGtlcally faced, though the po&alblllty 
of a otato lllegtillÿ pooneeaing or using atomic bomba wee 
not ruled out after the international oontrol oyatem had l^ eon 
set up,
/'OOiCon, LUC fact that under thé Baruch plan the queat- 
ion of the use of rwcnic energy for war purpooea
iwao oonoldrred independently of the regulation of convent­
ional or TZLats and ,armed forces was. hardly realiotio, though 
not at \vriO:ice with the terms of reference of the Atomic 
Energy Commloulou cet up under thc UIk AeGoHiy'o résolution, 
which wee oupported by all the great povmrc, As Dr* Andre?: 
Martin kco pointed out, the hope of eliminating atomic weapons 
in advtmce of a general regulatiozi of armamcnto 'was tantemount 
to ignoring the old experlenoG that every diaormament confer­
ence lo a bargaining counter* Tho A,E,0, could not oerve a#
Buoh while the-Baited States had the virtual monopoly of. 
atomic we^pono* For the Soviet Union to surrender the right 
of independent research into the production of atomic 
weapons (&s the Americano demanded) would have boon a uni­
lateral coneeegion* For the United states to destroy immed­
iately her otookpile of atomic bombs the Rusoians demanded) 
would have been an equally bad bargain, unless the Ùoviot 
Union prepared to trade in its superior armaments on 
land, but nogotiatlonn in that direotion were outeide the 
CommiOGion*8 terms of reference*#(G)
In brief, then, the Baruch plan was booed on the doctrine 
t?mt the development and use of atomic energy ohould bo removed 
from the spbore of domestic juriadlotion of all Btatoa and 
brought under the jurisdiction of an agency which had the 
b&Bic features of a cupra-nation.al authority whose decisions 
would be arrived at by majority voting, not subject to the 
veto of any state* But thou#i the plan proposed this measure 
of Gupra-nationalism* it did not envisage the formation of a 
supra-national force possessing nuclear weapons, though this 
would be necesGary if it to be an effective deterrent to 
a would-be violator of the agreement not to manufacture 
atomic weapons#
The Atomic Energy ComaiGSion's first repozt to the 
Security Oouncil on 51 December 1946, which was adopted by 
10 votes in ^ vour (Australia, Brasil, Canada, China, Egypt, 
France, Netherlands, Mexico, United Kingdom, United Gtates) - 
the .Soviet Union and Boland abstained - (9) was, in general, 
an endorsement of the Baruch plan. It rejected the Uovlot
Union*# proposal that states should accept on international 
convention banning the national production, poGOGoeion and use 
of atomic weapona, before negotiation on the setting up of 
international control machinery comi!?enced* In the view of 
the majority ouch a convent ion would not ensure that atonic 
cnc;^ would he uocd only for peaceful purpoees, or protect 
complying atatea against the hasarde of violations of euoh 
an agreement* :
Euheequently, in June 1947* after oeveral mon the of 
dlocueolon ln the Atomic Bnergy Commission, the Soviet Union 
modified it a CEtrlier position to adme extent by propoaing 
that in order to prevent violations of the convention for 
banning the use of atomic weapone, otriot international con­
trol should be eatabliohed oimultaneouely over all facilities 
for the production of atomic energy* The new Soviet plan 
otlpulcitod that raw matorielo and atomic plants would rosi^ iain 
under na^ rial ewnorohip and managenont* but eubjoct to 
contr&j I 1 on periodic Inspection* The Soviet delegate 
declared that the eo—called veto ehould not apply to the day 
to day eetivltiee end operatioue of the International Gontz*o3.
Cc lesion ouggeeted in the Soviet plan; but such a oommleeion 
would, he explained, only make reconmen dot lone to the Security 
Oouncll in reepeot of violations of any oonvention that ehould 
be drawn up* Puniohmonto for Borlouo violations ehould alwayc 
be BUbjeot to doolGlone of the Security Council* he emphaGieed 
that the rule of unanimity of the permanent memborB of the 
Council was a booic principle of the Charter, and that the 
Soviet Union could never ogrce to a violation of ouch a 
priBCiple*(lO)
C.U
Tho power# critleleod the Soviet plan not only
because it permitted & greet power to veto the application of 
eanctlme egainet a etste found manufacturing atomic energy 
for w&r purposes, but on the ground that there mwot be oontin- 
U0U8 &e oppoDod to periodic inspection# Not ourprloingly, 
further dieousoions in the Atomic Energy Oomiieuion in 1 j s 
did nothing to bridge the fundamental differences between the 
Soviet end ^-eetern plenc* end the GommlCBion reported on 17 
Key 19^C that it had f lied to prepare a draft treaty on the 
international control of atomic energy* The report stated 
that the mejn^jLuy plan had been rejected by the Soviet Union 
'either ao a waole or in separate porta, on the ground that 
ouch a plan coaatltuted an unwarranted infringement of national 
sovereignty', end that the majority .of the Oomzaiooion was 
fully aware of the impact of ito plan on traditional prerog- 
otivea of ziational sovereignty, but in the face of the real­
ities of the problem it oew no alternative to the voluntary 
eharing by nations of their sovereignty to the extent required 
by ite propo8al8«{il)
The eueotlon of the extent to which the domestlo juris­
diction of states would have to be ourrendered for the estsb— 
lieh^ient of an eaaontially eupra-nationol control of atomic 
energy occasioned eome dlecuGBlon in the First Cor-jttee of 
the Aoeembly, in Eoptembcr 1040,(12) after the majority iHon 
of the AtoHo Oommlosion had been vetoed by the Soviet
Union In the Socurlty Oouncil* The Soviet delegate aesorted 
that Implknontation of the majority recommendations would 
give the cpp03^tunlty to the oteff of on international author­
ity to carry out largo ecolo oopionage, and the Ukrainian 
8,G#R* delegate Gtated that, far from representing a eaorlflce,
y/u
the ü,É* was a manlfeatatloB of the Gupra-natlon&llBm
which wao poisoning international life and preventing all 
cooperation*
Oloorly, the eooontlolly supra-national approach of the 
majority to the ouGotion of eontrolllng the use and develop­
ment of atomic energy wag unacceptable to the SovlGt Union 
on the \ that It would constitute unv^arranted and intol­
erable intervention in nattera es senti ally within the domestic 
jurisdiction of states# But thou#i the Soviet attitude ?;a$ 
oonslderGd obotrnctlonlst by the majority of UN member stateo, 
and the Assembly approved the reco^Taendatlone of the majority 
plan In the reports of the Atomic Knorgy Gommission*(13) it 
may be argued, as Evan luard has done, that the effect of 
Implementing the plan 'would have been to place the Soviet 
Union in a position of permanent inferiority* For even if 
the United St&tos had in fact destroyed her.existing weapons, 
and the Soviet Union could have bee# satisfied of this, there 
was no Mor/fC of destroying the capacity to resume manufacture 
in the o so of world v;ar or even in the case of a breakde?m 
in the agroGmcnt# The United States would thus have held 
permanent technclogioal superiority in case of emergency#
The Soviet Union, therefore, as the oetohing-up power, pro­
ceeded to frustrate any attempt to roach agreement in this 
field',(14)
If this argument is accepted, it may also be contended 
that it was unrealistic to expect the Soviet Union to accept 
the majority view that conventional armanents should be con­
sidered separately from atomic weapons and other weapons of 
m&sa destruction, which was a major Ig&ue of disagreement in
the Oo:rnlccn,eii tlmt h W  been
Got vp b r^ tho -^eoiirity ODunGll early In 1947 In rG3i)once to 
the f3üOübly*B re&noGt that It Bhonl# &lve proapt eoB&iderat* 
ion to f(t r 'ilng mo&sureB for the general regulation of 
armament# anü armoë foreeB*(lG) Honevor, the attempt #ao ma&e 
to roBolve the matter In 195^# ^y %?hloh time the Soviet Union 
vrao building up her c %  atookplle of nuolear wenpono, through 
the eGtablloWent liy the Aeoembly of & eln0.e Dioormement 
Oon:::ieoioD ^ to ^^cparo propopolG to be eWaodlol In a draft 
treaty (or treaties) for tho regulation^ limitation and 
bslaneed réduction of all cmed fercei, and all nrm^hDonto^ for 
the el, 1 ution of ell major wenpon^ adaptable to meoe dOG-» 
tructioDp end for effeotlve international oontixsl of atomic 
energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic woaponu.and the 
uoe of atomic energy for peaceful purpooea only**(17)
î:he eetablieljEsnt of tho «îilch
vrae reprG#oz:^tativo of the mombcrB of the Security Gouncil end 
Canada^ thus IzDplled t W t  agreement on dleormoucnt depended 
on finding a %oy of balancing the ^eet*8 euperiority in 
iiO 10 ^eopODL with the Soviet dPivn*8 cva^wlority in con* 
ventlonal er.anonte end ground forcce* But though the oceroh 
for agreeiaent on a comprehenolvo and co*ordlnated plan 
dioarmn. c :t by the Oommleeion from February 195^ to April 
1954# (ud itc 8ub*commlttoe of Canada# France, Soviet union# 
United iiingCom and the United Btatoe, from 1954 to 
September 1957# (16) narrovfod to come o:rl;ont the gap betv^een 
the Soviet Union and the Voatem lowora# there were still 
diffore^ooc b^ co * them booauoe of their divergent views on 
the degi'eo of intervention that should be pci^aitted In mattora
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of domostio jurisdiction to enable an international control 
body to function r.ith adequate powers of inopeotlon and ver*, 
ifloatlon of national armaments and to initiate measures to 
prevent and GUpproee violations of a disarmament treaty,
D^ough the Soviet Union agreed in 195% to the principle 
of oontlnuouB inspection in favour of the periodic inspection 
will oh it hod previcuely accepted# (19) it vms reluctant to 
define how the international control eyatom, which it ouggeated 
ehould come into being simultaneouely with the proliibiticn 
of nuclear weapons* ehould function. Indeed# it waa not until 
^ay 1955 that the Soviet Union made some attempt to define 
the kind of international control ayotem it envisaged»
The control system which the Soviet Union proposed was 
one of the main features of a plan which called for a two*. 
stage dloarmomont pro n^rao2?m corrcBponding to the years 1956 
and 1957 v;hleh involved (1) the acoeptanec of the oeillngs 
for the armed forces of the great powers end other states# as 
proposed by the Western Powers in Baroh 1955# end the elimin­
ation of foreign bases; and (2) the postponement of the pro­
hibition of nuclear v;eapons until after 7g^ of the reduction 
of armed forces had been carried out* During the first stage 
of the dlsarmaacmt prograime, the International control organ 
would have the authority to station obsGrve)rs at railway 
junctions# large ijorts, highways and aerodromes in the territ­
ories of all stateo oonoemed, t3ie right to request information 
from states on the impkmwitaticn of measures of reduction of 
armaments and armed foroos, end the right to inspect national 
records on military expenditure* As to measures of prevention 
and suppression of violations of the ogroenonts entored into.
%7:
It was piopcsod that ths control organ could only ^akc rec- 
c^aendatlons to the.BoGurity aounoll*(20)
Ihe BovlGt plan wao imacoeptablo tc the Vvesteim Powers* 
Ihere was objection to the control system which it had prop- 
coed on the ground that it would not have oufficient powero 
of i ' ^ction# Ihe United Statoc ineietcd that in&pectlon 
on tne rrouau should be Gupplemented by aerial inoyoction to 
meet the pcoaibility of large acale Gurprioe attacko, a 
matter higuilrhted by ireeldent .icenhower at the Jumnit 
Conférence at Jcneva in July 1955, fhere also opposit­
ion to the Soviet proposal that the control agency ohoulu not 
possess the authr^ty to take any menaures in the event of 
violations of the propdeod diaarmament agreements, other 
than to Qo3:e rocommondatlono to the Security Counoil which 
was gevernoi by the great power veto*(%l)
hogotlationc on a formula for the rof^lation, limitat­
ion and balanood reduction of Efll armed forces all arma- 
mentü wore d o c  greatly complioatod by the fact that there 
wae no kncy/n method of detecting hidden etocke of nuclear 
weapons* flie Boviet Union pointed out in its  ^ay 1955 prop- 
osale that alnoe the production of atomic energ'. for peaceful 
purpooes provided posalbilities for evading intei*netion&l 
control* oecurlty could not bo ensured because the door would 
be open to a potential aggressor to accumulate stooko of 
atomic aad hydrogen bombe for a eurprioo attack, indeed, it 
was r.mtccl Z'ocegrition of this tliat influonoed both the 
vootern PcYmro and the Soviet Union to admit the advisability 
of trying to reach agreement on partial measures of anas 
control or disarmament, as distinct from a comprehensive
general disarmament plan*: Ihis waa demonstrated in the 1955 
and 1957 ooaolono cf. the Bub-Committec of the Disarmament 
Coiamluolon# ooDsietlng of Trance* the povlot Union# the 
United DingCor* the United tctcs nnd Canada. *A11 membore 
of the Fub-Oomnltteo appear to agree on the need to seek a 
partial rathor than a oomprebenGivo agreement,* it wee stated 
in the. Dritioh Foreign .Seorotarv*o Report on thG ,Dl8a%%3ament 
folks to rarliacont.in July 1957, *thct * there lé otlll con­
siderable dlvrigcnoc between the Woctern and Boviet view of 
what a p a r t ia l  ogroement should oontaln*#(22)
In 3\ov('ier 1957 the UTi Aooomhly urged that priority 
ohould bo givan uo onob partial moaauro#* or collateral meas­
ures OS they are ocmotlmoa called, as the immediate suspension 
of tooting of nuclear weapons, the cessation of the production 
of fiaaionoblo matériels for weapons purposes, the reduction 
of armed forces and armaments through adequate safeguard 
arrangements, and the progressive establishment of open 
inspection with ground and aerial components to guard against 
the possibility of surprise ettack*(25) Tut thé only partial 
measure on vdiiioh. agroenent was rcaoheo lor to 1959 the 
Antarctic signed by the Fovlet Union, the United
States, France, the'United Elngdom and eight other powers 
on 1 December 1959, which provided, among other things, for 
the demilitarisation of Antaretioa*(%4)
fho Antarctic freaty laid down that *any neasures of 
a military nature, such as the establishment of military bases 
and fortifiGullonB,thG carrying out of military manoeuvrec,
GO well as the tooting of any type of woapona* should bo 
prohibited in Antarctica, (Article 1) and that *all areas In
Antarctica, Including Inotallatlono and equipment
within those aroco, and all ehipG and aircraft at points of 
discharging or embarking cargoes, or personnel in Antarctica* 
ohonia bo open at.all times to inspection by any observers 
of the contracting parties,(Article VII) Furthermore,
Article VII stipulated that *aorial inepocticn may bo carried 
out at any time over all areas of Antarctica by any .of the 
Contracting harkieo having the right to designate ob&ervere**
vhuuyu Article IV stated that nothing in the Treaty 
involved *r renunciation or diminution by any Contracting 
f&rty cf any basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in 
Antarctica which it may have \'rther as a result of its act­
ivities or those of its n'tionels in Antarctica, or otherwise*, 
it was significant that the centrootirg parties were,prepared 
to relinquish somc measure of their jurisdiction to facilitate 
the work of inspection by the observers designated by any of 
the parties.(Article Vili) It was also stipulated in Article 
XI of thi _r f, which was open for aooGosion by any member 
state of the Dnited Uationc or any other otate Invited %?y 
the contracting parties that *if any dispute arises between 
two or more of the Oontracting Partleo oencmviing the inter­
pretation or application of the present Treaty, those 
Contracting Partiec shall conoult among thenaelveç wj.th a 
view to having the dispute resolved by negotiation, inquiry, 
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial -oettloment or 
other peaceful meaaa of tholr own choice*, and that *any 
dl&pute of this character not so reoolved shall, with tho 
ooDGoat, in each eaoc, of all partleo to the dispute, he 
referred to the International Court of Justice* but failure 
to reach agreement on reference to the International Court
Gbüll not absolve parties to the dispute from the reoponoib-. 
ility of continuing to oeek to resolve it by any of the 
peaceful means referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article*.
Although the Antarctic Treaty wao negotiated outside 
the United Rations# it exemplified the kind of partial or 
collateral cea&ure, involving a diminution of some meaGure 
of doocctlo jnriGdiction over the deployment, of n&tiofial 
military forces and rrca^ente, which the ' ly of the 
United Rations hoped would help to "build the confidence nec— 
eeeary to Zroilitate agreeaont on c oomprehehsive plan of 
disormoment# But though progress towards the conclusion of 
agreonorto on other partiel mereurec was extremely Glow, the 
/s&ccbly impatiently requerted o resumption of negotlatione 
on general disarmament in Uovedher 1959*(%5)
A joint statement iooued by J.J, FeOloy (United Jtates) 
and V*A. Borin (Uoviet Union) on 20 September 1961, during 
the sixteenth GesBicn of the UM Assembly, the outcome of 
many nontho cf dlBCUGGionG* recommended several principles 
ac a basic for new negotiationG on *general and complete dro- 
i:r;,lument * vl^lch# as stated in the t ext# ( 26 ) quot ed belo?^, was 
designed to oh&nre that states would have at their dlGpooal 
only those armed forces and conventional aramente oeeentiai 
for internal order and the Gcourity of their oitiaenB,
1* The goal of negotiatidno ic to achieve agreement on 
a programme which will enouret
(a) disarmament is general end complete and war 
iu no longer an instrument for oettling intcia^t- 
icnal problems, and
(b) That ouch disarmament io accompanied by the oat— 
abliairiont of reliable procedures for the peace­
ful cettlo^ent cf disputes end effective arrange- 
^.ents for the maintenance of peace in accordance 
with the %rincl3 I os of the Oharter of the Dnltec
D a t io n # *
2* Ako for gonorrl orkl oonploto dloarîmamoQt
LCDll cDourc that F-urtoo will ixavo at tholr dlonooctl 
ciiy ortDi nnn-nuclccir opmn'zenvG, foroeo# fmolIltlCG 
cac ccwal liobmauto co oro ogrood to bo nooo$8arv to 
'^ÂriaLçxn intornnl crdor cnd''p3'otcot the %)oroonal 
ruouz^lwy of oJtlxcAG; and tlk;t i)tateo oball DUp;^ )ort 
and piovMo tbo .:frocô C:ei%po'"or for a United Rations 
ponoo iorou.
5# DC one# the progzec2LO for gonoTal end oo/ailoto 
c:riJ:_r;jont ohall oontolzi t!ie uecancsry prcvloloi^o. 
tutj LOo^/aot to the izllltary eut- bllwlmont of ever# 
notion, for;
(a) ypo ClobajiClng of ryziop fcrooo, tuo dlu,,.entllnr 
ef ::d.lltary ortabllc^i'^onta, IncluJlng baooo, the 
Goooaùîon of "uho production of ez'Damonto oo well 
ar their liquidation or oonverGlon to oeaoeful 
uaou; ,:
The oll^'inGtlon ol ail otoclrpllou of aiiaolqar# 
ehe^loalp haotortrlogieul on# other weapons of 
uaow; ûontznotion# and tho ooojnvion of the pro- 
Cnotlon of such uaapono;
(o) who ollnlnetiDn of all aoano of do3.1very of 
woopODo of naoo aoütrüot&on;
(Ü) Fhù abolition of organisation# end institution^
Opglgned to organisé the military effort of Btatos# 
the ci3oa^_on of military training* ond tho oloo- 
ing of all military training Inoti&utloao;
(o) Aho dlcGontinnanoo of military czpendituroo*
4# The diermanont progrnaac ohouW be i:';plommtod in 
an njroad ouquenoo, by o\:ag03, until it io oo:%plotod, 
aoeoure ctege earrled out vd.tîi?n opeo— 
iz^ icl tiao-llcltn. ir— iuitlon tc a oubcequent otage 
In tho preooae of d 1er a.':ament ohculd toke"ij.aoo upon 
a re y le :/ o f the iini^lementatiozf o f mcaoureo Ino luâcâ 
In the prcoodlng utcjo rod upon *") deciolon that all 
ouoh conoureo have been implemented and verified and 
that any additional a?TengOine"ito icqnlrou for noaoui'cc 
in the next oi^  ^ arc, slen appreprlrtu* rcci^ to 
operato,
5# M l noùoures o f gcnoz'ai and oo n p lo te  <3ioeia.ament o h o u l^  
bo belnnoed mo tact at no ctfjgo of Implementation 
of the treaty oould nny itc lo or group of~Ltatoo 
,ain military edvxnknge tliat cocurlty io oxiüureâ 
equally for a l l .
6* Ml^dlav%aL^.^cnt zcnauros ehould bo iaplo^<\:toâ from 
hoglnninr; to m:d under atriot effoctieo intonat- 
iyjii ccnti'ol 05 v/ould provide fiiiz acjiAranoo that 
all partioG are honouring thoir obligr,tioi:o. During
10 of gonoral c \ \ompl#è
clurc'/miopt# tho nost thoi^ ouqh. control olionM bo . 
o . \ . wu Z. tho aakuro apF citent of ouch control.. 
aopondlng the roqui:mno#o for vorlfloatlm of. 
tho diaaœnmant wiu'ourca being c^irrloû out la eaob 
Lt:igo. To Isplonoat control over tho InopcetloD of 
ù:%:r/mcÀLanv, an Intoziaulcocl dlccrj/m:ccl organisât- 
zo:: 1:1 eluding nil paitloo %o tho ogroomcrt cuouM bo 
urcatod witbin the f%a;ro%cri^  of tho united hallona* 
v!hlo lntornatlo;ial dleor:i::;a3Ut orgnnl nation and Ito 
inunootoro chomia bo asonrcf cnrcwDrlotol recous 
alt^ioJt vote to nil plcoeo no neooosoi'^ f fc,r tan 
PuTpocc of effective vérifient1er.
Ÿ* frogrono in dzonimocent nhoulCL bo aooo%pnniod by 
noncnroe to ot3,'ongthoa inotltutionn for maintfjlyflng 
poaco and the settlement of lij^omntionol dicpx^tco 
by moTceful wcana* During and after tlx* Implojamt- 
atioa of tlio progronmc of yenorsl and complete dio- 
there obonld bo token# ocoordonGO 
the prlnciploo of the United Uatlono Olinrtcr* the 
nocoùjaiy coacuree to oainttiln international peace 
ünd oc(r.i3y.ty# inducing the obligation of ütateo to 
;;laoo at the dlcpooal oC tbo Ihiltod Rc;l:icna agreed 
r'Cnpovmr nooocnaiq^ for an peace feroo
to be equipped uitb egrocd type:} o: armroenUo* Arz'#* 
nngnmomtc for t W  use "of thir force dliould cneurc 
that the United Eationo oua cffoctivnly loDor or 
cupproec miy tlircat or ecc of ai:T:G In violation of 
t3uc pnrpoooc and yriuclploe of the vnitod Zzatiem*
8. ütatoe partiolpaving In the nogotlatlozzc ahonlc ooci: 
tc) achiovo implement the wMcct pocniblo agrno­
ne :t at tnj narlicnt posoiblo date# Dfi'orto ctbcull 
oondimc without IntciTaptlon until egrooaont upon 
tko jotnl erogrammo has boom cchlovcap end offcrtG 
to cn:;uro ogrocmmt on n&icl Iriplbaentntlon of
neeutc^cc cf dls%%r%:;azont ohould be w d o3M;cL\cn with­
out projndicltig progrooo on agroociont on the total 
urcjm'cano end in ouch a w y  tSit tZicoe aoaenrou 
uonlu faoilitato mnd form part: of that progrcmzo*
.. It ohouM he noted* hr ever* that on the day timt i 
joint otatcrcnt of prlnolplca waa ioouod to all ncsaboro of 
the ' I" ^ Retiono# a report on an exchange of rlevm b c W m n  
MeOloy amd Borin war olco relcaaed# #iioh Indicated an im%)ort- 
ant dlfforance between tho . oviet Union and the United .Statoo 
on the cuLction of nreancnte control# '3ie .United Statec 
roprcceiitatlvc atated that, in the view of .hla govcrnmcn.t# It 
%;ac *1, >* ^ oit In % e  entire joint Gt^cnont of agreed i^in- 
-cipleB that whenever an agreement etii^latea that at a certain
point oei'tam Ciid nrmaacmto m^ 3y be _
t W  veriiio,ticm ::aqklncTy nusu h?vo all tho'rlgbta mid 
p6W#^ UOVCGC: CJ ' tO WGUro tlUït Ul'COO iCVOlC W.C ZiOt- 0%rC0CuCa* » 
B #  to this tLe ..o dolo.y^ t^o %7ao opposed,. %  maintain# . 
that otrongiy-advcoatlng elfootivo control ovo%' dln*^
mzd wldblng, to facllltato ao mucdi oo possible tW. 
àohiovemcf:! of agreom-zot on this ooni r^ol# tno uc'/io-t Ifnion 
is at th.; cnuc tlno ronolutoly opposed to tim potrbllolcrcnu 
of oontroZ n%for aamnmo;(tr*.(27) Olcarlq;# thi# moant that 
It conlu not bo vcgzircA by the %cz'iilcatlcn o;.Ttom advooatod 
tlio X'CVlst D:il03i rbether the agreed level of particular 
catogoig," cl arxmicmta -"as bcliia observed afbcr a oervain per— 
contago rp tbaao crmamcut# hnT bj^n de^tro^^od* ,3ut It ohoulc 
alGO rc r: R.ai, a sr-jor dlffleulty In
o::ftluF prinol^o that verification - oTiould onouro that not- ' 
cmly ap;reod limitâtloas or roduotlcno ol&oald take rlece, but 
else t%'" 'V rotainqj crf-amanto dll net cxocod agreed lovols at 
;Zf]y et'^ go; :7fX^ t%:oro %.ao no jmoTn oolontlfie method of dvAoot— 
Irg hlddo.: rtcoT'o of nudlear woapcn j# m,<t tre eonverolon of 
airllnora for tlio delivery of euok wo,^p%ic ccmld bo er:;oacod 
wlthmit lenity even If Inopeetion eymton %oro aa
oprritlon*(/r;
nut,:lthvüTaiiing %oao prob^o.,#, the Soviet Union and the. 
W t e e  ntDt(.a went'ehoea the drafting of tz-eatioa o:A 
* general ami eoup3,.ete dloar^iamentMiaood on t3io jo in t  otùtomo3# 
of ogiTood princlpleo# and eubmitted twir draft treaties for 
th e  oonoluerc'tion of the m ghtoon-^m tion moarma^:ent OoaToittoo^ 
(2g ) id ileh  mot In  Gmovc In  1962*.
\\cv:tCv (Lmft ^ I - , . . / I ,^9" ^ ? %
- required tb.iw tug otaboc ptirtlo# to It DWnld carry cut a 
dlBonearj/zat pro;Ta%.:o In tln^eo atagos over a period of five 
yom'o,  ^t::%;0o st%o pro/A^a:mc wcs also propcsod is) t M  . 
United Rtal;ci: d3:"aLt treaty #** Outli^o of
g p y M C?!) - •>.;o Btagea of -Ks-sc .■-•e:a',i eash, snfi îîïç tialrci 
ptago whoso duration UL.nId be w t U l #  wkon the treeLy %%&& 
aignod* /;
' But thouru both the DuttoJ Btetoo Bcvict draft . 
treatloB roeo%iil#od tZnt the lqpl%incntatlon of c dla-
armuaent picgrczzie i-^ cqulrod Inotltutlcio sit bin the fros.cworh 
of the %ito# 7 hit Ion a for control mid Inspection by an inter- 
national. dlqarm'Gmcmt oTg:;^ ito?tiO(i# prooclurec for the pacifie 
^ottlomcmt of dlBpwoo* and t W  ootabliGhmmt of e IMltod 
Rfitlon# poaooWuping force# tZioro wore marhcJ Olffci^noec 
botwoon thorn c m v  the rmcu%it of dommtlc j%?rlodlotlo% that 
c3ic:ild bn surronaornd cnrblo the UuitcCl hnvlono* cr Isct- 
It^ztlona HrFcod to It# to Ir-^ M 'Miq mccoasnrj authority a #  
Btrorgt^^ iy. lTr%to%xnt thol^f o n 031 objoctiv# of gmioral <m& . , 
cou/lato
. Zio 'JnJtol Rtatos draft treaty* unlike the Soviet 
drz!:Tt troatyy laid dorm that voiTlfleatlon proocdiu^oo for the 
rC forcoo a #  araamonts fDiould oloo ennuro
that rw'':''j::cd for03;; and amcaonto shoulA not (m'éood agrood 
levolq ' t \v\y ntajo of the diocrmAmont prooooq* This woe 
otlpulatod in tlX' olasjoa cn loot ion of the International
Dluf'rimr^ont 0:g':alc:tlon*{32) and it wan t^uggootod. that thl^
bD the terzmtcry of a party .
to the trr'Ty into m; agreed of Konos for Inopootlcm*
00 ,thét ore::, a Gone had boéa In^epeotod it would remain open 
for. further Inouectica wWJLe vorifloatlcn was hoing o2rton.âe& 
to oddltlciol c^^o#*(35)
hut the üùvi.et  ^opposod to tho Inbpeotlm of
rea*timlng otoo;;o of ara-czontG at a given otci^ e of OlatKiameat# 
and to Olio r.ornl oyotom eu r rooted by tlie United vtntoD. lA;r3.ag 
'tW debate on # e  draft treatie.s.in/tho Firet Uonmittee of 
the Aasodhly In Dqoonber %D62* the Soviet delegate zmin 
that the ale of the ItilteO Btetos propoeAlo warn to ceoure 
information uaeflil to the ?TTTO intf'lligcaoc nervleeo# w M o h  
would he to oolloot all the pertinent data the
Govlot defenoo c^ystoa loog hofore tho completion of the 
firet Gtago of tlio UG dloamAmmit p3.an and when tlio %jetem 
poworo wore, still tin a mieh etrongor .nilitary position*(34)
. These oeuimtB hy t W  Soviet delegate laid the Soviet 
L^ion opo.1 to the ei'lticlsm* voio# hy the hrltieh dologate^ 
Ih;* J*T. Lo&her* that tac hind of *''r,f«u.#^oneyatem it 
ncvooatoD oenli :ict that IDO;^ #  the atoeh of a o e # a W
cAtoccry of uoApm a been âeatroyoa,(35) ^nt t W  British 
delogE.1,0 did not ;::^ ntion t h #  W m o e  it  ^: Impbsmihle to. dots. 
ozkXLDO neloztifloally whether otocW of zmoioar- woapono# or 
f j LBloRollo catorinl for weapon purpooos# had b o m  ohloldoù 
from deteotlon end dlooovo):?^ ;* there oonld be no aeonranca* 
oven tif the .Unitod s;tateo c^ y'ston of Inspeotlon* that 
agrool l:##a: ç f -nuo3.esr woi^e being oxeeoded through
the eoorot retortion of nndo.ar weapons * AfCcr all* oe etatoê 
OEirller# thlc problot: haH been openly reoosxiiiimd by botli the 
Soviet %ion and the %etern pa;;ere alnoe 1^55. Indeed^ <m.
DBF
-20 Rarok 1997 Dr» RazolC Lüaa&Dn, for the United rtnteo, '^, 
had aoacrted that.*& dialc/al goTorncont cculd cither keep '.- 
a part ef cxlgting atoolù or divert without the knowledge 
of the Inapectors, a quantity'of fleeioaoblo materiel froa 
whlob 20, 40, or.even go multi-mogeton bomb# could be fabric— 
etod» All of this could bo carried or itbout dlGCovery by
inspectera, end without the knowledge of.other rations, until, 
it r r: cc'j lately aooomplished%(56)' rmidea, even if all 
for^B cf ;i]ltsiy dclivmy 8T$teme wei'^  at Gome.
et ago 0 . " FioarmaiBent progremme# olvll aircraft could be 
converted :or nuclear delivery purpoBcs with little poaelbll- 
ity of Ji iooTcry by international InGj^c^tcrG* ae already 
u^ntloncd*
It would appear thet .thoas poBSibllitleg were not dis­
counted in the United Ut&tes draft treaty*: Since it cent— : 
aincd prevision for the establishment of a United Dations 
fcaoc force with. *&ufriolcnt armed foroe& end armament: oo 
that no /trte/oould challenge It**(37) in contrast &o tie 
Soviet pirn for à United Rations Peac^ Foroe with tcontlneentc 
of police (nilltla) equipped with light flrcarm&*(38) whose 
use could bo vetoed by a permanent member of the Security 
Council, It did not rule out the need & Uhitoc ctlonc 
force ctronr enough to deter or coerce a great .power, crmod 
with a secret stock of nuclear weapons, which might violate 
the disnrrcimoat treaty* In fact# the United ut&tea draft 
treaty stipulaIad that *the parties to the Treaty would 
undertake develop arrangements during &tage 1 for the 
eatablichmant In.atage II of a United Ration# leaoo Force,.
To thi% end, the fartlea to the Treaty ^ould agree on the 
following me/.curoo vithln the United Rations : (a) Icmninatloii
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of the QzporlenoG of the United Ratloaa loading to a furthor 
strengthening of United Ratlono foroeo for keeping the peaeo;
(b) Examination of the feasibility of concluding promptly the 
agreements envisaged in Article 45 of the Unitoa Nations 
Charter; (c) Conclusion of an agreement for the establishment 
of a United Rations Peace Force in stage II# including définit' 
ions of its purpose# mission, comp&sition and strength, dis— 
i>ositlon# oommand and control, training, logiotieal support, 
financing, equipamt and armament8\(59) hatei', in stage III, 
*the Parties to the Treaty would progressively strengthen the 
United Rations Peace Torce establishea in stage II until it 
had sufficient armed forces and arnam^ts so ttiat no state 
could challenge lt#*(4
The United States draft treaty also laid down that 
(parties to the Treaty would undertake to ocoopt without res­
ervation, pursuant to Article 36, paragraph (1) of the atatuto 
of the International Court of Justice, the compulsory juris­
diction,of that Court to decide internation 1 legal disputes*; 
(41) th^t they would agree to accept rules of international 
conduct related to dioamment, w h i m  would become effective 
three months after circulation to all parties unless a major­
ity ovod;(42) end that *in the light of the study of
indirect aggression and subversion conducted in stüge I, the 
Parties to the Treaty would agree to arranGGmentc necessary
to assure States against indirect aggression end 8ubversion**(43)
/
It qon be seen, therefore, that the United states scheme
_ .  ^ / required
for *oomple%0 and general disarmament* ^the surrender of &
very large neasuro of domestic jurisdiction to the United
Rations or institutions that might be linked to it# Indeed,
Er* Arthur H* Dean, the United ütates delegate* emphaslGcd 
in the First Committee of the UR Aoeembly In November ISGP, 
that full disarmament would not come until there was & change 
In oxlGtlng practices and iBotltutlêne* a new International 
law had boon built up* and meneuree taken to strengthen the 
United u.ene end its various peacekeeping rolee* in mediat­
ion* conciliation, in observation and in defence ag&lnst 
aggrosGion, The hovlet plan, he asserted* ignored the need 
for Gwoh ohango&*(44) Certainly, it ie difficult to gee ho^ 
a treaty for general and complete disarmament could eneuro 
ooourity to otateo if Its enforcement depended on the kind of 
United Rations force advocated by the Soviet Union* end if 
lie operation was subject to the veto of & great power in 
the Security Council* which wac also InslGted upon by the 
Soviet Union#
It uay be Inferred, therefore* that the terms of the 
United Statco draft treaty which, with the Soviet draft treaty, 
bcvc been the baole for negotlationo on general and complete 
disarmament in the dencva Disarmament Uomôittees since I962* 
(look towc^rd a transfonmtlon of the nation-states into some­
thing approximating a v^orld federal system** as Arthur I*
W&sko# hoe pointed out* *^betever the legal end constitut­
ional arrangements, the existence of & peace force so strong 
that *80 state could challenge It* would be likely to transfer 
the power to make many political declslone from the nations 
to the comple# of world institutions**#*. In cdiitlon* the 
GXlstence of eu oh a poiverful peace force vmula almost cert­
ainly requi^G e&tabli&hment of a highly effective quasi- 
governmental institution to control the peace force itself**(45)
m g
aïo must roadlly admit* however* as- Raukow oniplmalGos* 
*tho unlikelihood of aohlovlnf: ;i,moDg the preoent conflicting 
interests In the world a sufficient political consensus on 
walch to construct either a governmont or a oerlos of %)eac0— 
looping InotltutlonB %9ith quael- ovcmmmtal .authority to 
nonage r large army and aettle political dioputeo between 
natlono*#(46) We have oeen in the prevloua ahapter that oo 
r^r It has only been %)08Gihle to aohleve a political cdnsenous 
wi^nln the dïi%têd Nations in support of the estahliehment of 
poacckeopinj forces W.th very limited fimctlone end* with th ' 
exception of tneir uoo in the Congo rfjriy ## certain ocoas- 
lonu* for nm-cnforoenent action# Such forces have eerved a 
usezul purpose In a world of conflicting Interests, but hear 
little roûeüblance to the kind of Unitoa Nations ic&ce Forco/ 
requlred to make Implomentation of the CaltW Wtates plan for 
general dlGormamezit a x)irooticable promsltlon.
Clearly, the creation of a United Ratlone peaoekeoping 
&orce* equipped with sufficient nuclear and conventional nrxa— 
mentG to deter or coerce a state or group of states that viol­
ated a Bultlla'ueral t on general dloarmoment with the 
purpose of comzziitting cg^Tossion* end without which parties to 
such a t c t could olviously uot he afforded adequate eeour— 
ity# m e t  therofore be regarded as e Utopian concept* This 
being so* It hao to be recogalBcd that it is unrealistic to 
regard gmoral and complete disarmment 06 a oerlous objective 
for the foreseeable future; and that the only practicable 
objectives, in the present context of International politics* 
are partiel or eollateral neosuroe of arms control v/hich* in 
vie% o± the failure to implement the concept of security based
on ^ roat power wsnlnlty under the Charter, may Iielp to 
otabllloe the balenoe of power which Is* as one v.'rltor hao 
stated, (for better or woroe* the operative mechaniom of 
contemporary lh te rn a t im a l p o l l t lo 8 ( * ( 47) Indeed, th le h a s  
been tacitly reoognlsed for some time In the Geneva Dleorma- 
mont Oo:%;lttee8*(48) for since 19G3, when It had been mado 
clear that there was no hope of reconciling the aiffercncoc 
betvmen the Soviet Union and the United States on the quest­
ion of general and complété disairmamont* the negotlatlono In
Geneva have been almost exoluelvcly devoted bo partial or 
'
collateral moasuren#
we ohnll now concider the extent to  ^Rich agreemente on 
partial neaoureB of armo control in the field of nuclear arma- 
nonto have limited the domestic juriodiotlcn of statoo, with 
opeolel reference to the role of the United Kationa*
ThG fIrot of thece ngreemchte — tho Partial Muolear I'eet 
hnn Treatv(49) ^ ^/hich prohibited nuclem; tests in the awiou— 
phere* in outer epaoe* end under water, but not underground, 
was eigned In I^oecow on 5 Auguot ljC5 by the Soviet Union, 
the United Statoo, and the United Ki uo , It gained wide- 
opre&d approval in the United Rations &B8embly,(50) b%i w 
not aoco).'tcd by Prance* Ohlna, not then o member of the 
United Ûationo, began teatlng in the etmoEiphere in 19&4.
Firot, it ohould be noted that thio treaty did not 
require mi Intemationifl oyntem of control and Inspection 
because the tenting of nuclear weapons stipulated in the 
agreement could be verified by external nationally o&ntrollod 
methods,(51) without the need for (on-oite* inspectlone in
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the torrltorieo of GtatoG* which are esoontiel to detect the 
underground teat^u of nuclear wcaponG*(5%)
Secondly# einco It wao stipulated In the treaty that 
*caoh party In exerciolng its national Dovereignty have
the right to %%vWraw from tlie Treaty If it docldco that 
extraordijory events* related to the subject matter of thie 
(_ty, have jeopardised the eupreme Interests of Ito country*# 
(55) its signatories were entitled to claim that the resumpt­
ion of tooting nuclear weapons in the atmosphere^ln outer 
space* and under water vraa a matter within their domeatlo 
jurlBdictien* and thus outside the competenoo of the United 
Rations in accordonce wltli the general principle of non­
intervention under Article 2(7) of the Charter#
Though the treaty has been observed by the United states, 
the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, It has been ignored 
"by Prance &d China, and underground test# of nuclear weapono, 
not covered by the treaty, have been conducted by ell tlio 
Ijuelc-:i' i:Cfi,7orB. Actt tiiowgli under H'ticlo X ot the A i e M w L m  
■feejdiMi[^oaj;i£..a:jdcw^^ Weaig s G^tegtG; Blgnog
by thé Soviet Union and the United States in Boscoiv on 5 July !
1974* ' party undertook *to prohibit, to prevent, and not |
to carry out any underground nuclear wea^xin test having a i
yield exceeding 150 kilotons at any place under its jurlsdlot- I
ion or control, beginning L:arch 51, 1976%. (54) it should be |
appreciated that *the figure of 15G kilotons is still more 
than seven t.. ce the power of the bomb which hit Hiroshima#.#*(55) 
Rorcevor, Article 7(2) of the treaty stipulated that *each 
party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the 
right to withdraw from this treaty if it decides that extra­
ordinary crrents related to the subject matter of thie. treaty
ÎJOV0 jeoparclinea Its ouproEe intorests*.
A similar reservation was Inclwaed in the Outer Bpaoe 
•treaty - . _feinolgloe SovernlHR the Activities of
Jwniii.ujrwrmTiiini.nwMitiniiriiiiB yif.l liM( %-ir#in*
wMce. Inoludin,^  
OthGr pelesW.^ Bodl0s(561 - which waa unomimouo' 
ly OüOpuLu by the UiT AcGembly on 14 Deoember 1966(57) after 
it had (v& j algnod In hondon* Moaoow and Washington* Under 
Arclole iV of this vreaty, which oaiw Into force in January 
I9&7, Btateo partiea to it undertook *oot to place in orbit 
round tno earth any objecte carrying nuclear weapons or any 
other klndo of weapono of maea deetruotlon* install snob weep, 
one on colowtlaz^ bodiea* or etation auch weapons in outer 
opace in any other manner»* But the treaty did not contain 
intomatzonal arrangements for verifying compliance with tbio 
pronioition* though both the United Btateo and the Soviet 
Unim Zmd made provision in tbelr 1962 draft treatleo on 
gencrol and complete diaei%ament for pre-launch inspection of 
all op'"Gi' vohzcloG and mioallea by on intematiqnel disarma— 
ment organisation,(5@)
treaty canning the emplacement of nuole&r 
wcapoBG and other weopoho of naae destruction on the oea bed 
ouvoloe a 1^ ailo coastal &one,(59) which was commended by 
the Uk ^GGOobly in December 1970(60) and entered into force 
on 18 way 1972 %vhen the three Depoeitsiry Govemmaita (USSR, 
Ü&A and UK) dopoalted their instrumenta of ratification, 
contains verification proooduree, unlike the Outer Space 
Treaty, Under Article 11% each party to the treaty baa 
right to veri%^ through observation the aotiviticG of the
Okher partzea, provided that cwoh obeorvation does not infringe 
rights rcoocnlBod under International law, Vorifloation %ay 
ho undertaken by any et&te party welng ite own neane, or with 
the a&wzetaace oi any other state party* or through approp­
riate proOeduroB within the framework of the United Rations 
unu in ^ovorJoüüe with ite Charter; and.complainte concerning 
une.yiozaszon o& the treaty may be referred to the Ueourity 
wouncil, wnzon way take action in accordance with the Charter*
jjiiiC other partial arms control agroemento, to which
reference M e  already been iiiade, however, the Sea hod treaty 
coat ohe domeatic jurisdiction reservation concerning the 
light, 01 a stauo# party to the treot^ ,^ to %vlthdraw from it 
*if iu aocidec that oxtraordlnc!y eventh related to the sub­
ject w&utor of tbia Treaty h&ve jocpurdlBed the aupreme inter- 
osto 06 Ira country*, in such circumstanceo, *lt shall give 
notice of Guoh withdrawal to all other States Partieo to the 
treaty and to the United Dationo Security Council three months 
in aut' jc* 8uch notice Gh&ll include & statement of the 
oxtraoz^dlni^ry evente zt conozLCY'^ . to have jeopardised Its 
GUpromo intGro8t8t*(6l)
The domeatic jurisdiction reservation ig stated in 
preczGCly ü&e oa&o term# in Article K of the Treatv on the
, bucleg^__ NoG^ n a # (62 ) wbiob entored Into 
ioroe on 5 l arch igyo, about two years after it had been 
approved by a large majority/ In the #  A88embly.(65) And eyen:
li it ie esauoed that thio clauoo will not be invoked by any 
ct&ue uhat haa raisifieq the treaty# the fact that several non— 
nuclcar-7';eapon atatec* capable of producing nuclear bomba from 
the by-productG of mclcar reactora designed for peaceful
purponea* have not oven signed the treaty,(64) militates 
against its basic aim of preventing the dpre&d of nuole&r 
weapons# Further attention will bo given to thle qweotioa 
presently, but flret let ua examine the main prbvlolonG of 
tho/tremty* ' x: , '
/^rtiole 1 contains an imuertcblng on the i)art of the 
nuol€or';<7oapon otatoo party to iho treaty, vis, *hot to trmo- 
far to any reolplent ivhntooever nuelo r vmapono or other 
nuoloar explosive devioeo or control over ouch woapono or 
oxploolve dovioeo aireotly, or indirectly; and not in any way 
to aoaiot, enoou: ' o, or induce any nozi-nuolear- o"jX)n Gtate 
to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices, or control over auch weapone or 
exploelvo üevlooG*#
Article II contalnu a reoiproool undertaMrg by non- 
nuclear-weapon otateo. elgnatory tç the treaty, vi%3# »not to 
reoelvo the tranofor from any transferor wlmtooover of nuclear 
weaimns or othor nuclear explosive devices or of control over 
BUch wer pono or exi^oelve devloee directly, or Indirectly; not 
to manufacture or othorMoe acquire nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devicea; and not to seek oriecelve any 
aeelotæoe in the manufacture of nuclear  ^0^ .1 one or other 
nuclear czrploj^ve devlceo»* Gonoequently, each non-nuclear'— 
weapon atate party to the treaty, who io permitted under 
Article IV »to develop research, production end uce of nuclear 
energy for peaceful purpooee without diccriuinstion**.» nnd 
*to participato In the fulloat poBaiblo oxohango of equipment, 
materials {md eolGntifio end technological infonantion* for 
ouch purpceoo, undertaken under /article III * to accept eafe-
guards, as got forth in on agreement to be negotiated and 
concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency In 
accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energs' 
Agency m 3  the Agenoy*G safcguarda cyotem, for the exclusive 
purpose of verification of the fulfilment of Itc obligations 
assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion 
of nuclear energy from peaceful useo to nuclear weapons or 
other nuclear o'^ioslve dovlGe8#,,*(G5)
At the end of the first conference held to review the
ration Treaty, which met in Geneve on 5-50 Alay 1975,
94 states had ratified the treaty, hut 1$ non-nueloar-weapon 
states which had signed had not ratified. Indeed 57 states 
had not even signed, thougli several of these Bon-signatorlos, 
such as Argontina, Brasil# Chile, lerael, lakisten, Saudi- 
Arabla end Npain were oonsiderod capable of becoming nuclear 
powers within the next two yearu.(66)
Wo thus return to the point with v/hioh we began, vis. 
that oven If non-nuclear weapon htatoo which have ratified 
the treaty do not exercise their domestic jurisdiction reser­
vation to wlthdrmrfrom it, there ore several non-nuclear— 
weapon states, which have not signed it, capable of producing 
nuclear v/cepono from the by-products of nuclear reactors usod ! 
for peaceful purposes. The fact is, as aceretary-Genercl 
Ü fhent pointed out before the conolueion of the Uêh-?rollferatioi% 
Ti'oaty, (the dangers of nuclear proliferation are very real 
and very grave, more so than may be generalljp recognised# The | 
use of nuclear reactors produces plutonium wbich# %?hon pro­
cessed in a separation plant, can be used to make nuclear 
weapons by techniques that ore no longer secret* According
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to so#o esulnates, "by 1980 nuclear power reactors throughout 
the world will iiroduoe more then 100 kilogranmea of plutonium 
every day* It lo elwaye possible that cheaper and simpler 
methods of produolng fissionable material may be dleooverod 
and that tnolr availability for warlike purposes' will Inoreoso 
aotronowlcally* The rleko that no%? exist of the further 
spread of nuclear weapcma hold suoh peril for humanity that 
international eafeguardo should.ho ostablished not only over 
nu( le-r power reactors but alee over other nuolosr plante 
which produoe, uoe or process significant quantities of fiea- 
ionable materials*»(67)
fhie question was hi#ilighted in kay lg74, when India, 
who had not olgnod the Ron-lToliferation Ireaty, exploded its 
first nucloar devico# As ono expeit stated: *it has demon- 
strate# that today any government with a modest nuclear 
power progimmmc, a reasonable industriel base, woll-traine# 
oolentistB, an# concerned more with its regional than its 
global position# can cbtaln primitive but highly dangerous 
nuclear rorji^ n^s on the quiet and on i;he cheap* *(68)
In the immediate future, then, it is possible that 
several non^^iuclear^eapon states which have not signed the 
Don-Prollforation Treaty, as well as states that have ratified 
the tr T if they decide to exercise their domestic jurisdict­
ion to wlthdz^aw from It on the ground that extraordlnor;^» events 
have joopardisod their national Interest^ may c^'ark on nuclear 
arms progrcc^oo* . .
There c various reasons why a non-nuclear-weapon 
state may bo tempted to produoe nuclear armaments. It could 
be motivated by the fear that its national security vuld bo
,1 3 2
placed in jeopardy unless it poeoe&sed a nuclear capability 
to deter a hostile state* On the other head, it may regard 
the acquisition of nuclear weapons && a meana of exerting 
preGBure on another state whose national Interests - conflict 
v^lth those of her own# It io possible, too, that a state 
may decide in favour of a nuclear arms programme in the belief 
that it would enhance its prestige and give it greater bar- 
t 'mine pt L_ in international'diplomacy* It is reasonable 
to assume, however, that a non-nuclear-weapon state would be 
glad to refrain from pursuing a nuclear a m m  programme if it 
was more c Inced that ratification of the Bon-Proliforation 
Treaty would give it & greater Gcnse of security.
Unfortunately, several non-nuclG&r-we8pon states are 
reluctant to sign or ratify the Don-rrollferatlon Treaty 
because they are not convinced that it would afford them 
sufficient security* notwithstanding the security assurances
given by the Boviet Union, the United States and the Uiiited
resolution
Kingdom under Gecurity Oouncll^255 of 19 June I966*
This resolution, in line with declarations of intent 
made by the soviet Ublon, the Imltcd States and the United 
Kingdom when the Security Oouncil was considering the matter, (69)
3.# KogorDlKes that aggression with nuclear - c^'pons or 
tne throat of such aggression against a urn-nuclear— 
weapon state would create a situation'in waloh the 
Joourlty \iouAOil, 'md above all ite nuolerr— vei<pon 
Etato permanent : .oribers, would have to act lo;nedlately 
in accordance with their obligations under the United 
Eationa.Charter*
% lc<r:qo the intention exareosed by certain states 
tnat they will provide or support Immediate assist- 
anco, in accordance with the Uhartor, to any nozi- 
nuclcar-woapon Stato Dàrty to the .Tro^ tj' on the Don- 
Proliferation of Ruolear iycapons that la the victim 
of an act or on object of & threat of aggression in 
Yzhioh nuclear v^eapons are used#
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in particular the inherent right, recognisG#
under'Artiole 51 of the Charter, of individual end 
collective self-defence If an armed attack occurs 
agulnct a Member of tbo United Rations, until the 
security Council has taken messurea aeooge&ry to main— 
trin international peace and eocurity*(70)
:r:''ee did not join the throe pciu"nent membere of the 
$eGuriü^ v^unoll that spon&ored the resolution beo&uae it 
took the view that tlie only solution to the nuclenr arno 
menace was tlie ending of the production of nuclear arms and 
the destruction of existing stocks of such weapons, hut it 
promised that it would behave ezaotly as if it wore a party 
to the :TcU".r,oliforation Treaty* Chino/(then a non-nuclear 
power rcpr*;nonted by the Talv^an govomment), Oonada, Denmark, 
Paraguay# uonegal and Ethiopia supported the resolution because
the security asouroncos offered by the USSR, USA and UK seemed
.
the best obtainable in the prevailing situation* But it was 
criticised four non-siucloarw^vmapon states on the Council 
(Algeria, /rasll, Pakistan and India) on the grounds that the 
only real hope of oecurity for non-nuclear—weapon states was 
through nuclear disarmammt, that the security guaranteos of 
the three powers applied only to parties to the Non-ki'oliferatlon 
Treaty* and that ouch' guarantees should apply to all Iclnds of 
aggression, not only aggression with nucleor arms#
At the Conference of Don-Nucleaz'-ofeapon States in Geneva
(Auguot-^Gpteibcr I968)* several states .expresood their doubts
concerning the adequacy of the security assurances given by
resolution
the UJJB, U;A end U: under Security Council;,25$ (1968)# Ceylon,
Ecuador, PW^istan and Syria asked for more specific and jurid­
ical coi%:)itmontG, enslirjjied in a binding treaty or scxne other 
International document* The need for eosuranoea from nuclear
states agalnot conventional nrmaments wan
8l#o stroooGc by many non—nudeor—weapon stases* In fwot# 
the Deolai'TrLlon of the Conforenoe, which embodied the main 
oonoluslono of thé non-nuoleer weapon otatoG, Gtreosed 'the 
Bocessity of further oteps for a& early solution of the question 
of GOcurlty aeauranoes In the nuclear era».(71)
L % study of the etatemente of many non-nuclear- 
væapon ctateo in the Ocnferenoe referred to above end in the 
OR Ao$emhl3f,(72) it would epz^^ar that thooe non-nuolear-^/eapoD 
Btateo, v^Mch have not sliced or ratified tlio Bon-Prollferation 
Treaty, be induced to do eo if the gczieral declaration
of intent under beourlty Goimcil reBolution 255 (1968) ^ere 
converted into a more poeitive commitment and included In 
the treaty itself* in line with the following cuggeotea text: 
'The nuclear-wespOD states, signatory to this treaty, will 
provide immediate aGaistanco tc any non-nuolear-weopon ctate, 
party to this trcatyf, that is a victim of an act or an object 
of a threat of ajyrosslon in which nuclear weapons ere used,
To that end they ill act in accordance with a resolution 
approved by thé Security Gouncll; but if the Security Oounoll 
le prevented from taking action In the event of an a r m w 
attack In which nuclear weaixins are used against a non- 
nuolear-weayon state, the nuclear po%?ero signatory to thle 
treaty -1- provide or support immediate asQiotanoe to that 
state, in accordance .with the Inherezit right, under Article SI 
of the Ch.'rtor, of individual and collective self-defence, 
until thg ccv'ity Oouncil hco taken measures nooosaery to 
maintain international pence and security',
The inclusion of such an article In the ?;on-iroliforation
Treaty, wlileli fnay ’be araendofl -dïKÎei' its Az-ticle VÎ.IX, y;ouM 
provide a more pocitive ccraaittjic-at on the i*nrt of the aueiecsr 
power Bifaaotca-ieo than their eeorrlty aaerranceti under Secur­
ity Council resolution 255 (1968), Since collective defence 
undei' Article 51 ie only permissible In the event of an armeâ 
attBcî: against a state « it does not apply to throatb of agg­
ression - It is difficult to BOB how the nuclear power signat­
ories to the îfoa-ï’roliferation ïrcaty could give a more positive 
comaitmeat than this if they are to abide hy the existing 
terme of the Charter, Sueii a coiasjltoent, however, should 
serve as a powerful deterrent to a potential agereseor with 
nuclear i a.
iiOGlflcs, if the Uon-Sroliferatioi! Treaty is to have a 
laore lasting signiflcoMce, its signatories should recognise 
that the question of n etatc*s withdrawal from It should not 
be a natter within their domestic jurisdiction to which the 
principle of non-intervention by the United nations ie . iic- 
ahle under -rt.lole 2(7) of the Charter, Article x of the 
treaty ahouXû therefore he deleted,
Giwoe the ïreaty on the Hca-l-i'cliferatloa of Huclear 
leapoae is c. c . to sraendraent, tmâ its operation subject to 
review at intervale of five ; e .% from its entry into force 
an 1S70, it is desirable timt its nuclear power signatories, 
particularly the Soviet iV.ion and the United otntes, the two 
super iicwers, should give serious attention to ouch questions. 
They shsulS recogaise that eince the non-proliferation of 
nueloar T/capons is a means of stabilising their preponderance 
of goner, it is imperative that they should make their secur­
ity aBsiiï’DHoeo tc aon-nuolear-weapca states as firm as possible
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and Initiate incven to remove the domestic jurisdiction roc- 
crv&tlon concerning rlthdraral from the treaty,
^oreovor, since the non-nuole^r-weapon statoG, partico 
to the won^croliforatlon treaty, have aocoftod a Bclf-denylng 
ordinance hot to.acquire nuclear armu* they have the right to 
expect that the nuclear posera, parties to the treaty, ohould 
%ake a %. u utlarmined effort to put an end to their nuclear 
eraa race, in ^CLrdanco ^ith their plod&c under Article VI 
of the treaty*
though the Waited ütates and the soviet hnion reached 
ogrecm^t in July 1974 to limit the deployment of anti- 
ballistic QlBeiles to one apiece in their tGrritorie8*(73) 
their Strategic Arma limitation falka on auoh strategic nucl­
ear woaponB &o lana-haeed inter-oontinontol ballistic mis&ilGG 
and auhaariaowl&unched ballistic mieBlleB, have achieved 
little. At Vl&divoGtok in Boveahor 1974 they agreed to 
permit thepselvoB 2,400 nuclear delivery ay&temB, 1*520 of 
which n* t be equipped with multiple independently target­
ed reentry vehiclee (M1&VS)*(74) and the slow pace of their 
negotiatlone to reduce these enormously high *OGiliBgs* in 
Bubaequeht SAhf taka have dismayed the non-nuclear—weapon 
p&rtlGB to the ^oa-Proliferatioh Treaty* CVs)
Greater progress by the two super powers towards achiev­
ing significant agrGencntB on strategic arms limitation would 
certainly help to produce a better atmosphere for the implem­
entation of the hon-ProllferatloB Treaty, So, too, would the 
signing and ^^tificatloh of the treaty by Prance and China, 
for without the cooperation of these states the Security
Council cannot act In aocorcrnoe with the principle of groat 
power unanimity tc prevent srull-or mlddle-slRod powers from 
engaging in conflicts that 'i/ht Involve the use of nuclear 
weapons in the future, if the policy of non-proliferation 
does not succeed*
It la to be regrettei that China and France have hot 
sianed the Oonvouticn bn the Prohibition of the Development* 
Production; and ..tGcjzpllin^ of bactériologie^ 
and" Toxin ..ocGonc and on their Destruction, (76) "which wan 
BiC/iod in londcn, Mouco' " ,a ',;aohlngton on 10 April 1972* 
after being cojmcnded by the ÜÎ: ÂGcembly In 1971^ Thin 
treaty, ivblch at the end of 1973 had been signed by 110 
states ana ratified by 30,(77) wan an important step towards 
the elimination of existing biological weapons,
àihe the Treaty o# the ^on-lroliferotlon of huola&r 
Weapono, this Convention on biological tveapoos makes previs­
ion for the intervention of the Security Council of the 
nnlted t:atlono in ease of violations of Its terms* Article 
VI.stipulâtéai.
(1) Any btnte Party to this Convention vdiicl:! finds that 
any other State farty le acting In breach of oblig- 
atlona deriving from the provielono of the Convent­
ion any lodge a complaint with the Security Council 
of the United hatione* Ouch a complaint should 
include all pocelblc evidence confimlng its valid— - 
ity, 08 v;ell'as a request for Ito consideration by 
thé Security Council.
(2) Each State fmrty to this Go.uvontion undertakes to 
oo-opcraLo in carrying out any Investigation which
Security Council may initiate, in accordance 
wita tho provisions of the Charter of the United 
%at]030, cn the basis' of the complaint received, 
by the Gotmoll* The Security Council shall inform 
the üt&tes Parties to the Convention of the résulta 
of the investigation*
Article VIII states;
Each Tarty tc the Convention undertake# to provide
or aGBlotanoe, In accordance with the United
Uatlonc Charter, to any Party to the Convention which 
80 rczoeetG* if the Security Council decldoB that ouch 
Party h?s been exposed to danger ee a recuit of the viol* 
ation of the Convention*
It can be &een that corplaintB about vlol&tione of the
t . .
Convention would have to go to the Becurlty Oouncil, so that 
it would be nooaible for & perronent member of that body to 
veto in%^eotlgation of any complaint, Hie great power veto 
could el&D be used to prevent aBoietanoe to a party expoood 
to danger æ  a result of a violation of the Convention, which 
underlines the need for the collBboration of France and Cliina 
in this, B8 in other partial e œ e  control or disarmament 
treaties;* Unfortunately, China appear# to resent the dominant 
pooltion of the two ouper powcre and ha& opted out of the 
efforto being made to secure agreement on partial measures of 
arms control and dlsarriamcnt, Eind France, unwilling to part­
icipate In the Oonferenoe of the Connlttee on Mcarmament In 
Geneva, will not become involved In agreements that ; 
from negotiations.in that Committee,^
As In other treaties on partial measures of arms con- 
trol and dlearmonentthat hove been referred to in thlo 
chapter, the domestic jurisdiction reoe3."vation on wlthdrovml, 
if a state decides that *e:ctraordina.ry events, relotod to the 
subject zrttcr of the treaty , have jeopardised the supreme 
interesto of its country*, is contained in Article XIII of 
the Blolor t^l Teapons Convention, Consequently, Its implem­
entation is bosed on the assumption that states i^artles to it 
will not invoke that clause*
AG yet, agreement on & convention on the prohibition 
of the development, production and otockpiling of chemical 
weapons, and the elimination of exletlng eupplicc of ouch 
weeponG, has not been, attained by the Conference of the 
Ooimittee on Dienrmoment* The devolo^ent of chemical weap­
ons ie far more advanced than biological weapone* and several 
states* including the United States and the United Kingdom, 
are )iot prepared to accept o draft convention presentod by 
the Soviet Union* which followed elmoat exactly the terme of 
the Biological \eoponB Convention, Thle io because the 
Soviet Union has not been prepared to accept a system of 
strict international verification to ensure that the terms 
of such a treaty would not ice violated, Thus 1^# David 
jZnnals* for the United Kingdom, argued on 9 July 1974, that 
since - * chemical ' weapons are of considerable military ' Import— 
ance,.*a State which possessed them would have a potential 
rdlitery ouvantago ovez" a State which did net. Any State 
which'connits itself to renounce OW under an international 
agreement be satisfied that other States would not be
able to contravene that agreement* & comprehensive prohib­
ition which did not cater for the need of the signatories to 
be assured of other Utatee* compliance would bring risks of 
military instability and might hove results of the utmost 
grsTlt^ '', (7B)
It should be noted, however, that tho communique issued 
by the Soviet Union and the United ütatcs on 3 July 1974, 
stated that *both sides reaffirmed their.interest in an effect­
ive international agreement which would exclude from the 
areonole of states such dengerous instruments of mass destfuct—
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ion ae chemical weapono# Desiring to contribute to early
progre&D In tbia direction, the UüA and the UdoR agrocd to
ooAGldor a joint Inltlatlvo In the Conference of tbo Committee
a
0% Dloarmameat with reopect to the conclusion, ao^fir&t step* 
o f  on In te rn a t io n a l conven tion  d e a lin g  w ith  the  most dangcTouo, 
lethal _ci:n (f " .onl aorfare**(79)
Ooncli: __
The h is to r y  o f  th e  Umltod M ations hao ohown th a t  i t  h&e 
o n ly  been p o e a ib le  to  ach ieve & p o l i t i c a l  conGonsus In  support 
o f  peacekeeping foroOG w ith  l im ite d  fu n o tlo n e , which hoar 
l i t t l e  recemblanoe to  th e  k in d  o f  U n ited  R a tions  Beace Force 
th a t  would he neceocaiy to  e n fo rce  a trea % f p ro v id in g  f o r  
la rg o  ooa lc ge ne ra l disarmament* Rven I f *  under ouch a t re a ty *  
G tateo wore p e rm itte d  to  r e ta in  o n ly  l im ite d  armed fo ro e a  w ith  
light i'ii^ oarms to maintain internal order* a very powerful. 
U n ited a a t ic n c  fo rc e  would s t i l l  be re q u ire d  because i t  W o 
n o t been p o s s ib le  to  devise  an e f fe c t iv e  oyote^ o f  in te r n a t io n a l 
in s p e c tio n  to  d e te c t h idden o tocko o f  n u c le a r weapone, w h ich 
cou ld  bo used by a p o tm it io l  aggi'ccoor# *Rhat . in  in e x o ra b ly  
o e r ts in ,*  as M ir  M ichae l l^ r ig h t*  th o  le a d e r o f  t W  B r i t i s h  
d e le g a tio n  to  th e  Genova Disarmament OonferenoeG from  1939 
to 1963* aoGorted; ^io that a pOiC'-^ceeplng force of the . 
kind 80 far advocated by tho Mcvlot Union, competed of national' 
contingents and with no Integrated International Gtructui^^
YJlth a veto at .the troikaoxnmand level, a veto in the Security 
Council upon its use* and debarred In advance from posoe&Glng 
any nuclear vo%iCn8, would bo wholly ineffective,*(80)
Mir Michael Wriglit hue pointed out that *on tho face of 
it there arc at least three pooeible alternatives to leaving
to the Meeurlty Council, as at present constituted and with 
Itc preoent voting Gyatem, the power to use and diroot a 
poaoG-keoplng force in a dlaarmad world, The first is to 
amend tho Charter so that in this context the Security Council 
coula take a decision by a two—thlrda or conceivably a majority 
vote, %sithout the power of veto for any state. Tho oeoo&d 
possibility is to place the roeponolbllity upon tho 
Assembly, pmrhaps by a two-thirds This again would pre­
sumably involve ammdmont of the Charter since it would mean 
giving to the Aeeembly responoibilitles placed by the Charter 
on tho Security Ooimcll. The third alternative would be to 
agree upon some specially constituted body. This would entail 
by-passing the osloting provisions of the United Bâtions 
Oharter mid perhapo even the U*B. u nation altogether* .(61)
j  ' that^  :
DUG it &aa VO bo recognised, as he has emphasised, A*thG United 
tjtates ena uhe bnlted Kingdom h&ve shotm themselves willing 
to explore the various possibilities involved, while the 
bovaot Union nae so I'ar set its face %'egldly agilziat any amend— 
mOnt of the Chai'ter, or any by-passing of the Charter which 
would involve the abolition or the weakening of t%ie Soviet 
power of veto* fet without agreamoht on precisely this, the 
whole concept of general tmd complete disarmmaent carried out 
in three ooneecutlvo and uninterrupted stagaa is most unlikely 
to be reall&cd, and it 1# wiGleadlng to pretend otherwiae*.(06)
In brief, then, great power agreemont on the moans of 
transforming the United RationB into a i^olltical Institution 
with sufficient powers to control a pcaoekco%)lng force oo 
ctrong that no state could challenge it, ae loroposed in tlie 
United Mtatea 1962 draft treaty on general and complete die—
Jand without which the %}ortloB to such a treaty 
could not he afforded adequate security* must bo regarded &8 
outside the range of practical politico. Consequently, large 
scale general dieer&ament must be GoneidGred a remote object­
ive, and it is BonGible to recognise that the only practicable 
obj ectiveo that can be envisaged ore partiel meeeurea of arms 
co23trol and disarmament. Indeed, t M e  has been tacitly reoog- 
nieed by tho u. . Aaeei:][bly, end thc/diaarmament ëommfttecs 
linked to it, for the past decade, eince negotiations in 
(rcneva during this period haire been devoted almost exclusively 
to partial measures*. ..
Under some of the agreements which have been concluded, 
the United Ratio&B Security Council, or institutions linked 
to tho united Rations, have boon given the competence to 
exorcise certain powcra, though In oil tho treaties which 
have come into force, states parties to them can still czer- 
qiso their domestic jurisdiction to withdraw from them if 
they.dcoluo tnat their national interests are jeopardised*
This is a basic weakness 1 uuOh agreements, and particularly 
GO in the important Treaty on the Z^on-Prpliforation of Ruclear 
aoapono, for not only does it give a loophole to any non- 
nuclear—Joauon state, party to It, to embark on a nuclear 
arms progra^mne if it decides that its national interest dict­
ât os such a course of action, but fiLso provides a means for 
any nuclear qicwer, party to the tz'caty, to evade Its obligat­
ion not to transfer nuclear weapons to a non-nuclear.^feapon 
stato or to assist th&t state in the manufacture of such 
weapons» It ie desirable, therefore, that the domestic juris­
diction reservation on withdrawal from the treaty should be 
deleted*
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aluo important that tho security assurancco under 
^ecurioy vcaocll resolution 233(196%) should ho included in 
tho Bon-Prollforatlon Treaty itaolf in order to inapire con­
fidence that great power protection would he forthcoming to 
non—nucioai'wf.,or.jjon state# In the event of aggression with 
aucrear or the throat of on oh 2 ion# This Rtay helh
t,o inuuco non-nucloer—9/oapon ctatoa, who have not ratif—
not
lea the treaty, or^entered into agreements vdlth the International 
Atomic Rner^^ -%enoy on oafeguarde,to take auoh atope*
rfiie 1 ' .LjuEzrue ngreenemte belAveen the International 
Aiîomio imergy Agency end non^^mclear-weapon otatee, portion 
to vho iron—iToliicraipion Treaty on Ruclear bea%)on8, which 
involve %no ueo of the Ag0noy*o Inophotore to verify whether 
ouch agreeaenta are boii:ig compiled with, may well oerve &B 
a pattern lor verification proceduree In other posalblo arms 
con vroz agu/ooaonto# . Gertainiy* the oorvicoG of on internat— 
ional agenqy would be neoeaoory to negotiate r ""c'U 'rdo agree- 
mente wrtn partioa to a comrentlon on chemical Y/Ga%)ono, end 
onoh 'I ""oo^onto ehould provzlde that otatoe take the neoessary 
etepe vo monre that the international agcney^s Inapeotors 
could effectively dicohf n bheir functlcnc* Only In this 
way would zt oe poeciblc fo^ - the Security Oonnoil to have 
reliablo i,-or .at ion on ovanlono mid violations of the con­
vention»
Or oourec, the limited moves to detente between the 
soviet union and the United Rtaten have made possible the 
partial arms control treaties whicli have hitherto been eon- 
eluded, fznd there must be a fui^thcr oaolng of tenolon if 
tneae agreements ere to bo improved end now agreemente entered
into* Moro&var* It la ooGontlol that JFlna and France ohowld 
be parties to them and actively intorccted in their implomc&t* 
ation\ Ihelr oo—operation muBt be forthcoming if wo ere to 
80Ù the reoliG&tian of th&t limited, form of collective eee- 
uritj, baaed on the unanimity of the permanent nembore of 
the .k/oourity Coiaicll, which the archltocto of the Charter 
regarded a# the framework for the regulation and reduction of 
national tto.
'■ni.
* " %* -® * ■î->' *> % J W  #i,- -.* <f y i » aj.* .* %. * •‘^-^-î <
TC luw rRinaïrib:
.me..06ia.w8'i;«mc<> of tfao Ui« «oà itg.i;»B0lalieea..4Kg30les
âa.,aaej:iPiasa2£î„ycciiil
&t the Gan Francisco Conferenco 1# 1943 It woa agreed 
th&t mombor-statcG of the United Rations should pledge them- 
selves to take joint and separata action, In co-operation with 
the Organisation, to promote higher standards of living, full 
employment, and conditions of economic and ooclol progreoe 
and development. (1) This did not mean that member—stai^c; were 
required to accept InternationRl legal obligations which would 
have removed matters in the eoonoialo and social fields from 
their domestic jurisdiction. In fact, in order to dispel 
doubts about this, tho members of Committee ti(3) of the Uoa 
Francisco Confcrouoe declared that nothing contained in 
Chapter IX of the Charter (International Economic and Goclal 
Co-operation) or in Chapter % (The Economic and Uoolal Council) 
could be construed as giving authority to the United Rations 
to inter\ in the domestic affairs of membor-8tatee;(P) i, 
as explained earlier,(3) it was decided at Bon Francisco that 
in ordez* to safeguard member-states from any foivi of UR inter­
ference in thoir economic and social policies, the principle 
of non-intervention in matters essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of states should bo included as Article 2(7) of 
the Charter* Moreover, under the exception to the general 
principle of non-intervention laid down in Article 2(7), the 
competence of the beourity Council was restricted to authoris­
ing enforcement measures to maintain or restore international 
peace and security if it determined that the situation arising 
out of the economic or social policy of a state,- or any other 
matter essmtlolly witMn Its domestic jurisdiction, constituted
0 tnroat to the peace, .breach of the peace* or act of 
rooGlon*
There hag been cono controversy over the question 
whether the ooGte of the operations In theesonomlo and 
Boclal flDlds mny be oqnoldored expenses of the Orgonleatlon 
under Article 17 of the Oharter* and thus subject to binding 
apportic. Cat by tho Assembly, th^ organ empowered to consider 
and approve the bh budget.(4) In practice, however, the 
^;or aotivitloe of the UN In the economic and social fields 
jmve been financed from the voluntaiy contributions of member- 
states, a Scatter which will bo ref erred to later in this 
chapter* , - -
Tnc oospetenoo of tho Assembly, the organ vested wivh
tno main raoponsibllity for promoting international economio 
and social co-operation under Artiolo 60 of the Oharber, in 
w m c ü  eaoh otauo has one vote and whose deoiolono on oubstont— 
ivc mattera are errivod at by a simple majority or a two- 
thirds majority according to the importance of the question,(5) 
is limited under Article 15 to initiating studios and making 
non—mundatozy reooireendatlons on economio and social mattero 
over which Ul; membero have legislative powers. Ho reference 
IS made in the Article to whom the Assembly*s recommendations 
may be made, .but in the light of the discussions In Committee 
l/l 01 %ae Dan frtincisco Conference^ it would appear that 
those wao (iraited the principle of non-intervention in matters 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of states did not 
Invena vhai; vno Asseiably should be competent to make recommend— 
étions..on economic and social matters that would cause embarr— 
aBsmeot to particular states* Recommendations addreGscd to 
Un membor—stateo in general, to promote IntematloDal eGonomle
and social oo-oporatlan, were the kind apparently GnviB&ged+(6)
Under article 62 of the Charter, tho Economic and Docial 
Council, which iB designed to promote economic cad social wel­
fare under the authority of the Assembly, and to arrive at 
ito deoielcno by a majority of memberc preaont and voting,(7) 
with eaon n:<':u^ r having one vote, (8) has the authority to 
make or initiate otudicn and reporte with reepeot to 
ional ecnnf. .ic, aocioli cultural, educational, health, and 
related matt era: to mEd:e reocmmendatloDG with respect to Buy 
ouch mattera to the Aanembly, to the members of tho United 
hationc and to the opeclalleed agencies concerned^ to make 
recommendations for the purpooe of promoting respect for, 
and oboervanee of, human rlghte and fundemontril freedoim for 
all: to prepare draft oonventiona for aubmiosion to the /og- 
ombly, with reapeot to natters falling within ite oompetenoe; 
eid to call, in accordenoe %9ith the ruleo prescribed by the 
United Rations, international'conferences .on nattero felling 
within ite competence#
The queotion of t W  ^conoimLo and Boaiol Oounolire 
oompetenoG to mnlco reooiaiziendationo for tho pur^iose of promot­
ing respect for, m d  obccrvonCQ of, human rigito. and funda- 
mental frecdoioo for all, ac well as uR praetloe in that field, 
was ' dioGUoaqd In a previous chapto%\ (9 ) But two pointe need 
to be mentioned concerning matter# connected with Article 6P,
i'irét, unlike Article 15, which does not state to v/hom 
the Assembly moy malce recommendations on economic, social and 
related matters, Article 62 stipulates that recommendations on 
such matters may be made not only to the Assembly and special- 
ieed agencies, but also to meriber-states of the United Mations#
This presumably implies that recommendations may be addressed- 
by the Boanoaio and Mcclal Council to particular ctotnw, but 
in tho light of the dlGcuGBlons that led to the formulation 
of Article 2(7) of the Charter at fan frnnciaoo, ouch renoms- 
endatlono would not he permloelhle if they wore intended an a 
censure on a staters economic or social policies. Meoonaiy, 
the aeooptence by otate# of International legal obligations 
under conventlona drawn up by the Boonomio and Social Council, 
and opproved by the Assembly, depend# upon thuir ratification 
of each conventions, in conoonnnce with the prlnciidLe of con- 
oent, otherwise the prinelplo of non-intervention in matters 
essentially within their domestic jwriodlotion would be con­
travened*
ibo obligations accepted by menber-otatoo of the variouo 
üpeolallsGd agencies which have been brought Into relationship 
with the United Nations, in accordance with Article# 37 and 65 
of the Charter, are also baaed on the principle of consent* 
since these agencies are the products of multilateral treaties 
to which etatoo arc not (llzged to be parties*(10) The deeis— 
ions ti  ^ by the organs oi ouch inter-govei'nmentnl Institut- 
lone, some of which may be binding on their members under 
* 'oed constitutional procedures, do not, therefore, conflict 
with the TTinciple of non-intervention essentially thin the 
domestic jurisdiction of states,
Under Article 65(2) of the Charter the Economic and 
Coclal Council is empowered to 'co-ordinate the activities 
cf the specialised agonoles tlirongh conoultation with azid 
recoimendatlonc -to ecoh agencies and through recoimendationo 
to the General Aoeembly and to the Membore of the United
Rntlnns*. In brief, then, *thc United Motion# wos committed 
to the concept of a "hnb^ organisation and a group of auton- 
omcUB "MpoolollBCd IgencioB", looking to tho United Rations 
proper for co-ordination and guid&noe but enjoying GBoenti&l 
freedom of motion in thoir respective fieldG**(ll)
5^ a greater or Icaoer extent the cpoGlelisod agencies, 
which have been brought Into irelatlona^ilp with the United 
Hat ions through apeoial agreemente under Article 65 of tlm 
 ^ o'ter, pGsuime more effootivo jwwere than the eoBontlally 
recommendatory^ competence of the United Uationo Aoocmbl^' end 
tho Economic and Goolel Council, (12) and the fcllowing examples 
indicate the limitations on the domestic-jurisdiction of states 
which membership of come of theee lactltutlons entoila#
Dome opeolellGod agencien, ouch ac the orld health 
Organisation (-kO)$ have the authority to looue regulationo 
of a m^idatory character which give them, in effect, a legis­
lative function* For instance, under Article 21 of WUO'o 
conetiuUviu^, the health Assembly of that f[o cy has the 
power to adopt regulations ooncemlzig smiitary quarantine 
require:.lOots and other procedures to prevent the international 
npread of diaeaao. fheae regulations are binding on nombcrs 
after due notice has been given of thoir . adoption by tho aoulth 
Aeeembly,- except for such nombera os may notify the Director- 
General of rejection or reservations within the period stated 
in tho notice, as laid down in Article 2U*(15) Despite tho 
fact that mvi.bors may opt out of the regulations concerned, 
it io Btlll ^craiasible-to refer to them as mandatory regulat­
ions, end it may be asserted that 'to attribute to international 
organo power to take regulatory notion of mandatory character
Is to invest them In effect with legiGlativo functions, an# .. 
to run counter to the principle of otato sovereignty**(14)
Under ita /irtlcles of Agree:r^ ent w M o h  v/ero drawn up at 
Bretton %oo&e In 1944,(15) the International Monetary Fund 
#ae given a olgnlfle&nt role to promote exchange Bt&bility 
^6. to melntoln ordez'ly exchange nr:<ii'gfaamtG ,S2;ong its 
Bembera*
It vn# stipulated in Article IV of tho Articles of 
Agreement that eaoh member undertook to establish end melntiriln 
on agreed %mr value for its ourrenoy and. to consult the Fund 
on ^my ohonge in exceso of 10 per cent of the initial parity; 
and under Article III It was laid down that the Gubscription 
of each lïiombor, payable partly in gold and partly in tho 
member*# own currency, would be equal to mi ascigned quote, 
thot would dot ermine i ts voting power and the amount of foroigi^ 
exchmigo that oould be drawn from the Fund %vhon faced by temp­
orary bolmico of payncmto dlfficultioa* But at various stages 
in the history of tholfund, reviews of the memboro* quotas 
have led to gcnoraCL and selective lncroa.Bea In oubocriptj.onOg 
 ^vm'ious expedients h^ ive imcn used to provide additional 
rcoourcee for member# in temporary balance of pa^^mento dlffic— 
ultl0a*(l5) Moreover, 'hardly a olngle rule created by tho 
Fund at ; rcttor tVoode a^ id rUM;or for governing interzictional
be
monetary : tX.wvlour 3ioe not had tOy^ohongod or bent in oome 
degree during the Fund's career #8 an organisation for rule 
cupervision* «,(17 ) ^cr Inotanco, the Fund has had to allow 
mcfubero with no par values to use its resources, mid to toler­
ate fluctuating or 'floating* exchange rntos*(lO)
MoTartholeen, It nuot be appreciated that in accepting 
the Article# of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund# 
its ncmber-stntcs may be faced with significant limitation# 
of their dcwLctiC jariodictien ever monetary matter# provided 
the procedureG Inid down in the cnnctitntion are followed* 
_!<cle ( ction otipulaton that 'the board of Govern- 
ore, and The 'xrcntive Directors to the extent anthoriBod, nay 
adopt , ,end rogulntlcns ae nay he ncceooary or .app­
ropriate to condnot the huBinooc of the fund** and undor 
Artlolf \ (Section Pa) 'if a member falle to fulfil any of 
itB oblii akiono under thin Agreement, the r\*nd may declare the 
member incAfgl le to uoo the resources of the Fimd% Furthor- 
more# under Artiole XVllI(a), 'a^y question of interpretation 
of the provisions of thic Agreement arising between any member 
end the Fund or between any Memboro of the Fund shall be sub­
mitted to the Executive..Directors for their decision*»,^*; and 
under (b) of the onae article, *ln any caoe whore the Exeout- 
lye Directors have given a deoiaion under (a) above# any 
member mpiy reouiz^e that the qneatlon be referred to tho :Mosrd 
of Govomora* whoac dooislon shall bo final*,,.' Indeed, 
under Article XV (deetion 2b) & member nay bo roquired to 
withdraw from membership In tho fund by à decision of the 
hoard of Governors which, like tho Board of Executive Direct­
ors* is » powered to operate in aocorda&oc with the oyotcn of 
weighted voting and thue provider the largest contributors to 
tho Fund a proportionate influence over the policy of the 
crgcnieetion#
Under an amendment to the Articles of Agroomnnt, which 
was approved by the IMF's Board of .Governors 1#. I968, It wae ÿ 
agreed to ootablish dpooial Drawing Rights In the Fund# (19)
Tbeoe Dpeolal Drawing Lin (üDRo) wero a form of internat­
ional currency which could be u&ed by otatee in nettling 
balance of payaentB deficits &o a substitute for gold, for 
the aup&ly of goldÿ relative to the monetary needs of states# 
had declined, and it was recognised that the expansion of 
credit through this means was nooescary#
Theflrst allocation of equivalent to 3#3 billion 
dollars was made to 104 participants in the Special DravJing 
Account on 1 Jonuarz^ 1970# when their valuation was based on 
gold at the rate of #888671 grains per SDR# later their valu­
ation was defined as a basket of the 16 GurrGnciG& of countries 
that did 1 per cent or more of world trade*
It should be noted that the introduction of those Dpeo- 
lal Drawing Rights increased the quotas of the members of the 
International Monetary fund without any additional suhsoript- 
ion either in gold or In national ourrenoles# but the decision 
by the J , regarding the allocation and sise of UDRs required 
m  83/ majority of voting power of the participating states* 
Moreover, of special importance was the fact that with the 
allocation of DDRs by the International Monetary Bund# the 
total stock of international roserveo as well as its rote of 
growth reflected 'deliberate international decisions*# rat e 
than their determination 'solely by the availability of gold 
for official reserves and the accumulation of reserve currenc­
ies*. (20) Indec!^, if' January 1976# the Intcr-ministeriol 
commit toe of the I agreed at Kingston# Jamaica, to end the 
official role of gold in the IMP and its replacement at the 
centre of the monetary system by the Special drawing right*(21)
The International Bank for Beconotruotlon and Develop­
ment (lUaD)# whOBO Artlolea of Agroemont#(22) like thooe of 
the In to m a tlo n o l Tonotmiy Bund# wore form ulated a t Bretton  
'Foods in 1944# woo eotg^llahod# oa otatod In Article 1;
to eoclüt in the reoonotructlon and development of 
territories of mombero by faollitatlng the Investment 
of capital for produotlve purpoooo# Including the res- 
tor;:tlen of eoonomioe destroyed cr dleruptcd by war# 
the reconversion of productive facllltlcD to peacetime 
neoda and the onGcur&gonont of the development of pro* 
ductivo facilities and resources in leas developed 
countrloG*
to promote priyate foreign Inveotmmt by meane of guar# 
mitcea or participations in loano and other Inveotmonto
invGOtmont by providing# on suitable conditions# finance 
for productive purpooeu out of Its own capital# fundo 
reload by it and ite ether reoeurcea*
In brief# the International %%onk obtainG its financial 
reoourcGG from the oubsorlptlona of Its membcr-statee# from 
borrowings in the capital aarkete of the world# end from the 
eorningG that it Goguiree from its lending: operations* QO 
explained in Articles II* III and IV* It is authorieed to 
msl:e lomo to any member-state* or any political division 
thereof* and any bualnesa* industrial* and agricultural enter—
priao in the territories of a member, when it is 'eatisfied
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in the prevailing market conditiana the borrower would 
be unable otherv ice to obtain the loan under conditionr i^A.oh 
in the opinion of the Dank are reoaomible for the borrovfor** 
and subject to other conditions stipulated In Article III 
(Deotion 4)*
Voting righto of the menber-otatoe are related to their 
subBorlptiono to the capital stock of the Ui* as etlpulotod 
In Article V (Section 4}* and under Article V (Deotlon 2),
' the Board of Govomoro# the %ooutive mreotcro to tho 
extent authoriood, may adopt euch ruleo and regulctlono as 
mey he neoeooary or appropriate to conduct tho huolnoos of 
the Bank*# Moreover/under Article IK the Board of Governors 
ha$ tho '^rht of final deoloion in respect of any quootlon of 
Interprotatlon of the Articles of Agreement heWeen any nemhor 
end the Benlt or hotween any memhers of the Bank* and this 
applleo to its affiliates# the Intematicnal Plnenoe Corporat­
ion (IPO) and the International Development Aeeocletlon (IDA)# 
to which reforenoe will be &ade later in this chapter* The 
organs of theoe agenciez thwe possess the competence to make 
deoiaione tliat are legally binding; (2)) end under Article VI* 
Section 2* 'If a nembor fails to fulfil any of its obligations 
to the Bank# the Ban): nay suspend its membership by decision 
of a majority of the Goveimors* ezerclBlng e majority of the 
total voting power*#
Prom these examples Illustrating some of the powers of 
opeololineO agencies in the economic and social fields, it can 
be seen that several of these inetitutions were designed to 
operate under oonetltutions ivhich Invested them with greater 
authority than the essentially recornmondatory competence OD 
tho (T  ^sembly and Iconcmic end Social Oouncil# Clearly, 
whilst the goaeral principle of non-intervention in matters 
-.essentially .within the domestic jurisdiction of states-was 
Included in the Charter to prohibit the Assembly cmd the Boon- 
cmic and Dooiel Council from Wring binding decisions on econ­
omic and 0001 al mattors* it was nevertheless recognised in the 
Oharter that it was deeirable for Its statc-sig^atorios to co­
operate in autonomous grncies which miÿit possess the compet­
ence to take mandatory decisions tc enable the process of
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international economic and social oo-oporetlon to bo conducted 
more effectively# Of course, Ginoe the obllgatlono accepted 
by otatoo through tho membership of such agenoiOB had to 
depend on their ratification of multilateral treaties, in 
accordance with the principle of consent, they had no reason- 
to complain that any limitationo of their domestic jurisdict­
ion as members of such institutions would conflict v/ith the 
principle of Don-interventicn under Article 2(7) of the 
Oharter*
It ehould be appreciated that the legal obligations of 
member-states of some cpeciollsed agencicG are considerably 
more limited than those assumed by etatee that belong to the 
international financial agencies referred to above, For inst­
ance, 'the legal obligations of member states immediately under 
the constitution of b CO are few and slight* To a certain 
extent, the functions of the institution are exercised by the 
conclusion of international conventions on specific subjects* 
The procedure prescribed is that the General Conference adopts 
the text of the oonvention wliioh member states must then submit 
to the compétent national authorities with a view to ratifie- 
ation* Tills legal tcclmlquc is modelled on that of the 1*1*0#, 
although not yet developed to the same degree of efficiency as 
in that institution'*(24) Above all, however, it must be real­
ised that implementation of tho oonventions adopted by the 
Conferenoes of speoialisod agenoles or spooiol international 
conferences depends on the consent of national authorities to 
ratify them,
The Abortive International Trade Gr/:canisation
Though the Soviet Union was represented at tlio United 
Hat ions Monetary and Pinaneial Conference at Bretton Vi'oods in
1944; It did net oosBcnt to ratify the Articles of Agreement 
for the ootabllohment of thé Intcrnatlonol Monetary Fund and 
the inteimaticiicü. Bonk for Rooonotruction and Development, 
which wore designed to play important roles In achieving 
international oolutions to economic and inonetary problemo in 
the pooWj^fCr world* The Doviet Union 'did not take the eamc 
interest In the économie end eool^fl aspectc of the nevf organ— 
ioatlon'o work as in the political# This was certainly under- 
Btandahle In the light of the OoWunioto* vieT"^  of the nature 
of capitalism and their conviction of the Inevitability of 
ItG destruction*,(23)
In contract to the Goviet Union, the United Btateo was 
prepared to participâte as the prlncip#! Gubsorlber to the 
Internationrl Ecnk and the Intomationol ,cnothry Fund# though 
u»der the oystom of vmlghtod voting in thoae inotitutionc it 
10 aaourcd a major influence in their deoloion making proceeeeo* 
But the United states did not ratify the Havana Oherter for 
the rotViahment of an International Trade Organisation which 
many otatee hoped would he able to deal not only with the 
queet-^O ' of tariffs and other trMc harriers, hut also wltli 
several z issues oennected with international trade, employ— 
mmt, and the economic development of states#
& G  Ik'tvcna OharUcr# which v;ae signed by flfty-tM'ce 
states in March 1948 at the oonolusion of a United Rations 
Oonferenoe on Trade and Employment — the Soviet Union did not 
participate - outlined the objectives of the projected Inter­
national Trade Organisation in its first chapter, as followsa(2S)
to asw*ro a large and steadily grcv^ing volume of real 
income _,d effective demand, to inore&se production, 
consumption# and exchange of goods, end to contribute 
to a balanced and expanding economy;
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to promote Industrial oad general economic development, 
particularly of those oountrloB which are etill In tho 
early otages of Industrial development, and to encourage 
tho international flow of oapital for productive Invoot— 
ment;
to further the enjoyment of all countries on equal terms, 
of aoceoo to the markets, producta, and productive fac­
ilities which arc needed for their economic prosperity 
mid development;
to promote on a rcoiprooal and mutually advantageous 
' baolB the reduction of tariffo and owhor barriers to 
trade end the elimination of disora ir^tory treatment 
in intorn&tional commerce;
to enable countrlL^, by incrc&Blng the opportunities 
for their trade %nd economic development, to abstain 
from measures v^ lJLch disrupt world commerce, reduce 
productive employment, or retard economic progress;
to facilitate the eolation of problems relating to 
international trade In the fields of employment, coon- 
OLilc dovolopmeat, oonmcrciel policy, busineBO practices 
and commodity policy,
The International Trade Organisation was thus envlBaged 
ae a opeclolloed agency with the broad purpoee of achieving 
a belEiioed and expanding world coonom;^ ' based on a oystem of 
multilateral trading affording the fullest and freest exchange 
of goods and eervlccB, It was designed tc deal with a v^ ide 
range of eocnomlc matters. Including the reduction of tariffG, 
quotas ond related trade baiTiers, the maintenance of high 
levels of employment, inter-govommentnl commodity agreemento 
to stabllioe prloe fluctuations of primary products, restrict­
ive businoBB praotioes ouch as eono practices of international 
cartels, the various aspooto of foreign investments, the re- 
construction of wcr-dcvastod countries and economic develop­
ment, particularly of under-developed countries, and the settle, 
ment of trade dloputoB,
Th&t such matters as Intor-govemmentol commodity agree— 
mente and the economic development of under-developed countriOG
wore included in the'terms of referonoe of the projected 
International Trade Organisation, indicated the influence of 
the thirty or oo developing countries that participated in the 
drafting of the Havana Ohai'ter# Their economic growth, upon 
which their eooial progress eo much depended, required stable 
and adequate prices for their exportable primary products to 
onsure a eteady return of foreign exchange earnings* They wore 
olGo particularly interested in thé expanded flow of internat­
ional Gàpitél for produotive investment to enable them to div­
ersify their economies*
À6 provided in the Havana Ohorter, it v/as intended that
the projected International Trade Organisation would work 
through a Conference, oonsiGting of repreeent&tiveG of its 
member-atates, vested with the final authority to determine 
the policies of the organisation; an Executive Hoard composed 
of eighteen members - eight representative of those statea of 
chief economic, importance and ten selected by the Conference 
to represent stoteG at different levels of economic develop­
ment: and a Beorotariat headed by a Secret \ -General* The 
voting procedure for the Conferenoe and the Executive Hoard, 
unlike the weighted voting system that obtained in the Inter- 
notional Bank and the International tlonetary Fund, was bewed 
on the princiiile of one vote per member, and deoisions wore to 
be detcrcAced by a simple majority unless a greater majority 
was called for under the constitution, eg* a decision by the 
Oonfersncc to waive, in exceptional oircumstanoes, an obligat­
ion imposed on a member under thé rules of mcmberGhip, required 
tYm-thirds majority* As to the settlenent of trade disputes, 
it was laid dovm that if a party to a dispute did not wish to 
carry out a decision of the Inteimational Trade Organisation,
It could withdraw from the Organlcatlon, but in oo doing It 
would be no longer entitled to the benefits that the KemberG 
extended to one another*
f ' bhe United Dtoteo Administration elgnod the h&vano 
Oharter for m e  c .trullohmont of the International Trade Orgen- 
loation, it did not submit tho Charter to the Oangreoo for 
ratification, oinoe the latter was abarijl^ r divided over its 
provisions - 'the traditional protectionist lobbiee objected 
to its free trade content# while the free traders objected to 
,its .prctocticmist elements'*(27.) hesidos# the-fact : that the . 
projected International Trade Organisation'e vccing syste^ , was 
not based on the weighted vDtingEjyetea of the and the 1 
militated against its birth, since the leading trading count- 
rieo, particularly tho United Dtatce, would not have had such 
a dominant position in the. decision making process, and might 
well have been obliged to implement unpalatable decisions on 
matters which tsombership of the o%'gi!^ nisatlon had removed froa - 
the sphere of their domeetio jurisdiction*
Hut though the establishment of an intematlonol trade 
organisation# with vâde rosponGibilitiGS for facilitating the 
solution of problème in .the fields of c 3oyment# .-economic - 
development# oemmodlty end oomcarcial policies,, etc*, proved . .- 
abortive, twenty three states that participated in the negot­
iations for the reduction of tariffs in Geneva in 1947, under 
the sponsorship of the Preparatory Committee appointed by the 
Economic and Social Council to prepare the draft of the Havana 
Charter, become the original contracting parties to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and'Trade (G.&.2T),(28)
Under this multilateral treaty,(2$) which embodied
reciprocal rights and obligations, it laid down that trade 
ohould be conducted on e non-dieoricln&tory basis# Thus 
tariff reductions granted by one of the contracting parties 
to another had to be extended to all other parties in accord­
ance \vlth the most-favourod^o^ouse. The use of import" quota# 
as a neona of protecting doaoatio industries prohibited, 
except for certain purposes, such as their use to assist a 
country faced nlth balance of pnymente difficulties# 3ut 
the GircuDota&ccB in which they could be employed were governed 
by strict conditions in order to minimise any damage to the
trade of other countries# Irovlsion was also made in the - *
Agreement to limit the freedom oi governments to grant export 
subsidies and to prevent dumping: by permitting importing 
countries to levy anti-dumping duties# But Part IV of the 
Agreement, designed to expand the trade of lese-dêveloped 
countries, facilitating the growth of their export e&r&ings, 
and thus promoting more rapid economic development, was not 
Included until 19&$«
The obligations accepted by the contracting parties to 
GATT constituted an agreed code to govern their trading relat­
ionships, and representatives of the parties wore required to 
meet periodically to deal with matters that called for joint 
action, Including the conciliation of disputes# In fact, they 
were empowered, if conciliation failed, not only to make & 
recommendation or give a ruling in a dispute, but also to 
authorise the vjlthdrav'al of oonceasionG enjoyed by a disputant 
if it refused to accept a ruling approved by a majority cf the 
contracting parties, on the basis of one vote per member#
But though the establishment of the GATT system in 194B
was an Important development in the liberalisation of inter­
national trade* It'did not contain the comprehensive provis­
ions on commodity agreements, foreign investment* and restrict- 
Ivo business praotioes that had been contained in tbs ITO 
Charter* and tho less developed countries became convinced 
that their Interests required the creation of & forum for the 
.oenprehenslve review of trade and development .policy. Perhaps 
even more important wag the fact th^ the developing countrioo 
conoidGred the preoccupation of ' with the reduction of 
trade barrière and the elimination of dieorlmlnatlon as 
largely Irrelevant to - or even Iziconolctent with - their 
interests In development^tpO)
l^zd.^rr*Æ.Mvocaov.,.cf^.a,_A^
Undoubtedly, the lack of a oomprehenolvc international 
trade organisation waa but one of the dcficienoiea of the Ulk 
ayoten of inatitutlonalleed international cooperation In the 
econ^ _i and social fieldo which soon bee me apparent during 
the r yeare of the Organisation# Though the financial 
ryenclea* the International Monetary Fund and the Interactional.. 
I^nk, poasoszod more effective powers of control over their 
membero,than those exereiacd by the UH Aasembly and the Economic 
and Social Council, they were handicapped by the limited fin- 
anbiol resourceo placed at their disposal by those atatea that 
could afford to provide norc and the non-involvomcnt of the 
Soviet (%irn# Other agcnoieo* such as the food and. f.grloulture., - 
Organisation* were reotricted in their work of advan.cing the/, 
economic c^ zd eooicl objectives of the Charter* not only because of 
scant financial reaouroeo, but also because their compétence 
wac not much greater than the essentially recommendatory ccm*- 
potence of the UZb Aesembly and Economic and Social Council#
It was cecauae of these deficiencies that Sir John  ^
(later hord) Soyd Grr, the first Ilraotor of the Food and/ 
Agriculture Organisation.(lAO), urged in 194& the oroatloA 
of a ^orld Food Board, consisting of representatives of the ..
I C itself, the Inter&ation&l Bank for Reocnetruotlon and^ 
fovoloprcrzt and other speoialised agenoles, and the Fconoihio 
and Social Oou&oll, with wide enough powero and sugfloient 
rcaouroeo to effeot ari increase in the total ja'c- 
duotlon of food and to stabilise prices at equitable levels 
to both producers and consumers, Provision was made In his 
plan for the T.'orld' Food Board to .have funds available to pur­
chase surplUo food stocks In'years of gcod.harvests so that 
It would have reserve or buffer atooks whioh it could dlst- 
ributo, in times of OGarcity# to needy countries at special 
prices,(^1) As l»ord Boyd Orr commented on hie plan; roh a 
global food plan y;ould have given szple scope for all the 
powerc of modern science to be applied to constructive ends,
TZie great e^ ' ' 'olon of agricultui'c called for In the proposalo 
would ha%fe cj^c'ted a demand for vaet quantities of agricultural 
cqulpmmt and other industrial products for I m  flood
control, measures to stop soil erosion, T M s  woulc 
brought about the rapidly ezpsndlhg %vorld economy needed to 
provide full employment in all countries',(32)
Though: the Boyd Orr pz/oposals wore accepted with American 
support wlion the^ ' wore first presented, and a preparatory 
oommloaion was set up to report on measures for tholr implem- 
entatiGn, tZioy were rejected by the United states delegate at 
a meeting of the cozm^lsslon in Washington at the end of October 
1946# As 0,D,H,Cole pointed out at the time, in th#
course of 1946, the united States sy;ung back violently- to an
uncontrolled economy, the American attitude changed, both 
because they were felt to Involve too much state Intervention 
and becsuGG it was realised that the main task of financing 
the scheme would necessarily fall on the United btate8*,(35)
IhUBp the attempt to establish & World Food Board, #lth . 
the power and fundo to purchase and hold surplus focd atocks 
which could be distributed to needy countries at low prices, 
as oooacion demanded, was abandoned early in 1947, and all 
that waa agreed to was the setting up of & World 0ood Council 
with the authority to advise oxportlng states who retained 
their :—  u of independent action with regard to the sale and 
distribution of food surpluses* Moreover^ after the rejection 
of the World Pood Board plan, progress towards inter- 
govornmentsl agreements on prinar,y food %}roduota was 'slow, 
painful and pieoomeal, much of It conducted outside the
The Ooviet Union, whiCh was not a member of the Pood and 
Agriculture Organisation, did net participate In the diucusa- 
ion of proposals for a World Food hoard, -As already mentioned, 
at that time the Bovlet government showed no desire to become 
involved in the Ikl system of Intezmationol ooonomlo nnd social 
co-operatlon, and in the atmosphere of the 'cold war* the 
Bconcnic  ^ ,soion for Europe played a nlnozr role in the ro- 
ccnctruoticn of tho v/arrievastated cGuntrioo of W estern and 
Easterj _opo$ leeidea, the participation of Fact European 
countries in the "kvcholl plan wee opposed by Stalin, though 
the plan, was originally intended for the whole of . Buroi^e, and 
it was Implemented by the Orgrnioation for European Economic 
Cooperation (GEEC), outside the framework of the UE system* 
Furthermore, since the rival greet gowere tre&tod aid to non- 
aligned countriea very largely as a means of extending their
Gpheras of Influença or ir&roving their oyrtenB of defence, 
the amount of technical nnd financial nBaletanoe to develop­
ing countries on abll&tor&l'haGls* l*c* from one government 
to nnol'^3, ' exoooded the aaaigtanoo given on a multilateral 
taels ih^rugh the UK and its.epgoialieed agcncleo. In fact*
In the errly lOTa'c .only about 10-^  ^w&c handled by the and 
relBteC Institutions, Inoludlnr the International Bank.(35) 
and. thia cliould be home in nind in omr appralael e.f the IhZ'o: 
role In tho C'^"Tfslo and acoial dévelci of under­
developed countries, 'It special reference to.the principle 
cf non-intervention in rmtterc oocentlally wltb:!jn the domestic 
juriadiotlon of ctntcr, which wo ohell now consider*
The hJ jydto# of International Aid to hevelocin# Countries 
z^n Practice
hoforc we appraloe the main Imndmàrke In the UÎJ ayotom 
of aiding developing countries to accelerate their economic 
and social progreoo, it la neoosaary to .examine in greater ^ 
detail the fleoal powers of the UK Aacembly unuor Article 1? 
of the # ._i&zr* and to aeooco whether these pcwere negat# the 
principle c lon-itivorvmtion in matters easentlally Y,lthin 
the doaeotio jurledlotlon of etateo under Article 2(7) of 
the Charter*
It .lG laid down in Article 1? of the Charter that *tho 
General Aaeesbly shall conoldor and approve the budget of the. 
CTgoniKOtlon' and that 'the oxpazieee of the CrgsnlKetion ehall 
be b p m o  by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly*. 
Thue, since no distinction lo made in these olauoe# between 
the administrative expanses of the Organisation, on the one 
band, and the expenoGS of peacekeeping operations of & non- 
coercive nature or operation#! activities In the economic*
di0 JjXe4.üB, oxi tiie otliex’ iisncl, it ho.s boon 
arguou tn&v the ^xsacaoly has the-oo%Gtenoo* by two—thiz^ds 
mojoricy vote* to apportion the' exponeoG for its operatiohQl 
programzies am legally binding obligatiohs or-, the ertiro 
tiomberehzp of the UE# Indeoi, thlc vr;vs aoBortod in the .Inter— 
protatlom put forward in 1962 by .tho majority of judges of the /, 
rnternatioi:#! Court of Justico on the vo *.atonce of tho Acs- 
cmbly with rcgord to .the .flnEmoing of r  poaeekoeplng oper- ' 
atioDO; mid to roinforoe .thlG argument. It was/ pointed out - In 
the majority opinion that from, the-inception of the ÜE*
GZipeneea .for Ite operational progrnrzcoG of technical aoBiot-. 
cmcG, aavleory Goclol vmlfmre and human righto eervicee, narcot, 
10 drug control, etc# had been borne by member—ntateo ae app­
ort lonea by "uho AGoembly under the regular budget, In accord- 
mice with the two-thlrde najority rule.(36) It ohould be 
noted, however, that these operational progrcmce were of a 
minor choraotor which did not involve large eoalc pa:,inentG by 
UF ncJbere, end that the financing of the major operational 
prOf-z.T^ i^oa, such ao the United imticnB Ihternatichal Childrmi*^ 
Thiorgmcy Fund (milOEF)^ ADseobly in 1946,(37)
and the :ded Programme of Technical Aueletanoe establiohed 
in .1949, (38) had been from vo.luntary contributions .,
outolde.the noi%ial budget of the UM*. .
In effect, therefore, the majority opinion of the Inter­
national, vourt U\t,rted that the principle of . non—intervention 
in matters essentially within the aoacotio ..juri8diotlon of . 
etatee, w  Article 2(7) of the Charter, did not pi'ohj.bit 
the Aeeembly from shaking binding-deoleiono,..if appi'oved by a 
t'.vc-thirt3e majority, on how the ezpenoee for the UN*e operat­
ional aotivitlee in the oconoailo and ooolal fields should be
borne by #13. nomber-stntos, whether auch pz^ ogr^ a^ineG v/ùi'O of 
a ;'.#jor cr minor oheraotcr#
Thla Intêrprotation of the pewero of tho Asoenbl^^ woo 
opposed by eomo of the judges of the International Court*
For Inetanoe, Breeidént îfiniarokl maintelned that since the 
Aeeembly'B rooolutlone approving operational activities had 
only reoomzzondatory force, they did not impose legal obligat- 
icne 0 » statoo to participate in them or to ehaz'o in their 
coBt* Certainly it io dlffloult to see how this view can be 
refuted, t v the Aaecu^ly would be competent to impoee
large so' lo tozmtlon on atatee that were hot in favour of 
major oporcitional progrmmea in the econoaic and ecolal fioldOj 
which would be difficult to recoxicile with the %)rinoiple of 
non-intervention, in t^attero oasentlally wlt&iln the domeotic 
jurisdiction of statee* '
In practice, as already mentioned, except for come 
minor Itcmo financed under the roi^lnr budget, the operat­
ional aotlvltlee of the W  In the economlo and cocial fields 
have deponded upon the voluntary contrlWtlcne of member- 
etatee, 00 that the quoetlon of determining the amount of old 
to developing countries under the aueplcee of the W  has been 
regarded ae a matter eBaenti*%lly within the dc:octio juris­
diction of jt'toe, mid largely depended upon tlie genorooity 
of the wealthy eoonomloclly advanced oountrlee# Moreover* 
under the oyotenii of weighted voting in the orgene of the 
Internatlcnal ^h* the wealthy etates hove poeocGGed the 
voting pc^ 'mr to dotez^ine the size of the loans .and the rates 
of interest to deVoloping countries*
luring the early..years of the UK, the financial roscurccs 
at the diapocal of the Organisation Its spGOloliGed agen­
cies for waging the Wttlc o.galnct hunger, diooaso, poverty 
and i.gnor,'3ncc v/ere very limited. The Expanded .Lechnioel 
AWievî^noc ..rCtT'/rzm (.BPTA) eatauliehod by the A.sE^ cmhly in 
1949, which dOt3Sèeà on'extra-budgetary.funde oontrlhuted 
voluntarily 1 / ..on'vrn of the UE or the opoolaliood agenoien* 
a''oimted tc oa.i.y about 23 nillloa dollora per mmuin during 
uf;c peri;l lL930'*39» though the progre^zae was Intended to. 
provide e:.\/ur(; aeelotanoe in ouoh v&irlod fleldo ae h wJ.th, 
éducatif::, a^nclal training iz: modern. teohniqueg, trana%)ort 
and oomnUjiioation.CBS) ..
ÜUCÜ technical asGiatance to the dêvelc^Bn eountrieo 
WÜG an o%uential prelude, of com^'ec, to iie\/ oa r, of econ­
omic !.nid social development. But,, as Mr. Brmta Crus,.,the 
Chile/m delognte at the Assembly's 4th regular seeel.on in 
is"9$ poiatod out*.'the meet eztcnslve natural resouroêa and 
the moBt perfoot techniques could not develop a country if it. 
had not cufficlent capital to Incrcooe %)roduotlvit3?', and he 
emyho.cloed the need', for .a new, bold. appro.eoh to the p%"oblm of 
flncncin;;cGc::onicdevelopt:ent*(40.).,.
At.. thlB: tine the International had ver^r limited w
ftmdo, and %)çor. under-developed oountrj..on fotmd.it difficalt, 
ir rt to 3)crro^ 'J at the corzierciol rat#a of inter­
est c'lllor 'Yr. Ao^oover. *in its eaz'ly days it fiz\u 
doctrine tlmt the only 3:ind of ^^ rojoot' which th ivould .
even lool at a apeoiflc pleoe of fixed capital inveRt^ent ' 
showing a mcaourable rate of .return',(41) and this prevented 
developing countries from obtaining loans to moot the capital
ooLuL c . . .  oo%]rumcatloi%s, Gchocls* hoopltals, smd
other y*'-::—' vvmU'' ' m l n g  projoots for th03.z^  ooonomlc ana 
occlel Jc%rclvjc^-et/ .Consequently, novoo wez'o rrdc  ^^  .
IM to effect the eBtjfbliahmGnt of a Ga%)ttal development funa, 
and 1% '1952 on . expert oommittef ' e appointed hy .tho koorotery- 
CenGzal to report on_ 'tor to the A-^ ncr-Kiy^  . .
The omiFED Bcdiome
The %'CLOzt of ths Oo:a;nltteo* which appeared In 1953,(42}. . 
roGomaondod i/ho ore u 1.013 of a dpeolal Unztoo hoDzoEio #*.01
..Bconomio Davolopment to .proviso grants 'and. long-ter:** lot;
interest loans BEor tho finmolng of suitable projeoto in
developing acantrlon# It proposed that those states pro,,''cd
to oontributo to t3:e fund should meet annually to pledge .
their oontributiono in tholr own ourrenoleo* and that the 
fund ohcuia not be eatabliehod until the equivalent of 230 
nlllicn dollars had been plodgod for an Initial 
period, "urtlermore. It "wao otresaed in the report tZint too 
fund should not ba operated to permit interference in the 
intèzmàl affairs of the recipient ooimtrloa.
It la oignifiGsnt that the expert coimnittee did not 
reoommend that the proposed slf^KD should be financed out 01 
mi's regular ..budget, os decided by the/Assembly, and opportlonoa 
by that body as a legally* bindi:ag decision on the r beronip 
under Articlo 17 of the Ohartor, which the majority opinion 
of the lntor;:a%icnel Court in 1562, os erplolnea earziér, 
impllod not a oontroventlon of the principle of non- 
intervention in matvorc eaeentlally within the domestic jurio- 
dlotion. of etatea, What the ccmmittee recommended w':u 
GUl'^ FfD ahould bo financed me an oper;^tionEtl programme out of 
extra-budaetary funds, like -1-* and eo that tne
flnanci:3l .eontributiono .of UK me!i&)er-8tate8 would be iroluntor3^.
But most of the dcvelopecl ooimtries, whoso support -rao
vital for the financing of a oaplbel dovclopmont fund fro%:i
voluntary ooiitrihutiono* wore not pro%)ared to participate in-
the f ooheme* Their delegates In the fconomio and
Booiol Council and the Aeaenhly etated that their countries
were not in a position at that juncture to oeonme any addition*
al financial burdens# United Btates opohoenen declared that
the 0,3,.would.ho prepared to Inoroaee Ita financial oontrlb-
fund
utione to o.:tnllleh a UK capital development/'when oavlnga had 
"been made, pooeible through international agroenent on diearm— 
aaent, ml doubt was expressed in the statezu^ito of Soviet 
delegates wd)ether much could be echievod by the creation of 
SUHPB3)# It was the Soviet view that foreign' financial &id 
should only be need to oupploment domestic resources and 
earninga from more fai^ourable terms of international trade 
for developing countrie8*(43)
At the end of the debate on the oo.h(mG .in the
Aeeezibl^ /* à resolution was appz'oved 'b^r a large majority which 
reflooted the American vie:?, (44) end the . President of the 
Economic and Social Council, with the assistance of the 
Secretary-General of the UK., waB ..B83md to ooneult v^ith govern— 
cents with a viow to making recommendations to faellitate the 
creation of a capital dovolopnont fund, as olrcum^tanoao per- 
aitted*(45). The question of establishing SÙITFSD from volunt­
ary contributions was thus shelved,
The S^ecl#! Fund
She oetting-up of the International Finm:oe Corporation* 
an affiliate of the.International %3onk* to.advance the 
economic development of developing countries through invest­
ing in Irritate Gnterpi*iBes where sufficient oapital was not
evailsble, did not tho of those countries
for the erection of a in capital development fund to provide ' 
grants nnd long-term, low Interest loans for major investment 
projects* 3ut though this agitation did not ouooeed In Influ­
encing the developed countries to co-operete In eetohllehing 
such 8 fund» 3 consensus did emerge in the Assembly, In 195B, . 
for the oreetlon of the UK $peoi!sl Fund to flnenoo pre- 
investment projects In developing countries, euoh ae surveys 
of natural resources and research GCbGme8*(46)
Under the rules of the opeclsl Fund, for which the 
equivalent of approximately 26 million end 38& million dollars 
were In 1959 and I960 respectively,(47) the conditions
,cn %vhich the pre-investment projects were to be undertaken 
were laid.down In basic acraemants signed by the special Fund'o 
representatives end the governments that recueated assistance* 
It was also stipulated in the rules that the approval of 
projeeta reoomnended the special Fund's Managing Birector 
required a * o-.birds majority in the Fund's Oovei^lng Oouncil, 
which GODsloted of the represantatives of nine donor mid nine 
reel^ent countries appointed by the Economic and Goolal 
Gounoil» But though the donor countries hod sufficient voting 
power to prevent a two-thirds majority, in practice 'the 
Governing Council cf the Fund never voted but carried out 
its businç.Bs by arriving alwayo at a consensus'.(48) It was 
thus reoogniced, In effect, that the UU'e %)rincii)lc of non- 
intervention or nen-lnt erf eronce in matt era eesentlall^^ within 
the domestic jurisdiction of abates should govern tho operation 
of the Bpeelel Fund, for the financial contribution# to the 
Fund depended on the consent of the contributing states, and 
the Uli had no authority to Impose the services provided under
the terms of the Pur# on the developing countries.
The AGOo:jbli/*B 'levoloRsent Deoade* Resolution
Ginoe the Bpeoial Fund was limited to the financing of 
pro-lnvosi projects and research sohemos* Ito eetablieh- 
ment did little to leoBon the agitation cf the developing 
conntrieo for large scale ÜB assistance to finance investment 
projects to rptei up their economic and social development#
T h o u t h e  Int ematlonal Develop:!ient Association ( I M  )» 
an affillate/of. the'International Bank, .was set up In i960 
to provido uovelopiiig oountrios vdlth long term loans on easier 
terms then those being made by the International Bank, the 
new agency 'fairly, quickly ran thrcug'' most of the not very 
large sum of ncney.wlth whlc?i it had znitlolly .been.endowed*# 
Besides, though the Assembly, in 1961, unanimously approved & 
resolution dooignating the 1960*0 as the UE Development Dec­
ade with the aim of effecting in each developing country a 
mlnlmuis annual growth rate, of aggregate national income
by the end of the j)coade, and called u%)on the members of the 
OÈL" inter ,âlla# .*tc pmrsue pelioiee designed to enable the. 
less developed countries end those dependent on the export 
of pz* ccmrcdltiQB to sell more of their products at 
stable and rozunerative prices in expanding .markets, and thus 
to financo increasingly their own economic development from 
.their êamingc of foreign exohonge and domestic savingo*»(30) 
the recpcnso of the developed cGuntriea did not match up to 
what required of them under the reeolution#
Of course, though the unanimous adoption of the Aesenib- 
ly's resolution was an expression of the morel comiT.itment of 
the eoonc^ioally advanced.CGuntrioe to provide the developing
ccuntrî93 with groator financial aid and bettor teras cf 
trade, it imposed no legal obllgatlona upon them to carry 
out Buch policies# Since the Aaoedbly did not noseess the 
authority to Ic elate or enforce.measures of coononio and 
social oc-operatlon; the Imploaentotlon of the resolution was 
dépendent on the consent of ctatoa, In consonanoe with the 
principle of non-intervention in matters , essentially wl,thin . 
the domestic jurisdiction of stat&o*
A report prepared by the aecretary-aeneral of the UN on 
propOGGls for the Intensification of action in the fields of 
economic and aooial development by the UK oyster of organlBat- 
lone, which wee requested by the Asocibly under ite 'Develop­
ment Debade* roGGlutlon* wao considered by the Economic and 
Social Council at Ita.mid-1962 session,(31) The report advoc­
ated that the xotal flow of capital asointanoe to the develop- . 
In g oounti'lco ohould reach azid maintain the .level of of the 
national inccme of the advanced countries, as recc:z3ended by 
the 'cscmbly in 19&1, end that the advanced countries should 
reduce i^erriero to the entry of importe from the less develop­
ed coi.mtrieB ezid extend to them, advent ares not necessazzili;' 
requiring full reciprocity, i*e* by (planting them tari.ff pref­
erences* It also considered that the Bcenomle and Social 
Council GGUld play a part in promoting the expaneion of 
intemstlonol trade through its Oom?]iiosicn on International. 
Cormodit^ '" T::':'do.
This Commission had reported to the Economic and Social 
Council that the adverse terns of trade of developing oountrioB 
producing products had caused a doolino in their export
earnings, and that it had therefore appointed ea expert group 
to study cystoma of compencatory financing to offset losses
caused by ouch factors, . Thig line of approach wag ondorcod 
by the boonomlc and Social Council* and approved by the 
Aoeembly In Deoomber 1962% with the request that the expert . 
group*r rcpeit bo oent to/tho Preparatory Commission of the 
UK Oonfoienoo on Trade end Development,(32) the sal# Inpetue 
for. the rieldlz"' of which had ooâo from the developing ooimt-. 
rles who "rut;d to oreste new machinery within the UK to 
ezert proeoure on the developed oonntrlee to meet their 
demands, for better terms of trade#
The ^ x  Eenfe?'C::<;^  on Trade and Development (iriJIAB)
The developing countries oonsldered that though the 
3A22 organisation had done ouoh In liberalising trade among 
the industrialized: nerket economiee by means of reductions, 
of tariff other tr&do barriers. It,had proved inadequate 
to zaeot: thoir 'Lratio neede*. Indeed, Eio Rlehard K, Gardner ha# 
a&æerted, *the late logo's an# early igGO'e were years of 
growing frustration for the lose developed countries, yenra 
in which the dreana of rapid economlo development to follovf . 
.in the weho of..IndopendenoG wore rudely ohattored, There . 
was. a marked In the prloeB:of...oome ke^ r primary, camiod.
.ities oa .which developing oountrles rely for their, export 
earning ;# At, the ofzme time foreign aid felled to:lnore#ne 
as rapidl)' no the l.eso-develc.ped countries had hoped* and . 
new aid .was ineronolngly offoet by i*e%r(ynent of prlnci%)sl mid. 
interest from past loans# Among the developing emmt%*le8. . 
th ere  was a growing oonviotlon th a t nothing short o f a. funda- 
no,ntal rc'bo^Ang of the world trading oyetoiii could with 
their dczpcrzte and urgent problème*.(3?)
Attention was focused on these probleno at the United
1st ions CoaCeroxcQ ozi -'u:3 ./ovalo^ 'imenv q\;:-Ci.!'..u) wm.u.z
v.-aG !'izld In KoiiGva .1:1 19G4,(54v waz iti.a.iLjid .g" {,:.u.. r-cfw—
rc z e n ta tlv a a  o f  120 s ts to o , 77 .o f  'k. were r^^rozon^azzYC#-
of the developing countries of the Eorld*, a muoa
Irrgcr group than the group of.Soviet bloc countries or rne 
group of zirliily Teoterx .otatoo with developed economies#
The vcaforenoG rrjoumcnlGd that ^L*oss&ohld oc sa^en 
to asoiot the developing ooimtriee Ineroane and et^llico thoir 
eeminge iron exnmd their ergoid;^ of mmu#. ovur-
el productO; and obtain the capital needed for cevazonneuu*
It was aleo .proposod'tlmt .the O.onferonoe Itself ahonld he-, 
established as an organ of the uK ioceably to be oonvoaoa at 
intervale of not t_: than three yonro; 4^ the pormonoat 
oxooutivo organ of tho Conference should he known.as-the % 
iralo ani hevelogmmt :Coard'and ooaslst of 55 combers c«_r- u . 
by. the Con.forenc3 from among its monborohip, vitk regard ::or 
.both eqnitcibl, .^ zraphlcal. distribution and tZ:o dasz%w.i:i.Lzty 
of continuing roproseitation for the prlnolp:%l trading ouatca: 
u that : for the c.ff eotivo .dioohcrge of its .functlone. the 
rd ahonld j,:\f,llsh $ubcilia%br connittees on auoh.mattez- 
as oearodlties, n%mfactures» .%id invi.sibles m d  finon^: '
rdatod to trado* In .brief* tho now. inotituticn wag on%^ .iGag- 
ed as a body with the co uzt-zicc to "* o recozccndationa on . 
^a:5orj iclrtlng to trade and devalopnont, and to oc-oporatG 
with the /caonbly and the Economic end foolol Council in co­
ordinating ths activities in such fields of other inotltutrona 
within the Z» .yuvon,
Ac to tho voting procedure in the Conference end the 
Iradc mid .:.t:velopnent Benrd, it .vrae rcccimended that 'each 
btate represented at the Conference should have one vote*
3^6
Subject to provlolono to. be dotenzilnea by the Goncrnl /maembly 
Dt It# niaeteeatb session after consideration by It of a 
report and propOBols to be made by & Kpeolol Committee to be 
appointed by the $eoretary-Gener&l of the United EatlonG, 
deolsione of the Conference on matters of eubstonoe should 
be .taken by a t#o-thlrdo..majority of the representatlvoo. prea-. 
eot and voting» and deolBlons of the Foard by Blmple majority* 
The tec:, of the Gpeolel Committee vmuld be to prepare propoe- 
ole for prooedureo* within the continuing machinery# deslgnod 
to eebablloh a proceee of conciliation to take place before 
voting, and to provide on adequate basle for the adoption of 
recommendatiomo with regard to propoaalB of a opcclflc nature 
for action eubstantlally affecting the economic or financial 
interesto of particular countrle8^*(55)
Detallo of the conciliation procedures referred to above 
- the compronioe formula accepted by the developing and devel­
oped countries to facilitate the adoption of recomsendatlonG 
by conaenouo Inctead of by majority voting - were worked out 
by the Special OommlttGe appointed by the Secretary-General 
of the # ,  and Incorporated in a résolution approved by the 
Assembly in December I9Ô4, which embodied the preposale of 
the Oonforence*(56) Frovielcn was made for the procesG of 
conciliation to take place before voting on propOG&le of & 
specific nature for action substantially affecting the eoono%^ 
ic or financial. IntercGtG of particular countries, if requccted. 
by a comparatively omoll number of nembcrs - ten in the Oonfer- 
encé, five In the Board, and three in committees - or if 
initiated s:,c frealdent of the Conference or Chairman of 
the Board,
Ac to thé procedure v?lthln a conciliation) committee, it
W&8 laid down that *the oonolllstio# eommltteo shall begin 
its work .80 soon oa pooolble and lt ehsll onde^ivour to rooch. 
agreement during vhe.eame sesBlon of the.Conference or the 
Board# t vote shall tske place . In the conciliation comrùltteo* 
In the event that the concillaticm o(%mltteo lo unable to 
ccnclWe .Its work or fails to zcaoh, agreement at the. sane . 
eeseion of the Oonferenoe or the Z^oard, It shall report to the 
next ocoGicn of the Board or to the next eeeslon of the Confer­
ence, whio*'^ver meets earlier# Ho%?ovor, the OonrcTcnoemay 
instruct  ^T cone^l atlon oomnitteo ap%iolnted by it to submit 
its rorort to t%%c following sesolcn of the Conference, in the 
event the doz;i:ittee shall not have concluded its ttori: or
Gh&ll h&Vf znllod to reach agreement during the some session 
of the Orxfegencol
Witliout this.form o.f oonoili^ion procedure, the minor-' . 
ity of developed countries would have found It difficult to 
.restrain the i gazlty group of developing countries froü pass­
ing recT% z&" Lions of a specific nature for action on such 
matters as their .^ tarlff or monctaiy policies, or their policies 
of Gconc^aj assistance* developed countries, it. may .be 
stated, regordod the conciliation procedure as nccoGcory bec­
ause they considered that the adoption by a i.ajority vote of 
rooom;:iendations which called for specific aoticn by them, 
despite their opposition to such action, as tantamount to 
Interference In mattero essentially within their dcszestle jur- 
iodlction, oven thou#i auoh rcCDCizcndetlons would not bo bind­
ing decisions#
As alremdy mentioned, the adoption of reccmmondatlono on 
economic and sociol Latter#, addressed to particular states or 
groups of states, was a form of UK interference which the
draftorâ of Article 2(7) of the Charter bad apparently Bought 
to prevent; and In defence of their stand on thlo question at 
the U3 Cqnferonoe on Trade and Development in 1964, the gover­
nments of developed countries could argue that 'public opinion 
in the doveloped countries would react adversely to reooa.cnd". 
atloDB pauBQd over the opposition of the developed countries 
hut calling for action by them# Moreover, the currency of 
the reeolutii^ie, an well ao the prestige of the UK, would be 
debased by the poesage of reoolutlone that were net followed 
by action# Vvhat wae wanted, in the last analyeio, was not 
voting but results*,(37)
The governments of the developing countries chewed rcce 
appreciation of this 1# aoaeptlng the conciliation procedure 
with regard to majoz'^ ity voting in C^A organe. Indeed, *in 
praotlco the formal conciliation procedure hae never been ueed, 
but the concept of prolonged consultât lone %'ather than eumoary 
votes hao been widely employed in F'uTAi, even in acme proced­
ural eaeew \ere it was technically not necessary*.(56) The 
developing countries thus recognised that UKGDAD deGieions, 
though of a recommendatory, non-mandatory nature, should be 
arrived at by consensus If the co-operation of the developed 
countries w  s to be gained, and this was also true o their 
attitude in the Governing Council of the United Nations Devel­
opment lTc,;iramoo (bEDi ), w M o h  was formed as a result of the 
merger of the Expsmded Trogram.ae of lecl^mioal Assistance and 
the Speoz,* und in 1965#(59) Though the developing countries 
had a built-in ..^jority of t:?o on the t?ilrty-seven aeiaber UEDF 
Council, they recognised that decisions should bo taken by 
consensus. In ocnsonemce with the principle of non-lntorforenoo 
In matters of domeotic jurisdiction, since the developed
countries most of the funds o# & voluntary &a8l8*(6G)
IlBsatlcfnctlon vlth the ApsroQoh by Consensus
Towrrdo the end of 1566, however, the developing states 
rebelled to some extent eg /net the 'approach by ocneenoue*
\ hon they need their voting strength In the Aooembly to eetac— 
Iloh the UK Induotrlal .Developnient Crg^imleation (UKIDG) ao an - 
autonomous body within the UK for the purpose of promotl#' end 
ooceleratini the lnay8trl8ll8etlon of their countries In the 
manufaotnrlng. eootor,^ Expenses for the ed&ilnletretlon and . 
research echeceo of the new org;an were to be financed out of 
the UK*G z'c clar budget, end provlolon vme made for the hold­
ing of annuel pledging conferences aa a means of obtaining Its 
ccuroe of fun dr; for carrying out ouch prog cet oac; surveys of 
industriel development poeelbilitlos and operationo to develop 
the marketing techniques of developing countries*(61)
%ut at the first UKIDO pledging conference in kecoober 
19:^0, the ï^^jorlty of rich, developed countriee were not prep­
ared to rnhe eo^arrto oontribntlons to I olncc they con- 
eidered that Ito operational aotivltiee should be given only 
limited, financial support from the. D' ovelopment Programme 
(UXLh') which W88 then 'moving toward an expenditure of dose 
to 200 million dollars a year, with the United tîtatea providing 
of the fimdG' *(62) in fact, only mlllloz! dollars %%ere 
#&Gcg8d for '.1-0*8 operational activities,(63) and the attempt 
of the develop,lag countries to obtain l&rge socle financial 
GUpport cm developed countries for üniDü, whose establishment 
had come about aa a reoult of a majority vote In the Aeeembly 
which did not represent e consensus between the developed 
and developing states, was unsuooGGoful,
The developed countries reacted In almll&r faGhlon when 
the developing countries used their greater voting power in 
the Aoco hi/ to ootahlloh the United Katlono Gepitol Develop- 
mont :imd 86 nn crgen of the AoDexhly to aeslGt them In the 
development of their économies by supplementing exlating eouroee 
of capital oezietnnce by neons of grants end loene, particularly 
.long-term loans made free.of intereat/or at low intere&t 
r&te&*(64)
developed countrlea, partlculerly the leading i^ est- 
ern powers, were opposed to the ore&tion of the UK Capital 
Development : und cn the ground that the existing apccigLlieed 
agencies^ zhc International Sank and Its affillateo, the Ditcr- 
natloncl linmce Corporation and the International Development 
Association* were the appropriate Institutions for the dloburoc- 
sient of multilateral aid* and the Uovlot Union -and France ex­
pressed opposition to the administrative cxpencca of the Fund 
being finanGod out of the regular budget of the UK.(6$) It was 
not Gur^rlolng* tïo.e^ore* t the developed countries wore 
not repreeonted at the flret Capital Development fund Pledging 
Conference in 19G7* when only about 1^ million dollars were 
pledged tvfçnt^ '-two countrlC8#(66) Clearly* the estebllGh- 
ment of the UK Capital -"'^elopment Fund by a majority vote in 
the Assembly* without the support of the developed countries 
who would bo required not only to accept the main burden of 
.the adwiniotratiVG expenses* but also the grnnte and Icng-term. 
loans free of interest or at low interest , rates* w&a .doomed , to . 
failure.
This rg In served to emphasioe the point that any attempt 
by the developing countries to pressurise the developed countrioa
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Into participating In UK old BOhemes through the adoption of 
resoiutiono In the Aooombly by majority voto* which did not 
reflect the oonocnauo between the developing and developed 
etatoo, was r^'grrdcd by the latter* in effecu* ao using the 
UK t( terforo la mattera essentially within their domestic 
jurlediGtlca la contravention of Article 2(7) of the Oh&rtor, 
and was thus unacceptable to thorn#
_UK _ In t era at 1 on el Devclouaeat Stratemr for tho 
Second "------- -— —     
It is slyziflcant that the General Assembly's resolut­
ion on the UK's International Development strateg^^ for the 
peooad i^eve3c_jrnt Decade was arrived at by a coneonsue of all 
monrar—Btawes(67) — It was adopted unanimously without a 
formal vote in 197G — and could not therefore be construed as 
a fora of Interference in matters essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of statee,
*0n the threshold of the 1970's, Ooveraaents dedicate 
themselvoB anew to the fundammital objectives ens&irined in 
the Ohartcr of the Baited mtlons tivonty-flve ago to 
create ccnditlcas of stability and well-^^eing end to ensure a 
minimum süandord of living consistent with humm dignity 
throu^ ccononic and social progress and developmeat', it was 
stated la the preamble to the Strategy. ^The launching la igGl 
of tne first *zted Datloas Development Decade narked à world 
wide endeavour to give concrete substance to this solemn 
pledge. Blaoe then attempts have continued to be made to 
adopt s%:eciflc measures end to fachlon and employ new. instit­
utions of iLteraatioaol oo-cporatlon for this purpose. How­
ever, the level of living of countless millions of people in 
the developing p&rt of the world is still pitifully low, These
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people ûro often still under-nourished, uneducated* unemployed 
end wanting In mmiy other basic Gaenitlos of life* . khilc & 
part of tbo world lives in groat.comfort end oven affluence* 
iiiucn 0.1 tee larger pavt suffers from abject poverty* end In 
fact the. disparity is .continuing to widen.* This lamentable 
situation mro contributed to the aggravation of world tension.'
Though it wao reoognieed in the preamble tlm.t the primary 
reeponGiblllty for t'o development of developing countries 
rooted upon themseivos, it nevertheleec maintoined that 'how­
ever gzo t their own efforto» these %;zl_ not be aufficient to 
enable them to achieve the deeircd devolopmcmt goalo ao ezped- 
Itiouszy as %;hey must unlesz they ore aceietcd through Incrcnood 
financial resourcos end more favourable economic and com#rciel
policies on the part of the developed couBtrieB*,
Among the objectives of the strategy were the follov;ing;,
iho avcr' ^ o minual rate of growth in the gross product 
of tne developing countries as a whole during the .icoond 
United Mations Development Decade should bo at loact G 
per coat, with the poociblllty of attaining a higher 
rotezn ühe^Gooond half of the Decade to be Gpcolflcd on 
Dho basic of a comprehensive mid—term review*,,
g-ogrycroge annual rate of growth of gross product per 
heed in developing countrioc as a whole during tho Locade 
BüOü^d be about 3*3 per. cent with the Docsibility of 
cccelorat^g it during the second half of the leoade in 
order at least to make a modest beginning towards norr— 
owin^ the gap in living otondmrds between dovolopod end 
developing countries* An average annual growth rate of 
r#5 per cent per head will represent e doubling of Tier— 
ego Incono per head in the courée of two decados. In 
countries with very low. incomos per head, efforts ehculd 
I3C mode to double such Incomes within c ehortêr period*
zho torget for (^owth in average Income per head lo c i- 
culatcd on the basis of ah average annuel increase of 
2,5 per cent in the population of developing countries# 
wEloL ic lcas than the average rate at present forecast 
tor the l97Gp* In this context# .each developing country 
should for;%ulato its own demogr"^,^o objectives within 
the fi'.?::.oworD of Its national cc,* Lopmont plan*
Am avcrc/a cnnual rate of growth of at least 6 per cent 
in vio L^occ product of developing oowntrieB during the 
DecrCc %iZl Inply &n annual average oxponGion of:(a) 4 
per cent in agricultural output; and (b) 6 per cent In 
manufacturing output*
Ao the ultimate purpose of development Is to provide 
inercncing oppo% tunities to ell people for a better 
life# it lo essential to bring about a more equitable 
dictrioutioi. of .inoo&c and wealth" for promoting both 
ucolsl gucvlOG and oflioienoy of production, to r 
ocbctcntinlly the level of employment, to achieve a
f
soclcl welfare, '''id to enfogi%rrd the onvlronmont* Thus 
qualitative and s+ruotu^^l cbonges in the society muot 
CO hrmd in hand with rrpid ooonomlo growth, end existing 
disparities - regional# jcotorel and sooiel - should be 
GUbGvontially reduced, These cbjcctivee are both deter­
mining factors end end-results of development; they 
shoulJ therefore be viewed as .Integrated przt' of the
dynamic procoes and would require c wf fled approach 
» # t» # C Gvi )
Zbeso objectives# it was pointed out, called for a con­
tinuing effort by all peoples and Governments to promote econ­
omic and social progress in developing ocimtries by t3ie formul­
ation and Implementation of a coherent act of policy measures, 
%?Mch Included tlie following*
3,ic_netional frade(69)
All efforts will be made to secure intemationcl action 
boicvc 31 Deoember 1972, including, where appropriate, 
tko oouolueion of international agreements or arrange­
ment u eg commodities mentioned in zezelution 16(IZ) of 
fÔ r/n'oh I9S8, adopted by the United Katione Conference 
on Cr.ido and Development at Its second cession,##,#,«,*
(ma..Ççü;,(^'kle8_K»rW^âJa.^
aasaJiJ£sLllfeiiAj»Sej.jM^^
_ tea$_ _wlno#__zrqn ore^ uobaoco* m:tuiji^ -sra. 
■k.mica, copper, shellac end phosphates.)(7u)
Efforts will bo made to reach agreement, before the
zlrd seoslon of the United nations Conference on Trade
rnd lovolopment, on a set of general prinoliuLoc on 
pricing policy to servo'as guidelines for conouitat lone
Gommoditia; ft one of theand actions on Individu! 
priority elns of pricir jollcy particul r attention 
will bo paid to securing stable, remune^.,^tzvo and equity 
able prices with a view to increasing the foreign e/oh- 
enge carnlngo from exports of primary products frcm 
developing countries.
3 #
Spcclri attention, will bo given to the expanolon and 
ClveroiTlcntion of the export tr'&c of developing count- 
riez in ncnuieoturos and soni- 'nuf'ctwreG, particularly 
for enabling thorn to attain inore&Bed participation* 
co%:eneurato with the aeecc of development» In Lho 
groivth of Intoznatlon&l trade In those oomodltic&*
/rranrcuonto concerning the c^traliGhment of generalised, 
nar-discriminatory, non-rcoi.rcc^l preferential rreatiaent 
to cxpo^to of developing count' i or in the aarletG of uov- 
ole pel oouBtrlOG have .been drawn up .In the United ^avionc 
Oobforcnco on Trade and Development end oonGldoroê mutu­
ally cLOoptrblo to developed and developing counlricc, 
Ircforc&cc-glving countrloG are determined to Book pe 
rapidly ae poaoiSle the nccoosary legislative or other 
caacticn with the aim of icolcnanting the i)rolerentlÿ. 
nrrznjOisents cz early as pooeible in 1971# ;ifforte for 
further iuprovozcnto of these preferential arrangements, 
%;ill be purcuod in a dynamic context in the light of the_ 
Ghjcctl\ti of resolution 21(11) of 26 ^aroh 19GB, cdoptoa 
by tg# Cc ^oroncc at Ite seoond cession#
Flnanoicl,Reeourcm.._for...^.% (71)
c eecro lonlly advanced country should endavour t o - 
z\ do ' y z972 cnnunlly to developing countrieo finan­
cial resource transfers of à minimum amount of 1 per 
cent of its groGG ü&ùlcn&l product at market prices In 
terms of actual disbursements having regard to the opeo- 
lal position.of those countries which arc not importers 
of capital* Those developed countries which have already 
mot thiG target will endeavour to ensure that their .net 
rcBOUroe trannforo are-maintained and envisage* if poss­
ible*' an increase in them* Those developed countries 
wLlol ore unable to achieve this target by 1972 will 
endo 'vcur to attain it not later than 1975*
in roooraiwlon of the apecial importance of the role 
which crn bo fulfilled only by official development 
coGlutanco, a major part of financial resource transfers 
to ihc developing countries should be provided in the 
fore of officiel development aeciotaaoe* " 3^ 601% oocnozic— 
ally rdvanood country will piTcrcmively incrc^e its 
official developisent aesiet^nce to the developing count­
ries and w-ill exert its best efforts to reaoh a minipup 
of C #7 per cont of its gross notional product- at market 
priccr by the middle of the Decade*
Ac Gocn aa adequate experience is available on the work­
ing of the schoce of Special Drawing Rights, serious 
consideration will be given to the possibility of the 
csto;]lishacnv of a lin3: between trie ollocntion of the 
ROW reserve assets under the scheme end the _%>rovision of 
additional development finance for the benefit of ell 
developing countries* The question will* in any case* 
bo oramined before the allocation of Special Drawing 
airhtG in 1972*
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As mentioned earlier# an aaehdment to the International 
Monetary Pund'e Articles of Agreement eotablleblng the special 
Drawing llgZito eeheme to expend International liquidity - unde: 
the eGhene no^ihore' quotas in the Fund wore enlarged without 
any additional oubsoriptlon in gold ornationfLl ouzTencles - 
had entm^ed Into force on 28 July ig69; and bn 1 January 1970 
the first allooatlon of aDRs* equivalent to approximately 
billion dollars, was made to 104 participante in t3ie Special 
Drawing 'oooimt* But olnce the major shares of the SDRs went 
to bho Jevoloped oountrieo, particularly the United States, 
with high quo&eg in the Fund, the developing countries* with 
low quotas and omsll ehares# were anxious to eetablieh a link 
between the allocation of the new reserve eesetG under the 
scheme and the pi'ovleion of additional finonce for their dev­
elopment; end* 30 indicated above, the Aesembly's resolution 
on the International Devcloimient Strategy declared that eer- 
louo GOBBideratlon would be given to the natter#
It s3iould aloo.be noted that in the Assembly'e resolut­
ion it v;as c,.pi.coieed that 'financial end technical asoiGtanoo 
should be .""l%:ed exoluelvely at promoting the economic and 
eoclal prcgrooo of developing countries and should not in any 
way be used by the developed countries to the detriment of 
the national sovereignty of recipient countries*# Clearly, 
this Implied that multilateral aid eoheaeo under the auspices 
of the uH, though mainly financed by developed countrioD* 
should not be operated in any way that contravened the Charter* e 
principle of non*#interferencG in matters essmtially within 
the domestic jurlcdletlon of the recipient oountrloc#
Other policy meacuroe covered in the strategy were des­
igned to promote, national and international action, the
oarnln^o of dovelcplng coüntrloG from invisible trado$ suoh 
as toKrlsti* incwanoe, and shipping: (7P) to provide spoolel 
aoolotanoo to the loaot dovelbpod asong the devoloping count#* 
rloB(73) and londTlockcd developing oonntrlec: (74) ^nd to 
further IntersatlonRl CG#,operatlon oo that developing count#, 
rlea could ozpand their ca%}ability to ''.*1/ oclenoe and tech#, 
nolog^f for dovolopaent»(75) A special eeotlon on *:iumnn 
DeVGlopm^t*(76) eloo preecrlbed eoclol policies for the dev.# 
eloping countries in the fielda of employment, education, 
health and nutrition, housing and related communlt)^ faollltios, 
the enviromamt.^ .etG#, and It w o  stated In the resolution 
that ^ thooe developing countries %hloh consider that their 
rate of population grov;th hampers their development adopt 
moaeures Tdilch they doom nccossary in accordance v;lth their 
concept of dovelopnent*#
Mention hao already been made that a clause ras included
on the need to protect the national sovereignty of developing
cnui'vrlGo in connection vdth the use of external aid. Another
' * _ 
clause T :s inserted to safeguard their s o v e r e i g n i n  the
soctlon on measures for crimnslon and diversification of pro#*
duction#(77) *full e%erclGe by developing countries of per#»
rnancmt sovoroiyiity over their natural resources will play an
important role in the achievement of the goals and objectlvca
of the Decade^* it %*oad, ^Developing countries will take
steps to develop the full potential of theli" natural resources#
Concerted efforts will he nede, particularly through intomat#»
lonol aceistmce, to enable them to prepare an inventory of
natural roeourcee for their more rational utilisation In all
productive act1vitles,^
As to i;)ollcy measures prescribed for developing oountrios
to 5%'oduotion and . improve produotivlvy in oraer .to
prcvide gcoZ;. Lz:u services neoesGary for raiding levels ci 
living cri Improving économie vieliillty, luho Aeoembly^o ie^ «# 
olutlon (m Intorrajionol Devolopment for vnoy^ooond Docuae 
Inclrcei the fcllOTing:(78)
i s m ^ . s s s x ' j s i j s s ? ^
i a c  r - i i r . t î l  r y c D f m ü r y ,  f i e î i c r l c o  a m i  s - o r c ' c t i y  -  < * e & i & a e ^ -
tc' r.iîcnro t -nore oâeçiue-So fooa auiiply. iroi t,.,e
cv.;:r.-.,i-.r,î±ve and oualitr.tivo vicwifOlirca, to i.xc.-_ f*f“  - 
putriticnrl p M  istostriol ro'.i,ui!.'er,scnts, ;o eSi’ja f«j“-:mSg':;Sâ5 :^F jS:
)'0V0lc.,ii:g oountrloG will tolte nnrallcl otops to prcmoto 
li'.&nctrv in ordor to oohiovo rapiu 02:jx:ins20n, 
ntlcn rnJ Jivoraiflor^tion of thoir ooonooiOG. 
devzac %.ajourcs to cnsuro aderuavO ozpension oi^%no 
tutrice ühat utilljo donootlc rawmavorzalo,
csccauiu]. inpute tc both agrloulturo ana otnor incus 
rioe, and th?t help to inoreaoe <';:port oamings.###*..**
Aa olroody mentlonod, since the utrato^y was arrivoa 
$.t by a consenoUB of all meril';ere. it was not at vaz'ianco 
with the Obartor^G principle of non-lnterfermoe in matters 
eeeentiolly within the domeotlo guriaalctlon of states, and 
it must he re^i^ieed tlmt the. terme, of the Strategy oonstltntcd 
no more them t W  erpreBCion of the,moral.oommitment of tne 
govar.n.ciitu of the developed and the doveiop3.ng eta%ei:> in 
favour of :Lezm:ree doeigned to uplift the economao and aoci.^ dl 
atandarâe of the hundreds of nllliono of people onfzeri% iro,4 
pGverty, oiseaoe, hunger and illiteraey throughout the world.
It impOGod no intomationol legal obligatlcnEj on the develo^ow 
Btatéo to implm.ent the meaBuros considered essential to 
aesist the developing couhtries, and no legal chligatione on 
the latter to carry out the proscribed eccnoaio ano fociel 
reforms, euch.as the.reform of land tenure eyotcoe for promoting
Boolol juütlee, where itwau appllonble# In brief, then, the 
btrstcgy v/ao nou an International tree by or convention, but 
a deoiaratzon or morel Intent* Coneeguently, Ito unsmimouo 
adoption by m; menbors did not give 'the m  tho authoz^ it^ ' to 
binding doololono on the ixzlioy meaouroB presozlbed* Iho 
ccc^ctcncc of the Organieotlon In économie and aoclcl i "ttera 
romazncG cuscntlolly rooo^'^oru'-'tory*
g g | r j | L . g s g p s f e - ^ i â s ^ ^
m o  rlrst ever»* 11 rovlo%':' and appraisol of progreoo .ln 
the Implomentnwicn oi. tne International Development Strategy 
. in 1973$ . 8$ roQUlred. under, the AB8e5d3ly*o reBolntlon,(7g) #. 
tliG :',eonowZO anü w^colal r..Council. wor;:lng paper prepared 
by the r _ Group or L\le>7 mid AppralGal(8ol-; cqiiciuded: that 
* the intemationnj. Developcent strateg^ f. .renelne nuch more a 
wish than a policy* : It .has not yet talcen hold .?;lth az^ythlng ' 
-l%ko the ioroe .needed* Gmzer^lly in the developing oowbrioo 
the reoog^iltion of the compleaentarltioo among the major goals 
''na objeotrvoo of development and of the need for ooono:%lc 
grow%?h to bo aooompanied by the c^ualitativo and otruotui'olL.. 
ohangee T*' t society ao laid dovm in the International Develw 
opnent :^ togy has not yet been ade;iuately reflected In their 
deveio*, i u progremmea and poliolée* fhis Inoludeo, inter 
al^, vhe ij..dlng Into .tlie devolci .mt prog%vi;,_-:c of each 
country cf roasureo for api'cading tlio benofltc of ' ooonooio 
growth '^'1 for overcoming the under».ijtili::ation of production ; 
capaoluy as v;erz ao the orientation of educational syutems 
to%?0rdB development priorities* The develo%;od countries have 
âlopleyeü a laok of Implomontatlon or late or lopcrfeot oxeo##- 
ution of the-policy noaeurco embodied In the Strategy* Only 
aoae developed countries have eo far ahow% an encouraging
rcGponso to the provlslcne of the Strateg3% Tl:ie net ccmtrib*» 
ution of the developed world to the oconcmlo end oooiol pro»* 
greso of tzie cieveloi/ing oountrlcs boo net yet cbovzn the degree 
of fori,vara ncvement envisaged In the Strategy*.(81)
^Owi CLGVolcping and developed oountrioc were urged In. 
the report to take steps to implement the Ihtei^atlonal Devel#» 
opment strategy, and all eountrles were called upon to *actlvo#^ 
ly promote the aohleyement of general and complote disarmament 
through effective measures* # The resourceG that may be rel*# 
cesea as a result of effective measuros of actual disarmczont, 
it was Dtreesed, éhould bo used for the %)romotlon of economic 
end social development of all nationG#(82)
zhe repoi*t eloo emphasised that the reform of the inter*# 
n!)tionol monetary system was vital if the objectives of the 
International Devdopaent strategy were to be realised. This ..
could hardly be gainsaid, for during 1971 to 1972) there had 
been a continuing crisis in international monetary relations 
because of the deterioration in the balance of p&ymente position 
of the dnitcd ütates resulting from American investments In 
Y;estei*n Buropean countries and Japan# In August 1971 the 
oriels became particularly acute because the United ^;tatcs, 
facing marked losses in its gold and foreign oûrrency reserves, 
decided to suspend convertibility for the dollar into gold and 
to allow the dollar to float, with the result that the central 
banks of other countries wore left holding vast <iuantities of 
almost unusable dollars. Indeed, *ln terms of other curi'encios, 
this action amounted to a dollar doiraluation of about and 
'there wore consequential changes in the currency parities of 
the leading trading notions..*(85) In fact, despite eubsequont 
moves in 1972 and 1975 to restore some order Into international
rGl^tlons, the quectlon of dollar inconvei'tlbillty 
romalnod the main reaeon fo"r the lack of censTiaonoe In the 
dollar, which weo clovaluen by ICf in Pobruary 1975, there 
LLiuCn wicertaznty through t%:o precarious practice of 
floating ezohange rates,(84)
Di view of the upheaval in internatlcnal conotary rol#^  
Ktv^onc bevweon I97i m d  1975, it wad not surprising, therefore, 
tnat the rr^ort of the Moonomle and Social Council*e ;/orklng 
uroup on the .cvlow and Appraisal of the International Devol#. . 
opzent Strategy stressed the need for International monetary 
refera* * ticfactory and early settlement of international
monevcry j.rs is in thé intoreste of all countries, devel#- 
oped and dcvcloplnG/ It deolared* *Bpeciol attention sbould 
Ü0 pQza to - the effect of the international monetary crlois on / 
GLÙ uevolopznc oountrzea, with particular reference to the 
adequacy ana value-of their recorveo, sustained growth of 
: vLoj.r e::pc)rt eamingo, the pricoe of theiz' c:q;ozt products 
aiiu t_eii teice of traoe#* Certainly, the cevelc:)ing countries 
were p;u cultrly vulnerable to the instability of the rates 
O4. ez^cuunge .Lhe oi^rrencios of the *^ZLi trading nations^ 
linco a l..rge proportion of their currency Tcacjveo was In 
\*'"l_'ir8, the devaluation of the American dollar led to the 
oepreciE.uzon 01 thoir roeerven.(85) Thereport thus argued 
oac^ xj countrzes enould be accorded sn effective '
volCta i^ ho .^.ons relating to r:li aspects of the inter»'
national monetary ^to% in euch a that the résulta are 
iul^y in eonBonance with their development needs', and nivoc#* 
a t w  *a revimv of the voting, oyotom and the quota structure of 
the inteni:monal kcnotery fund with a viewr to selling it pose## 
i.)±e *01 developing oountrioo to have greater pai^tioipation in
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intornatlonal monetary üeoislonB' æ d  'the oateblWment. of 
a link betrecn ne?; allocationB of opeelQl drawing rights and 
additionel development finGnolng*#(8G)
3Sut international monetary problème wore made enoimionslj^  
more (Ilfflquit . to%vards the end of 1975 by the decision of the 
Orgeninction cf Petroleum Dzporting Oountrloo (OiEC) #* ;'iaudl 
Arabia, Mbya, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Algeria, Iraq,
_ orio, Tnaenooia, Iran and Venoimola ## to Impoeo a four», 
fold inoro^re In the price of oil; for thlG had an inflatiozi'» 
cry effect on the price of everythin'^  whicli.oil helped to pro*# 
duce or J: ctributc in both the developed and developing oil»' 
importing comitrleo* The dramatic increase in the price of 
oil thuo created considerable - balance of payments difficulties 
for the oll»lnpozting states, whilst it produced huge .money . 
ourplueoo for the oil»e:q)ortlng states, Ooneequently, unleoB 
measuroc- wore taken to .recycle theoe huge surplus sum.s of 
money to finance economic activity throughout the worl:^ , there 
wae the ozingor that the balence of paymmts difficulties of 
the oil..i.;pcr:'tlng oounti^ ies would force them to introduce 
Import . t^lctionB of oil kinds and devalue their currencies. 
Indeed, .icri was a groat danger that, many oountriea,v;ou.ld 
boGome economically paralysed through Igiok of money circulât»* 
ion. .
The :-oz"ld ZJank'o Annual Report for the period July 1975 
to June 1974 (07) .pointed out t.hat the most olgnificant dcvcl#*' 
opmentB of the recent past had included the realignment and : 
.floating of exchange rates; accelerated inflation, aosooiated 
with rapid rlsoo in the plaices of moat primczy oomaioditica 
end of Industrial exports; dramatic increaseo in petz'olcua
z5:
l;rlocB; sbcrtegGo of foodgnd.no and of fertilizer; mid a . 
Glowing of the gro#h of gross national produot(Gi;r) In induot- 
riollsed eoimtrles# It vmo oxpeated that QkP growth In irmy ' 
developing ooimtrieo would foil below 6^ over the r m t  of the 
1^708, the re%3ort added; the rate of growth in the poorest 
coui6ür.iesg znomdlng tne most populoue, v^ould be eo low that 
per capita Incomee would either stagnate or rise very little 
bet%7een 1974 and igso*
I eng the fectoro contributing to the need for a larger 
ilow of eztomai eoaletance to developing countries was the
..'X
eharp rl^ iïi W l t y  prlcco, the Impact of inflation on 
vhe przceo oz menufcotured goodo v;hloh they imported from 
Indue vrlaz.i.aea oountries, ana the. terzae of financing to moot 
inoreanos in thoir current aooounb deficits# Indeed, the
ropor'c unaerizned that the Internatioz)ol oosmunltv needed 
not onzy to mobilise moi'c development ascletance, but aloo to 
ulrecu eucn aeszstanoe if^niedlately to . the poorest among and 
%vlthln the developing countries, which included thoce In. the 
wholc of the Indian oub-contlnent, tropical ^.frica, paints o: 
latln 'noilca, m d  the Oerlbbean#
Jui; nelt) lor tnc poorest developing ccuntrles depended 
nob on^y on tae eoohomicaliy developed countries, but aleo on 
comurreo wzua rapidly increasing oil revenues* 'csldes, 
tne aei^iuy Of tne eoonoBlcally advanced countrice to play a 
more generous roze in the field of developnent eselotance 
cependoa on tne negctlatlon of eaultable i^rlcos for raw satcr»" 
isle and looastuffs with thoee developing ocuntrloa that 
duoed them.
How far tko United r'atlone end its spoalslieed agenciea 
liavo been able to assist in finding solutions to this quest.». 
ion of raw materials and development, and other Inter «.related 
problems .requiring latometional action, without trespassing 
on natters eeeentially within the dooeotlo juriediotion of 
etates.ie ooneidered below# - . . ,
gv^iç ^
The B/ceicl .eeBùzon of the .W Assembly in Aprll»f4'ay 1974 
on the prcblemo of raw materials end development, which rco 
called on the initiative of Drosident Scumedienne of Algeria, 
resulted in the rdottion without vote of a Declaration of 
iTlnoiples and ?rogranma of Action that bed been formulated 
by the hundred or so developing ceimtrioo witMn the United 
liationa# Iheso amounted to a reiteration of the nialn reoomm»' 
endatlcne of the UZZ Aiesembly'e 1970 resolution on Internatioinfl 
Development strategy, which wae not at %'arlQnoe with the 
principle of nozi.-interventlon in zmtters eeaentially within 
the do .0 ,Llo jnriadicticn of etatee#
.The Ijclaration of DrinoipleB, the force of which, was 
of a moral nature, recognised that 'current events have brought 
into foGUB the realization that the interecta of the
developing: eountriec oan no longer bo isolated from each other; 
.that, there, is. oloco inter#-relationahip between the pi/ooperity 
of the doveloped cpuntrieo and the growth and development of 
the developing counti'ies; and that the prosperity of the 
international community, as a vzholc depends upon tbs prospezity 
of its conetitueit parts'# it was significant that it
affirmed that the new intemationRl eoonomlo order should be 
founded not only on the various principles on which the Inter*»
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national Dovelopment strategy bosed, but also on 
* faollzvating the rolo "which producers * associations may 
pzoy wluhla tae I'ranework of international co*»cpcratlon, and 
in pursuance of-their.alnc, inter alia* aeaietlng in promot­
ion or ounur'ined grovTth of the world economy and aoccloirat— 
ing develc_."ut of developing oountriee*.
It wse apparent, however, that in the mlna of the Amer­
ican beorotary of Gtate, Dr# Henr^  ^klaBinger, prodUGers' 
Gcsoci&tionc could, also pursue polioios at variance with the 
Gplriu of i%3temational co-operation, for in an addrees to 
tne Aeeombly, (89) ho warned that 'no nation or group of 
nations can gain by pushing its claims hejmnd the limite t3mt 
sustain world economic g%'owth\ and he maintained that 'the 
notion of the northern rich and the southern poor has boon 
chattered# fac world is composed not of two sets of interests 
but many2 aeveloped nations which are energy suppliers and 
developing nations which are energy consumers; market eooncm- 
les and.nonmarket eoonomios: capital providers end capital 
rsoipients'#
' The world economy ie a seneitive set of relationshipo 
in whlcli actions eon easily set off a vicious soiral of count— 
eractionc deeply/ affecting all oeuntries, developing as T;ell 
as teohnologienlly advanced/ he added# 'Global inflation 
erodes the capacity to import* A reduction in the rate of 
world grovfth" reduces export proepecte# Exorbitant 1 igh prices 
laver oonnuwption, spur alternative productlcn, and foster 
development of substitutes#*
But from the viewpoint of the 0?%c countries, and even 
of those developing countries who were suffering from the
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czorbitant Incroaso in the of oil, the ImpoBltion .cf
higher prioes for tholr com\:c:fzty exporte was a justifiable 
challenge to the rich dGvelo#d states who had for 8o long 
reoiotod thoi"^  pleas within the %lted ZTationa for more equit#, 
able and sti'lc prices %^ d.th a vie?; to Inorenslng the foreign 
exehnnca carnlrrc of primary produoto from developing count­
ries, .:creovqr, there can bo little doubt that Arab hostility' 
....-' ^ ■ * 
to the United 8totee and other iveetern Buropeon Gountrlee that
gave L ) orb to lorael in her struggle with- Arab oountries wao 
a factor of Dono Importance In motivating the exorbitant 
inoreaee In the price of oil#
The point that needs to be otreaoed, however, ie t 
the action of the (h'BO countries in oireatlng euch lr:cionoe 
problems for both developed and developing countries, ec well 
CD the reluctcnoc of the cocnomieally developed btatcc to 
treat the trade and development prablcms of the dcvelcplng 
crUi'itrlo. with.a greater sense of urgency, served to un-iorline 
-tao necu z'or greater internaticnal oo-operatlon .cnd the extern- 
olcn of the cnmpetcnoo of the Uni ted nations to Intervene in 
natters czcontially within the doncatic jurladlotlon of ito 
member,etatvn in the economic end eooiel fields* 3ut this 
could ic /.ohlcved; without contravening t;he pziroiple of non- 
Interventien under Article 2(7) of the Charter, only if all 
lacmber Dationo, developed and developing, producers and con— 
auaors, arrived at a oonGcnous on the wcrld-wldo ar^ranaemcnta 
that %:rrr 'cooosary, and gave organs the authority end the 
tieano. to carry thorn out* .
The pi'ogramme of notion of moot immediate practical 
importaneo that vrao adopted at the Slirth Upccial Jcosion of 
the UZÎ Anoombly on Baw Matcrlizlc and Dovolopnent v^ as tho eat—
abzlBk/aont of a opeoial c "rgcnoy fund,, under the aus%)iG08 
of too tJi, to holp those developing countrieo most ooverely 
affected by the increasGa.firieea of their vital imports of 
ozl, foodotuffc, fortlllsero and capital.goods* The Deoretary— 
General was asked to nako arrangements for t3ie operation of 
"cae fund in ocnsultation the various speololised agencloe,
end to lanneh en appeal for voluntary contributions to t3%o 
fund*. . \. :\.
m o  11 that the fund was based on %'oluntary oontrib— 
utlons Inaloated that no oonsensus emerged at the Assembly 
for the cost of the emergency operations to bo treated as 
expenses of the mi under Article 1? of the Charter, and thus 
subject to binding appei^tionment by the Assembly, Indeed, 
the bnzted states opposed the creation of.the fund oven though 
it was based on voluntary oonuributions, but this was not 
Dooauso it aiGputed the need for omergenoy aid to those count— 
rles Imrdoot hit by the iziternatlonal inflation, but becauee 
it:.:consiaered that such aid sliould be channelled through ex­
isting institutions within the THF ayetcm# Subsequently, at 
vhe Aooemüly's regular session, in December^ 1974, the .American 
delegate distributed a etetomont which maintained that the 
azd fund proposed by the non-aligned block would merely 
'znscrt yet'another layer of burcau oraoy between donors and 
those, who so doci^eratoly need asolctahco'* Appsi'cntly, the 
Americano %V2re olso irritated by the attitude cf the oil 
proaucmg .?crai) .states towards the emergency fund, statod one 
Uï; oorrcspcufont# The Arabs maintained that they supported 
the fund mid that they were giving largo sums to those count­
ries tnc fund aimed to help* But they refused to 8oy how much 
they were giving or to whom, end the recipient nations were 
too fearful of antagonising the Arabs to talk about It i)ubllo-
ly##* Bvem the Jorld Ban!, had been unable to find out what 
the AraDG were giving* . The only, certainties vrere t;iat the 
situation, was being polltioieod by both the Americans ana tne ' 
Arabs; the poor countries not. getting what they needed^ .;
and the Gezierol Assembly had done little about it*(99)
This aooount of the response of member etateo of the 
United ^^tiene to the Assembly*e special emergeno)^ fund, 
referred tc âbo%"e, underlined onee again the eeaentlally reo- 
ry oompetenoe of the Unltei Mations in the. economic 
end oool:âl fields# Though its . rerclu lions might %)e cujj^crted . 
by subotaatinl majorities, it had no means of compelling 
mcmber-atatea to r^rf financial ccntrlbutiena to the coonomic 
or socirl programmer recozm:icnded, and this was-one of the 
realities of international life which the devoloping oountriOG 
found it difficult to accept#
Oonflle.tlnf:^  Views .on .the uM'e Coinpetcn.ce
The developing countries were also die-satiefied with 
the limited competence of the United "atic.L Jonferenoe on 
Trade, and Development (U.MGTM)).# In .general, the developing 
countries, f  ^ nrted b^ r the Soviet bloc, wanted to reform 
irccrAD into .a comprehensive .trade organisation with oufficiezTt 
authcz'lty to make binding deGisions on matters designed to 
im%)rove their tero^y of trade, t^ ueh ao the fixing of equitable 
and eto.ble prices for thciz* ooimodity exports on which devel- 
cpod rtatcc were very much dependent, as well as on matters 
involving the reotnaoturlng of the institutional framcv;ork of 
Intometlonol oconomio relations so as to enoure a more cal— 
anood relationship between developed and developing count ries# 
On the other hand, the United btates, the United Kingdom,
Branco, Canada and.other developod countries ooncldored 
vMGTAD ohouM remain êBcentlallv a consultative organ of the 
Ascezzibly end arrive at Ito roco^t^orJaticno b^ " coïi^ sonouo and 
not by majority icDioionc to tiiloh they niglit to oppooed#(91)
Tl'ie differing Intorprctationc of the Chart or of Zoonomlc 
RiehtG. ^  . ules of states, which was approved by the DM
Assembly on. 12 December 1974, . by a vote of 120 to 6, %vlth 10 
abstentions,(92) also brought into focue the oonfllctlng vicwo 
of the devolcplng atatca and oeverol dcvolopcd ctateo on the 
ooTwpetenco of the: Assembly in the eooncmlc .field, The six 
ctateo t::at vet ci agalnat the resolution containing the to^ rt 
of the new Ohaz'ter were Belgium, , lenmork, V; eat Germany, 
ji^ uxembourg, tl:o %itod Kingdom and United States, and the ton. 
that abstolnod wore Auotria, Ccmado., 3'ranec, Ireland, loraol, 
Italy, JoTion, the lietherlande, Monday and S%;cin,
. This Charter, which was based on a reoomiseiidatlcn adopted 
by j V t its third oeGolon at Santiago in 1972, ^nd the 
report: of a working group, eat^liehed-by .iheUM Asaembly.ln'.. 
Booez^or o" t f ;'car, wao a doelaratlon of the economic
rights dutlee of ctateo wTiich reflected the standpoint of 
developing oountrleo. It affirneo each ntate'a right to exor— 
cioe full peroanont covoreljp:ty, including pocceecicn, use ez:d 
dispaoel, over all Ita wealth, natural re^Gurccs and economic 
aotivitieo: to regulate and exercloo eutlierlty ever foreign 
invcota.^at within.itc territory in accordance with its laws 
mid re^ulationct .tc regijdate the. activities of transnational 
corporations, and to nationalise, expropriate or trcnofer 
omerelilp cf foreign property, with conpcnoatlcn settled under 
its dcmeatic law and by its tribunals unleéc it was mutueily
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o.groGd by all otatoB cpnoorneo that cthor peaceful mcanc 
chould bo sought to reselve the. matter#
It wee Glso deolored In the charter that etatea had the 
right to aaeoclate in organieatione of primary commodity pro- 
duoere in order to develop their national eoonomies to achieve 
finoncing for their development; that it was the duty of otatoo 
to contz*lbute to the development of Intrz ""vZonal trade by the 
ooncluGloD of long-term multilateral commcdity agreements which 
took into account'.;:the interests. of producers and conGumere; 
that all otatcB shared the responsibility to promote the reg­
ular flow and aoooso of goods tredéd at stable, remunerative 
rmd equitable prioes; and that 'with a vlev; to accelerating 
the economic growth of developing countriesand bridging the 
economic gap between developed and developing countries, dev­
eloped countries should grant gozicrelii^ed preferential, nczi- 
%'eoiprocal end non-discrimiz)atcry treatment to developing 
countries in those -fields - of internationsi econoziio co-operation 
vjiere it may be feasible' # .
The debate on this Oharter of Koonomlo Rights and Duties 
of btatco in the UN Assembly indioated, ao The G u a r d i a n UN 
correspondent pointed out, that the developing countries reg­
arded it as 'a net of le^al norms and a first step toworde 
codifying intemotional law',(93) an interpretation which 
implied that the economically advanced states could no longer 
regard the duties i^resoribed in the charter as matters eoaent- 
ially within their domestic jurisdiction# On the other hand, 
tlie United States considered the charter 'non-lcgel and non­
binding', (94) and voted against it not because It was opposed 
to all its articles, but mainly on the ground that its articles 
on the treatment of foreign investment and compenaciuion for
5GG
foreign property nationalised by o state did %iot fully take 
into aoeount reopeot for agreenoiito and International obll#- 
atlonn, and beoauoe It oould not accept the endoroonent of 
produoer oartelo vghioh could fix and bold pricoa against the 
normal foroee of oun^ly and do and* In fact, the luilted states 
dolerato to the ITT Aoocbty'v ocond (Boonomlc end I^lnanolal) 
Goamlttee did not conoider that the charter provided for a 
balanced z^elatlonghlp between developed and developing count— 
rlee end would dieoourage the Internatimal flow of capital 
which wa# eo vital for develope%mt*{95)
fhlB debate in the Aeeembl); thus ohowed that there waa 
no eonaeneua %)etween developed and developlzig countrleo on 
several Inportont losuee, but at the Aaeembly'o seventh opec- 
lal Gooolon in Uoptembor 1975 both oldea displayed a greater 
meaeurc of compromise than previously, end approved a résol­
ution v;hich reprooented a new eoneonous on Development . and 
InternationLl ccnomlc €o«operatlo2i#(96) Above all, thourh 
it did not endorse the establishment of producer cai'telo which 
could fix and hold pid.ces against the noim:al forces of eupply 
and dammed, it rccognlGcd the need for tiie lmproveriont of 




Section 1 of the Aeconnily's resolution on Development 
and Intel ^_onal idonoj^lo Op-operatlon, whloli dealt with 
International trade, began by affirraing that 'concerted effoi'to 
ohould be made in favour of the developing oountriee towerda 
expanding ond diversifying their trade, improving and divers­
ifying thGlr productive capacity, improving their productiv-
Ity, Increaolny tholr export omvilngG, with a view to count­
eracting the adverse effeoto o:C inflation - thei^eby ouotalnlng 
real Inooméo — and v&th a view to improving the terras of 
trade of the developing countries and in order to oliziiinato 
the economic imbalenoe between the developed end developing 
Gountrlea*# It then etated than an import^mt oin of the 
Oonference on Trade and Development (WOTAD) should he 'to 
reach deoiaicna on the iuiprovment of market atruetnree lY) 
the field of raw materiala and commodities of export interest 
to the developing countries*, and that ouoh deciaiona ahould 
be concemod with international stocking and other forma of 
market arrangementa, including lonr-tarm and medium-term con- 
tracta, end adequate international financing for euch arrange- 
monta, in order to aeoureatable, remunerative and equitable 
pricea for commoditlea of export interect to developing 
count rice# It was also atrcaced that W O T  AD* a deoiaiono 
should take into account the need for substahtlslly Inprpved 
facilities for compensatory financing to aealat countrlea hit 
by a sharp decline,in comsiodity prices*, bz fact, in ^^ecticn 
II of the resolution - Transfer of real reaourcee for fine^- 
iUjgz the development of develoDiniR: countriea and international 
I o etarv reforms - it was etated th&t the compensatory flnan- 
cing facility available through the latornatlonal monetary 3und 
chould be o^i *idcd and liberaliaod and that t^ iio aliould alao 
apply to its buffer stock financing faoilitiee*
The International Monetary fund, which vms given a key 
role under the Acombly'e résolution, had approved a Oompcnaat- 
or^ ; rinancing for Export Pluotuationa cc^e:e in 19G3* Ihio 
echeme, whic3i woo Intmzded to help developing oountriee fcced 
by sudden felle in their export eaminge, vmB liberalised in
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I96G, when IMP members, particularly.developing countries 
that produced primary produete, wore allowed to drav; up to 
50T^  of their quota In oomponoatlon for temporary Ghortfello 
beyond their control# Deeidoo, In I9G9 the Bund aloo dooided 
to allow drawings up to SOÿ of quota to permit member etateo 
to finance pnrticipaticn in commodity buffer etocke organised 
under International agreements#(97) later, Inrebruar^ 1975, 
the In-.cn'^'tlonal I^onGtaiy Bund agreed 'to study the poeeibll- 
Ity of Inorcoozng its aæiotanco to buffer otocke and in eo- 
called ''cemwoneatoz^ uiolng" when a country*e foreign 
eamlnge froz rev; matei^ale drop off',(98) mid too!: eeveral 
deoieiocG to inoreaoo its financeal reeourceo to provide 
ready cao3. for countries with liquidity problème, end long­
term credit faoilitlee at low interest rates to the poor dev­
eloping Goimtrieo moot oeriouoly affected by ouch diffioultiec# 
The opocial ell facility to Gooiot zembera in meeting increaood 
oil import coots, which had been established in 1974, was 
enlarged from 3 billion to 5 billion, or the equivalent 
of 6*2 billion dollarG; financial oubscrlptiono to the Bund 
were, raised by more than 50 per cent; the OPEC membere* _ c ;SG . 
were doubled and hênoe their aubsorlptionG; and the Bund was 
authorieed to raise money which would enable it to make loanc 
to developing countriea in greateet need at the annual inter­
est rate of about 2^ per cent#(99) Moreover, in September 
1975 the I f decided that one third of ItB gold hoi .a, 
then valued at 14 billion dollara, ahould be sold, that ncli 
of the prooeedo should be distributed tc its members in rec­
ord an oe with their relative quotas, and that the other hazf 
oliould be placed in a trust fund to provide loons at m  low 
interest rate to developing countries with pressing liquidity 
difficulties.(lOD)
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estab llohm ên t o f  ouoh a t r u s t  fun d , finanood n o t 
o n ly  tW T i jk  th e  In te rz '' zon a l o zo to ry  fund gold oa lo o , b u t 
a lso  thTOU(^i v o lu n ta ry  e o n tr ib u t lo n s ,  was I'oooiznended in  the  
UN A oaom lly 'o  re s o lu t io n  on Devt^opaent end In te m a t lc n a l 
Soonomio G o-opors tion#(101) The Aosemhly a lso  reocimiGndeo 
th a t  'th e  e u ta b llo W e n t o f  a l i n k  between th e  o p e o ia l draw­
in g  r ig h t  a and develoiRî^ent aooletaneo ahould form  p a r t  p a r t  
o f  th e  c o n s id e ra tio n  by th e  In te rn a t io n a l Monetary fun d  o f  
th e  o r o it io n  o f  ne;/ epGOlal draw ing r ig h ts  ao and when th e y  
a re  crea ted aocord ing  to  th e  needs o f  in te rn a t io n a l l i q u i d i t y ' *  
(102) As mentioned e a r l ie r ,  th e  o b je c t o f  ouch a l i n k  would 
be to  e:':ablo deve lop ing  c o u n tr ie s  to  o b ta in  a g re a te r  p e rce n t­
age o f  LfMc ;;hen th e y  wore crea ted  in  th e  fu tu r e ,  f o r  d u r in g  
the  pe rio d  I9?0m^5, they  re ce ive d  Icon  than 5 cen t o f  t M  
;-'Dko which were d lo t r lb u te d  in  accordance w ith  I  ' deolG ions î 
a l l  in  a l l ,  th e  develo%jod o o u n tr ie s  re ce ive d  GDR 100 b i l l i o n  
o f  In te rn a t io n a l rcoe rve  c ré d ité  ove r these (p e a t) f i v e  j^eoro 
(97 per Gont) and the  leoa  dovelcpcd ooimtz^iec 2*g b i l l i o n  
(lesG than 5 per cent)'#(105)
It re rln'' to be seen whether this trend in Mlh distrib­
ution will be edified to enable developing countries to ob- 
t(iin greater finanoial reeeuroee for de%rolo]^ent* Jut einoe 
the developing ceuntrlea (including OlEG countries) control 
only about a third of the votes under the lUfe weighted 
eystem of voting, the developed countries have the voting 
power to determine decialona on the zLatter# i'^ ecdleoc tc aay, 
they would hg^ ve the last word if decio'ione were, arrived Bt 
couE^enGually*
The fact io that although dooloionG of the ZI::!!'' are bind-
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Ing on its members, unlike the reoomcondatory deoislons of 
the Aeoembly and its onbeidiary organe, euoh se UMOIAD end 
UI3DT, they oannot be reached vjithout the support of the major 
developed ooimtriee. In effect, therefore, the question of 
determining the eoeeleration of capital exporte to the poorest 
developing ooimtrleo la a matter within their jurlodiotion, 
and this aloe applies to deoieionG relating to the enlargement 
of fInanolal reeourceG for development aoeietanoe by thr crld 
Bank and Ite affiliate, the International Development Aoooo- 
iatlon, w M o h  was reoommended by the W  Aeee^bly in its 1975 
resolution on Dovelo^ent end International Economic Co­
opération. (104)
The AooeCiibly'e 1975 résolution stated that 'the partio- 
ipaticn of developing oountrleo in the decision-making proccea 
in the ccmpetont"organa of international finance and develop­
ment inatitutione should be adequately increaoed and made more 
effective without adversely . affecting the broad ' geographic 
representation of developing countries and in accordance with 
the existiu^ and evolving rulea'.(105) But general agreement 
on the prooiee formula for ouch a dovelopment la unlikely to 
change Gi#ificantly the dominant position of the major devel­
oped countriee# vnder the agreement reached in Januory 1976 
at the Klngoton meeting of the IMP, 'the preponderance of the 
United Utntes and other western nations will continue even 
though nevr voting arrangements will give a greater acy to the 
oil producing oountriea v/ho have become the new rich of the 
world ayetom',(106)
i>uoh being the oaoe, the leaot that ahould be expected 
of the advanood devoloped etateo io that they should faithfully 
implement deoioione arrived at with their consent, not at
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variance with the prlnolple of non-intervention in mattoro of 
domestic jurloâlotion, ^^ rhioh are adopted in the cz'gano of the 
speoialiccd International age;c*ce and UN development Instit­
ut lone* In brief, this m m m s  that they should oarry out rec- 
oomendatione In roopeot of targeto relating to the transfer of 
resonrceo to doyoloping conntrioa, in particular the officiel 
development aGRietonoe target of 0*7 per cent of grooo national 
product, to whioli they agreed in the AoBozibly* o 1970 résolut- 
Ion on Intoi'nntional Development Btrotogy for the Second Devel­
opment Dcoc.de, Olid confirmed in the Aseemhly'c reoolution in 
'September 19)75 on Develc^ ont and International Economie Oc- 
operation* (107) It ic also imperative that they should make 
a determined effort, as reoomraended in the Aeaezchl^-'e 1975 
resolution, to ocae acoeso of developing countries' exports^ 
especially manufactured goods, into their own markets,(106) 
expand their asoistanoo to GOientifio and tcohnologictsl pro- 
gremmcG of the developing vmrld, (109) facilitate the develop­
ment of new policloG, including labour market pollo^i , yJzick 
would enocur-ge the redeployment of their induatrice that are 
lcz3B ôoi::potltive Inteaniationally to developing countries, (llG )
and tike finm\,c_f"] Tv technlonl meaBurec to /Increase .rapidly 
thei/jproduction of fdodrin the needy Countries#(111)
it la elBo ensmtial that developing oountrlea in a pos­
ition to do sc, ao stated in the Aeoeably* a 1975 resolution, 
should help the poorest nations of the developing world who 
find greet difficulty in coping with ohortagoe of raw matez'ialn 
and food, (IIP) l oaidee, It ehould be recogniaod by both dev­
eloping and developed ocuntriea, though thio was not mentioned 
in the rooolution, that stopping the population e^cplosicn as 
quiclvly 0.0 poGOlble is offUndeaental Importance, as emplmoiaed
by ProfesGor John P# lewis# He riglitly aGoorts that 'poor . 
countries must do it to aid tholr Gcraable for Improved wol- 
faz'o, and to laprove internal equity# The rich countries 
must do it to ease the resouree-savlng adjuetments they are 
going to -TO to make* It is a global imperative with whieTi 
virtually olz national neede, rationally examined, ore consio- 
tent\{ll5)
But at the Rorld Bopuletion Gonforence in BucTmrost in 
1974, the majority of the delegatee from the 135 countrlos 
repreemted expresoed the via^ ; 'that/population problems could 
not be solved without economic end social progreeo which, in 
tum, required a more equitable international economic order, 
high fertility ratée would not decline merely through the pro- 
violon of family planning Information end means; declines ' In . 
birth rates and smaller family sice generally were essooieted 
with development mid modernlmtlon%(114) Indeed, the efforts 
of the advccatoG of family planning to socure specific commit­
ments by governments to provide Information and mesne of con- 
trace jv^rn to reduce over-population - meaauree which are 
esGO) V* 1 as the expansion of cccneizlc development progr^ 
if living standards are to be ralaed - were unBucoooBful,
if r V ft
The fact is that population and environmental policies 
in general ore matters essentially i^ i^tliln the domestic jurio- 
diction of atatee, oo that member etates of the United Matlone 
can claim that the Crganieatlon bos no authority to Intervene 
in ouch questions, other than to make general reoommndatlone# 
International Conventions may be formulated on euoh matters, 
but their ratification and implementation depend upon the 
coneent forthcoming from the natlon-ctatee#
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GonolUGlons
cince ubo deolslons of the W  Assembly and its eubsld- 
iary orgisns in the ooonorilo, Goolnl' m d  related fleldo are of 
a reooionendatozq' nature, their Implementation de%>endc upon 
utie ooneent 02' UN member statos* Conaequezitly, UM ]eecon%iend- 
&tio2io on quoatlonG of International trade and development 
assiotrnco, ' hieh Involve arrengementG between developed end 
developing ooihitrleo, stand little or no chance of being put 
znvo effect unless thc^ are arrived at by coneenouo between 
both ^cupB# Indeed, there io no guarantee that even conoen- 
Gual deoioions, not at variance with the principle of nozi- 
intcr%«"ention in matters esamtielly vrithin the domeotie juris­
diction of otates under Article 2(7 ) of the Chert or, v&ll bo 
implemented, for since they are reoommendetory, they cannot 
impose binding obligations on UZf momberc, and thie applies to 
the AoBccbly'D resolutioB on Development and Intemc^lmial 
Economic Co-operation which was approved unanimously at its 
seventh special session in Se%)tember 1975#
It must also be apprcoiatod the; although implementation 
of the ''cse^ b^l/'e 1975 rorolutlon on creiopnent onô Internat­
ional Ecanomlo Co-operation largely depends on decisions by 
the International Monotsry Bund and the borld : group of 
agencies, %?hich are binding on their nembers, unlike the rec- 
omneadatcry doolDions cf Ul% dcvolot^mont institutiozic such as 
IE: V TAD cud L MB, they cannot be reached without - the ' support 
of the nojor doireloi)ed countries whether they are arrived at 
conoensuolly or in accordance with the weighted system of 
voting that obtains in those l)odiG8«
The home Convention agreed to by the nine developed 
countries in the European ):ccnayic Ocmmunlty end forty-six
developing CDUntrleo in * rlca, the Caribbean and the laoifle, 
in Pobruary 1975, pointed the wry to the kind of oomprclie^ iBivG 
prcgr/_ 1 on.International trade end developneit aoBlotence 
that mignt be arranged, on a global eoale through ICT institut­
ions and the apeoiallsod agenoleo to Implemazt the AoGezably'# 
reaolutie:} on Dev^opmont and Internat!o)iol Eoononle Go- 
operation* Under this convention, prov'ioion was made for stab­
ilising forclgzi e^ cehenge eamlnge of the forty-elx developing 
countrieo fron twelve oozmiodity .exports, through .oompeneating. 
them when frlling prices redueo such earnings: finanoiol aid 
totalling El,700 1 Ion made available to the developing
eountrlea for a f L- c r period: the Industrial exporto of 
the developing , countries were freed entirely of ouotcms., . 
duties and levieo; and moot of tlieir a^ pricultnral exports 
given tariff-free entry to the nine EEC etatee* In return, 
the latter wez^ e aeeurod acceee to raw naterlnlo at predict­
able prlcoa#(115)
Of 00:" ,r K., a global vereicn of the home Convent ion, 
under which UNCTAD and the opeolaliced finance agencies could 
play a co-oralnated role, would require the acceptance of 
prcciee internatlcYnal obligatlonB amMved at by conceneue 
between the developed and developing countries, not at var­
iance with the pi*inclple of non-intez'vontion In mattero within 
their dczeetic jurisdiction* So, too, would the Integrated 
Brograme for Oomaodltieo, the plan conBlderod at the fourth 
aeeoion of tmc.mD In Nairobi in 1976, vhoee . implementation 
dopendc upon agreement between the developed and developing 
oountrloe on the establishment of a common fund to atabllloG 
the export eaminge of the commodity producing countrlCB by
financing atookpiles to help even out price noveaents and to 
provide oompenoation for fells In export earnings If prloea 
fell below a oertein level#(116)
Indeed, It io difficult to see how the international 
probleza of trade and development, population gro?/th, fishing 
limits, the exploration m d  exploitation of minerals on the 
deep ce? bed, and other economic, social and related matters, 
c n be solved, If states ere not prepared to consent to the 
diminution cf their domestic jurisdiction In favour of inter­
national legal obligations under multilateral oonventions which 
moke thez accomitable to the international community on such 
questions*
VIII* CCrOLÜKlOMR
In the light of iK.o dieoussions at the hen .Francisco 
bcnferencù In 1945, it wna the evident intention of those who 
drafted Article 2(7} (f the Ohsrter that Dnited iFaticns organs 
chovld not interfere in mottere traditionally regarded %%'ithln 
the donsstio jurisdiction of states* This principle of non­
interference was thus rcunt to apply to a state's form -of- gov- 
cr ''cnt: the troetzent of its own subjects, which covercd the 
entire field of human rights: Its administration of a non- 
sclf-gcvcming territory not placed under the uM trusteeship 
system: irteiTnal cczflicts ?;lthin its terrltozy; the else, of 
its or:/  ^/to zmd cz'mou forces: end. In the absence cf inter­
national trc-atlos.; its iz2);igration policies,.. questions of 
nationality, and economic policies, ouch as the imposition cf 
tariffs* The only exception to .this general' principle of non- 
intorforenco in natters OBsentially within the domestic juris­
diction of states was tlie coapetenoo given to the Security 
Council to authorise enforcement measuree to maintain o%^  res­
tore international peace under.Chapter VZI of .the Charter, If 
it deter%3iïiod that a situation arising out of a matter of 
domoBtic jnriodiotion constituted a throat to or breach of 
the peace*-
It should be appreciated, howoz^er, that nothing was 
included in 'u ole 2(7) to Indicate whioh oz'gan or authority 
was to determine ?;hetlier or not a matter was easentlally with­
in the daaestio jurisdiction of a state, and this, together 
with the fact tlmt. tlie critorion of international law was also 
omitted as a mcmm of dcolding the question, conspired to make 
the article a subjcot of controversial interpretation# Desides,
although It la ovi&ent that thooe who drafted Article.2(7) 
Intended that the t o m  *non*lntorvention* should' mean *no 
interference in any for&*, the text cf the article did not 
clarify its impllo&tlona* /he orgnne of the united hotlone 
were thuc given the loophole to accfrt their competence to . 
deal with ^uention: rti ooûld juBtlflGhly claim ao
matters eacentielly within their domestic guriedlctlon, and 
this hrn certainly been exploited in their handling of human 
righto ^ colonial questions*
Himan Ri^htq .aseqtlonc
In eeveral InGtanoGs United Uaticns organa have rejected
claims by Btateo that the human rights of their subjcote,
which they have been accused of violating, were matters eseent*'
lolly within their domeotlc jurlBuiotion, to which the general
principle of non-interference under Article %X7) applicable*
Rot only the Beourlty Council# but oleo the Assembly, the
Economic and Social Council and the UU Cornmleslon on Unman
to
Mljghte have asGumed the com%)ctenco to do thio/[a justify their 
practice of addreeblng ceneuree to particular governments on 
human zl ht: violations# though at the samo time it has boon 
rccognif,L ', the Aeecmbly that Dtatco are not bcund by inter­
national legal cbllgatimiG In I'crpoot of human rights if they 
have not voluntcnrily ratified international conventions V/hich 
remove such matters from the sphere of doneetlc/jurlsdiction*
ICaturally W  interferenoe in human rights questions has 
aroused the rocontment of those states which have been subjected 
to this trca' t'.cnt# end created much antagonism between members 
of the United Ilatlc^ ic, %'l%lch has weakened the Organisation* 
resides# many states# themselves guilty of practising various 
of tyranny# have actively supported W  resolutionslorms
condemning the human rlghta violation# of other states, and thug 
exhibited what has been described ae #the indecent spectacle of 
tyrants condemning tyranny at the United hatlonG*,(l) iberc 
lE much to justify the view, therefore, th&t tho organg of 
the United !3atione should cease interfm*ing in human rights 
queatlons in respect of which gtates , ^o not accepted inter­
national legal obligations, and that the legal approach to 
the liaplonontatlon of human rights, through the vcluntar,y 
ratification by atateo of the AGseobly'G oomprehenBlve Inter­
national Oovenants on Human 3 (te, should be strictly adhered 
to 1*0# in accordance with the principle of coneent ivhlch is 
not at vaii.ancG with the principle of non-intervention in 
matters ossentially within the deaestlo jurisdiction of states 
under Article 2(7) of the Chnrtor.
It is recognised realistically in the Covoiant on Econ­
omic, Social and Cultural uiyhts that the Implementation of 
sucli rights as the right to education and social security cE;zi 
only Indiveto objeetivos and standardo, for the réalisation 
of these rights depends on the resources available to states 
mid the Ce(Tco of international co-operation end eggieianoe 
forthcc. improve the economic and sooial conditions in
developIrg countries# In oontragt, the obligetiono which 
etates cgeuce undor the Covenant on Civil end Political Eig:%tG 
are meant to be implemented os scon ae they ratify it# It 
should bo .'r:v..ised, however, thot this offers no guarantee 
that states will honom* their obligations^ for the violators 
of the Covenant can onl^»^ be osiposod to the ooral pressure of 
the intoi'nationol oon::iimlty# ICvcii so, it is possible that/ 
states will do eometMng to modify their domeotio policies in 
the field of basic human ri#ite if tlmy are likely to incur
the morel luo of world opinion for tranogreBolng
the Internationa^, uovenont on Civil mid Eolitlcr!! which
they have voluntarily ratified. ^
th of ^ PeoploG ,
^bt long after the formation of the United Uatic,", its 
political orgeno began to Intervene in colonial questions 
which colonial powera could justifiably clolm were matterc 
eeaentially %?ltbln their jc juriedlction to sHich the
principle of non-lnterferenoe under Article 2(7) of the 
Charter was applicable, for instance, by eocerting its con- 
petencG to make reocKzendetiono on economic, Boclol and educ­
ational conditlono in non-celf-govemlng territories not 
placed under the UH truatecehip eycten, m d  to detcrlnc 
whether or not a territory woo oelf-governing under Article 
73 of the 'ter, the AGcembly accused a eupervieoiy role in 
reepect of thoce territorlec similar to that which it been 
authorised to perform, with the aid of the Truoteeehlp Oouncll, 
with regard to truot territories*
With fmrczocitions, the colonial powera yielded to this 
me&eure of cceountabllity to the United t^atlona during the 
early yoaro of the Org^inieatlon, though it hr.d not been inten­
ded by the crohiteote of the Charter* :)ut there wee more 
determined opposition on their part to prevent the United 
Uatlono frœi Intervening in oolonlol conflicts, end prior to 
i960, with the exception of the Indonesian affair beoauoe the 
Unitoü ; tctoe was prepared to exert precsure against the 
;iethGrlm)da in cupport of the Security Oouncil^e policy of 
deoolonieing Indonesia, the UU'o role in such conflicts wac 
restrictod mainly to recommending the desirability of negotiat. 
ions between France and her rebelllouo colonial peoples In
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%orth Africa,
hut the entry of a large numbez* of former Afrleon and 
Asian col(mle8 Into membarahlp of the United 1%tlone served 
to strengthen the attaok against colonialism in the AasL 13 y, 
and after the adoption of the I960 Declaration on the Granting 
of Independence to Colonial Oountrlee and/Peoples# the Aaoechly 
acted on the aoeumptlon that the principle of edf-determlnation 
rmpoaed a legal obligation on stateo to grant independent 
8u&wonood to those non-eelf—governing peoploe under their cont­
rol, mid was a sufficient basis on which to juetify UN inter­
vention in colonial eonfllotê without contravening Article 2(7) 
of the Oh&rter*
aeoumptlon wao of dubious validity, Even the most 
extreme of anti—colonialist stateg had reoognlccd that the 
. * right of self—determlnEt ion \  and other rlghtc which were 
includes In who International covenants on human rights then 
being drafted, could not be converted into legal oblz, t^one 
until Guch Govenante had been ratified by etates, Moreover, 
the fact uimt the Uovlet Union was anxious that the United 
DatloBB ahould act on thlo assumption wao not coneletent with 
It6 dlBrenpeot fo%' the principle of eolf-determination of 
pecpieo m  kooteiYi furope, though It i-.'ae underotendable that 
stases in Loa and Aela which had juet cnorged from colonial 
rule ehould have been eager to accelerate the prooesB'of de- 
ccionicatlcn through UN Intervention In colonial conflicts, 
even if it ivao difficult to justify Ito Intervention on legal 
groundG,
%bct of those states with ncn-aelf-governing territories 
were not averce to the procoae of docolonlaatlon being continued.
though the pressure exerted by the Aoocnbiy'G Ooamlttee of 
24 probably influenced them to cpeed up their piano to grant 
independence to colonial peoploe. On the other hand, üouth 
Africa woo leter&inoa not to yield control over Uouth Ueot- 
Africa (izmibia), and Portugal held on stubbornly to ite
cclc^ina until the fall of tbo Gaetano regime In i F * 
fhc illcv;;üL Lùjii:o in Bhodeola, too# denied the black populat­
ion in ohwu country the polltio&l rightG nocesacz'y to enable 
them to elect a government reaponelve to their wlahou in con- 
oonance ivith the prinoiplG of GOlf-deterLination, Go&Gequently, 
during the l9&0s m u  after, the ooembly concentrated its 
effort# mainly ageinot those states.
fho Aosodbly justified its réccnmendatlon for diplom­
atic and economic oanctlcnO agalnot Portugal not only beoauae 
it csnoidored that the principle;of.self-determlnation wa# a 
.legal right agninat which Article 2(7) of the Ghnrt'er was no 
defence, but alao on the ground that the conflicts in the 
?ortuauoao oolonies endangeroi international peace m/d coour- 
ity* It, icarg'uable, therefcra, that reoommeadation %'fao 
a Gontravention of Article 2(7), since the principle of oelf- 
determination had not been converted into a log''3 right- 
nullifioi ;.'oruUgal*a ,domeBtio jurisdiction over ..the question 
of determining when its colonial pooplea should obtain indep- 
ehdenoe, .rid only the Security Ooimoil wao entitled to author- 
ieo enforcemont measures in situc^tions arieing out of nattez'O 
of domo^Llo jurisdiction that oonetituted a tinreat to Intez"- 
national pe^oo* On the other hand, in recommending economic 
Banctions aga.inet Bouth Africa for refusing tc coizply with Its 
re&oluticna on Namibia, the ABoembly wao on aounder ground, for 
it could renoonhbly claim, that Gouth Africa was accountable
to tho United Hatlona for ito ndcinistrotlon of a forcer 
le&guo of Actions mandate, sa the Internationol Court of 
Justice emuhaalGoâ In I97I when It advised that the continued 
proBonce of Bouth Africa In Namibia was illegal,
2he beater# powcre were thus less justified in refusing 
to join in the application of economlo oanctiona agalnot ^outh 
Africa in response to the AGsembly*^ reco&men&atlonG on 
Nsraibia# and In exercising their veto to prevent the authoris­
ation of ouch ceaoures by the üeourlty Council under Chapter 
VII of the Charter, than in preventing -much action .net 
Portugal prior to that otate^e surrender of Its African colon­
ies* It vmuld appear that the Western powers, upon whom the 
effectivenesa of eoonmic aenctlcns agalnet Bouth Africa would 
largely depend, were afraid th&t euoh coercive measures would 
not only daisgo tlielr cvm economies, but alec lead to a Qitu- 
otion in southern Africa which would give the Bovlet Union 
opportunities to extend ita influence in the area*
Only In the case of Ehodesla hao the Security Council 
euGceedcI li: authorlBin^ dcvciy economio sanotioas ageinat 
a roglme which it condemned for pursuing a policy:" Inoozpalllle 
with the self—detoraination of tlio black nejority: ln that 
country, but It zioeds to be otresGod that m-en in this instance 
v"* ^ sanctionr'ly i:)ressure Avhich the United Uatione was able to 
exert wag zncuificlent to bring about the collapae of the 
illegal regime# The Rhodesian affair thus de&onGtrated the 
limited enforce ^nt capabllitiec of the 0%*g%niaation, and not 
Gurprlsingly gave rise to what Richard A. Folk has described 
as ^Btratcgiee of violent implosentation* by those whose 
claims to celf-duL .jiinatlon could not be r 0olioed through 
the action of the United ITat Ions*
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and the Non-intervention frlnciplc
At ban JranoiGco tao arohlteeto of the Charter agreed 
that each of groat powers, the permanent members of the
security uounoll, should poodoso the right of veto in the 
field of enforcement action, Zhcugh thio meant that the 
oeourlty Council would be unable to euthorioe enforcement 
measuroe againet a great povjor under Oliapter VII of the 
Ohaz'ter, it ivaa preoumed that the great powera would co­
operate to enable the Coimoil to do so when thoj'' were not 
directly involved# i,e* authorise enforcement measuren ojain&t 
leaser etatea that threatonod or caused a breach of internat- 
lonel poaco# But the hlotory of the Security Oouncll has 
ohov^' that groA^ t' power dlo-unity has made .it a major failure 
in this Gonneotlon, and prevented agreement being reached on 
making available to the Security Council the armed forceo neo- 
eeoary for maintaining international peace and cacurity# in 
accordance with special agreemento under Article 43 of the 
Charter* ;
Tl.i''' Izlmtorr of the United Uations has alec shown 
though, the AnnnTcbly has been able to reeoimuend Bazictlrnnry neae» 
urea ardnct otatoG whoge policies# , In . the view of the majoi?- 
Ity, have „,d"jiycrod internationnl peaoe, its recommendations 
for the application of such meneur es have been ineffectively 
Irqlemcatoi because states whose nupport woe vital v/ero opp- 
oocd to vbc#,
ICL j,thotanding the limited oapabilitien of the ITnited 
Nations OB an "-f (Qr fqr the enforcement of peace, however, 
the Organisation hag Guoooedod in Glowing down the Impôtuc of 
conflict or effecting a ceGoatlon of hoBtilitioG In
YU
troubled areas* Bhl# It has done through oomo forn of UN 
presonoe, &uoh a# military observer groups or forces armed 
only for self-defence which have been contributed voluntarily 
by member-stetes and. established with the consent of those 
ctàtcs.o.n whose tezrltory they'have been required to operate* . 
.ÿhç estohlf ohmont of such peacekeeping ic.sonnol .has thus not 
been at varinnce \ith the principle of non-intervention in 
natters eesmitlally v^ithin the. domestic juiisdiotlon of .states, 
under Article 2(7) of the Charter*
Hio ihetanoe of * peacekeeping with the
consent of etates was -c") t conducted by UN observers and U r?
( United Natzc ni Uocurity Force) in v;e$t New Guinea ( %. eat Irian ) 
in 1962* This was beoauso the Force was give:) a clear mandate 
to maintain law and order whilst the United Nationo temporary 
Executive Authority (UNTEA) took steps, wader en agreed polit­
ical sottlomont of the dispwto bctvroen Indonesia and the 
Netherlands, to transfer the administration of the territory 
to Indonesia, hut other peacekeeping operations by UN forces- 
establiahed vrlth the consent of states have been embarlced 
upon iHon '"VC waa no L'lmediate proo^'^ct of a political sett­
lement be f the parties to the conflict, 00 that any party
which *ed that the continued preaence of the iTN force
beyond a mable period of tine was simply having the
effect of fr&CRing tho .statuo quo, to the advantage of its 
adversary, was likely to regard the force as an expedient 
which had outlived its usefulness. Apparently, this was the 
case in 1967 when Egypt reached the conclusion that only 
through collaborating with Byria and Jordan in exercising 
military pressure against Israel could the Arab-Israeli 
question be resolved, end demanded the withdrawal of the UN
Zmerjoncy which had bocn established by the Acoembly
with Egyptian consent in 195&*
fhat Egypt wag able to secure the withdrawal of the UN 
force in 196? without chsllenge in the political organs of 
the United Natione, even though this was likely to lead to a 
resumption of hostilities between Israel and her Arab neigh­
bours, demonstrated the fragile nature of a u ^oacekeeping 
operation whose termination vme recoghieed ae a matter withiz: 
the domestic jurisdiction of the state on whose territory it 
ivae being conducted* /^ nd though the question of detemlnlng 
the ter iintion of the second. UIT Smergency Force in the 
mdilc ."'It# whioh was established by the Security Council 
with the consent of Egypt and Israel in 1973, appears to be a 
matter witliin the jurindiotion of the Council, so that z^either 
Egypt nor Israel may. legitimately invoke the n cm-Intervention 
principle under Article 2(7) of the Charter to justify a 
demand for its withdrawal, in practice that body has dedt 
with exteneione 6f the forceps mandate as If decisions on such 
matters fercnded on the consent of Egypt.and Israel, .Beslaes,. 
it has been recognised that Syria and Israel must give tnorr 
approval before the Security Ccunoil con ezrbsnd ZIDOf^s man­
date* Consequently, the oontiimed presence of peacekeeping 
forces In the middle East la' highly precarious, end tvithout 
signifioant progress towards a comprehensive political settle­
ment of the )-l6raeli question, tliere is the danger of a 
recurrence of hostilities which the small sized Ub forces 
armed onl\T for self-defence could not chock.
It is difficult to avoid the oonoluslon, therefore, that 
the Middle hast will remain highly oxplosive until the greot 
powers, particularly the United States and the Uoviot Unzon,
apply gufficlant llnlc ic and ooonomio proDEure cm ^he 
parties ccnoemed to Induce tlu^ : to accepts political settle— - 
ment In conrccru/ce with principales considered reaooiiablc by 
the Seo:.irit^  " end eeslgt jointly: in tiwnsfcrming the
oxiatlng non-coerclve UN forces . In the. area into foroca with /. 
offcotlvo omCcrocmcct oanabilltlev to cnnrre the obsorvcnGO 
of . euch a r/.tllcimit*. .Certainly* .It lo in .the Intmreat of . . 
thé cupor ;,cwcrc to a.dopt such an ap)proaùh# alnoc it is the 
most ocnci'^ 3 . 0 1 ; ^  which they can avoid direct oonfrczitov- 
ion with each other in areas of conflict outaido their milit­
ary fl- GyotemB»
.IndeM, it is difficult to oee how the grca;; po'rerc ., 
can make a policy of detente credible unleoG they resist the . 
temptation to exploit such conflicts to extend their own 
cphoreo of Influence, whether such oonflicto involve strife 
between leaser gtatee or war between rival factions in a 
ed _f .t" ^ 8" that conatltnteo a tlircat to Intemat 1 on%1 pcoco 
and security, ouch as coourred in the Congo in tho early IbuOa 
or in . ; ^ .n the mid 19708* Clearly, it is aealrable that
the r^-t powora should recognlos the need for. joint aotlon; .- 
.under, the augpaicec of the UN to put an end.to .aueh confllcte*. 
and.it needs to bo understood that such action would not b o ' 
at variance .v;lth the principle of non-lntorvonticn in matters 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of stateo under 
the Charter#
It is ol^vnlflcant that an end to the conflict liz the 
Congo was not effected until after the Eecurity Council had 
autborlGod Jooretar^^—General U Ihcczt to take z^ieaeures against 
Fehonbe^s latangB which .approxlm8.ted more to. onforcemcnt 
meaaures unuer .Article 42 of the Charter than to provlsioziel,
non-enfcrecmont measures under Article 40, which Secretary— 
General Hcmmarnkjold had attempted to apply In accordance with 
the principle of oelf—defence and non-intervention in Internal 
conflicts, constitutional or otherwise* Indeed, had there 
been great power unanimity i# the Security Council to enable 
that body to authorise enforcement measures In July I960, it 
le rececnakle to aoauae that much of the conflict during the 
yeare that fcllowed would have been prevezited*
From tkke analyeie of peacekeeping operations with UIT 
forces in this study# it would appear logical to infer, thore-ÿ 
fore, that unices the great powers recognise the need to permit 
the Security Council to authorise enforcement measures to deal 
with throats to the peace# broaches of the peace# or acts of 
"rsGsion "C^ieh involve leaser states outside their nllitary 
alliance systems - action pormisoiblo under Chapter VII of the 
Charter without contravening the principle of non-intervention 
under Article 2(7) — there lo little hope of the ITT. being able 
to function effectively as a peacekeeping agency with a zimzted 
but none the less Impoi'tant role# for iD! forces# armed only 
for self-defence and established with the consent of stages# 
have for the most part proved ver;^ ' fragile Instruments of 
peacekeeping in areas of conflict* Oe-cteinly# it is in the 
interest of the great powers to cot in this w%'' to prevent 
their collision In dangerous stern centres# as well as to 
exert their,influence on.lessor states to accept political 
settlements of their differences# based on principles roocma- 
ended by the Security Council# In order to prevent the out­
break or reourr.enoe of violent conflicts*
The Roduotiou /md Be,fiulation..of
Of course# the creation of a UN peacekeeping force.
equipped with sufficient strength to deter or ccorco any state 
tbat ehallemgcd it, and without which parties tc an internat­
ional treaty on general dlGama&ont could not ho afforded 
adequate eocurlty# nust be regarded ao a utopian concept# 
since there is no prospect of tran&fcrslng the United Haticna 
Into r, political Institution with sufficient power# to estab­
lish or. crmtrol such n force* Consequently, it has to be rec- 
.: oghisel vk'^ t It is unrealistic to rogard renoz'ol and largo 
scale 61 comment as a sorlouc objective for tZio forocecahle 
future, cic that the only practicable objeotlvea, in the 
present .contezrt. of .international politioe, are partial meas­
ures of control and limited reductions of armaments and 
military personnel*. , . . . «
A baoio t]]o arns control agreements already
concluded is the right of states, parties to ouch agreements, 
to withdraw from their commitncnta if they.decide that their 
national intoreato are jeopardised because of events related 
to the ,jt 3^tter of the treaties* For instance, the 
domestic jurisdiction reservation on withdrawal from the 
Treaty .on the Ncn-lTolifcr'^: *on of Nuclear VJcapona hot only 
givee alcaxiole to an%/ nonnuclear otate, party to It, to 
-ombar:: on :a nuclear arms ir'C'-r If it decides that its 
national interest dictates cuoh a course of but also
provides the means for any nuclear power, party w-the treaty* 
to tei%inate Ite obligation not to transfer nuclo r weapone . 
to anon-nuclear. Gtato or to ansist that otate in their manu­
facture# It is desirable, therefore, that the domeetic juris­
diction reçcrv'tlOB on withdrawal ohould he removed from the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and other 
partial arms control treaties which recognise thic reoervation*
Another æajor weaknegu of these arms control agreements 
Iw that wbln& and Freaoo oro' not party to them» Clearly,' 
alnoe both etatoe are permanent moulera of the oocurlty 
E Dim oil, the body ccnjetent %mder the terms of the Non- 
frolifer^uion Treaty, the Sea Bed treaty, and the Convention 
on clolc/loal Weapon# to consider viol&tlonc and to authorise 
'enfoioencnt meaaureo agalnct violât ora, their part iolpatiom'- -in 
such trnatiea is vital to their effective implementation* 
vonaequcntl^^ÿ it la imperative that the United Gtatea, the 
Uoviet Union, and the United Kingdom ohould make aerloue dip­
lomatic efforts to encourage their oollaboration.
Above all. It liae to be reoognieed that progreoe towardo 
the Goneluaion of eatiefaotory i^artial arms control and IHzlted 
disarmm^snt. agroeaonto,. not at varicmoe with the prinoiple of 
non-intervention In matters of domestio juriodlotion, dopende 
upon the consent forthcoming from êtatee to accept effective 
methoda of international inspection, where neceeeary, to 
cncurc tfiai ouoh agreements arc observed. Indeed, the safe- 
guardo agruomcnke between the International Atozalc Ame^gy
mid /son—nnolear waapozi otatca, parties to the Treaty 
on the Non—yro3,iforation of Unclear Ueapono, w M o h  Involves 
the. use of the agency* o inspootora to verify whether such . 
agreemonta are being complied with, may well een i %i a. patt­
ern for vorifiGatlon prooodnreo in other poeeible arzne control 
lémente»
The Role in thu oonomlo and Sooial Uielda .
Ihoughtho IDi AGsembly end the Boonomlo and booial 
Council were not given the compétence to take deciaiona on 
économie and occial natters which would bo binding on 
membei' otateo, it waa neverthelecc rooognlaed in the Charter
that it wnx desirable for its stato-oignatorioa to participate 
in auùonozoua economic and. social agencies which might posseoo 
the ooopatsncc to talc-mandatory doGicione to enable the 
process of international economic and ooolol co-operation to 
be conducted more effectively. Of oourco, since the obligat­
ions aceopted by eteteo through the membership of ouch agenc­
ies had to depend on their ratification of multilatorsl 
treaties in aoeordanoe with the princiiiLe of consent# they 
had no reason to conplaln that any linit&tion of their domest­
ic jurisdiction as aeabors of ouc^ i institutions would conflict 
with the j.'Caclple of non-lntcrvmtion or non-interfcrcnoo in 
matters oaGcmsially within their domestic jurisdiction.
But though tho specialised financial agoncioo related 
to the uN - the International Monotrn'y ?imd and the' %orld
jgrouY) of agencies - have been dosignod to operate under
o.onstitutions which Inveot thorn with the authority to tolco 
decisions which are binding on- thoir ziomber—statos, in con­
trast to tho UN Assembly and its subsidiary.organs in the 
economic and social fieldo# whose competence le restricted to 
tho spproV4/l of recomnendator^' decislozis# it must be appreciated 
that the binding decisions of . the I/iP and the World Bank group - 
cannot be reached without the support of the major developed 
countries# like the United states, or such groups as the
whether they arc aiTivcd at conscnsually or in accord­
ance with the weighted system of voting under the constitutiono 
of those bodies. The fact is that tho decision making proc­
esses of these %encies.— Institutions whioh have vital roles 
in the inpl nation of the UU Assembly/*s recommendations 
on Development and Internationa]. Economic Oo-operation - do 
not, in effect, limit the freedom of action of the major econ­
omically odvenoed countries on international monetary matters
^end the of financial assiatcnoe to the imcr devel- .
oping countries*
But it must algo be realised that the developing count­
ries, no less tlian the developed countries, have been preperei 
to surrender little of their domestic jurlodlotlon to achieve 
more t 'Otlve international action in solving problczas of an. 
economic and acolal character. Indeed, it has to he reoognlsGd 
rcallûtloally that progi'oso in uplifting economic and social. . - 
Gtancnz'd# tl&roughout the world largely depends upon the will­
ingness of both (loveloped end developing ooimtrios to Implem­
ent faâthiully recoi.r:ondatlcno arrived at by obhaensuc; in UZI 
vhioh are not at varlmioe with the principle of non- 
intervcxtlon in matters oaaontlaSly within the domostlo jurlo-. 
diction of GtatoB, through, the voluntary accoptanoe of preciee 
interziatlona]. obligations under multilateral treaties,
To GU%; Up: whilst it is judlciouc that , the o~ rs of the 
United Nations should refrain from interfering In the affair# 
of statcB not covarad by précisa, international legal obligat­
ions, .It is desirable that ./UE mombers...should consent .to a 
gz'eatair . diminution of their domostic jurisdiction , in favoin? .. 
of such ohlicitiona, in order to make international co-operation 
&ore affective in the security, political, economic and 
Goolal fields.
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44. gs. Has. 14C9(XIV). IS 3eaei*or 1958,
45. ïJncioi’ If ::o3. 154.2(XV). 15 Beoosfeer i960, the Assosibly 
geairrcsr A'lmt i?OTtiisgtil’s African territories wore noa- 
Eeli'-qcA’CGw.iHg and that Portugal was obliged to transmit 
information about then under Article 73(c).
46. g& Ho b. 1468(1X7). IS Bocenber 1559.
47. !ie© A'Pg. 184G.G7. pp. 536-40,
48. Doe m  1847-48, pp. 362-65,
48. Under A-*lulo 40 the acourity Counoil moy. before Resid­
ing on f 'orsc'toïït oonoureo,^ call upon the parties to 
comply iiitU Ëueîi provieioasi ccaouï'és es it deeraa neceao- 
ary or deslreblo,"’
50. aS_E@s. 455, 1 Aag-aet 1947.
400
51# See II of thio. Btudy*
5^ '. 467, IP August 1947# ' . -
52. 2C.ji6a, S£S.(1). 25 Aagaet 1947.
54. so HSS. 525(11) 25 August 1947.
55, See hP. 212.13, v
56# EC Rao. 1190. 24 Doùedbor 194G# \ \.v
57.
58# BG Ren. l"34f 28 Jmuozy 1949# . - \ :
59# B# -'inCciGo* 'Indonesia oad the UlT* Leg^oliém* y^olltloe 
end tU'3 Lcw'$ Inton^stionol Rolotlons# Vol# 111$ Ro,8$ 
Mov. 19^9$ The c/ the Lcvid Davlos Mlemorlal
i liictlüUvù'cf IHverziCrtlonol Ltudloc, p# 587#
60,
51# Ibid#,, p# 5BS# .
62# Bee YT%^,^.,ig52# pp. 57e-S5.
GA aea#^612{VII), 19 looember 1952, 
64# Moe 1953# 2,190.,
05# ':;GG 17 Deoember 1954 m d  O A ^ M ^ S l M A ),
65, Leo jRjR,, 19 r^2,' p# 26G)e't.„8eq.
67, OA Roo, 61ir ), 17 morniber 1S5S# .
68,#. See A%r%*, 19^5$ pp, 2Q8L1^#
69, $1 voted for the draft résolution, IB against, sn& 10
(%b;3i;fii:icx3 # .
70# ,.r. ROD, 915(D:)# 17 Déomber 1954# :\'\ .
71. Boo y;r:^  1955. p%, 65-9 for on aocou3it of t w  l^erlm 
. . , quootz^ o^ : %;i%955# '
72. 04 Reo,Ll012CXIh 15 Pehruery 1957#
75. .GA .Wo, llG/i.():II.)., 10 Deomher 1957,
74, Boe n r p  p, 79^81# The iroting on the draft roo-
olutlon "('otee in favour# 18 against* with 28
abotojtlcLo.
75# BOO TUJ# !. ./. op, 9 W *
76# 1957# pp, 72^6#.
77.# !) ^ectrnber^ 1958,
401
78* 9.15$.
79, Crtîoîïs. Girine-a, Jorâ^'i, I M i m  Sepualic, iRos^ lltg'aa 
Aral tàîiïu’jlioj. TA/Ada, "égal, îanioia> Sudan, srx
■ JÆHkG (foï'r.îeriy Ce.}ly.t}, (‘jad Aloi’occe.
ÿ)r Repuhllo* Oamoroon^ Ohad^ Cozigo*
3aboi>$ lîTory Coaot* ...jûagaeow* Mail* Ligor* Lzgorla* 
Sonogcl) c.alla* enâ Togo* -
81* GA luis. 1914(%V^^ M.Deoenber 196O*
B2#; L=cQ ,1'"%* PD# 4 W 0 $  for an aooomt of the éeWto 
on jJoolc&tlon and Its full test*
8gÀ 3 ^  l I K ^ m ) .  D e o e ^ W  1961*
34« obc î'B» 47-57* ■





Cotr:rtriG3 aad.J’aoplos* in.f03.19.6? œ û  ouhcoçumt Y O g ,
-s i-•«.;( » •" “v>*> .cè»--’%*!•*«*■<■ »k..* " Kw* 'M- fs<« >
es ïork, ÎS7C, p,S.
. 20 April 19S1,
99* 5 Ju^o 1961. (Coc Ï S k J M l t  m *  85-55 fer
un cceccj.t cl tno t^ocollcn, )
90* ë:_ioD. I'vl3(.mi). IS # o m b e r  196».
91. 3g_;iSRT.l%, 31 July 1563*
9». mJlSaT,.aiSZW, :! leoeober 1S65.
93. ;aw : . UL2&G. Pg* 608.^8.
r . # R # 4 & 7 t ^GraM/R7(Ili' ):'"#%%#ëePl94S.
9»* . 5^.JàSjiÇiSSi 1950. pp. l?Ëf 153—4-0, 144* cv see ^TiM&xAS^
pp.U0'/-14.
36* 3-955, rr. 67-8, or PP»
■ cnct .ÇvG, p.5», or W *  »04-a»*
97. ââJiiiiwiïâiiiiSi)* 19 December 1Ç61,
iSiUiSiSYfe, 1966, s*6, et. oe%,, or pp.648-
flg'r'H'lJrê:?? et 
99, ^  OOtober I96G*
3ecGid>or Igù?*'
102# c w  ;%)_ 'loocimv of tho queetlcn of Raalbia before the 
''Gouzwy Uo^icil :n 1959$ eoe IB^L pp# 675-701#
-Zuly 1970# For .gn aooount of the pro-$r- ,  ^  ^W' 'Vf^* Ï.J-.V» ««f V V  V*-^ »'*'-ii.'W J/»L W
S"i?“ ¥'w® '-•’■'uloJi loa. to  i t s  spaaotroX, raee 1Q7G, «y.
I V - & '  . ■ ' '
104. .iiL ikü & U & î-, -'=3 J u ly  1970.
iC 5* I'Cv 581—16.
10Ü, j l l ; *  '■& tc to ’r-Ci* Û.D71. Joo UG iJoath lv i'ihvt'-MoTi
..O fc s J 'c i'lj7 1 , PS. 15-34, fo r  
. ':33U:z.ty '■f’ajjîi. .
10?» 17 .vocciiiay -0 :4 . cg ‘ S itu a tio n  is  ffjS !» ± a ’ »
11— uï ci wt ry U.9F5, Pî>» 15—27»
3-6*s» 68 d'une 19G2, .
M JâS Ê A JM M M .h  5 l'oirc-tfoer ig e s .
“ 1C*. SSuMSÆ.J3Âf 12 Kovcaler lg 6 5 .
111* ii^ LMsàs.JM.» 20 Eoveobûi- 1965.
112, M Ji-iâ j^JIlfî^U U ^), 20 Beocsîber I 965.
lo% ef XL.0 : ccblutlm,
-('Gcombor igGS#
115# PL, C9-13S* -
 ^$ 3» fZovexibér 1957*
Deoember 3L$58#
$ 29 May igGa* '
Loc r'io/nzL 'The United R'atiwot Various
-î,'.iy iioca uorüoa'iîer, ÿrineeton ualvexclty l-reos.
iy7i, :v. i9'j“4
.3^ 20# 7 Ikuroh 1976, pAü#
%<1# ior CL f^ocount of Klorlnger^o hnoAlio opooeh* see
2*3 /cp%%iL 3.975$ êâ%d p,6#
8^no(' LI//9 irgh nni Ru:t(nvi Rwopenn ooimtzlos# nnd a 
% c o  :y.'Ljc cf_i:iLzC v'm'ld ot^too$ hLVe eoowoü^the aêôi^" 
c/ ucycTcû. reueluticaio by tho UII Aosonbly to Improas 
%)on ü.io Rfroürity OounoU tho neod for uooouros to 02^ng
1 3
Cn 10 Movozboz- 1$75 the Aasonbly$ by a vote of 101 to .
8$ with ?5 abstentions^ re^^firrned its roeolutlon $235 
(XXIX) of 52 uDvaxber 1974$ which had recognised 'the. 
iLuliczu.le national rights of the I'oleotlnltm.people*$ 
dooidod to ostablleh a Gomilttee on tho'Ezercioo'of the 
IniLlionclle Righto of the Rolestlnion Fecplc'* and author— 
Iscd tunt ues&zsittee to subnlt a report* ?&th recomacedat- 
lo::e$ to Jho Socrotsr3^,#Goncral not" later t3z!$a 1 J m o  1975 . 
to o:a!:lo bin to trmozlt tno report to the - Security, 
vfrccll* Ù3.Ü0 0^: 10 Hovezbor igfSg the Aeeemtly* by a 
vote of 93 to 18$ with r? abstontlcm* celled for ^the 
invitation oi vbo Taleotlne I^iberatlon Orgenleatior, the 
reprosontrtivo of the caleotine people* to paitlolpeto In 
all o:Zfcrt9p dollbc'^ntione end ceafereneee 'on the illddlo 
Laçtÿ wliieh are held imder the auapicee of the United ' 
on on ^equer footing v/lth other portico, on the 
bno^o of renelntion $5$5(X)lI:{)',
Tnc Jnitod utaten .otid other ntatee that voted ognlnet 
tiiecc rDsclutlon^) took the vie.? that the Ddeatine llbor- 
aticn Crjziioation'6 refusal to accept the erieteaoe of 
cid its rojectlca of Locurity Coimoll rocolutloas. 
on tZic :Z.adJ,e Last dia qualified It uo e parti04.*iat Im 
oorforcriiQoz on the I;lddle Dant*
' Since leraol was a otate which had hooR ootahllchcd by 
tbo hhitcd Mations* there was jnotifloation for their . 
opposition to the naeembly'o'cnll for the 310 to parvlc- 
ipato in vZi ocsifeTenoen on tho Middle Hast# hut It le. 
dlffioult to jmtlfÿ %lted Staten action In vetoing a_ 
roeolutic:: I'ofore tize uoourlty Oommll on 27 Jannmy 1976$ 
which wo'j^ ld iiovo affirmed that the ' Ralootlnian people 
riioulC bo oncbled to cxoroiec Itc right to ootcblleh on 
indejcudoht abate i'z loleatlnc, that'leraol ahould vzita- 
fzcci nil rzah terzltoi^ea occupied elnoo 1967* end 
tLzt thore rhc'Bld he nrrmT,cmmitc gnaraiteeing tlio right 
of nil ctntcj In the area to Dcaccful cxiatcnco wltliln 
r^ Qp;;r'3 reocgnincJ boundzrikC. The United vtcvtea del- 
ognte onnciiod tlict l^ ic dolegatlon^B nogativo tote wac 
%:ot l%i*où cn to the acplratieno of the Dalootin—
IrnCy h::t hocnuae^lt did not conoluor tl:at the JraTt 
rocclnticn wac the noot of fectlvo vmy of oddrosoing the 
prohloc cf, t'holr fntnr<^ in the cnnte:g:t of m  over-riLl
OOtwlOZC&jt, '
It io dlificult to coo how a octtloment of the inddle 
Bozit urection ow: be erfocted* ao the delegate for Prance 
during t2i3 debate in the Goourity Council* 
uzileao prcvicion lo %mdo for Israeli withdrawal frotü the 
occupied teri^itorion* rocogkiitlon of the rl#.t of the 
Irzdc tü independent homeland* and re- 
fiflrraticr cf the right of all states in the région* 
induRing Zoroel, to Bccurb and roecgnlsod hciindarles#
The report W^nlttcd to the Bocurity Council in rk\y 
1S76 by tlic CocT'ittcc cn the Tbgcrciae of ths Inalioz:ablo 
!:ighto of the ;;Ylewtinim People* %?hleh was set up b,; t W  
In";c;Vbly in hoves^or 1975$ celled for. the of dis-
plLOoi ?aloDtlnia::%s to their hones and reoon,,*onlod thut
Avift Ooi7tV;,i.l c'aq'jXù. £.sii c, fleaâliïss ox -1 Juiic- 3.5??
I'or cwi-acio nthjzsy;:! fcy EcjraoX I'ros s W  arc;'5 , 
o-aov,:.;l.;« it»’ IS''?, tlmit tic «t-Ou-Aoû iori’itoyiou Ghoulu 
be tlSrae ever 'oy t.îà IB', iti cc-eperAr.iios t;xs:i Jue .acv.yuo 
-’icb. i/iila:: wr?r,lc; «a'bncicwontxy 'iuzvl them ovu.'.'^
t v  the i-cleatias xdhei’atlcn (dcaisatitm. But. the resort 
;--;,d mct'da.s uc Gaj- okoot tlie n-cod Bor tho I'BO ta reca@ar»e 
t'ao eâoseaee of the ctrts of Ioro.o.L, ar.d It irac act 
>3'U‘er?.r)in- it had ae cheaco of hoisG acoeptefl
the"Baited utateo aaâ other v-'estora Gowatriea.
(320 follwiaG %i Ceitre for the rdeasoo were i;sd*
I V .  T T T R  m E - T T f T - p i m r m T I O R  P R I i m i E T , ? , A ,S  A t  JfgffTT'R T W  P . E A H E = -  r
K-R-RPTIfG 0PERATI0E5 WITÏÏ W  FORCER ,    . ^
1# For z:i oDGount of po?;er Cifioroncgc c. bizia cubgcct*
e e e  D * \ .  Z^ ovjotw* * ' & m o L S  . . w c
2, . :d::Ba rilicr, C|dn;^nJJ^ Srlcoetcn
DnlTcwoLby JrccC) 1ST P* *. #
' R" * (Zugùülovia), :or in zeoomit of 1 Lu,-«  L. U  .X - ,  -'".X k  w  ... V  — t  ' .T \  W  ^  (, f  ^  *  »-
c6zo:i(2 iu 1955$ I 1,99.0# ot. soq,
tc- 1 (lüROoIcvla)* 2 aDotDRtLcr;: India j
B t r S ® 3 ' S A c - t J 5 S  î ï ï ô o Ü v S t  l S S ‘œ5' lialS)I'
7# ' ROOM, gth year# %^ootinr# . -
e* Boa. ?77(?), 5 Icvoab’Si’ 1S5D, It war rfoptea fey f>?
Vûtc-r. ro a.
9, â©0 G,ica, 5th sGSsloa, 29Çtu vtiâ liOSnû nonary rneetmcs,
K o v a e ^  1..3, 1955.
10. 1C C a y '1951. it c.floiAtccl fey «-? vctjee
to Ü. v/ltk T ahSvontlono.#
11#
«:.# 3%brl.oliL: .c*;ncr. '.Tho United ITetionc lcaz\;cnay 
' From ^ Gol j c V,, tc
1/
ji-L %'V-;#
3» '-'or :'Uî iiccc'U.il; tu' BS. alièTjaïy ofciSorvei’ qrciipr, ei.tabliUJiOu
;ùt;a tfcc c:uocu5 c: zrràu-, soe Bo'uayt; îiirsir;;;, os. old,
• s i — .Aj i|, ,4, i U , * L k  3. — . #
jine met In energonoy Geeüion.from 'cvc.(~.
C'ZS? jL*\iCrp J-vMïp.
\rliera Fe'ioc Toree.:;'* Tho/.volntio»:
f
-r-ntt"" -rr": the five penrcnozt nrzberc cf the -SequritT 
c? '-.1 ii'c; tT:3üù,:Y'rlch, pzo/rec cf "M'Olr coc^ ricrj^ . 
— 1C 1 , — teen* e: 1er Ct):'!/- ro'-onc clMibbe
T# f* >Uv ■ ,-.v ,*i ^  .* r.   T * , V, . . 3 -* _ .
1/# -^iznaarak^ o^lci oni;llnod the .l:~olc prlnoinles ezzd mlec that
.'’•.•n,'ir*.-r*'rr),rt .H, A5 fU%^ ■ »/rt. «_ T.  Î,  4_____  - - Ï-  ^ *.■ -  ^ ■ • * ' . - ■ •  -r»
16# -2:e_^:S/%gC^^.6Mova::b
^9# M 4 ^ I? » j;S .S .ïL L iz ll, 7 Zicvecber .1955#
2v# , '..nijii:: .?cr fcaoc' reaeluticn, under,which the Cues
7 "^9 .ryccloircd to the icccchly by "a .procoduz^l
Tpr; - '^ '.tohor 1956$ when, the Ccourity'Counoil. had.
/c Cry uic nou exclude o%;.propriété recc:umei3dat** 
'LOuy ..cr ccZl:eî:i;c zoacures other thru ;hc ucc of armed 
'.cz*er; lor ooerclTc -aocacroo to mdZwCiT. or rer,tore inter— 
natlonrl peace and aoourlty, . . .
paragraph q#.
RilL:» 567th 7 Mcvea:bor 1^ !56, osro—
grapL: .'MW., ' -
-^ 9 LZrtiaikf '^^ oport of tho :ooretary-3cnoral on Imolo 
%)nzntu Lor the proaence and funetionlng in ZRr/et of CihrnFm 
.,f'0.-cvcz\MrlS50y .Annex. . ..-
24* XI)# 24 Z'Tovon"ber 1956.. .
4:^9., ram l'.^ cl^ uiçn noted.mith cntiofactlon the firot report 
ca “A7"*Meacril o%) hig Trlan for an cme3:'f:eney
jaiTciiyr^  '.l^ C/foreo (4/9289) .and eotabllo^ rod S
--- i;ao force to-sooure and. oupervi.oG the GeoGa.i;— 
iozr of .' r ziitios^  . ,
6G« uZl3%& ' Ootonor igySf oar^igraya 158.
27. Eoaa. Earringtoa Gagnon, ’I'eseo i'oroes and the Vetos tlie 
EGlev.'32'iCo of Conoost', îategnatioasl Oa’aaaisation. ?ol.




31# %'km the union of Hgypt mid Cyvla tool: %)I&oo In 1958 the
now otato was oallod the United Arab i.opubllo* but in 1961, 
wh(si tho union wao dlsoolvod* -fiypt i\'talned -the name of 
United /crab hepuhlio for horoolf*
32# P«L._ Report of the Ceoretaify-Geaeral on the
wltLdrav/al of the Ihergonoy Poroe* 26 June 1967* paragraph
33# Earrington Gagnon, op* oit** p# 826# *3inoe the mém­
orandum wae not included in any report on the negotiotlo ^ a
af,^ "'eoaent to oonvey#^
34* Ibid#* p* 827 m d  footnote g$ on p#.827#
39* A/6730/Add#3# paragraph 22#
36# Ibid#
37.
38. Ibid#, paragraph 37#
39# Ibid.* paragraph 2$#
40*. Ibid#* paragraph 24#
41#,. Ibid#* p,<hragrapb8 26 end 27*.
42# Ibid#-* , paragraph 44#
43# 8/7696# 19 May I967#
44# At tho Utai rrznolooo Conference In 1949 It was decided
that tZio coci'otary*#3oneral oliould not be given the author^
General AoüJübl^' vould %aolate the iTlmary réeponeibllity 
of the Security Ooundl*# me Goodrich. 2iambro and eimono* 
op# Git#* p# 989#
45. a ®  JaiaoD, ^ t t o , e a a
v^zimuo,» for the inctztuto for utrategio utudloe* I9C5, 
p# 910#. EOT the author* e commente on lIMT'a withdraw' 1.
GOO pp* 306#*13#
407
1(34—65* or oco p%># 4764*77#
Acaounto of t3)o Oongo affair* with UM doouinonbatlon, ore 
g%vm in fbM:, 1960-64# . . '
46. - ' . ' :
49... ;
96* W  Tui I#G# It was adopted by 8 to 0*
. ' : wmta 3 uoutontlono# ' . \ . . »
93^ # First report the Hecrotory-
L^OLoim. m  %no lm%)lenentation of ÈC^.EGo#45S7.'14 July IMP.
9"^ * i&j&Sâ&M&S# July I960* It was adcptod unaalmouely*
95. . ' \ : . '^ : .
5ee: Ueopna report the .secretary-
vO;icrLTL on t m  laDlementatlon nf so 14 July 1950$
95# ()G0 004th m d  B65th meetlnga* B August 1S6C*
56# 600 920th meeting* 13-14 Foombm:» I960* pp*14-25*
97* bee bO(^ GD5th neetlng* 8 August 1960#
^6# 9 August I96Ù# It was. adopted by 9 votee to
u* m t n  J aoDtentlono (Frauee and Italy)# - . , '
99* 2 ââJZi&2âZ# A M . 6* .12 Auguet I9GO*.
.66* . #6.^4417#,.. A # # % ( )^ .' 14 Augu.et 1#
61. B r i m  Urgubet, Bie BcSicy iioad. # 72, #,
4<^ q* c'Uthor'e aooount of the Congo affozr draws upou
uni%3olloned8ourom.# . . . .. '.
88?m$ 888th . m d  889th meetings* 21-22 ^uguot . .
I)ÿOV*
83# % Œ U r q u h a r t ,  op, olt#* p.. 4$e.#
84*. . D)ld#* p,444*
65# :.IbM#p p# 445*.
66# .. Ibid**, p, . 442#
67* ^ee paragraph 12$ I'ourth report of the Georotary-
General* . ,
68* Geo 14 bopte ber I960*
69* )# '^ 6 Soptodber i960* If woe. adopted by
/v voteo to 0$ \;ith 11 abotoutiouo .(the Soviet bloc otateo,
&:ranee and the Union of bquth Africa)#
4K
70, peo- 22 Bovoabop IgGù. It vea eDjseoved
oy 5J votes to »4, vatb 19 bbotoalaoas.
74*
65,
71, Gee S^gggg, G December I960, '
72* This would appear to bo the oonolusion that con bo drmvn
from tiTO Coorctory-Gonorol'o otatemonto to the ^oourlty 
Oounoll at Itc 920th mooting in Hooombor I9GO* 800 
gnotL mooting, poragrapho 56-59$ É/987Zmd.Æâ#l* 1$ 
_DoocL>orin6i#.
73# ^oe 935th 15 Pebruery igGl, paragraphs 3-
2(7*r
75# Boc (Iiottor of 21 Pebrmry I96I) o M  S/474$ (Cable
of 02 ^ebruzi^y 1961) from the representatlvo of. tne 
.RoLUblio of thq Congo#
76, flco S^^pj..ra)c.^^*, Eoport of ?7 S'etouary 1«61 f » B  ' 
^pOGzcl ,,üjro3m'*va'üivo of \;ho uocie^aary-Ocuorol %n the
Oonjo on inoiaonto In Leopoldville Involving UI; permnnoi#
77. ?ss fiOBCPt .of 6 K83?(& 1961 ttoia
opooiai Lopreaentative o* vhe Soorotary-Gemrol. %n the 
lOcxngO,
76* Joe :3/4775y 3^ 2:ohcmgo of Oorreapondenee bGt«;/een the Seoretary^
Genorél and Drooidont of Congo on Uateidl#
79# : $ee GA Boo. 1800(%TL 15 April 1961#
80# - ^7 W y  IgGl*
61* M^oenrlai* Urauhart*' pp# oit#, pp# 549-50*/ '
62# Soo 6/4940 and Add# 1-12* end Add* l2/qorr#;»m Report of
14 Goi^E&or 'ïgëïJ ' by 'üïffio eiCin3h^^ unit ed Mations
Operation in Go% 0 relating to Implementation of paragraph 
A-2 of (aeeurlt^ y bouneil reselutloa of 21 Pobruary 1961#
65# Joe nnpubllohoa eable from Hmmarekibld to Stvro Llnner* 
Offioer in ohorge of United ITatlono Operation in the 
Congo, #oted by Brian Urquhart, op# olt#, pp* 555*6#
84# 600 0/4940* quoted in Mote 82#
For rn aooonnt of the plan, see Brian Urquhart, op# oit#$
%,)%), 502-69# For Conor Crulee O^ Z^ rlen^ o version, see O'Brien,
IQ .lUxtmm ma..Saofc. itoteiiinson, 3.968, PP.266, ot.oeci.
86# For cm aoooimt of the Gritioh govommont'a reaction to W  
oporctione in Ratenga In /u "uot and Beptmber 1961, eee
e Of
ilorcic LBBiofai xiopert, Goi.Txo, ana House of Cosmono, 
îîe'oûtOE^ ¥ol.64ë» oo1b,19«22*
67# See op*, oit,$ p# 418# ; , . ',
es. pjMsw.§gS|*. 04 Swemfees? 19S1. It vps eRoptod by 9 w t o a  
to 0, vMh.2_ WBtontions (Franco and Jniitod Mimgdom)*
69*
go*
Urltod notions Oporotlen In Oonro, relating to Implemmtat- 
ioa of raBr.jrapZi A-2 of Meourity Oounoll rëocluvlon of 
21 Fckru"'rj'l96Z Inoludlnr Report reletlnn to lagldoat of
"  iu Oorr.
tfiroo (xzulee fron rziaiotoi* for PerolQa Affaire of Rolglu: 
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